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Abstract 
This study is concerned principally with the ways in which the school 
subject of History has developed over the past quarter century in the 
People's Republic of China. One of the key objectives of this research 
has been simply to redress previous neglect of a subject that seems, if 
public opinion is indicative of a topic's importance, to have some 
bearing on the ways in which states and societies try to shape young 
minds, values and identities, and thereby steer the course of future 
political, social and economic development. It accordingly traces the 
evolution of the History subject both through time and, more 
importantly, through the process of production, transmission and 
consumption, from central government organs, such as the Ministry of 
Education, down to the individual school History classroom. 
Specifically, it analyses various factors that have influenced thinking 
about the purposes and practice of history education, and how these 
have been reflected in the main vehicles for transmitting narratives of 
the past: national and local curricula, History textbooks and school 
lessons. Particular attention is paid throughout to the impact of the 
reform and opening policy on history education, highlighting tensions 
arising from often conflicting political and pedagogical objectives and 
evaluating the extent to which theoretical goals are attained in practice. 
The study argues that History is not simply an instrument of 
ideological control wielded by a totalitarian government seeking to 
sustain its own hegemony, but is a process in which many stakeholders 
participate, and in which learning outcomes cannot be guaranteed to 
correspond precisely to teaching objectives. Securing the future 
through controlling the past - even in an authoritarian society - is thus, 
the study concludes, considerably more complex and challenging than 
it might superficially appear. 
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I 
Introduction 
The Importance of History 
`Who controls the past.... controls the future; who controls the present controls the 
past' is the Party mantra intoned and implemented with terrifying psychological 
brutality in George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-four. ' Manipulating the past to 
legitimise the present and produce docile citizens who will adhere to prescribed social 
and ethical norms and sustain the polity into the future has been a common practice of 
totalitarian regimes depicted in fictional dystopias. In these brave new worlds, the past 
is to be commemorated principally as the `bad old days', while the present is the fruit 
of `liberation', the future a time when `things can only get better'. Officially 
authorised `traditions', `culture' and `narratives' of the past which usefully serve 
present and future purposes, therefore, may be preserved; the rest must be consigned 
to the scrap heap of `incorrect' thinking and customs, and quickly forgotten. 
Commemorating the discarded past and, more dangerously, invoking it to support the 
development of individual or collective identities outside state-decreed parameters is 
heresy, and `thought criminals' must recant publicly and often submit to `re- 
education' in the prevailing orthodoxy. 
It is not, of course, only in fictional societies that the past is carefully edited or 
even completely rewritten to justify present political and social circumstances, limn 
an idyllic future, inculcate desirable values and legitimating ideologies, or foster 
loyalty to the state and support for its causes. Such uses of history have been 
particularly blatant in totalitarian societies, although it should not be forgotten that 
history has also been used in liberal democracies to further ideological goals; 
liberalism and democracy are, after all, current ideologies, not eternal verities. 
Totalitarian regimes, however, (especially those which derive their symbolic 
legitimacy from religious or utopian political ideologies) generally deploy a wider 
range of state resources in their efforts to regulate public commemoration and 
transmission of the past. This usually involves an amalgam of exhortatory and 
coercive measures: on the one hand, popularisation of `official' versions of history; on 
the other, suppression of `unofficial' or `counter-histories' and legal/penal action 
against dissenting voices. The school subject of History, with its large, young and 
impressionable, and, above all, captive audience of citizens-in-the-making, is widely 
' Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-four, p. 34. 
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regarded as among the most powerful weapons in the exhortatory arsenal, presumably 
based on the assumption that inculcating official history at the earliest possible age 
will ultimately ensure homogeneity of historical memory in private as well as public 
spheres. Thus, while the state-supervised media and cultural arenas may provide 
valuable reinforcement of `correct' historical viewpoints, universalising the 
fundamental `truths' of official history and its core moral-ideological message is 
largely attempted through nationally standardised curricula, textbooks and 
examinations, teacher training and assessment mechanisms, and pedagogies which 
encourage acceptance of received `facts' and interpretations. 
It is often thought that in the People's Republic of China `the Orwellian nightmare 
has already visited, '2 with a malevolent Big Brother Communist Party and Ministry 
of Records-style propaganda apparatus tightly controlling the present and future 
through instilling in hapless masses state-authorised accounts of the past, resisted only 
sporadically and in vain by a handful of brave and selfless dissident intellectuals and 
oppressed minority peoples. Using or changing the past to serve present and future 
purposes, however, has been far from a novel brainwashing strategy devised by 
scheming Communists, and, in fact, has a pedigree as ancient as the Chinese state 
itself. From Qin destruction of the histories of all states other than its own, to the 
seventh-century establishment of a state History Bureau (shiguan) charged with 
producing official dynastic histories (zhengshi) and recording the present for 
posterity, to Qing purges of writers and historians suspected of calumniating the 
Manchu regime through historical allegory, China's rulers and their acolytes have 
consistently employed both exhortatory and coercive mechanisms to ensure the 
primacy of the official version of the past. Education has long been an integral 
component of exhortatory efforts to circumscribe public historical discourse, and 
since the inception of a mass public education system in the early twentieth century, 
the ability of the state to propagate official accounts of the past among its citizens has 
rapidly increased. Under Communist rule, in particular, educational provision has 
dramatically expanded, and official histories disseminated through the centrally 
prescribed school curriculum have received unprecedented levels of reinforcement 
from state supervision of academia, the media and other forms of cultural 
(re)production. Increasingly strenuous efforts have also been made to create 
collective memories that can unite diverse communities to serve allegedly `national' 
2 Avery, `Translator's Introduction' to Zhang, Half of Man is Woman, p. xi 
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interests, and the state has thus largely appropriated local history and the histories of 
formerly subaltern groups (peasants, urban labourers, ethnic minorities), subsuming 
under the `national' umbrella the foundations on which competing national or sub- 
national identities might be constructed or sustained. At the same time, although the 
heterodoxy proscribed under imperial law as `un-Confucian' (bujing) or `against the 
natural order' (wudao) has merely been re-branded in the PRC as `counter- 
revolutionary' or `unpatriotic', mechanisms for suppressing beliefs and activities that 
threaten state authority have become more sophisticated. To this extent, then, the 
`Orwellian nightmare' conception of the PRC is not entirely baseless. 
Yet, even during the most ideologically repressive periods, attempts to 
monopolise and standardise the past, and use it to justify the present and construct the 
future according to particular visions have frequently been resisted. Sometimes 
resistance has come from rival factions within the regime itself that seek to secure 
their own position and power, or to follow alternative paths to the future; sometimes 
from individuals and communities that feel official history neglects, denies or 
misrepresents crucial aspects of the past, or that the present policies and future 
prospects the official history aims to legitimise have little to offer. Needless to say, 
the authorities' first response to resistance has frequently been harsh repression. Such 
repression, however, has usually been temporary; as all good students of Chinese 
history know - and China's leaders almost invariably believe they are good students - 
repression has historically bred further resistance, leading eventually to dynastic 
downfall. Official clamp-downs, therefore, have often been followed shortly 
afterwards by leadership reshuffles and policy reforms, which in turn have required 
revision of the past to validate the new present and future goals. This has entailed not 
only changing the narratives constructed to represent the `correct' course of history so 
that it leads smoothly and inevitably to the `correct' policies of the present, but also 
demonstrating (however superficially) that the erroneous ways and thinking of the 
past have been reformed or abandoned, and the correct ones preserved. 
The post-Cultural Revolution repudiation of the revolutionary and isolationist path 
to modernity, the adoption of the `reform and opening' policy and the quest for 
restoration of national greatness have required precisely this kind of revision of `old 
thinking' and old historical narratives. History education for school children has 
naturally been crucial to this undertaking, and not only have the goals and content of 
the History subject been repeatedly modified to harmonise with the changing nuances 
4 
of current ideological, political and economic imperatives, but the ways in which 
History has traditionally been taught and learnt have also been targeted for reform. 
This study asks how and why the school subject of History has (and has not) been 
adapted to accommodate diverse and sometimes conflicting present and future 
projects, and considers the impact of recent reforms on the Party-state's ability to 
ensure that historical orthodoxy is not distorted in the process of transmission from 
the Ministry of Education (MOE) to school classrooms. Although the scope of this 
project does not permit a thorough analysis of all the variables involved in the 
formation and expression of collective historical memories and identities, the final 
chapters advance some tentative conclusions concerning the relative influence of 
school History on definitions of `the nation' and `being Chinese', and assess the 
potential ramifications thereof for the Party-state's efforts to steer the course of the 
future. 
Before embarking on this journey, however, it is worth discussing some of the 
general matters related to the purpose and practice of school History from various 
historical, political and cultural perspectives so as to provide the broader setting in 
which History education in China may be examined and evaluated. This is partly to 
avoid the cultural relativist pitfall of analysing the Chinese case in splendid isolation 
and ascribing the particular characteristics of History education in the PRC to an 
ineffable national-cultural `essence' rather than to the changing ideas, processes and 
people that shape it. It is also, as the latter sections of this chapter will show, because 
the secondary literature on History education in China is minimal and offers no 
theoretical model upon which to build. Additionally, China's `opening' in the post- 
Mao era has allowed History education professionals unprecedented access to 
international education research, upon which they have increasingly drawn to 
legitimise reforms and enhance their own practices. 
The remainder of the chapter summarises the sources and methodologies used, 
focusing on issues and problems arising both from the nature of the topic and from the 
specific Chinese context. Finally, it outlines the structural parameters within which 
the findings of the present study are organised. 
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I. Global Historical and Theoretical Perspectives 
The Purpose of History Education 
Moral and Patriotic Exhortation 
In recent years, there has been much research on the subject of `nationalism' in its 
various ethnic, cultural and political incarnations, and on the related questions of how 
communal identities are formed. 3 Perhaps most influential has been the work of 
scholars such as Gellner, Anderson and Hobsbawm, who emphasise the `invented, 
`imagined' or `constructed' nature of the nation and the ways in which histories, 
traditions and rituals have been adapted or made anew to create attachment, 
identification and loyalty to the nation transcending that felt for other communal 
entities. 4 They also note the role of language standardisation, print media, increased 
literacy and the expansion of educational provision as resources deployed (usually by 
the state) to enable hitherto isolated or autonomous communities to `think the nation. ' 
Furthermore, Anderson claims, the `blueprint' for the nation-building model was 
exported from early nation-states to aspiring ones, engendering a universally similar 
(if not identical) pattern of construction, and subsequently the emergence of a global 
order in which only the nation-state was recognised as a legitimate and sovereign 
political unit. 5 The literature on nationalism has since proliferated and become 
increasingly complex, incorporating the ideas both of postmodernists, such as 
Bhabha, Bruner and White who have highlighted the ways in which `narrative' shapes 
past and present realities and identities, and of those, such as Smith and Connor, who 
have investigated racial and ethnic definitions of the nation. 6 While this breadth of 
research supports views of `nationness' ranging from the primordialist to the strictly 
constructivist, most historians reject cultural essentialism (in principle at least) in 
favour of evolutionary explanations of the `continuity and change' variety. Recent 
case studies of nationalism and identity development in individual societies, therefore, 
have basically followed some version of the `invented' or `imagined' nation thesis, 
emphasising how rituals and symbols are created or manipulated to represent, unify 
3 Much of this work on collective identities proceeds from the ideas of Halbswachs outlined in 
Collective Memory. For a more recent elaboration of this thesis, see Fentress and Wickham, Social 
Memory. 
4 Gellner, Nations and Nationalism; Anderson, Imagined Communities; Hobsbawm `Mass-producing 
Traditions: Europe 1870-1914'. 
5 Anderson, Imagined Communities. Duara notes, however, that the same resources have also allowed 
other groups to `imagine communities' in opposition to the nation-state (Rescuing History from the 
Nation). 
6 Bhabha, Nation and Narration; Bruner, `The Narrative Construction of Reality'; White, Metahistory; 
Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations; Connor, Ethnonationalism. 
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and bound the nation. 7 The roles played by historical narratives and formal education 
are also commonly featured, and the school subject of History in particular is noted 
for its use in `mass-producing traditions, ' transmitting `national' culture, and 
inculcating civic virtue, a sense of patriotic duty and especially the faith that pro 
patria mori is both dulce and decorum. 9 Most importantly, History is thought to instil 
the message that `We' are a primordial national people with sacred heritage and 
inviolable territory. 
If allusions to history education as an element of the successful national 
consciousness-raising process are common, however, studies supported by more than 
a few cursory references to government proclamations and occasional quotes from 
historians, educators and textbooks of the day are rare except in works dealing 
specifically with education history. 9 This is clearly, in part, because studies of 
nationalism must necessarily consider many factors other than the minutiae of school 
History, but it is also perhaps a product of constructivist models of national identity 
formation (implicit in the very term `nation-building'). That schooling in general and 
History in particular were (or still are) effectively used by Machiavellian states or 
elites to fashion hapless masses into dutiful national citizens thus tends to be assumed 
rather than demonstrated; even in histories of education, conclusions about elite 
instrumentalism are generally inferred from government macro-policy statements 
rather than from detailed analyses of school curricula, textbooks or education 
journals. 1° This is not, of course, to deny that social and moral engineering and/or the 
reinforcement of authority have been the intention of many states and various power 
elites. La Chatolais' 1763 `Essai d'education nationale', for example, urged 
suppression of Jesuit schools because they were `promoting loyalty to Rome' rather 
than to France; the 1806 Faucroy `Rapport' called for teaching to have `one single 
7 Cohen reminds us that a `boundary' defining the limits of a nation (or any other community) not only 
`from without symbolises the public face of community' but also `from within encloses difference' 
(The Symbolic Construction of Community, p74). Duara makes a related point in challenging the 
hegemony of the `nation-space' as the subject of history, arguing that not only may a nation contain 
many sub-national communities, but that the `nation-views' of these communities `are not overridden 
by the nation, but actually define or constitute it' (Rescuing History from the Nation, p 10). 
8 Hobsbawm `Mass-producing Traditions; Wilfrid Owen, `Dulce et decorum est', c. 1917. On dying for 
one's country see especially Tamir, `Pro Patric Mori: Death and the State'. 
9 For a comparative historical study of the relationship between education and the state, see Green, 
Education and State Formation: The Rise of Education Systems in England, France and the USA and 
`Education and State Formation in Europe and Asia'. 
10 Notable exceptions include Powell, `Perceptions of the South Asian Past: Ideology, Nationalism and 
School Textbooks'; Lee, Modern Education, Textbooks and the Image of the Nation; Chancellor, 
History for their Masters; FitzGerald, America Revised; Bailey, Reform the People; Peake, Education 
and Nationalism in Modern China. 
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aim, that of forming characters virtuous from religious principle, useful to the State by 
their abilities and knowledge, attached to the government and devoted to its august 
leader in love and duty. '1' Likewise, a proclamation issued by Reza Shah in 1921 
stated that `It is essential for the character, the spiritual foundations and the feelings of 
our young people to be developed by means of a national-patriotic education so that 
our sons [will be] willing to sacrifice their lives for the motherland. )' 2 History was to 
play a central role in this type of patriotic and moral education; as the nineteenth- 
century French `school-historian, ' Lavisse, wrote, 
If the schoolboy does not carry away with him the living memory of our national 
glories, if he does not know that our ancestors have fought on countless 
battlefields for noble causes, if he has not learned how much blood ... 
it has taken 
to make the unity of our fatherland, .... the teacher will have wasted his time. 
13 
Similarly, the American historian, W. T. Laprade, maintained that History should be 
the `inculcation of a species of patriotic religion, ' 14 and the British Board of 
Education in 1905 asserted that `no-one would dispute that our scholars should have 
examples put before them, whether for imitation or the reverse, of the great men and 
women that have lived in the past. ' 15 
Two important qualifications of the `top-down' instrumentalist paradigm 
should, however, be made, particularly as regards state-directed efforts to create or 
reinforce nationalist sentiment. First, during the time period with which most studies 
of nationalism are chiefly concerned (the eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries), few states exercised the kind of control over teacher training, curricula and 
textbooks characteristic of many later education systems. Even in highly authoritarian 
states such as Prussia, the USSR and Japan it was some years after the establishment 
of centralised bureaucracy that education was brought fully under government control 
and nationally standardised curricula and textbooks were adopted. How effectively 
education could be harnessed to serve state-centred nation-building programmes, let 
alone guarantee the desired outcomes, is therefore debatable. Second, not everyone 
believed education should inculcate uncritical patriotism, morality or obedience, but 
rather saw it as a means of delivering liberty, enlightenment and equality, and 
nurturing the individual mind, body and spirit. These goals were, it must be said, 
typically promoted by elites who believed that popular enlightenment and liberation 
11 Cit. in Hall, Education, Culture and Politics in Modern France, p21. 
12 Cit. in Menashri, Education and the Making of Modern Iran, pp94-95. 
'3 Cit. in Lowenthal, Possessed by the Past, p64. 
14 Cit. in Novick, That Noble Dream, p246. 
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from ignorance, superstition or ecclesiastical sway would enable intellectual, 
technological and social `modernisation', thereby fortifying the nation against foreign 
competition or colonisation. Such `nationalist' efforts were often, nonetheless, 
broadly anti-hegemonic/pro-democratic, and emerged from civic movements that 
sought to limit state power to the representation (rather than dominion) of society. 
For society to be empowered to guarantee such representation, in turn, required all (or 
at least most) individuals to understand the values, rights and duties of modem 
citizenship, a process which was to be effected through universal education. The focus 
on the schooling of the individual, however, was not only about the utilitarian 
manufacture of the necessary components to produce civil society; following 
developments in the new fields of sociology and psychology, there was also 
increasing concern among educators for the healthy mental, emotional and physical 
development of the child. 16 
Yet, in all but the most detailed studies of education history, these other 
objectives are typically ignored. Illustrating his claim that all school History has been 
essentially concerned with promoting `national fealty, ' Lowenthal, for example, cites 
criticisms made by the American Legion of 1920s textbooks for `placing before 
immature pupils the blunders, foibles, and frailties of prominent heroes and 
patriots. ' 17 But he fails to mention the other side of the coin; someone must have 
written those textbooks either to present a more `balanced' account, or as counter- 
history challenging existing verdicts on said heroes and patriots. If it is remembered 
that professional historians (who were, in most industrialised societies, largely 
responsible for textbook production and teacher training until well into the twentieth 
century) were then pursuing `that noble dream' of objectivity and attempting to 
discover an unadulterated past `exactly as it was', it seems likely that the textbooks 
attacked by the American Legion were written in just such a spirit. Indeed, a US 
15 From Sylvester, `Change and Continuity in History Teaching' cit. in Vickers, History as a School 
Subject in Hong Kong 1960s-2000, p 194. 
16 Hall (Education, Culture and Politics in Modern France) argues that the `enlightenment' view was 
prevalent among French revolutionaries, but was sidelined by the Napoleonic regime in favour of a 
state-serving education. The revolutionaries' views, however, remained popular in Europe and 
America, and resonated in other parts of the world, such as Egypt and Iran, where education and 
modernisation were heavily promoted as a means of saving the nation from colonisation (Soliman, 
`Education in Egypt'; Menashri, Education and the Making of Modern Iran). Likewise, in Meiji Japan, 
there was an early enthusiasm for child-centred `developmental education', modelled on the latest 
Western pedagogical theories, which it was hoped would bring `civilisation and enlightenment' 
(bunmei kaika) to the populace and bring Japan into the modem age and parity with its European and 
American aggressors. (Lincicome, Principle, Praxis and the Politics of Educational Reform in Meiji 
Japan). 
17 From Loewen, Lies My Teacher Told Me, cit. in Lowenthal, Possessed by the Past, p132. 
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education conference held as early as 1892 witnessed many historians attempting to 
promote the new creed of objectivity in school History teaching. 18 Similarly, in Meiji 
Japan, the Rankean views of professional historians and the promotion of child- 
centred `developmental education' (kaihatsu-shugi) oriented to knowledge discovery 
and the maximisation of individual potential led many History curriculum developers 
and educators to reject Confucian moralising and traditional pedagogies involving the 
spoon-feeding (chünyü) of correct viewpoints, and to attempt instead to focus on 
presenting the 'facts'. ] 9 
Such efforts to promote objectivity in school History, however, were soon 
suppressed. In Japan, the developmental education project and the curriculum and 
textbook pluralism of the early Meiji period were swept aside as education was 
centralised, Confucian values were overtly restored to the curriculum and `emperor 
worship and love for the nation' (sonnö aikoku) were promoted. 20 Thus, while 
professional historians could continue to study the facts of `pure history' (junsho 
shigaku), schools, it was declared, should teach `applied history' (5yö shigaku), 
serving the needs of the state and society and perpetuating the `national polity' 
(kokutai) and `national essence' (kokusui) through nurturing obedient subjects (komin) 
and useful citizens (kokumin). 21 History was effectively demoted in status and 
explicitly required to supplement the principles taught in Moral Education (shushin) 
with concrete examples. 22 Likewise, in the USA, President Woodrow Wilson 
counselled historians against the promotion of objectivity and historical thinking skills 
in school History as young minds, he alleged, would be easily confused by dealing 
with doubt, criticism and evidence. In the interests of school pupils and for the future 
of the country, he insisted, it would be far better if History provided `moral and 
patriotic exhortation. ' 23 
With the widespread transition from private education for elites to compulsory 
public schooling for `the masses', government administrative and financial authority 
over education increased. In most cases this meant that the moral and patriotic 
imperative of education was strengthened, not only through History and other 
18 Novick, That Noble Dream, p71. 
'g Lincicome, Principle, Praxis and the Politics of Educational Reform; Mehl, History and the State in 
Nineteenth Century Japan, p54. 
20 On the restoration of Confucianism to the curriculum see the 1890 Imperial Rescript on Education 
(SJT. 2, ppl39-140). 
21 Mehl, History and the State, p145. 
22 Lincicome, Principle, Praxis and the Politics of Educational Reform. For an analysis of Moral 
Education content, see Yamashita, `Confucianism and the Japanese State'. 
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humanities subjects, but also through the addition of Civics courses to many school 
curricula. In Prussia and Japan, for example, loyalty to the state and obedience to the 
ruler were placed centre-stage: discipline and conformity were emphasised, raising 
the national flag and singing the national anthem were incorporated into the school 
routine, and students underwent regular military training. A triumphalist history that 
demonstrated the purity and superiority of the `national people' (volksgemeinschaft, 
minzoku) over all others was taught, and the state and the Kaiser/emperor were 
depicted as the embodiment of the people. While the state took a more laissez-faire 
approach in other societies with rapidly expanding education systems (such as Britain 
and the USA) it did not mean that those responsible for History curricula did not 
promote a triumphalist account of the national past. Indeed, flush with the success of 
colonial conquest, and supported by the social Darwinist pseudo-science of race 
espoused by the likes of Herbert Spencer and Lewis Morgan, commercial History 
textbook writers in many `democratic' societies were often just as assiduous in 
lauding their countries' national and racial greatness as their counterparts employed 
by authoritarian states. 
For reasons discussed in more detail below and in subsequent chapters, it is 
extraordinarily difficult to ascertain exactly how far school History influences 
national identity formation. The extent to which the nationalist and, more often than 
not, racist orientation of school History in the late nineteenth - early twentieth 
centuries contributed to widespread jingoism, the outbreak of World War I, the rise of 
European fascism and Japanese expansionism and the genocide attendant upon them 
is, therefore, questionable; certainly, this influence cannot be evaluated without 
reference to other vehicles for public exhortation, such as the mass media, assorted 
popular cultural activities and political campaigns. Clearly, however, it was widely 
believed by the end of World War II that education had been an important factor in 
bringing about and determining the outcome of global war. For the victors, their 
social and political systems and values were vindicated and national self-image 
reaffirmed. There was no pressing need, therefore, to reform the triumphalist national 
narrative promoted through the school curriculum. It was another matter, however, for 
twice-defeated Germany and Japan, and under Allied supervision, school textbooks 
23 Novick, That Noble Dream, p71. 
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were dramatically revised to repudiate the immediate past and ensure that future 
24 generations did not repeat the errors of their forefathers. 
Under the newly established communist regimes in China, North Korea, Latin 
America and Eastern Europe, and in the postcolonial states which regained 
independence or formed following the demise of empires, meanwhile, History 
curricula and textbooks were also substantially overhauled as national histories were 
invented or re-imagined to create or strengthen national sentiment, to legitimise new 
political or social systems, and to unify the people in the drive for modernisation. In 
many of these societies, the new histories highlighted the struggle for independence 
from recent colonial oppression, tying it to a broader narrative of the people's 
resistance to tyranny and love of liberty, while in others ethno-cultural or religious 
ties were invoked as the basis for national unity. 25 In the communist states, history 
was restructured according to the historical materialist model of development from 
primitive to slave, feudal, capitalist and socialist society, with a strong focus on class 
unity and conflict as the basis for social cohesion and national purpose. Additionally, 
internationalism was - in theory at least - advocated in place of racial and cultural 
nationalisms. As we shall see in the case of China, as in other aspiring communist 
states, the internationalist ethos of utopian socialism proved short-lived, and History 
texts were soon openly promoting more traditional ethno-nationalist and moral- 
ideological concerns. 
Skill-training and Critical Citizenship 
History in most societies may have remained chiefly oriented to moral and patriotic 
exhortation for some time after 1945, but from the 1960s onwards, this gradually 
began to change as calls from educators for the teaching of `transferable skills' in 
History gained momentum. `New history', as it was originally known, sought 
principally to reject the positivist notion of history as a fixed body of facts waiting to 
be discovered or learnt, and to convey the idea that historians create history through 
selecting, analysing and interpreting data. Children should, therefore, practise the 
process of historical investigation, and instead of memorising `acts and facts', should 
24 For an in-depth discussion of textbook revisions in the aftermath of WWII, see Hein and Selden, 
Censoring History. 
25 Ferro, The Uses and Abuses of History, provides a useful overview of post-war developments in 
History education in numerous societies. For more in-depth analyses of the various bases on which 
national histories for school children were constructed in particular postcolonial societies see, inter 
alia, Goh and Gopinathan, `History Education and the Construction of National Identity in Singapore, 
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learn to examine `evidence' and generate hypotheses and interpretations. 26 Despite 
some opposition from those of a Piagetian bent, who believed that children and young 
adolescents would not yet have attained a sufficient level of cognitive development to 
enable them to handle the complexity of evidence, 27 new history was widely accepted 
in Britain and the US by the 1970s, and in many other education systems thereafter. 
While the initial promotion of skills may appear to have been `value-free', it was, 
in fact, underpinned by various socio-political and ideological as well as pedagogical 
concerns. One important reason was the long declining status of History, since it was 
seen as increasingly meaningless, being merely about dead people and bygone events 
and, therefore, apparently irrelevant to modern life. Indeed, in many school systems 
History was downgraded to a component of the supposedly more `happening' inter- 
disciplinary subject of Social Studies. Viewed from this perspective, emphasising 
general, transferable skills was an attempt to inject contemporary `relevance' into 
History and secure its place (and the place of History education professionals) in the 
curriculum. 28 At the same time, however, there appears to have been genuine belief 
that historical thinking skills would not only enhance students' future ability to obtain 
lucrative employment, but would also enable them to evaluate more critically the 
relative merits of assorted political platforms and commercial spiels they would 
encounter outside the school. History education, in short, could prepare them to 
assume the rights and duties of adult citizenship and enable them to participate 
actively in democratic processes, since in this view `questioning and debating 
"received truth"..... is where citizenship really develops, not from the content of the 
national story passed down. '29 
Along with the emphasis on skills and democracy, traditional forms of moral and 
patriotic exhortation were increasingly resisted, especially in much of Europe where 
the two World Wars, the loss of empires, large-scale immigration from former 
colonies and European integration contributed to a rethinking of the meaning of `the 
nation' and `citizenship'. Indeed, even the terms `patriotism' and `morality' are today 
often avoided by educationalists (if not politicians), for `patriotism' is still associated 
with Hitler and holocaust, our shameful pasts of imperialist expansionism, and present 
1945-2000'; Kazi, Ethnicity and Education in Nation-building: The Case of Pakistan; Wilson, Ford 
and Jones, `The History Text: Framing Ethno-cultural and Civic Nationalism in the Divided Koreas'. 
26 In Britain this took shape under the auspices of the Schools Council History Project. 
27 Husbands, What is History Teaching?, pp15-16. 
28 On competition for resources and status as a determining factor in curriculum development see 
Goodson, The Making of Curriculum. 
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instances of jingoism and racial intolerance; `morality', meanwhile, is a `nanny-state' 
imposing its values on society in an attempt to create obedient citizens, mindful of 
their proper social place and disinclined to challenge authority. History, like the rest 
of the school curriculum so this argument goes, has been complicit in advancing the 
cultural and ideological hegemony of the ruling classes and reproducing social 
inequalities for too long. 30 Subaltern voices should be heard, and tolerance, pluralism 
and multi-cultural identities, awareness and empathy should be nurtured. Opposing 
this reorientation, other historians and educationalists have bemoaned reforms as 
overweening political correctness, predicting that such goals will undermine national 
unity and leave students with no sense of identity, pride or loyalty to their country of 
citizenship. 31 Somewhat ironically, both sides have criticised their opponents for 
violating the principles of impartial historical inquiry and distorting history to suit 
ideological purposes, while remaining blissfully unaware of their own blatant 
ideological leanings. 32 
Unawareness of bias is precisely what those influenced by post-modem critiques 
have attacked, claiming that all history is inescapably freighted with values, that all 
`truths' are relative, and that students should be taught to recognise that they are being 
confronted with `discourses' or `texts' and their sub-textual messages, not `facts' or 
neutral judgements. 33 While post-modernist purists or hard-liners - whom Lowenthal 
bitingly calls the `solipsist fringe'34 - argue that there is no basis at all for 
distinguishing fact from fiction, thereby apparently negating the value of historical 
study altogether, most post-modernist historians and educationalists see relativism in 
practice as a tool with which to heighten awareness of bias, and tend towards the 
democratic pluralist model. Whether nationalist, internationalist, liberal, conservative 
or post-modern, however, all approaches should be regarded as variations on a theme 
of civic exhortation. Which approach is adopted and what is taught merely reflect the 
29 Masalski, `Teaching Democracy, Teaching War', p262. 
3o On the role of the school in perpetuating domination of one class or group over others, see for 
example, Althusser `Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses'; Giroux, Ideology, Culture and the 
Proces of Schooling; Gramsci, Prison Notebooks; Dale et al, Schooling and Capitalism; Apple and 
Christian-Smith The Politics of the Textbook, Macedo, What Americans are not Allowed to Know. 
31 Schlesinger, The Disuniting ofAmerica; Hirsch, Cultural Literacy; see also debates over the National 
Curriculum in the British press c. 1988, especially comments made by then-Secretary of State for 
Education, Kenneth Baker. 
32 Lowenthal on historians Arthur Schlesinger and Ronald Takaki, Possessed by the Past, pl 11. 
33 See, for example, Jenkins and Brickley, `Always Historicise: Unintended Opportunities in National 
Curriculum History'. 
34 Lowenthal, Possessed by the Past, p 118. 
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kind of society those who make and implement the curriculum wish to represent, 
reject or create. 
How far such debates over the status of historical knowledge have permeated 
thinking about History education beyond the mainly North American-European- 
Antipodean academic axis is questionable, although proponents of `cultural 
imperialism' and `globalisation' theories have argued that ideas developed in `the 
West' are invariably exported to everyone else as an instrument of continued 
domination in the post-colonial world. 35 What seems certain, however, is that, 
regardless of which theories of history are influential, training in transferable skills 
and encouragement of `creativity' and `individuality' have become mantras for 
education world-wide; in part, because such goals often appear at first glance culture- 
and value-free, but primarily because they are thought to have underpinned the 
continued `dynamism' of `the West'. 36 As shown below and in subsequent chapters, 
however, pedagogical objectives such as `independent' and `critical' thinking skills 
may sit uncomfortably with equally if not more important aims of promoting 
patriotism and `correct historical viewpoints'. 
The Practice of History Education 
Content 
Differing visions of History's purposes are typically manifested in practice in how 
much centralised state control is exercised over syllabi, teacher training and 
textbooks, what topics are or are not taught, and what types of pedagogies and 
assessment methods are adopted. Whether History is used to promote patriotism, 
liberalism, inter-cultural understanding and tolerance, moral codes and model 
behaviour is usually reflected, therefore, in the balance maintained between local, 
national and global, political, social and economic history, famous persons, a 
collective `national people', ethnic groups, social classes and so forth, as well as in 
the extent to which students are required to imbibe and regurgitate information and/or 
`correct' interpretations, or to form their own opinions. As discussed above, moral- 
patriotic exhortation has long been the dominant model of History education, and 
unsurprisingly this has typically resulted in a focus on national rather than global 
31 See for example works by Altbach, `Education and Neo-colonialism', Freire, Pedagogy of the 
Oppressed; Meyer et al, School Knowledge for the Masses. 
36 In Singapore for example, the government instituted a programme to enhance Singaporean students' 
`creativity' as they were regarded (like students elsewhere in East Asia) as diligent but dull (Buruma, 
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history, with strong emphasis on nation-defining events, on `national' culture, and on 
the deeds of the great, the good and the dastardly. This, it is thought, will teach 
children who `we' are, how `we' got here and possibly where `we' might be going, 
and will provide moral exemplars for them to emulate or spurn en route to the future. 
What constitutes the nation, `its' history and `its' culture, and by extension the sense 
of `we-ness' knowledge of `our' history and culture is supposed to create, is rarely, 
however, as straightforward as it might appear, even in countries such as China, 
Ethiopia and Japan, which have existed mostly as unified states within much of their 
present land mass for more than a thousand years and have a relatively high degree of 
ethno-cultural homogeneity. Since defining the nation and which territories, 
languages, peoples and culture are `national' is an extremely complex topic discussed 
extensively elsewhere, 37 I will not attempt to analyse those arguments here. Instead, I 
will briefly examine some examples of problems or contradictions in the national- 
history-for-patriotism model, each of which will be discussed in the Chinese context 
in later chapters, and which, I will argue, may subvert or limit the success of intended 
didactic purposes. 
Perhaps the most ostensibly simple and most widely used definition of national 
history is that which has occurred within the borders of the present sovereign state. 
This is relatively unproblematic if it recognised that all or parts of the present state 
have previously been components of other states or empires, that some areas were 
once independent states (and may still wish to be) or that ancestors may have arrived 
in waves of conquest or migration. Typically, however, the nation is depicted as `as a 
self-same ancient entity evolving into the collective subject of the modern nation- 
state. '38 Thus, Chinese historians vaunt five-thousand unbroken years of glorious 
history, France is exalted as `the oldest of the mature European nations, ' while `we in 
England have maintained the threads between past and present, [and therefore] we do 
not, like some younger states, have to go hunting for our own personalities. '39 
Specific events, innovations and cultural achievements may bring long-lasting 
national glory, but only antiquity and continuity confer national sacredness and 
greatness for eternity. At the same time, however, many states also seek to emphasise 
Bad Elements, pp 136-137). The irony of the rigidly authoritarian government running this project to 
enforce `creativity' should not be missed. 
37 See texts by Anderson, Gellner and Hobsbawm cited in n2. 
3' Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation, p229. 
39 From Burke, `French historians and their cultural identities' and Butterfield, The Englishman and his 
History, cit. in Lowenthal, Possessed by the Past, pl76, pl86. 
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the newness of political and social programmes as progress or even radical departure 
from a less enlightened past. Creating a coherent national narrative that captures 
ancient essences, which are perpetuated changed-yet-unchanged through inexorable 
progress towards the telos of modernity, is not easy, yet this is precisely what many 
History syllabi and textbooks attempt to do. 
One of the most common ways the national narrative is given coherence is 
through imagining a `national people' that may have been `divided' between other 
states or suppressed by alien conquerors at various times, but survived intact to realise 
the modem nation-state. Germany, Italy and Greece, for example, may be relatively 
new countries, but Germans, Italians and Greeks are portrayed as `ancient peoples'. 
The histories of former states such as Saxony, Verona and Sparta are thus demoted to 
mere local components of national history, while famous individual Bavarians, 
Venetians and Athenians are appropriated as national icons and ancestors. The 
origins of supposedly `ancient peoples', however, are rarely discussed, and are 
depicted as hazily primordial, buttressed in some instances by myths of divine or 
semi-divine ancestry. Where the dominant ethnic group is clearly not indigenous, and 
has overrun indigenous peoples or earlier arrivals, the History curriculum typically 
side-steps such issues: American history in many US schools begins with Columbus' 
`discovery'; Taiwanese History textbooks downplay the role of immigrants from 
China in driving aboriginal peoples into the mountains (although the latest editions do 
try to include indigenous peoples in the national narrative); and in Britain, Celts have 
featured so little that a Conservative Party MP could recently remark that `our 
homogenous Anglo-Saxon society has been seriously undermined by massive 
immigration, ' warning that the `British' are in danger of `becoming a mongrel race' ! 40 
It is not, of course, only ethnic groups that may be partially or wholly erased from 
the national narrative. Women, lower social classes, certain religious congregations 
and other `sub-national' communities may also be excluded, since national history is 
`the big picture', and the big picture is almost always drawn by Great Men with the 
proper ethnic, social and religious credentials. Yet, even if re-imagining the past to 
narrate an `already-always nation-space'41 and/or an `already-always' national people 
is accepted with few reservations, much history is still omitted, for - time constraints 
aside - the entirety may disrupt the smooth (and often triumphalist) grand narrative of 
40 Loewen, Lies My Teacher Told Me; Renshi Taiwan: lishi bian; remarks made by John Townend, MP 
for Yorkshire East, March and April 2001 (italics mine). 
41 Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation, p28. 
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progress from ancient times to the present. It may also project an undesirable 
ancestry of the modem nation-state, and certain episodes may therefore be avoided as 
too painful, too shameful, too alien or simply too dull to inspire patriotic fervour in 
the young. This is not to say that school History is always `happy' or that `our nation' 
always `wins'; histories of suffering, as Renan observed, tend to be equally important 
in promoting national bonding, 42 and are commonly emphasised to exhort children to 
strive and serve so that `the bad bits' of history will never repeat themselves. To 
these assorted ends, Italy's World War II history has been recast as a tale of 
victimisation at the hands of fascist oppressors and evil German Nazis. 43 In Pakistan, 
pre-Islamic history and anything that does not demonstrate a trajectory leading 
inevitably to the Pakistan Movement is ignored, while in India, Mughal contributions 
to Indian cultures have been downplayed, and in some BJP-commissioned textbooks, 
have even been attributed to Hindu ancestors. ` 4 British school syllabi since the end of 
empire, meanwhile, have neglected imperial history as `embarrassing', and in the US 
few schools cover the Korean `police action' and still fewer the Vietnam War because 
they are 'controversial'. 45 
Yet, as educationalists such as Hahn argue, it is difficult or controversial topics 
that are best suited to teaching critical thinking skills, and it is through learning how 
cultures and societies have developed through migration, trade and cultural interaction 
that children can best understand that history is about `the phenomenon of change 
over time, ' not unchanging essences. 46 On the other hand, applying critical thinking 
to controversial, or indeed uncontroversial, issues may undermine authorised national 
narratives, and is not, therefore, always encouraged even where, as in China, 
cultivating `historical thinking skills' is an official curricular objective. Such 
discouragement of critical thinking or avoidance of difficult topics lends weight to the 
arguments of scholars who maintain that school History rarely if ever teaches the 
analytical discipline of history and its concomitant concept of change. Instead, they 
argue, it seeks to define and bind the nation through promoting `collective memories, ' 
42 Renan, `What is a nation? ' [1882] reprinted in Bhaba Narrating the Nation. 
43 Rory Carroll, `Italy's Bloody Secret', The Guardian (online) 25/06/2001. 
44 Powell, `Perceptions of the South Asian Past'; The Guardian (online) 26/06/2004 
' Cave, `Teaching the history of empire in Japan and England'; Loewen, `The Vietnam War in High 
School American History'. See also Loewen, Lies My Teacher Told Me. 
46 Hahn, `Controversial Issues in History Instruction'; Stearns, `Goals in History Teaching', p281. 
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`myths' or `heritage, ' which emphasise essentialist and exclusive notions of 
`nationness' and are `impervious to rationalistic scrutiny. '47 
In the study of world history, `rationalistic scrutiny' and evaluation of change are 
less likely to conflict with the patriotic education goals so prevalent in national 
history, although they may disrupt attempts to prove theories of `History' (in the 
teleological, Hegelian sense) or challenge hoary stereotypes of `national 
characteristics'. This is not to say that attitudes to world history are disinterested or 
that world history cannot be harnessed to serve moral-patriotic education goals. As 
countless scholars since Said have emphasised, we define our `selves', both past and 
present, in relation to our 'Others', 48 and the very purpose of world history, therefore, 
may be to locate or create suitable Others against which one's own nation may be 
usefully (and usually profitably) compared. Indeed, how world history is narrated 
may reveal as much about national self-image as it does about those societies, peoples 
and cultures it seeks to portray. That world history is fundamentally `other' is 
frequently confirmed by clear demarcations from national history, although perhaps 
only in Hong Kong are there two entirely separate subjects of Chinese History and 
History, the latter largely excluding China, but controversially including Hong 
Kong. 49 Elsewhere, national and world history are a single school subject, but often 
taught as separate courses, so that in the USA, for example, many schools will teach a 
year of American history, followed by a year of Western Civilisation, which does not 
include America except where relevant to international events. Few international 
topics other than wars are covered in most History curricula, however, and world 
history, like national history, normally takes existing nation-states and their self 
defined national peoples as a given, focusing on what are perceived to be major 
nation-defining or world-impacting events and accomplishments. 
World history may also serve patriotic and moral education goals through 
providing comparisons with one's own `superior' national achievements or greater 
antiquity and longevity, although it may also exhort students to strive to surpass 
certain desirable qualities of Others and their national heroes. Similarly, the suffering 
of Others may be downplayed if it appears greater than `ours' and especially if there 
47 Wertsch, Voices of Collective Remembering; Lowenthal, Possessed by the Past; Cohen, The 
Symbolic Construction of Community, p99. 
48 Said, Orientalism. 
49 Yeung, talk given at International Conference on History Education, Shanghai, Nov. 2001. Yeung 
noted that recent efforts to integrate them as a single school subject have been bitterly opposed, 
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is extant tension between `us' and `them' over past or present conflicts. Thus, when 
new Palestinian History textbooks were drafted in 2000, it was decided to exclude the 
Holocaust as it `has been exaggerated in order to present the Jews as victims of a great 
crime, to justify [the claim] that Palestine is necessary as a homeland for them, and to 
give them the right to demand compensation. ' 5° Recent Taiwanese History and Social 
Studies textbooks, meanwhile, have reduced formerly extensive coverage of the anti- 
Japanese War (Mainland Chinese suffering), while emphasising the `2.28' massacre 
(Mainland Chinese inflicting suffering on Taiwanese), as well as acknowledging 
some of the positive aspects of Taiwan's history as a Japanese colony. 5' 
While omissions and additions of data or revisions of interpretation catalysed by 
changing identity politics and other contemporary imperatives are widespread in 
syllabi and textbooks, they attract attention only when particular communities - 
usually `sub-national' - perceive their history, identity and/or contribution to the 
national whole to have been neglected or misrepresented. Occasionally, however, 
History is controversial enough to incite international indignation. Unsurprisingly, 
the changes in recent Taiwanese textbooks mentioned above, and especially the move 
away from the KMT-imposed China-at-the-centre narrative, have been vituperatively 
condemned by officials, the media, historians and educationalists in the PRC for 
`distorting history, ' `promoting separatism' and `equating Han Chinese with foreign 
invaders. '52 (The PRC take on Taiwanese history is discussed in later chapters). In 
2002, the German ambassador to the UK blamed an over-emphasis on Nazism in 
school History courses for racist attacks on two German teenagers, and called for 
curriculum revision to emphasise post-Third Reich democracy `to convey to young 
people that the Germans have learned their lesson and that they have changed. '53 
Most notoriously, bitter controversies erupt periodically between Japan and its East 
Asian neighbours over textbooks that `whitewash' Japanese aggression and wartime 
atrocities. 54 In the most recent spat over a particularly euphemistic account, which 
failed to mention `comfort women', glossed over the Nanjing Massacre and portrayed 
especially by teachers of Chinese History. See also Vickers, History as a School Subject, on this topic 
and on debates over how and where to include Hong Kong history in the curriculum. 
so Dr. Musa A1-Zu'but (chairman of the Palestinian Legislative Council education committee) in 
Palestinian newspaper, Al-Risala, 13/04/2000, cit. in The Guardian (online), 18/12/2001 
sl Guomin zhongxue: lishi, Renshi Taiwan: lishi bian and Renshi Taiwan: shehui bian. 
52 See for example Liu, Lishi jiaoxue yishu yu yanjiu, p24. 
13 Vasagar, `History teaching in UK stokes xenophobia', The Guardian (online), 9/12/2002. 
sa On Japanese textbook controversies see chapters by McCormack, Gerow, Nozaki and Inokuchi, and 
Kimijima in Hein and Selden eds., Censoring History. See also Rose, Interpreting History in Sino- 
Japanese Relations. 
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Japanese invasions as wars of liberation from Western imperialism, South Korea even 
recalled its ambassador from Tokyo. 55 Although China did not take such drastic 
official action, the new textbook was roundly denounced for misleading Japanese 
youth about the `truth of history'. Reared on `lies', it was asserted, Japanese youth 
would develop a mistaken conception of their national identity, and this in turn could 
be potentially damaging for future Sino-Japanese relations. 56 
Whether History can really influence self-Other identity formation is impossible 
to gauge accurately, but to understand the ways in which it might contribute requires 
an understanding not only of what topics are included in or excluded from syllabi, 
textbooks and classroom teaching and which viewpoints are proffered as `correct', but 
also of how data, concepts and values are organised, transmitted, received and 
interpreted. Clearly, the latter question is extremely complex, for the ways in which 
ideas and values are learnt and internalised inevitably vary from one individual or 
group to another, and there are, moreover, countless extracurricular influences on 
historical consciousness and identity formation. Before turning to the outcomes of 
History education, therefore, it is worth briefly considering some common 
characteristics of textbooks and teaching which might increase the likelihood of 
school History and the ideologies therein being accepted or rejected. 
Teaching History 
If national curricula set out the goals and general content of History, textbooks are, in 
most school systems, the primary vehicle for transmitting historical knowledge and 
ideas, and typically, the more concern the ruling regime has to ensure that a unitary 
official version of history is taught, the more tightly textbooks are controlled. In some 
instances national or local government bodies may authorise only a limited number of 
textbooks for school use (as in Japan and some US states), or even draft textbooks 
themselves (as in the former USSR, China, Taiwan and South Korea until very 
recently, and as continues to be the case in North Korea). Yet, even where schools or 
teachers can freely select textbooks, often only one is used. Furthermore, given that 
textbooks are frequently designed to meet the requirements of standard examinations, 
both teachers and students may rely heavily on them, rarely using supplementary 
ss Watts, `Koreans angry at Japan's approval of book sanitising war history', The Guardian (online), 
10/4/2001. 
56 See `Negative Teaching Materials of History' and `China can't accept Japan's revisions of History 
textbook', 6/7/2001 and `Why Japan doesn't earnestly inspect history' 16/8/2001 in RMRB (online). 
As of 2004, only five schools (all of them private) had elected to use the controversial textbook. 
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materials. This reliance may be exacerbated if teachers themselves are not trained in 
history 
. 
57 Encountering a single account of history, therefore, is one way in which its 
authority is increased, and this is especially so, Hein and Selden argue, if the single 
account bears the `imprimatur of the state' through being government-authorised or 
produced. 58 
It is not only limited use of supplementary teaching materials or state sanction 
which makes textbooks authoritative, but the ways in which their content is organised 
and presented. They are usually `written in a distant, magisterial tone, ' muting 
authorial voice and giving the impression of omniscience and neutrality, thereby 
`discouraging students from questioning any of their assertions. '59 Although Loewen 
observes of many American History textbooks that `we need not even take a look 
inside' to discern their ideological purpose since titles and covers may be extremely 
revealing, 60 students are far less likely to approach something so apparently innocuous 
as a book jacket with a critical attitude. Unless guided by teachers to `deconstruct the 
textbook' through examining titles, cover designs, proportions of ethnic minorities, 
women and the poor represented in visual images or text, dates of publication, 
authors' gender, race, place of origin and so forth, students may well see the text as 
`objective fact' and assume that more or less `the whole story' is represented. 61 
The `magisterial tone' is not simply a writing or presentation `style', but inheres in 
the type of analysis and explanations woven into the narrative. While analysis is less 
important for younger primary school pupils who appear to respond principally to the 
internal logic of a `story', by the time children reach secondary school - the stage with 
which the present study is chiefly concerned - they are usually beginning to develop 
some basic critical skills, and stories without supporting `facts' or `evidence' are no 
longer sufficiently persuasive. As Project CHATA (Concepts of History and 
Teaching Approaches: [ages] 7-14) research into British schoolchildren's historical 
understanding has found, there is a distinct progression in awareness that historical 
accounts are not necessarily complete, and that where younger children are more 
57 Professional training or tertiary education in a subject is not always or everywhere a necessary 
qualification for teaching it. In the USA, for example, a 1990 survey revealed that only 40% of 
teachers had a BA or MA in history or a degree with a significant history component; 13% had taken 
no college-level history courses at all (statistics cited by Loewen, `The Vietnam War in High School 
American History', p 150). 
58 Hein and Seiden, `The Lessons of War, Global Power and Social Change', p4, p8. 
59 Masalski, `Teaching Democracy, Teaching War', p261. 
60 Loewen, `The Vietnam War in High School American History', p151. 
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inclined to attribute omissions of data or differences in explanations to the writer's 
lack of knowledge or `mistakes', older children may perceive authorial bias 
(intentional or unintentional). Furthermore, how children themselves deploy `second- 
order structural concepts' such as causes and consequences of events also shows 
evidence of a progression in understanding. Younger children tend to emphasise 
`important' individuals' personal qualities and desires, older children to recognise 
some external or `situational' factors. They also appear to become gradually aware 
that people in the past did not have the benefit of our hindsight or share our values, 
and their decisions should not necessarily, therefore, be judged out of context. 62 
While the researchers note that these findings may be attributable to cultural and 
pedagogical conditions prevalent in British schools, researchers elsewhere have drawn 
similar conclusions. 63 Following this pattern of learning (and perhaps contributing to 
it), accounts targeted at secondary school children offer more `structural explanations' 
of past events; that is, they explain causes and consequences in terms of abstract, 
macro-historical, political, social and economic forces rather than simply in 
`intentional' terms of personal will or desire. 64 This gives texts a veneer of `scientific 
objectivity' and emotional detachment, again increasing the probability that they will 
be accepted as credibly neutral statements of fact. Statistics, maps, charts and 
diagrams further enhance the `objective' illusion, since these are items children 
regularly encounter in subjects, such as Mathematics, which at this level have 
ostensibly clear-cut, right-wrong/true-false answers. On the other hand, the 
impersonal and abstract nature of structural explanations may be dull and unappealing 
to student imaginations, causing them to lose interest in History. It is unsurprising, 
therefore, to find History texts the world over populated by Great Men and gripping 
tales of individual heroism, even if the `Great Man theory' of historical progress has 
been philosophically rejected, and even if, as in China and the former Eastern bloc, 
historical materialism has supposedly recast the urban proletariat and peasantry as the 
principal subjects and agents of history. 
61 Masalski, `Teaching Democracy, Teaching War', pp261-262. Masalski, a former History and Social 
Studies teacher, used these questions and others to teach her students that history texts are not `received 
truth, ' but narratives constructed by particular persons who interpret selected evidence. 
62 Lee, Dickinson and Ashby have reported extensively on CHATA in papers such as `Researching 
Children's Ideas about History' and `Children's Ideas about the Nature and Status of Historical 
Accounts'. They build here on their earlier work in volumes such as History Teaching and Historical 
Understanding and Learning History. See also Shemilt, History 13-16 Evaluation Study, on 
adolescents' historical understanding. 
63 See for example chapters by Hallden, Carretero, Voss, Leinhardt, Dominguez in Learning and 
Reasoning in History. 
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Not every textbook ignores alternative versions of the past, lauds Great Men, 
suppresses the subaltern, or seeks to promote `collective memories, ' `myths' or 
`heritage' over `history'; some may be specifically designed to provoke discussion 
and analysis, to teach skills rather than data or ideologies. More often, however, it is 
teachers who must `mediate' or challenge `hegemonic' texts if critical skills are to be 
nurtured. Whether they are willing or able to do so depends considerably on their 
professional training, their personal opinions, experiences and responses to textbook 
narratives, as well as on how much freedom to manoeuvre they are allowed by 
examination systems, schools, local education authorities or the state itself, and how 
much of that freedom they choose to exercise. Even discounting individual difference 
and extracurricular influences, students studying the same text with different teachers, 
therefore, may have quite varied learning outcomes. 
Learning Outcomes 
In discussing the effects of History education on individual or collective values and 
identities, it is important to maintain a distinction, as Wertsch has done, between 
`production' of official history by states or their subsidiary agencies and its 
`consumption' by target audiences. 65 History production can be restricted directly by 
government control mechanisms or indirectly by self-censorship on the part of 
historians, museum curators, History curriculum developers and textbook writers, but 
prescribing how official histories are consumed and suppressing all competing 
sources of historical memories are impossible tasks. No matter how authoritative a 
text or how authoritarian a state, citizens can only be forced to `know' an official 
history, through having to memorise and regurgitate it in public performances (such 
as examinations) in order to succeed academically or professionally. There is no 
guarantee that official histories or indeed any government-decreed ideology taught in 
school and reinforced in other state-supervised arenas will be `believed, ' regardless of 
how often or how insistently they are reiterated. 
As evidence now emerging from post-Soviet societies suggests, despite 
successfully monopolising education and cultural production, the Party-state was 
spectacularly unsuccessful at controlling what people actually believed about the past. 
Not only did counter-histories flourish both in samizdat literature and in private social 
64 Carretero et al, `Historical Knowledge: Cognitive and Instructional Implications'. 
65 Wertsch, `Is it possible to teach beliefs as well as knowledge about history? ' and Wertsch and Rozin, 
`The Russian Revolution: Official and Unofficial Accounts'. 
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and familial settings, but the Party undermined its own efforts to dictate a univocal 
past by revising it to reflect the rise and fall of leading comrades or changing policies 
so frequently that it became risible; as the oft-quoted quip observed, `nothing in the 
USSR is as unpredictable as the past. ' Official histories were, in fact, often actively 
`resisted' precisely because they were state- sponsored. b6 One Russian interviewed by 
Wertsch recalls being stunned as a primary school pupil in the 1930s when told to 
delete from the textbook portraits of former heroes who had been reclassified as 
`enemies of the people', since new textbooks with `correct viewpoints' had not yet 
been distributed. 67 Other interviewees reported similar instances at which their faith 
in official narratives was shaken, and many claimed eventually to have automatically 
believed the opposite of any official line, although most did not reach this stage of 
doubt until the upper years of secondary school or in adulthood. This by no means 
implies, however, that younger children are always passive, uncritical consumers, and 
they are especially prone to resist official histories if they belong to an ethnic or social 
group which is excluded from the national narrative, or if personal, family or 
community experiences conflict with the textbook account. As Ahonen has shown, 
ethnic Estonians under USSR rule rejected official Soviet histories en masse because 
they conflicted with their own family and community memories, and because USSR 
history was in reality a history of Mother Russia, albeit moulded to fit historical 
materialist theory and justify Soviet claims to non-Russian regions. Since 
independence, the situation has been reversed, and ethnic Russians living in Estonia 
(36% of Estonia's population) reject current official histories because they narrate an 
ethno-nationalist Estonian history and portray Russians as the enemy. 68 In Taiwan 
during the mid-1990s, meanwhile, I found that many junior and senior secondary 
students and even some older primary school children thought KMT-dictated textbook 
claims to legitimate rulership of Mainland China (and Mongolia) were ridiculous, and 
few seemed to relish the idea of `reunification with the Motherland'. They all said, 
however, that `of course we go along with what is says in the textbook; we have to 
pass the tests. ' 
66 On the failure of the state to control the past, see, for example, Tulviste and Wertsch, 'Official and 
Unofficial Histories: The Case of Estonia'; Wertsch and Rozin, `The Russian Revolution'; Ahonen, 
Clio sans Uniform. 
67 Wertsch, Voices of Collective Remembering, pp 126-127. 
68 Ahonen, `The Politics of Identity through the History Curriculum: Narratives of the Past for Social 
Exclusion - or Inclusion? '. 
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`Knowing' one story and `believing' another, or telling different stories in 
different circumstances - whether to pass examinations or avoid punishment for 
heresy - may lead to what Ahonen calls `double consciousness' and Zinchenko 
`internal emigration. )69 In this mental state, private ideological or value commitments 
are clearly distinguished from publicly iterated ones. This is more, however, than 
merely a boundary between the public and the private. Much as in some languages, 
such as Japanese, in which not only vocabulary, but grammar is adjusted according to 
power relations between speakers, the ability to switch from public to private register 
(or from official to unofficial history) according to circumstance is learnt from 
childhood and is accomplished subconsciously. Describing this psychological process 
in theoretical terms, Wertsch has argued that `known' or `mastered' official histories 
may be more than a politically correct account trotted out for public performances; the 
official history, in fact, may powerfully affect `cognitive functioning, ' and may be the 
basic `mediational means' or `cultural tool' called upon in all representations of the 
past. Many Estonians and Russians he interviewed in the early - mid-1990s, for 
example, insisted that the official account they had learnt in school was `false', and 
that unofficial histories were `true'. Yet, when asked to talk about certain historical 
events, no-one was able to construct a coherent, reasoned narrative that did not rely 
almost entirely on refuting the official history with a `series of counter-claims' 
constructed from the data, concepts, structure and language of the official version. It 
appeared that what they knew, they did not believe, and what they believed they did 
not really know. The official accounts, then, had been mastered as cultural tools, 
profoundly shaping cognitive functioning, but the target audience had not 
`appropriated' or `internalised' the truth claims, values and ideologies of the official 
history; that is, they had neither made them `their own' nor `integrated them with a 
sense of self. ' Official histories thus failed to penetrate the `affective dimension. 70 
That official histories were so successful in determining cognitive functioning is 
hardly surprising in the Soviet context since by the mid-1930s all public historical 
discourse was state-supervised and voicing heterodox opinions could be extremely 
costly. 71 Cognitive mastery of texts or other cultural tools, Wertsch argues however, 
69 Ahonen, ibid and Clio sans Uniform; Zinchenko `Vygotsky's ideas about units of analysis for the 
analysis of mind' cit. in Wertsch and Rozin, `The Russian Revolution', p46. 
70 Wertsch and Rozin, `The Russian Revolution'; Wertsch, `Is it possible to teach beliefs as well as 
knowledge about history? ' 
71 See Shteppa, Russian Historians and the Soviet State for a discussion of early Soviet historiography 
and history education. On History as a school subject, see especially Chapter 6. 
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is not enough if such tools are to serve as `identity resources. ' Mastery of official 
histories may enable citizens to `think the nation' as defined by the political state, but 
only affective appropriation will lead them to feel emotional `attachment' to such 
`inventions. ' 72 Proceeding from self-determination theory, Wertsch suggests, 
moreover, that the Soviet state failed to control collective identity formation or foster 
genuine loyalty to the Party because official histories and the values therein were 
experienced as coerced rather than `fully chosen' and `autonomously undertaken. ' 
Like teenagers rebelling against their parents, the more force the state exerted in 
trying to engineer affective appropriation of official ideologies, the more resistance it 
tended to create. Indeed, the existence of a monolithic (even if ever-changing) 
narrative `provided a good target for opposition, ' and a model against which counter- 
histories and identities could be constructed. 73 
If it is correct that enforced orthodoxy correlates closely to levels of resistance, 
this would certainly lend some credence to assertions that hegemonic narratives 
promoted in liberal-democratic societies are perhaps more insidiously powerful 
because they appear freely chosen. 74 This is partially borne out by Penuel and 
Wertsch, who found that US university students were strongly influenced both 
cognitively and affectively by a `master narrative' of America's `quest for freedom, ' 
even though they explicitly opposed many basic claims of the `official' US history 
they had read in school textbooks. 75 Researchers have also found, however, that 
many North American schoolchildren master several competing narratives from both 
`vernacular' and `official' sources, but do not necessarily develop pronounced 
responses of appropriation or resistance to any of them, instead displaying 
`confusion, ' `indifference or agnosticism toward [all] historical narratives. '76 
There is, of course, no absolute, quantifiable correlation between the level of 
control a state exercises over the production of official history and the degree to 
which these narratives are affectively appropriated by their consumers in school 
72 Wertsch, borrowing from Anderson, Imagined Communities, in `Is it possible to teach beliefs as well 
as knowledge about history? ', p4l. 
73 Ibid., p43-44, p47 Wertsch's concept of appropriation is based on Grolnick, Deci and Ryan, 
`internalisation within the family: The self-determination theory perspective' and Bakhtin, The 
Dialogic Imagination, cit. in `Is it possible to teach beliefs as well as knowledge about history? ', pp40- 
44. 
74 Gramsci, Bourdieu, Macedo n21. 
75 Penuel and Wertsch, `Historical Representation as Mediated Action'. 
76 Seixas, `Historical Understanding among Adolescents in a Multicultural Setting', Barton and 
Levstik, "It Wasn't a Good Part of History': National Identity and Students' Explanations of Historical 
Significance' cit. in Wertsch, `Is it possible to teach beliefs as well as knowledge about history? ', pp46- 
47. 
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classrooms and beyond. Even if official histories serve as the primary mediational 
means of understanding and representing the past in both liberal-democratic and 
totalitarian societies, there are many possible outcomes for the formation of collective 
values and identities, determined not merely by the form of government, but by 
diverse historical experiences on multiple social and cultural levels. Nonetheless, the 
relationships between production and consumption of official histories analysed by 
Wertsch et al highlight a crucial distinction that must be made when discussing 
History education in any society. The production-consumption thesis also 
complements the distinction already drawn in this chapter between the purpose and 
practice of History, and has the added advantage of having been derived principally 
from the USSR experience, which in so many ways - although by no means all - has 
been paralleled in China, as well as in other `communist' or `revolutionary' states. It 
is used, however, with some modifications and caveats, not only to allow for different 
historical and cultural experiences in China, but because it omits the crucial stage of 
what I have termed `transmission'. This has much in common with the `practice' 
model already discussed, and should be seen not merely as an interim stage lying 
between production and consumption, but as a major factor determining the extent to 
which official histories are consumed in the spirit in which they were originally 
produced. Caution regarding the production-consumption thesis is also applied 
because it was formulated on the basis only of respondents' knowledge and beliefs 
concerning recent history; that is, those periods about which counter-discourses 
deriving from personal, family or community experience were still very much alive at 
the time of consumption. No interviewees were asked as to whether they had 
similarly resisted official accounts of the more distant past. Furthermore, no account 
appears to have been taken of interviewees' `narrative performance' for the 
researcher. Given that interviews were conducted after the dissolution of the USSR 
and the transition to democracy, it must be suspected that some respondents would 
`remember' resisting a defunct and unpopular regime even if they had not. As we 
shall see below and in subsequent chapters, vocal criticism or claims to have resisted 
a policy after the event have also been common in China. Nonetheless, these flaws in 
the foundations of the production-consumption thesis are not regarded as fatal; on the 
contrary, they are embraced as specific issues to be addressed, which will help not 
only to deepen our understanding of the Chinese case, but may perhaps contribute to 
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the refinement of an important theoretical model for understanding the place of 
History in the process of identity formation in other societies. 
II. Sources, Structure and Methodology 
The State of the Field: Sources and Problems 
Part of the widespread trend, the literature on Chinese nationalism and national 
identity has proliferated over the past decade or two, and has mostly emphasised its 
`invented' nature, while also noting the ways in which much older ideas about culture, 
race and the state have been incorporated into the modem construct of the nation. 77 
As in other studies of nationalism, both history and education have been highlighted 
as means by which elites have sought to deliver the nation unto modernity, whether to 
sustain their own domination or (for ostensibly more altruistic motives) to `save 
China' from the combined evils of cultural stagnation, domestic oppression and 
foreign invasion. History (together with Civics and Social Studies) has been 
frequently cited as crucial to the moral-ideological aspect of the citizen-making and 
national consciousness-raising process. Yet, despite much academic interest in both 
Republican and Communist education and historiography, and in stark contrast to the 
international attention devoted to History in Japan, History education in China has 
been almost completely neglected by scholars outside the PRC. What little has been 
done, moreover, has tended to follow the Orwellian stereotype of an omnipotent 
Party-state operating a top-down system of ideological indoctrination, assuming that 
what is decreed by the centre correlates closely to what is taught and learnt in 
individual school classrooms. 
Beyond passing references to government directives or the occasional textbook, to 
date, there has been only one book-length study undertaken in the early 1930s which 
analyses the content of History, Civics and Social Studies textbooks and evaluates the 
ways in which they were influenced by nationalist imperatives. 78 Nothing on the PRC 
was written until the 1960s when C. T. Hu, a Chinese emigre based at Columbia 
Teachers' College, published two papers outlining the ideological bases and 
principles of History and its place in the PRC curriculum. Although works by Chen, 
Ridley et al and Martin in the 1970s examined the political and socialising role of 
education, with detailed reference to pre-Cultural Revolution school textbooks 
 See, for example, Harrison, The Making of the Republican Citizen; Fitzgerald, `The Nationless 
State'. 
78 Peake, Nationalism and Education in Modern China. 
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(mainly Chinese Language), it was not until after the Cultural Revolution that 
anything else focusing specifically on History was published. 79 Works published over 
the past two decades or so include a chapter in Ferro's comparative history education 
volume, The Uses and Abuses of History, which covers the period from 1949 to the 
immediate aftermath of the Cultural Revolution, drawing principally on textbooks to 
demonstrate how (per the book title) the Chinese government has manipulated the 
past to serve the present. The range of textbooks upon which Ferro has drawn, 
however, is extremely limited, relying, moreover, on translated excerpts rather than 
complete Chinese-language volumes. 80 Chau's overview of the nature and status of 
History in the PRC also covers the period since 1949, but goes further into the post- 
Mao era, and makes wider use of primary sources. The title - `Continuity and 
Change: History Teaching in the PRC' - is, however, somewhat misleading as the 
central topic is not `teaching', but government policy and national curriculum 
guidelines. 81 As a specialist in PRC education, Lin would no doubt have been able to 
adopt a more comprehensive approach. Unfortunately, her discussion of socialisation 
through curriculum in a general work on reform-era education devotes only two pages 
to History, and the one (senior secondary) textbook examined is not in fact a History 
text, but a supplementary political education text on the history of social development 
produced and used only in Shanghai. Her analysis, nonetheless reflects a more 
nuanced understanding of education policy, recognising that not only are there 
discrepancies between government-prescribed educational objectives and actual 
learning outcomes, but that government policy itself is not simply a series of decrees 
from on high, and in fact frequently responds to rather than initiates social change. 82 
One shortcoming of all the above-cited works is that none has anything to say 
about Chinese approaches to world history. This is not entirely surprising, since - as 
will be seen in subsequent chapters - Chinese history has clearly been central to state 
efforts to promote patriotism, prove the political legitimacy of the regime and nurture 
loyalty to the Party, and has consequently enjoyed a far higher proportion of class 
hours than world history. Even China's professional historians, as Croizier notes, 
have paid scant attention to world history, resulting in a low output of scholarly 
79 Hu, `The Teaching of History in Communist China' and `From Orthodoxy to Historicity'; Chen, 
Chinese Education since 1949; Ridley et al, The Making of a Model Citizen in Communist China; 
Martin, `The Socialisation of Children in China and Taiwan'. 
80 Ferro, `A Note on the History of China'. 
81 Chau, `Change and Continuity: History Teaching in the PRC'. 
82 Lin, Education in post-Mao China, pp10-11. 
30 
writing, few university courses in the field, and consequently little knowledge of the 
subject among History educators. Paltry though coverage has been, however, world 
history, as discussed above, may be an important vehicle for favourably comparing 
and contrasting one's own nation with its Others, and China has been no exception. 
Croizier's references to secondary school world history textbooks thus begin to fill 
some important lacunae in the literature. 83 
Since I began this project, Chan and Scott have co-authored `Teaching Chinese 
History in Junior High Schools in post-Mao China'. This is the most comprehensive 
piece yet written on the subject, although it does not discuss world history and, like 
Chau's chapter, bears a title unrelated to the article's content, since it focuses on the 
People's Education Press (PEP) textbooks from 1979-1990s with no references to 
`teaching' or `schools'. Chan and Scott cover in considerable detail modifications to 
textbook format (such as font, page size and colour, chapter length, paper quality), 
and concisely summarise general ideological trends, emphasising the familiar problem 
of correlating Chinese history to historical materialist theory, and noting a 
reorientation away from socialism towards patriotism. Chan reiterates the main points 
of this paper in her guest editor's introduction for a recent volume of Chinese 
Education and Society (henceforth CES) containing extracts from the 1992 junior 
secondary and 1996 senior secondary curriculum guidelines and several articles on 
History in the PRC translated from Chinese journals, which provide some useful 
insights not normally available to non-Chinese readers. Like most scholars, Chan 
contends that History education is principally `expected to serve politics' and `to 
foster support for the Chinese Communist Party's version of socialism and its one- 
party rule. ' Leading cadres in curriculum development, she asserts, are `usually Party 
members hand-picked by the Party, ' and `Party control over the teaching of history in 
schools is almost watertight. '84 Thus, while she notes that some of the articles 
included in CES `do not quite accord with the official views laid down in the 
Teaching Guidelines, ' and both here and in her paper with Scott implies that, as 
historians, some curriculum developers and textbook writers may have professional 
reservations about following political directives, she moves only slightly beyond the 
Big-Brother-manipulates-hapless-masses model in a brief final admission that `it is 
83 Croizier, `World History in the PRC'. 
84 Chan, `Introduction', pp3-4. 
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almost impossible to tell' whether and how History influences students' `ideological 
and political commitments. ' 85 
History education in China may hitherto have been of little interest to those 
outside the PRC, but in China it is well-researched at academic and governmental 
institutions, and not only are there numerous education journals in which History- 
related issues may be discussed, but there are also several monthlies dedicated 
specifically to the field. These publish articles written by professionals ranging from 
curriculum developers to school History teachers, and cover every aspect of History 
from analyses of specific historical events or persons to discussions of curriculum and 
textbook production, teaching goals, model lesson plans, and examination questions. 
Although by the standards of most international academic journals, the majority of 
these articles appear somewhat methodologically and theoretically unsophisticated, 
and many (editorials in particular) are puff pieces broadcasting the current `correct 
line', they provide some useful insight into mainstream thinking about history 
education, and occasionally also give print-space to more risque pieces. 
These journals, as well as specialist books on History education, have been among 
the most important secondary sources for the present study, supplying valuable 
background information to primary sources, such as government directives, 
curriculum guidelines, textbooks, teacher handbooks and classroom observations. A 
significant problem associated with having no sources outside the Chinese History 
education community, however, is that what is publicly iterated is already censored by 
the writers or speakers themselves, and may have undergone further revision in 
editorial hands. There is great emphasis on public consensus and unified viewpoints 
(tongyi guandian), and since the kind of records available to Vickers in his study of 
the Hong Kong History curriculum (minutes of meetings where curriculum content 
was debated for example)86 either do not exist or are inaccessible in China, the extent 
of negotiation over History goals and content is impossible to assess accurately. 
Personal communications with History curriculum developers, textbook writer-editors 
and other research and teaching professionals, reading between the lines in published 
documents (usually made possible by acquaintance with the authors), or criticisms 
publicly voiced once a policy is no longer in effect have thus been invaluable 
supplements to contemporary publications and official policy statements. Clearly 
85 Chan, ibid, p7; Chan and Scott, `Teaching Chinese History in Junior High Schools in post-Mao 
China', p 118. 
86 Vickers, History as a School Subject. 
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there are methodological implications for this approach; as discussed in the preceding 
section, respondents' memories or opinions of past events may be shaped by present 
circumstances. In addition, `double consciousness' remains a feature of everyday life 
in authoritarian China, and discussions with a foreign researcher are just as much of a 
`narrative performance' as they are for assorted domestic audiences. I cannot be 
certain that my interviewees proffered genuine opinions, although the fear associated 
with the Maoist period has begun to dissipate, and talking to foreigners is no longer as 
perilous as it once was. Indeed, many people may even feel freer to express personal 
opinions to an outsider. At the same time, however, it appeared that people often told 
me whatever they thought `I' - either as a generic `Westerner' or as the person they 
felt they had come to know - wanted to hear. Similar problems of audience-oriented 
performance arose with classroom observations where teachers and students were 
forewarned of my visit and presented a `model lesson' (although this was not always 
the case). Even anonymous surveys, as Chinese researchers have found, may be 
subject to this kind of self-censorship on the part of students and teachers, frequently 
eliciting what respondents suppose are `correct' answers rather than encouraging 
critical expression. 87 As shown below, these difficulties, among others, have led me 
to avoid excessive reliance on informal communications and to focus this project 
primarily on those aspects of History which can be understood through analysing 
formal, written sources. 
Objectives and Organisation of the Present Study 
As far as I am aware, the works outlined above constitute all the literature specifically 
devoted to History education that is presently available in English, 88 and the most 
basic objective of this study, therefore, is to redress longstanding neglect of the 
subject. It focuses chiefly on the junior secondary History curriculum as primary 
87 Personal communications with education research unit staff who warned me of the limitations of 
their survey results. The difficulty of drawing valid conclusions from such surveys has been discussed 
by Chinese researchers in several journals (Paine, `The Educational Policy Process'). 
88 In endnotes to her CES `Introduction', Chan misleadingly implies a broader literature in suggesting 
that readers who `wish to consult Western scholars on history teaching in Chinese schools, can read, 
among others' the works by Croizier, Hu and her own paper with Scott cited above (italics mine). In 
addition to this handful of papers and those others mentioned above, I have recently read a Chinese 
translation of a German paper by Klaus Maeding (translated as `Cong Deguo jingyan kan Zhongguo de 
lishi jiaokeshu' for a 1998 conference in Taiwan) on world history textbooks in the PRC, and also 
understand that a PhD comparing PRC History textbooks since 1949 with post-World War II French 
textbooks was being researched as of summer 2000. Since 2003, researchers at the Georg Eckert 
Institute for International Textbook Research in Braunschweig and the University of Leipzig have also 
been engaged on a project analysing History textbooks in East Asia (including the PRC, Taiwan, Japan 
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History has recently been absorbed by a new Social Studies course and senior 
secondary education is neither compulsory nor universally accessible. Additionally, 
the junior secondary curriculum currently covers both Chinese and world history from 
ancient to contemporary periods and is thus probably the most systematic and 
comprehensive account of national and global history that most Chinese citizens will 
ever encounter. The basic narrative of Chinese and world history and its general 
moral-ideological thrust, moreover, is the same at all levels of the education system; it 
is merely the type or quality of analysis and quantity of material that change. Junior 
secondary History may therefore be regarded as largely representative of history 
education as a whole. 
In part because of the difficulties associated with self-censorship and `narrative 
performance' already described, I had originally intended to focus almost exclusively 
on the changing content of junior secondary History textbooks, and in particular to 
evaluate differences between the various editions published since compulsory 
education was legislated in 1986 and limited textbook pluralism was introduced. It 
soon became apparent, however, that regionally produced textbooks did not provide 
noticeably `local' perspectives on national or global history, nor had a significant 
diversity of historical viewpoints or even narrative styles emerged. In fact, it seemed 
that an analysis of textbooks alone would indeed demonstrate little more than 
changing publication formats and the ways in which the vicissitudes of `political 
lines' had been accommodated. This would not only duplicate existing research on 
the politics of reform-era historiography, but with textbooks being an end-product of 
history `production' would tend to suggest either homogeneity or top-down 
imposition of views about History goals and content. It would thereby neglect the 
different views of history and schooling that shape subject content and its 
presentation, and would reveal almost nothing about what is actually taught and 
learnt, and still less about issues such as national identity formation. To gain a more 
complete understanding, therefore, I decided to make textbooks but one small part of 
a broader exploration of History education, analysing not only the changing political 
imperatives and curriculum guidelines which directly delineate the acceptable 
parameters of textbook content, but also examining curriculum development and 
textbook production processes, the personnel involved and their ideas concerning the 
goals and pedagogy of History, and the ways in which official guidelines and 
and South Korea). Otherwise, I have so far been unable to locate any other work on this subject by 
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textbook content are mediated by teachers in History classrooms. Although a 
fascinating question, establishing how History affects student beliefs, values and 
collective identities is, as Chan noted, much more difficult, and would involve an 
analysis of an almost infinite web of extracurricular influences. This study focuses 
mainly, therefore, on the `production' of official histories and their `transmission' 
down through the hierarchy of the education system, offering only a preliminary 
analysis of their `consumption' by students. 
The structure of this study follows the theoretical model outlined in section I 
above, maintaining the already-noted distinctions between the purposes and practice 
of History, and the production, transmission and consumption of history texts. Part 
One explores the changing purposes of History education and the contexts and ideas 
that shape the ways in which the curriculum is designed and implemented. The first 
chapter considers the historical background, examining the purposes history has been 
expected to serve in China, particularly over the past century, and outlining the 
official narratives of Chinese and world history and the institutional framework for 
making and implementing History policies that were inherited by the post-Mao 
regime. Chapter 2 evaluates the ways in which this historical legacy and the current 
policy of reform and opening have influenced contemporary views concerning what 
purposes History should serve. This chapter focuses principally on central 
government attitudes to school History, analysing them in light of political and social 
change, general education reform and developments in professional historiography. It 
also draws attention to the changing perspectives of History education professionals, 
and highlights growing tensions arising from often conflicting pedagogical and 
ideological objectives. The way in which History education is administered from an 
organisational and procedural perspective is outlined in Chapter 3. This chapter 
details the systems and structures in place for the development of History curricula 
and textbooks, and for the dissemination and implementation both of official policies 
and practical pedagogy. Following Goodson, I analyse the professional relationships 
between institutional and individual curriculum `stakeholders' and assess how power 
to determine the content of History syllabi, textbooks and teaching is distributed. 89 
If Part One is concerned with why and how history is produced, Parts Two and 
Three focus on what emerges from the production process and how it reflects or 
distorts the stated purposes of history. Part Two consists of two chapters which 
`Western scholars'. 
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analyse the intended or `preactive' (as opposed to the implemented or `interactive') 
curriculum. 90 Chapter 4 examines national curricula, known as History Teaching 
Outlines (lishi jiaoxue dagang), which elucidate subject-specific teaching and 
learning goals, provide detailed syllabi and general ideological and pedagogical 
guidance, and are designated as the basis for textbook writing, teaching and 
assessment. It charts the ways in which the divergent views of History's purposes, 
changing political circumstances and `official lines' as well as developments in 
academia discussed in Chapter 2 have informed the changes made to the various 
Outlines produced between 1978-2000. Chapter 5 adopts a similar approach to the 
analysis of the local curriculum guidelines for History and Social Studies that were 
developed in Shanghai and Zhejiang respectively in the late 1980s as an experimental 
project in curricular devolution. It shows how curriculum developers attempted on 
the one hand to conform to national standards and goals, while on the other to develop 
something innovative and relevant to the conditions of their locale, and to set a 
modernising example for the rest of the country. This chapter concludes with a brief 
analysis of Beijing's local curriculum for History, promulgated in 2001, which shows 
how the experiences of both national and local curriculum reforms over the past two 
decades have been assimilated, and points towards the direction in which History 
education is likely to proceed for the next several years. 
Part Three explores the implemented curriculum, but in contrast to the generally 
chronological or - to use a more fashionable analytic term - diachronic approach 
adopted in Parts One and Two, these chapters primarily examine History education 
synchronically, that is History education in practice as of 2000-2001. Chapter 6 looks 
at History textbooks, focusing on the various editions that were first published in the 
late 1980s-1990s after limited textbook pluralism was legislated and that were still in 
use at the time of fieldwork. Although comparisons are made to earlier PEP textbook 
editions, the purpose here is not to chart the effect on content of changing `political 
lines' as this would be to repeat unnecessarily much of Part Two; rather, it aims to 
shed light on the ways in which historical accounts encountered directly by school 
pupils over the past two decades have been constructed and to reveal some of the 
implicit and explicit messages and lessons embedded in the texts. Following the 
themes discussed above, it uses several examples to explore how important events and 
persons are represented, what types of data and which kinds of people are included or 
89 Goodson, The Making of Curriculum. 
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excluded from national and world history, how language is used to convey 
`objectivity' and `neutrality', and which salient characteristics of `the national self 
and its significant `Others' emerge from textbook narratives. 
Chapter 7 addresses History curriculum implementation at the school level. This 
chapter is the least well substantiated by comprehensive or representative research 
data and is consequently somewhat shorter and considerably more speculative than 
the preceding chapters. It examines how History is (or is supposed to be) taught in 
school classrooms, and is predominantly based on a combination of journal articles 
written by, for or about teachers, collections of model lesson plans, pre- and in-service 
teacher training materials, officially and commercially published teacher handbooks, 
discussions with teacher training professionals and teachers themselves, and 
classroom observations conducted in Beijing and Shanghai in 2000-2001. The final 
section follows Wertsch's theoretical model of `mastery' and `appropriation' outlined 
above, and draws again on classroom observations, on the findings of Chinese History 
education researchers and on various popular media in an effort to gauge whether and 
to what extent History influences values, ideologies and identities. 
If `Party control over the teaching of history in schools' has ever been 
`watertight, ' this research concludes that innumerable leaks have sprung, and that 
while the authoritarian regime retains ultimate power over the school curriculum, it 
has not (yet? ) chosen to stem the flow. This is not to suggest that officially approved 
narratives of the past may be freely contested; as a cursory analysis of the pilot 
curriculum and textbooks currently on trial shows, changing the `deep structures' of 
the past and its narrative representations is not easy. Nor is it to deny the profound 
influence of `politics' on History curriculum development and implementation; on the 
contrary, politics is found to be among the principal considerations determining what 
should and should not be taught. Politics, however, is shown to be more complex 
than the interests of the `Party-state' (which are themselves varied), and to encompass 
the often conflicting political, professional and personal objectives of stakeholders at 
all levels of the education system from the Ministry of Education (MOE), to local 
education authorities, schools, teachers, parents and even students. Rather than being 
simply a straightforward top-down process of ideological indoctrination, it is asserted 
that History curriculum development and implementation are somewhat more 
dynamic than has hitherto been suggested, and that much like the childhood game of 
90 Ibid. 
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`Chinese whispers', official messages may be consciously or unconsciously distorted 
in the process of transmission from government representatives to History education 
professionals to school pupils. 
PART ONE 
THE MAKING OF THE HISTORY CURRICULUM 
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Chapter 1 
The Historical Context 
ETW, T : ATS, TMaEo t, , 3199K ,t YG_ If jade is not carved, it cannot be a tool, if people do not study, they cannot know the 
Way. Thus, when state-building and ruling the people, the ancient kings began with 
education. (Xueji, verse 2). 
Using bronze as a mirror, one may adjust one's attire; using the past as a mirror, one 
may predict the rise and fall [of empires]. (Emperor Tang Taizong, AD 597- 649) 
If China's leaders have not always been able to shape the present or future quite as 
they would like, it has not been for want of efforts to control the past. Over the past 
two millennia, they have devoted much attention to the historical record, heavily 
investing state resources to institutionalise the production and transmission of official 
histories and suppressing unofficial histories where seditious intentions have been 
suspected. Such profound concern to control not only the content of history but to 
dictate the ways in which it has been produced and the purposes its telling should 
serve began, in part, because the past was widely viewed as a vital source of 
precedents upon which to draw directly or analogically to validate present beliefs and 
actions. It was also because the ancient past was considered a golden age in which 
sage kings had ruled with wisdom and benevolence (ren), and right (yi) had prevailed 
in all under heaven (tianxia). Through following the kingly ways (jun zhi dao) 
described in the Classics, learning the moral and practical lessons of previous 
experience, emulating the worthy and vilifying the ignoble, it was believed, this 
utopian society could eventually be recreated. Transmitting both past and present 
insights to future generations was regarded, therefore, as an almost sacred task. 
Additionally, among a largely agnostic secular elite, history was venerated and feared 
as the `Last Judgement, ' and China's rulers and their acolytes sometimes kept their 
less noble instincts in check, mindful of their posthumous reputations. ' Perhaps most 
importantly, history `proved' the chain of `legitimate succession' (zhengtong) to the 
imperial throne through narrating the transfer of the ruling mandate (tianming) from 
one regime to the next. Although the ancient concept of legitimate succession began 
in simple genealogy, it soon came to be predicated on a Confucian moral mandate, 
which could be forfeited through degeneracy and misgovernment and inherited by 
morally `superior' successors. Needless to say, since new dynasties wrote the 
Jenner, The Tyranny of History, p 11. 
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histories of their predecessors, this simply proved the maxim `victors are kings, the 
vanquished are bandits' (chengzhe wei Wang, baizhe wei kou), overlaying `might' 
with a veneer of 'right'. Later, as the state supplanted the virtuous hegemon as the 
primary locus of loyalty, maintenance or restoration of political and territorial unity 
was also incorporated as a sufficient condition of legitimacy, thereby conveniently 
accounting for lengthy periods of rule by non-Confucian `barbarians' such as the 
Mongols and Manchus. 2 Given the obvious possibilities for reinterpreting history to 
criticise government policy, challenge regime legitimacy or assert regional 
independence from the imperial centre, it is hardly surprising that China's leaders 
sought to ensure that the official vision of the past and the Confucian ideology which 
underpinned it reigned supreme. 
Education was the primary vehicle for universalising the values and 
Weltanschauung of the state, and with the seventh-century inauguration of the civil 
service examination system, which recruited `talented persons' (rencai) to 
administrative office based on their knowledge of the Classics, a `national curriculum' 
was effectively created. Although few could afford the intensive education required 
for probable examination success, the potential for social mobility through this 
meritocratic system engendered widespread belief in the value and status of classical 
learning and respect for those who possessed it. This curriculum was thus followed 
not only by the gentry with their individual tutors, in elite state schools or private 
academies, but by the sons (and occasionally the daughters) of families with more 
limited financial resources in local, clan-run or charitable schools. For those who 
required a rudimentary education, but had no examination aspirations, there were 
`miscellaneous wordbooks' (nazi), designed to teach functional literacy as well as to 
affirm the Confucian virtues of filial piety and obedience to the ruler. 3 The illiterate 
majority, meanwhile it was hoped, would eventually be weaned off their primitive 
`customs' and superstitious beliefs and be `transformed' (huamin yisu) into model 
subjects by emulating the superior example of those who `had culture' (you wenhua); 
that is, who had received a classical education. Of course, the `trickle-down' 
approach was hardly guaranteed to effect the desired social and ideological 
transformation, but for back-up there was always the penal code, which enshrined 
2 On traditional historiography and regime legitimation, see especially Beasley and Pulleyblank, 
Historians of China and Japan, and Chan, Legitimation in Imperial China. 
3 Miscellaneous wordbooks were typically funded by the local scholar-gentry, anxious to reinforce the 
ideology which legitimised their own status and `cultural hegemony' (Woodside, `Real and Imagined 
Continuities in the Chinese Struggle for Literacy', p32). 
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Confucianism as official orthodoxy, proscribed `heterodox' writings and practices, 
and included convenient catch-all statutes to punish disobedience of Imperial orders 
and generally `doing what ought not' - if one were a good Confucian subject -'to be 
done' (budang de wei). 4 Exhortatory reinforcement was provided through the 
xiangyue lecture system, which required that imperial homilies on proper thinking and 
behaviour be read out to `the masses' at regular public gatherings. 5 In this way, then, 
not only were a high culture and common values created among those who followed 
the classical curriculum, but even among those who did not a culture was encouraged 
in which education was valued, texts were authoritative and the state was the arbiter 
of public morality. 
`History' (or pseudo-history) formed the substantive content of ideological 
education at all levels, from the Classics (which were believed to refer to real people 
and events), 6 to the various language primers and potted histories that served as 
preparatory texts for the classical canon. 7 Through `praising and blaming' (baobian) 
Great Men whose deeds and misdeeds had determined the fates of their states and 
peoples, history taught morality and ideology `by examples, '8 and showed the way 
forward to the re-creation of the idealised past. The values taught through the 
historical lesson, in turn, provided the moral determinist rationale that underpinned 
the official narrative of history and guided readers towards `correct' interpretations of 
the past. In short, history provided the veridical `evidence' to support the very values 
4 Hulsewe, Remnants of Han Law, p34. These catch-all statutes were included in every code from the 
Han dynasty to the Qing. For more detail on laws pertaining to religious and socio-ideological control, 
see especially de Groot, Sectarianism and Religious Persecution in China. Also, Johnson, the Tang 
Code and Boulais, Manuel du Code Chinois. 
5 Hsiao, Rural China. At these gatherings the righteous in the community would be honoured, while 
those who had committed `wrongful' (if not illegal) deeds would be denounced and publicly 
humiliated. 
6 Although the Classics were deemed to be truthful records of the past, they were generally considered 
sacred and therefore exempt from conventional historical analysis. Some scholars, however, such as 
Wang Yangming and Zhang Xuecheng, did not regard classical exegesis (jingxue) as substantively 
different from historiography (shixue), viewing the Classics as `all history' and thus subject to the same 
questions regarding their authenticity. 
7 The most famous of the mnemonic primers were Qianziwen (written during the Southern Dynasties 
period) and Sanzýing (written during the Southern Song dynasty). Both were widely used until early 
Republican times. These and other primers are discussed in de Bary and Chaffee eds., Neo-Confucian 
Education, especially chapters by Lee, `Sung Education before Chu Hsi', pp105-136; Kelleher, `Back 
to Basics: Chu Hsi's Elementary Learning', pp219-251; Wu, `Education of Children in the Sung', 
pp307-324. Children's history texts included: Huang Jishan, Shixue tiyao and Wang Ling, Shiqishi 
mengqiu, written during the northern Song dynasty (cit. respectively in Zhu, Lishi jiaocaixue gailun, 
p27 and Sun, Lishi jiaoyu de yishu yujiqiao, p9); Hu Yan, Xugu qianwen, also written during the 
Northern Song dynasty, provided a one-thousand character outline of history from `ancient times to the 
Song' (JDC, p1790); Chen Biao, Lishi mengqiu and Wu Chengquan, Gangjian yizhi lu (cit. in Bai, 
Lishijiaoxue wenti tantao, p207). 
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which had circumscribed the selection and representation of that evidence in the first 
place. 
While it would be erroneous to suggest that essential or immutable concepts of 
history and its presentist didactic functions have been transmitted in toto across the 
centuries, many of the `traditional' values, concepts and practices outlined above have 
survived the transition to `modernity', albeit modified by changing political, social 
and cultural forces. Thus, although the cyclical, dynasty-centred, Chinese past has 
been re-imagined over the past century as a `rational', `scientific' and `linear' story of 
a primordial `Chinese nation' marching through history towards the Enlightenment 
telos of modernity, this (variously defined) `nation' as the subject of official history 
has consistently been imagined as coextensive with the constant ideal of the `unitary 
state, ' which must be preserved or restored for `China' to remain intact and for the 
regime to attest its legitimacy. 9 Moral determinism has also remained a core feature of 
the modem discourse of legitimate succession, despite the switch to `scientific' 
evolutionary explanations of historical change. Thus, while historical materialist 
`laws' prove the Communist party's `inevitable' rise to power `scientifically', 
considerable effort has been made to demonstrate the moral superiority of the CPC 
over both the Kuomintang (KMT) and its republican and imperial predecessors. 
This shift to a linear, progressive view of history has profoundly affected 
education over the past century, and goals have been decisively reoriented away from 
the restoration of a past utopia towards the construction of a better brighter future. In 
order to achieve this, formal education has undergone a transition from the artisan 
creation of political elites schooled in the ways of the ancient kings towards 
production-line manufacture of worker-citizens, equipped to serve the national 
modernisation project with literacy, numeracy and a grounding in science and 
technology. The switch from an emphasis on humanities to one on sciences has not 
meant, however, that moral-ideological education has been abandoned. Changing 
political systems, the development of nationalism and the modernisation project have 
required that imperial subjects become national citizens who are committed to revised 
social, economic and political goals and support the regime and its legitimating 
ideology. History and other subjects with morally or politically didactic functions, 
8 This paraphrases Voltaire's oft-quoted dictum, `history is philosophy teaching by examples, ' from 
Essai sur les Moeurs et I'Esprit des Nations. 
9 See for example Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation, and Fitzgerald, `The Nationless State'. 
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such as Politics, Civics and Geography, have accordingly retained an important place 
(diminished in size if not in symbolism) in the curriculum. 
Clearly then, the Communist Party's attempted use of history education to sustain 
its political legitimacy and implement its vision for the future has hardly been an 
original strategy. It is not only the purpose of PRC history education, however, that 
owes much to its historical antecedents; in devising and implementing the school 
History subject, the Party has also drawn heavily on the experience, policies, 
administrative structures and even the narratives produced under previous regimes, 
especially those of its immediate predecessor, the Kuomintang (KMT). Thus, just as 
it would be misleading to dismiss global developments in history education as 
irrelevant to the Chinese experience, it would be inaccurate to see History in the PRC 
as a project begun from scratch in 1949 (despite what PRC commentators would have 
us believe). It would be equally mistaken to think that History in the post-Mao era 
has merely resumed where the Cultural Revolution left off and developed 
autonomously on a carefully cleaned slate. The previous chapter situated this study in 
its global historical context, identifying some of the general matters pertaining to the 
purpose and practice of History as a school subject over the past century or so; the 
purpose of this chapter is to examine the evolution of the History subject in the recent 
domestic historical context, analysing some of the specific functions and objectives of 
official history and the ways in which education has been harnessed to disseminate 
them. 
I. Developing a Modern Curriculum 
History in Transition 
Until the mid-nineteenth century incursions by foreign imperialist powers, the 
efficacy of Confucianism as a viable political, social and educational philosophy was 
never seriously challenged. Its superiority was, after all, `proven' by history. Had not 
many neighbouring peoples adopted Confucian culture? Even the Northern barbarian 
conquerors of the Middle Kingdom had ultimately been assimilated by the glorious 
civilisation they found. And had not Western barbarians been coming to China to 
procure the fruits of this civilisation for centuries? Thus, when Europeans and 
Americans arrived en masse to `open' China to international trade, they were 
rebuffed. The foreign traders did not simply slink away, however, but brought the 
might of their national navies to bear, forcing China into a succession of humiliating 
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`unequal treaties' which gave foreigners extraterritoriality and privileged trading 
rights. These humiliations, however, eventually persuaded some leading officials to 
advocate `using the techniques of the barbarians to control the barbarians' (yi yi zhi 
yi), eventually engineering the establishment of schools in which sciences, 
technology, foreign history, culture and languages could be taught as part of an 
overall military and industrial `self-strengthening' (ziqiang) effort. Despite court 
consent and tentative support, the new learning struggled to gain credibility, for the 
traditional examinations remained the main gateway to power. Moreover, even those 
who promoted the new schools maintained careful distinctions between the (superior) 
`essence' (ti) transmitted through the Chinese Classics and the `practical application' 
(yong) of foreign knowledge. 1° 
Defeat in the 1894-95 Sino-Japanese war precipitated more drastic reforms, and 
within ten years, the civil service examinations had been abolished, and a Ministry of 
Education (MOE) established to co-ordinate the transition to a modern school system 
based on the Japanese model, which had so evidently contributed to Japan's national 
`enrichment and strengthening' (fukoku kyohei). ' 1 The new system was to replace 
traditional examinations and degrees, teaching subjects such as mathematics and 
science deemed necessary for China's modernisation. 12 Physical education was also 
emphasised to transform the stereotypical pale, frail literatus into a strong, healthy 
citizen who could defend his country. Traditional learning, however, remained the 
foundation of the national curriculum and in both the 1902 and 1904 regulations, 30- 
50% of total class hours were consistently allotted to `Confucian' subjects: the 
Classics; Self-Cultivation (xiushen), a moral education class (deriving its name from 
the Japanese shushin subject) which aimed to teach children `filial piety, loyalty, rites, 
justice, honesty and shame, to venerate elders and respect teachers, to serve the ruler 
'0 Although the ti Yong approach is frequently used to describe attitudes and policies implemented from 
the 1860s onwards, the expression was not formulated until 1896 (by Zhang Zhidong in Quanxuepian). 
The concept, however, clearly permeated thinking about the foreign invaders, their ideas and 
technologies throughout the East Asian region, as similar slogans, such as `Eastern ethics, Western 
science' (toy6 no dötoku, seiyo no gakugei) `Western implements, Eastern Way' (sögi, tongdo) were 
used in both Japan and Korea. It is interesting to note the Japanese and Korean use of `Eastern' in 
these slogans, presumably implying a shared regional culture in which they actively participated, 
facing off against another regional (Western) culture. In China, by contrast, `Chinese' was used rather 
than `Eastern', since the Middle Kingdom was considered the fount of civilisation; Korea and Japan 
were regarded as mere beneficiaries, a view which is in many ways maintained today (see Chapters 6 
and 7). 
11 Following Prussia's 1871 victory over France, Japanese reformers determined that Prussian power 
derived not merely from having a corps of `talented persons' (jinzai) in administration, but from the 
education of the general populace. A modern education system based on the Prussian model was 
accordingly introduced with the 1872 Education Code. 
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and love the country' 13; and History, a survey of dynasties and Great Men from the 
legendary kings to the Qing. Further ideological reinforcement was provided in 
Chinese language courses. 14 The complete dominance of moral-ideological subjects 
over ostensibly `value-free', `practical' subjects such as sciences and foreign 
languages gradually decreased as students progressed through the system, clearly 
suggesting that the tiyong (essence-application) principle permeated the new 
regulations, with young, impressionable children to be infused with Confucian 
learning, allowed access to things new and foreign only after a sound moral 
foundation had been established. Even in secondary school, however, the `technical' 
or `practical subject' (shike) stream remained inferior, deemed suitable for 
`industrious' students intending to `make a living' after graduation; `wise' students, 
by contrast, favoured humanities, and were best qualified to `rule the country and 
pacify the people. "5 These propensities were supposedly innate, implying none too 
subtly that scholars able to master the Classics were at the apex of the intelligence 
hierarchy, and that Chinese learning must, by extension, be the highest form of 
knowledge. 
Although History was emphasised more heavily for humanities students, it was to 
be taught at all school stages with local history (xiangtu lishi) providing the entry 
point in primary school, focusing on familiar heroes and other worthies with whom it 
was expected children would readily identify. This would inspire them to strive for 
`wisdom and virtue' and provide a basis on which `the spirit of self-strengthening' 
and patriotic loyalty could be built. 16 In secondary school, the syllabus moved 
slightly beyond dynastic rise and fall, adding some limited cultural, political and 
scientific history. This was presumably a tentative response to calls from those 
influenced by foreign, evolutionary models of history, such as Liang Qichao, who 
argued that dynastic history was increasingly irrelevant to modem citizens, and that 
social and economic development of the nation-state and its people should instead be 
emphasised. 17 Foreign history was to comprise 50% of the secondary course, the first 
time non-Chinese history had ever been considered remotely relevant to a complete 
12 For a detailed study of late Qing/early Republican education reforms, see Bailey, Reform the People. 
13 `Qinding mengxuetang zhangcheng' [1902), COCP, p2. 
14 The 1902 regulations also required schools to hold assemblies at which the Sacred Edict (Shenglun 
guangxun) would be read aloud, bringing the xiangyue lecture function into the classroom ('Qinding 
xiaoxuetang zhangcheng', `Qinding zhongxuetang zhangcheng', COCP, p11, p18). 
'S `Xuebu zou bian tong zhongxuetang kecheng fen wei wenke shike zhe' [ 1909], COCP, p51. 
16 `Zouding chudeng xiaoxuetang zhangcheng' [1904], COCP, p23. 
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education. Its uses were entirely `pragmatic', however, centring on China's 
immediate neighbours, and heavily favouring recent history (especially the past 
century) over ancient history so as to illuminate the causes of China's current plight, 
and alert students to the `danger all Eastern states are facing from Western 
invasion. ' 18 The new education system and the broader reform package implemented 
from 1902 onwards, however, were not enough to save the dynasty either from 
foreign encroachment or from its own revolutionaries, and despite a last compromise 
offer to move to a constitutional monarchy, the Qing and the political system were 
overthrown. 
New Citizens, New History 
After the 1911 Revolution, education reforms accelerated to serve the nationalist 
modernisation project and create loyalty to the new state, and in 1912-1913 new 
curricula were issued. These integrated humanities and science/technical streams, for 
their separation was thought to have hindered educational modernisation. As Cai 
Yuanpei (then-Minister of Education) observed, `every province is establishing 
humanities-only secondary schools, and there are few technical schools... 
[Consequently, ] the number of qualified college students specialising in science, 
medicine, industry and agriculture is low. ' Humanities students meanwhile `have 
little scientific knowledge, and remain but traditional civil service examinees in 
modern guise, ill-adapted to the new age in which science is omnipotent. ' 19 The new 
curriculum was thus to expurgate tiyong influences and provide a more balanced 
education which would also serve those who did not continue their studies at higher 
levels. Most importantly, Classics classes were eliminated, for they were deemed not 
only inappropriate and overly taxing for children, but also to perpetuate `old' 
thinking. 20 Concepts such as `loyalty to the ruler' (zhong jun) and `respecting 
Confucius' (zun kong), and the `backward' ethics of the patriarchal social hierarchy 
17 Liang Qichao Xinshixue [ 1902]. A survey of early twentieth century developments in Chinese 
historiography may be found in Wang, Chinese Historians and the West. 
18 `Zouding zhongxuetang zhangcheng' [1904], COCP, p42. 
19 Quoted by Xiong, Zhongguo jinxiandai jiaoxue gaige shi, p109. 
20 The Classics were temporarily restored by Yuan Shikai in his bid for the monarchy ('Guomin 
xuexiao ling', `Gaodeng xiaoxuexiao ling' [July 1915], `Guomin xuexiao shixing xize', `Gaodeng 
xiaoxuexiao ling shixing xize' [January 1916], COCP, pp77-101). These documents were revised in 
October 1916, after his death, and the Classics were permanently removed. 
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were thus to be replaced by the `bourgeois morality of liberte, egalite, fraternite, '21 
more suitable for a republic with democratic aspirations. 
In fact, `bourgeois moral education' remained barely discernible from Confucian 
morality with primary Self-Cultivation to teach `the pristine virtues of filial piety, 
love, trustworthiness, righteousness and courage, respect, industry and frugality..... to 
stimulate students' determination to fulfil their responsibilities to society and the 
country, and to nurture the spirit of altruism and patriotism. '22 In secondary school, 
however, a slight reorientation was evident. Students were to `develop moral thinking 
and sentiments, .... 
fulfil their duties to the country, society and their families, '23 and 
then meet their responsibilities `to themselves, to humanity and to all things. '24 That 
patriotic duty was listed first suggests an effort to establish the Republic as every 
citizen's primary locus of loyalty, for although the state had long been paramount for 
scholar-officials, most people saw `duty' chiefly as family-oriented. Indeed, Sun Yat- 
sen regarded family duty as an impediment to developing national sentiment and 
advocated selling patriotism to the people as an extension of clan (jiazu) loyalty. 25 
Another departure from tradition was the notion of duty to oneself as an individual 
and to humanity as a whole, reflecting the growing influence of many Western 
theories of education, as well as a less Sinocentric/more outward-looking worldview. 
Although in terms of class hours History was demoted to subsidiary subject status, 
it was, in tandem with Self Cultivation, to play a significant role in Republican 
citizen-making and teaching new morality. A new history was accordingly needed to 
legitimise the new polity, provide accessible precedents and role models for the 
young, and thereby set the country en route to modernity. Throughout primary and 
during the first two years of secondary school, content focused solely on China, but 
the final two years of secondary schooling were devoted to East Asian and Western 
history, with emphasis on the latter, reversing the 1904 weighting. History was to 
convey concepts such as `the evolution of races (minzujinhua), social change and the 
rise and fall of states (bangguo). ' `Particular attention, ' it was further noted `should be 
paid to the evolution of political systems and the origins of the Republic. '26 History's 
core purpose was thus to narrate the genealogy of the nation-state, create a strong 
21 Xiong, Zhongguo jinxiandai jiaoxue gaige shi, p79. 
22 'Xiaoxuexiao jiaoze ji kechengbiao' [1912], COCP, p63; `Zhongxuexiao ling shixing guize' [1912], 
COCP, p69. 
23 `Zhongxuexiao ling shixing guize' [1912], COCP, p69. 
24 `Zhongxuexiao kecheng biaozhun' [1913], COCP, p75. 
25 Stafford, `Good Sons and Virtuous Mothers', p368. 
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identification between citizenship and membership of the `Chinese nation' (Zhonghua 
minzu) and to situate China in the global multi-state system. What defined 
membership of the `nation' and/or `citizenry' was, however, uncertain, fluctuating 
between Confucian culture and civilisation, a `Han' biological-racial unity, a multi- 
ethnic `national people' of shared descent from the mythical Yellow Emperor 
(Huangdi) (by fortuitous coincidence, correlating almost exactly to those peoples 
occupying the territories of the Qing empire in its expansionist heyday, and now 
claimed if not controlled by the Republic), and a political community with proto- 
democratic aspirations. 27 
New Culture, New History 
By 1917, not only had Tibet and Mongolia declared independence, but the rest of the 
former Qing empire had split into de facto autonomous regions governed by military 
leaders. National policies were, therefore, selectively implemented and inconsistently 
funded. This did not mean, however, that they were not promulgated, presumably 
based on the assumption (or hope) that the state would imminently be reunified. In 
education, those active in the New Culture Movement, particularly the `Deweyan 
clique' of American-trained scholars, 28 dominated both higher education institutions 
and `national' education policy-making. They understood China's current domestic 
and international problems as a product of cultural (and sometimes racial) ennui and 
debilitation, and argued that national salvation (jiuguo) lay in profound culture and 
value transformation (which education reforms had hitherto failed to achieve) as a 
prerequisite for scientific and social modernisation and the eventual transition to 
democracy 29 
The 1922 Decree on Reform of the Education System reflected the New Culture 
reformers' views and the Deweyan, child- rather than text-centred, education-for-life 
approach. It also marked the transition from the Japanese to the American 
educational model. This was a twelve-year system of lower and higher primary, and 
26 `Zhongxuexiao ling shixing guize' [1912], COCP, p69. 
27 See Dikötter, The Discourse of Race in Modern China on racial definitions; Fitzgerald `The 
Nationless State' on `statist' definitions. 
28 This refers mainly to those who had studied in the USA at Columbia Teachers' College under John 
Dewey, but may also include those influenced by Dewey's education theories. For a full discussion of 
Dewey's influence on Republican Chinese education see Keenan, The Dewey Experiment in China. 
29 On the New Culture movement and racial degeneration see Dikötter, The Discourse of Race, pp 126- 
131. Some thinkers also advocated eugenics as a means of `saving the nation' (jiuguo). 
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junior and senior secondary schooling (split 4-2-3-3), of which the lower primary 
stage was intended as compulsory. The stated goals of the new system were to 
1. meet the needs of social progress 
2. develop the spirit of education among the people 
3. develop [the child's] personality 
4. develop citizens' economic potential 
5. emphasise `life education' 
6. facilitate the universalisation of education 
30 7. allow regional flexibility. 
To meet these new and disparate demands, the curriculum was substantially revised 
and expanded, and, for the first time, individual subject curricula (kecheng gangyao) 
were issued. These were drafted by experts in the field, and briefly outlined subject- 
specific teaching goals and provided detailed syllabi which were intended as the basis 
of teaching and textbooks. 
Inspired by foreign theories adopted in professional historiography, the new field 
of archaeology, and a more internationalist ethos, History was to avoid traditional 
moralising and describe how `human lives have changed over time, so as to nurture 
students' ability to adapt to their environment and subdue nature. ' It was also to 
`awaken their sympathy with all humanity in order to cultivate a spirit of fraternalism 
and mutual assistance, ' and to help them `discover the origins of things so they may 
understand the true nature of present issues. ' Furthermore, it was to teach basic 
`historical research methods and foster interest and familiarity with historical works. ' 
To elucidate the `common development of human society throughout the world, ' and 
`eradicate the narrow conception of dynasties as the basic historical unit, ' Chinese and 
non-Chinese history were merged, with Chinese history simply to be `described in 
added detail' within the `framework of world history. '31 Junior secondary History 
outlined social and political development from ancient times to the present, 
concentrating on major civilisations (mainly European) and events, while Cultural 
History was taught compulsorily in senior secondary, covering the same time-frame, 
but focusing on topics such as scientific and economic developments, politics and 
international relations, religion, philosophy, art and literature. This was intended to 
emphasise the relationships of cause and effect between events, ideas and 
phenomena. 32 This attempt to move away from moralising dynastic history towards a 
`scientific' approach to global political, economic and cultural change closely 
3° `Xuexiao xitong gaige ling' [1922], COCP, p105. 
31 `Chuji zhongxue lishi kecheng gangyao' [1923], COH, p14. 
32 `Chuji zhongxue lishi kecheng gangyao' [1923] and `Gaoji zhongxue gonggong bixiu de wenhua 
shixue gangyao' [1923], COH, pp 14-20. 
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reflected the New Culture reformers' preoccupations with science; indeed, following 
professional historians' rejection of China's earliest history as myth and fabrication, 
the sage-kings and the Xia and Shang dynasties were even eliminated from the 
curriculum. 
Whether the new curricula were actually followed in school classrooms is 
questionable. Available History textbooks were predominantly translated or adapted 
from foreign (mainly Japanese) texts, 33 and although some were written locally after 
the establishment of the Republic, all were in classical Chinese and were becoming 
obsolete with the transition to the vernacular. 34 Following promulgation of the 1922 
curriculum, however, textbook production began to develop rapidly, with commercial 
publishers espying a potentially lucrative market. 35 Although none appear to have 
adopted the curricular principle of integrating Chinese and world history, they 
generally followed state guidelines, for they required official approval to be 
commercially successful. 36 Even if the new textbooks produced by China's 
professional historians transmitted the new learning, however, many teachers were 
classically trained, had little knowledge of non-Chinese history and probably found it 
difficult to move towards the less text-centred, more interactive learning style 
advocated in the curriculum guidelines. 37 Additionally, the few teacher training 
colleges could not produce enough graduates willing to remain in the profession. The 
new curriculum, furthermore, was barely implemented beyond wealthy urban centres, 
primarily because local education bureaux did not usually have the funds or the 
political will to implement the costly new programme (especially at secondary level). 
It was also, however, because many people, particularly in rural areas, were still 
hostile to the new learning, which, as in the past, represented attempts by educated 
elites to `transform the (common) people and change their (crude) customs'. 
33 Bai, Lishi jiaoxue wenti tantao, pp208-209. Among the (reputedly) more widely used of these 
adaptations was Chen Qingnian, Zhongguo lishi jiaokeshu, vols. 1-2, originally published before the 
revolution in 1910, but revised and republished in 1913. 
34 See for example: Zhonghua zhongxue lishi jiaokeshu, vols. 1-4 (Shen Wu ed., vols. 1-3; Zhang Xiang, 
vol. 4); Xinzhi benguo shi jiaoben, vols. 1-3 (Zhong Shulong ed. ); Gongheguojiaokeshu benguo shi, 
vols. 1-2 (Zhao Yusen ed. ), published with an accompanying set of teacher reference materials; 
Gongheguojiaokeshu benguo shi cankaoshu, vols. 1-4. These textbooks were all reprinted several 
times until the early 1920s, suggesting that they were among the more popular editions. 
35 Gu Jiegang and Wang Zhonglin eds., Xiandai chuji zhongxuejiaokeshu: benguoshi, vols. 1-3. Other 
popular editions included Jin Yaozi, Xin zhongxuejiaokeshu chuji benguo lishi vols. 1-2. Zhao Yusen, 
Xinzhuo benguoshi, vols. 1-2 (this was a revision of his earlier text, Gongheguojiaokeshu benguo shi). 
36 'Guomin xuexiaoling shixing xize' [1916] required all textbooks to be officially approved, but by the 
1920s it was merely an advantage for the publisher to have the Daxueyuan stamp. 
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Although individual educators outside the parameters of formal education and some 
local warlords tried to improve literacy andlor develop genuinely mass education, 38 
most people remained illiterate, and many rural schools simply evaded the new 
regulations and continued to teach the Confucian canon from ancient character 
primers. 
II. Nationalist History 
The End of Liberalism 
When the Kuomintang (KMT) gained control in 1927, they attempted to centralise the 
education system, and even planned to produce unified textbooks, but this idea was 
soon abandoned as impractical'39 and they merely updated the existing inspection and 
approval system. A rigorous process of national curriculum development was also 
established under the auspices of the MOE Primary and Secondary School 
Curriculum Standards Committee, involving many academics and educationalists in 
the initial drafting and subsequent discussion processes, although final approval rested 
with the MOE. 40 The separation between an overarching curriculum (kecheng 
biaozhun zonggang), which outlined general principles and allocated class hours, and 
individual subject curricula (also known as kecheng biaozhun) tailored to specific 
disciplinary goals and content was maintained, although the new curricula also added 
lengthy instructions to guide teaching, study and homework. Teaching and learning 
goals were also far more clearly specified and content was substantially altered, 
particularly in arts and social sciences, for although both the 1922 Education Decree 
and 1925 draft constitution explicitly stated that education must be independent of 
politics, the KMT instated Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People 
(sanminzhuyi) as the guiding ideology of the state and its education system. Thus, it 
was directed that `everything which violates the Three Principles should be excised 
37 At least two textbooks were required as the `starting point of study, ' on which other methods such as 
lectures and discussion could build ('Gaoji zhongxue gongong bixiu de wenhua shixue gangyao' 
[ 1923 ], COH, p 17). 
38 Most notable among these educators are probably Tao Xingzhi, James Yen and Liang Shuming. 
Liang is particularly interesting, for he believed China's problem was not a lack of modernity and 
`Western' knowledge and institutions, but was caused by their corrosive effect on traditional values. 
(Alitto, The Last Confucian). The warlords Yan Xishan and Chen Jiongming also invested in 
education in the areas under their control. By 1923, Yan's efforts had ensured that 60% of school-age 
boys and 11 %o of girls were enrolled in primary school in Shanxi (figs. cit. in Rozman ed. The 
Modernization of China, p408). 
39 Peake, Education and Nationalism in Modern China, p102. 
40 'Xiaoxue kecheng zanxing biaozhun zong shuoming' [1929], COCP, p 116 and `Chuji zhongxue 
zanxing kecheng biaozhun shuoming' [1929], COCP, p119. Those involved in the 1929 draft History 
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from curriculum materials, ' although, perhaps somewhat contradictorily, it was also 
stated that scientific methods and evidence were to be `the basis, so as to reduce the 
errors of subjectivity. ' 41 It was clear, however, that politics was to have priority over 
`science', and in addition to permeating the curriculum with the Three Principles of 
minzu (nationalism), minquan (People's Rights) and minskeng (People's Livelihood) 
and directly promoting the Nationalist agenda in Citizenship, significant class time (2- 
6%) was allocated to Party Principles, and students were to learn military drills in 
Party Cadet classes. The curriculum for these subjects, moreover, was not issued by 
the MOE but by the Party Central Office. 42 
Although in primary schools History was integrated with Geography and 
Citizenship into a new Social Studies course, it retained an important place in the 
curriculum and was taught throughout junior and senior secondary school. In line 
with the nationalist ethos, Chinese and world history were separated, and 
approximately two-thirds of class hours focused on China alone. Moral didacticism, 
regarded as crucial to `saving the nation', was restored as a central History objective, 
expected to `nurture [students'] noble sentiments and the tireless spirit of serving the 
people (renqun). '43 Chinese History was to follow the Three Principles, narrating the 
development of the nation, People's Rights and Livelihood, which had culminated 
(inevitably) in the `Nationalist Revolution'. This required a combination of political, 
economic, social and cultural history, with an emphasis on recent history to 
demonstrate `how the Chinese rninzu has suffered foreign invasions... [in order to] 
stimulate students' minzu spirit and arouse consciousness of their responsibility to 
China's National Movement (minzu yundong). '44 Indeed, the importance of this 
period to minzu consciousness-raising was such that teachers were explicitly warned 
to plan ahead to ensure sufficient class time for full coverage of China's 
humiliations. 45 Minzu, however, remained ill-defined, although the three principal 
themes highlighted as the core of Chinese history suggest efforts to create flexible 
boundaries which could be moved as necessary. These overlapping themes were `the 
past glories of the Chinese minzu, ' `the relationship between history and present-day 
curriculum included Gu Jiegang and He Bingsong (Jin, 'He Bingsong dui lishi jiaoyu de gongxian', 
p532). 
41 `Xiaoxue kecheng zanxing biaozhun zong shuoming' [1929], COCP, p117. 
42 `Chuji zhongxue zanxing kecheng biaozhun shuoming' [ 1929], COCP, p 119. 
43 'Chuji zhongxue lishi zanxing kecheng biaozhun' [1929], COH, p21. 
44 Ibid., p21. 
45 Ibid, p27. 
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life' and `the extension of China's borders (kuojiang). '46 History thus narrated how 
past cultural and/or military superiority had allowed the `Han race' to assimilate 
(tonghua) or Sinify (Hanhua) both its neighbours and barbarian invaders, thus 
expanding national territory (guotu); how together as the `Chinese national people' 
(Zhonghua minzu), they had resisted recent invaders; and how evolving political and 
civic consciousness had led to the establishment of the Nanjing government and its 
correct social and economic policies. Racial, cultural and political communities were 
thereby conflated in the rubric of both nation and state, KMT legitimate succession 
was successfully demonstrated and the present territorial claims of the Republic were 
justified. 
World history, meanwhile, traced the origins of the present international balance 
of power, and required students to develop `international knowledge' and `a broad 
outlook. '47 As in the 1923 Curriculum, international `sympathy' and `a spirit of 
fraternal co-operation, justice and tolerance'48 were to be cultivated, but were now to 
be moderated to `appropriate' levels to prevent students from developing `excessively 
lofty ideals' which might lead them to `neglect the necessity of revitalising and 
protecting the Chinese minzu. ' Through examining the histories of other societies 
(predominantly European), students were to understand that 
capitalist imperialism in recent history has led to the oppression of workers and weak 
minzu. Since the First World War, these weak minzu have risen up to oppose 
imperialism and demand independence ... 
China is an important member of this 
group. Thus when teaching foreign history in China, special attention must be paid 
to the development of imperialism and independence movements so as to inspire 
citizens with the courage and diligence to cast off the bonds of imperialism and 
achieve liberation. 
The example of the imperialist powers, however, was to motivate the Chinese minzu 
to strive for similar greatness, although China would not, of course, `imitate 
imperialist policies...... The post-war world is, nonetheless, one in which might 
prevails, and thus [China] must not be seduced by ideals of Universal Harmony 
(datong shijie). ' Despite the emphasis on self-strengthening and resisting 
imperialism, students were not to become unequivocally anti-foreign; indeed History 
was to `correct narrow, anti-foreign, minzu prejudice. ' It was also to provide practical 
precedents, and in tiyong fashion, students were to recognise the cultural (primarily 
46 Ibid, p22. 
47 Ibid, p21. 
48 `Gaoji zhongxue putongke waiguoshi zanxing kecheng biaozhun' [1929], COH, p37. 
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recent scientific) achievements of Europe and the USA, and use them to supplement 
China's deficiencies. 49 
That Nationalist curricula and textbooks could take such an anti-imperialist stance 
vis-ä-vis Europe, while lauding Han military conquests of `foreign peoples/races' 
(waizu, yizu) does not seem to have been regarded as a contradiction. A possible 
reason was the influence of USSR ideas on the KMT and of historical materialism, 
then making rapid inroads among historians. This posited imperialism as an advanced 
stage of capitalism. Since `China' had been at the feudal or proto-capitalist stage 
during its expansions, by definition it could not be imperialist. 50 This, however, 
merely removed the opprobrious label of `imperialism'; it did not account for the 
national glory derived from Han subjugation of `weak minzu' or conquest of their 
`national territory'. It is probable, therefore, that the resemblance to imperialism was 
unseen because China's culture and political system had long been regarded as 
benefiting `barbaric' peoples, bringing them the light of civilisation where there was 
hitherto only ignorance. Indeed, most history textbooks clearly `proved' that when 
uncivilised waizu invaded Han territories, they did so not simply to plunder, but 
because they `craved' civilisation. Such a comparison could not be made with the 
European colonial project, not because it had no ideological justification, but because 
the European civilising mission was, in China's case, being brought to a society that 
regarded itself not merely as already civilised, but as `civilisation itself. '51 As the 
twelfth-century historian, Zheng Qiao, had written, `The myriad states have each their 
different ways, but all must join in the greater community which is China; only then 
may the outlying areas escape the ills of stagnation 52 
As Japanese exigencies intensified and the KMT felt increasingly threatened by 
the Communists, efforts were made to intensify moral-ideological education, most 
notably through the New Life Movement launched in 1934, which advocated 
adherence to Confucian virtues of decorum (ii), righteousness (yi), integrity (lian) and 
a sense of shame (chi). This it was hoped would raise the `cultural level' of the 
people, so that they could better resist enemies both without and within. Somewhat 
surprisingly, neither New Life nor the subsequent outbreak of war significantly 
49 Ibid. 
50 Many History education professionals reiterated this view when I questioned them on China's 
`imperialist' history. 
51 This paraphrases Harrison, The Making of the Republican Citizen, p7. The original quote reads, `In 
the eyes of the emperor's subjects, the [Chinese] empire was not a country, but the country, not a 
culture, but culture itself. ' 
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affected the History curriculum or textbooks, although curriculum goals became 
increasingly presentist and more dogmatically N/nationalist, placing ever greater 
weight on defending the minzu and the state, supporting the leadership and opposing 
imperialism. Presumably as a call to national unity, a slight redefinition of the 
formation of the Zhonghua minzu was also displayed, with the terms `assimilation' 
(tonghua) and `Sinicisation' (Hanhua), which implied Han superiority and, 
frequently, military conquest of other ethnic groups, abandoned in favour of the more 
egalitarian and peaceful process of `ethnic integration' (minzu ronghe). In addition, 
class hours were adjusted to increase emphasis on Chinese history (see tables 1.1 & 
1.2 below), and in fact by 1948, world history no longer warranted a separate course 
of study, but was to be inserted into the Chinese history course at appropriate 
junctures. As is evident from the 1948 revised syllabus, this was not intended in the 
internationalist spirit of the 1923 curriculum, but was because world history was 
considered inessential to the paramount objective of propagating 
Abbreviations 
I, II, III first, second, third year of school A ancient history Ch Chinese history 
i, ii first, second semester M modem history W World history 
x class hours per week C contemporary history 
1929-1949 
1.1 Junior Secondary 
I. i Lii II. i Il. ii 111.1 III. ü 
1929* Ch/2x Ch/2x Ch/2x Ch/2x W/2x W/2x 
1932 Ch/2x Ch/2x Ch/2x Ch/2x W/2x W/2x 
1936 Ch/2x Ch/2x Ch/2x Ch/2x W/2x W/2x 
1940 Ch/2x Ch/2x Ch/2x Ch/2x Ch/2x W/2x 
1948# Ch +W /2x Ch +W /2x Ch + /2x Ch +W /2x Ch +W /2x Ch + /2x 
1.2 Senior Secondary 
Li Lii Iii Il. ii IILi IILii 
1929* Ch/2x Ch/2x Ch/2x W/2x W/2x W/2x 
1932 Ch/4x Ch/2x Ch/2x W/2x W/2x W/2x 
1936 Ch/2x Ch/2x Ch/2x W/2x W/2x W/2x 
1940 Ch/2x Ch/2x Ch/2x Ch/2x W/2x W/2x 
1948## Ch/2x Ch/2x Ch., W/2x W/2x 
* Suggested class hour distribution. Class hour allocation in the 1929 draft curriculum was not given; 
rather, a credit system was employed, 1 credit =1 term of 1 class hour p/w. History for both junior and 
senior secondary was to consist of twelve credits over three years -8 Chinese: 4 world for junior 
secondary, 6: 6 in senior secondary. 
# Class hour distribution unspecified. Suggested only that world history be integrated with Chinese 
history 
## Precise class hour allocation unspecified, distribution specified as 60% Chinese, 40% world. 
52 Quoted by Fincher, `China as a race, culture and nation', p64. 
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patriotism and loyalty to the KMT. 53 Other than the changes noted above, however, 
syllabi and most textbooks were barely altered during the turbulent 1937-1949 period 
except to bring content up to the wartime present. What is astounding, however, is 
that amidst all China's troubles the KMT government found time and 
resources to revise the school curriculum at all. According to Li, this may be 
attributed to the `study to save the nation' (dushujiuguo) theory popular among many 
educationalists and the associated KMT policy of `viewing wartime as peacetime, ' 
maintaining a semblance of normality and stability within the surrounding chaos. The 
war, it was thought, was going to be a lengthy affair, and skilled personnel as well as 
soldiers would be needed both for the resistance and post-war reconstruction. 
Education was thus to continue as usual. 54 
III. History for the Masses 
New Regime, New System 
The Nationalists were indeed correct that the war would be long and that skilled 
personnel would be needed for national reconstruction. By 1949, however, they were 
no longer on hand to supervise the reconstruction project, having been resoundingly 
defeated by the Communists, thence retreating to Taiwan to re-establish themselves 
as the government of Mainland China in absentia and plan the overthrow of the 
People's Republic. As the actual government of China, the Communists finally had 
the opportunity to implement the policies they had tested in the liberated areas 
(jiefangqu) under their control during the war years in the national arena. Once in 
power, however, the many policy experiments of the resistance years were abandoned 
in favour of a more traditional, centralised model, much along KMT lines, with 
significant borrowings from the USSR. Education was considered central to socialist 
transformation and modernisation, and with a `new' cause and ideology, it was 
thought that the education system and curriculum and textbook content of the past 
would need to be substantially reformed as well as more closely controlled by the 
state. In `value-free' sciences and foreign languages, reform was not urgent, but in 
ideology-laden History and other humanities subjects, it was deemed essential 
immediately to adopt `Marxist-Leninist viewpoints and methods, and new democratic, 
scientific, mass, anti-imperialist, anti-feudal culture to replace the reactionary idealist, 
53 `Xiuding chuji zhongxue lishi kecheng biaozhun' [1948), COH, pp97-99. 
sa Li Dingkai, Kangzhan shiqi Chongqing dejiaoyu, pp2-6; `Zhongxue kecheng biaozhun bianding zhi 
jingguo' [ 1940], COCP, p 145. 
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mechanical materialist, feudal, comprador, fascist ideology and curriculum produced 
under reactionary Kuomintang rule. '55 To this end, it was decided that not only would 
the state continue to issue detailed national curricula, but it would also provide a 
public school system with a Party-supervised education administration at all levels of 
government from central to local and would take charge of textbook publication. 56 
This could not, of course, be achieved overnight, but after a brief transitional phase, 
during which policy would be locally set and textbooks selected from Yan'an 
editions, abridged versions of professional (preferably Marxist) scholars' work, or 
those from the Nationalist era judged politically acceptable, China would adopt the 
USSR model, and all children would follow the same course, with the same textbook, 
at the same time. 57 
The structure of the new education system was not, in fact, to be very different 
from that established by the KMT. Over the next few years, general Teaching Plans 
(jiaoxue jihua) and individual subject Teaching Outlines (jiaoxue dagang) replaced 
the Nationalists' Curriculum Standards (kecheng biaozhun), but the development 
process as well as the format and even much of the content of the new curricula were 
remarkably similar to their allegedly `feudal' and `fascist' incarnations produced by 
the Nationalists. The first Teaching Plans and Outlines were initially drafted by the 
MOE, while the task of producing unified textbooks was assigned to the People's 
Education Press (PEP), which had been established as an organ directly accountable 
to the MOE in December 1950. By the mid-late 1950s, however, PEP had acquired a 
virtual monopoly over subject curricula. Not only did PEP produce all school 
textbooks and accompanying sets of teacher handbooks, but it also assumed 
responsibility for Outline production, although comments and advice continued, in 
principle at least, to be sought from academic and pedagogical `experts' before 
ss RMRB, `Renzhen shishi wenfa xueyuan de xin kecheng' 14/10/1949. This exhortation is frequently 
cited or adapted by writers on the history of education when arguing for the newness of CPC policies 
as distinct from those of the K1vIT. See, for example, Xiong, Zhongguojinxiandai gaige shi, p330; Yu, 
Ye and Zhao, Lishi xuekejiaoyuxue, pp 109-110. The RMRB exhortation is an elaboration of the 
Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference Common Programme, which declared `The 
cultural education work of the People's Government should raise the cultural level of the People, 
nurture talented persons for national construction, eradicate feudal, comprador and fascist thinking, and 
develop ideology which serves the People' (cit. in Su, Shibian shiyi, p119). 
56 Lu Dingyi (then CPC Propaganda chief), Xinhua shudian work conference [19/10/1949] cit. in Zhao, 
Zhongxue lishijiaoyuxue, p92. 
57 The early years in the USSR had allowed relative freedom in education outside the few Party 
schools, but from the mid- 1930s central control was increasingly asserted over the curriculum, 
textbooks and school time-tabling (Shteppa, Russian Historians and the Soviet State, pp123-145; see 
also Brandenberger, National Bolshevism). 
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curricula and textbooks were promulgated. 58 Meanwhile, under state and Party 
supervision, an increasing number of education journals were published (several of 
them by PEP), various academic and professional associations were created, and 
individual subject `research groups' (yanjiuzu) were established in secondary schools 
to find ways to improve both the ideological and academic `quality' and uniformity of 
teaching. 59 
The Purpose of History 
Education in New China was to unite Marxist-Leninist theory and China's 
revolutionary practice, as exemplified by Mao thought, and develop children's 
intellectual, moral, physical and aesthetic abilities, preparing them to progress to the 
next level of schooling or to take up employment. Students were to learn to `love the 
motherland, the People (renmin), labour, and science, and develop civic morality and 
resolute courage to protect public property. ' They were also to be healthy, disciplined 
and to develop their creative abilities. 60 At the secondary level, emphasis was also 
placed on cultivating `self-awareness' or `self-consciousness' (zýue), so that students 
would internalise ideology, ethics and discipline rather than simply obey instructions. 
They were thus to be taught `good study habits and the skills of analysis, criticism and 
independent thinking to enable them to understand and use the knowledge learnt in 
each subject, and to verify and develop it through practical application. ' 61 
In addition to developing science and technology for China's economic 
modernisation, moral-ideological education was strongly emphasised as a means of 
creating new socialist citizens. With a clear Politics curriculum yet to be determined, 
History was selected as the principal conduit for inculcating new ideological precepts 
and `socialist morality', and transmitting the revised narrative of legitimate 
succession, now `scientifically' proven by historical materialist 'laws'. 62 Although no 
individual subject curriculum was issued for secondary History until 1956, its basic 
goals were made perfectly clear in both the Plans and the primary school History 
Outlines. Its chief purpose was to provide children with `an elementary 
58 It had been planned that PEP would assume Outline drafting duties by 1959, but the reins were 
actually handed to PEP in 1957 ('Guanyu zhongxue lishi, dili, wuli, shengwu dengke jiaokeshu de 
jingjian banfa' [1957], COH, p236). 
s9 `Xiaoxue zanxing guicheng', `Zhongxue zanxing guicheng' [1952], COCP, pp200-212. 
60 Ibid., p200,206. 
61 `Zhongxue zanxing guicheng' [1952], COCP, p209. 
62 The first Politics Outline was not issued until 1959. In the interim various courses on socialist 
theory, revolutionary history and the PRC constitution were taught. 
59 
understanding of the laws of historical development: that the labouring people 
(laodong renmin) create history, and that class struggle drives history forward. ' This 
would gradually foster a `historical materialist viewpoint, the willpower for 
revolutionary struggle' and an awareness of China's `place and responsibilities in the 
endeavour to achieve world peace. ' At the same time, children would learn that the 
Chinese people (Zhonghua minzu) are `hardworking, brave and wise, ' that they have 
`made many great discoveries' and `occupy an important position in Asian and world 
history. ' This would nurture patriotism. 63 Indeed, so important was History to moral- 
ideological training that in all Plans until 1957, it was consistently allocated 
approximately 10% of total class hours, behind only Chinese and Mathematics. 
During the New Democracy phase, Chinese history was allocated two-thirds of 
class hours, as had been the case under the Nationalists. Both Chinese and world 
history were taught from `ancient times' to the present, and junior secondary content 
was simply repeated at senior secondary level in more depth. By 1953, however, 
China was `leaning to one side' and adopting USSR models, resulting in an equalised 
distribution of class hours between Chinese and world history. Moreover, world 
history was to precede Chinese, so as to situate the latter in a global context, while 
repetition at junior and senior secondary levels was avoided by arranging the 
curriculum in a continuous chronological narrative. Only ancient history was thus 
taught in junior secondary and only modern in senior secondary. Although this must 
have allowed greater depth of study, it seems that Chinese educators thoroughly 
disliked it, feeling that it devalued the importance and uniqueness of China's past, as 
well as depriving the many students who did not progress to senior secondary of the 
historical knowledge necessary to understand the modern world and provide 
motivation to build China anew. It may have been an acceptable structuring of the 
syllabus in the USSR, one Chinese textbook editor has argued, but the Soviets had a 
ten-year compulsory system, ensuring that all students would complete the entire 
course. Furthermore, `the USSR is a European country and has from ancient times on 
always had a relatively close relationship with the world..... China's national situation 
is different.... Ancient China's links with the world were not close, but the Teaching 
Plans (1953-1955) blindly copied [the USSR]. '64 
63 'Xiaoxue zanxing guicheng' [1952], COCA, p204. 
64 Zhao, `Zhongxue lishi jiaoxue shijian sishinian', p3. 
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The Materialist Conception of History 
By the time the first History Teaching Outline and accompanying set of PEP 
textbooks were issued in 1956-1957, a fairly coherent national and international 
historical narrative had been established, and despite some minor changes in the 1963 
Outline and later textbook editions, and the rupture of the Cultural Revolution, this 
narrative has remained fundamentally intact in the post-Mao era. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, the new national and international narratives sought principally to 
define the nation-state, its national people and their unique characteristics, and to 
compare China favourably against its Others. It also, however, followed more 
`traditional' Chinese themes of moral didacticism and incontrovertibly proving 
legitimate succession. 
The theory of legitimate succession, however, had been revised, and the 
`inevitability' of Communist Party (CPC) rule was now `scientifically' proven by 
historical materialist `laws', although Mao's oft-quoted dictum, `Political power 
comes from the barrel of a gun, ' also explicitly acknowledged the pivotal role of 
`might'. Synthesising China's actual historical development with an evolutionary 
model derived from European history, and balancing ideological orthodoxy with 
patriotic and cultural-historical pride, however, was complex, as China's historians 
would attest, for they had laboured long and hard to correlate theory (lun) with 
historical data (shi). 65 This had largely resulted in `Sinification' of the imported 
theory, particularly in school History where ongoing debates of the academic world 
were ignored or simplified to accommodate younger (and more impressionable) 
minds. Inexorable social evolution from primitive communist to slave, feudal, 
capitalist and socialist society was thus modified to de-emphasise the capitalist stage, 
since China had only developed the `sprouts of capitalism' (ziben zhuyi mengya) 
before repeated foreign invasions `reactionary', `feudal' and `fascist' thinking on the 
part of China's corrupt rulers obstructed progress, reducing the once great empire to a 
`semi-feudal, semi-colonial' state. 
Regime changes, meanwhile, were attributed primarily to class contradictions and 
struggle, and much attention focused on landholding patterns, taxation systems, and 
corresponding tensions between landlords and the peasantry which had culminated 
eventually in `righteous peasant uprisings' (nongmin qiyi). Although class relations 
and peasant uprisings were highlighted as history's `motive force', Chinese history 
65 For a full discussion of pre-1949 communist historiography see Dirlik, Revolution and History. 
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actually traced the rise and fall of dynasties (Fig. 1.3), and tempered economic 
determinism with voluntarism, assigning individuals prominent, and frequently 
decisive, roles in historical events. Consequently, efforts to emphasise the peasantry's 
gradual transition from `spontaneous' (zifa) resistance against oppression and 
exploitation towards class consciousness and `self-aware' (zijue) revolutionary action 
were mostly superseded by tales of Great Men, which focused on `praising' heroic 
rebel leaders and `blaming' their reactionary ruling class opponents, despite the fact 
that innate `class morality' had supposedly replaced acquired Confucian morality. 
Whether it was because historical materialism (Sinified or otherwise) is at root a 
foreign theory, or simply that the cultural legacy retained a powerful grip on modem 
thinking, the CPC also sought to demonstrate legitimate succession in more strictly 
traditional terms of moral superiority over predecessors, and the defence, restoration 
and preservation of national unity. Accordingly, History Outlines and textbooks 
portrayed the CPC as the spearhead of the national restoration movement: organising 
Fig. 1.3 Periodisation of Chinese History 
Historical materialist stage Era/Dynasty Historical Period 
of development 
Primitive Communism, Primitive, tribal (matriarchal, Ancient History 
1.7m-2100BC patriarchal) society 1.7m BC - 1840 
Slave Society, 2100-476BC Xia, Shang, Zhou 
Feudal Society, 475BC- 1. Warring States, Qin, 
1840AD Western Han, Eastern Han 
(Since this accounts for most 2. Three Kingdoms, Western 
of China's recorded history, Jin, Eastern Jin, Northern 
the curriculum normally and Southern dynasties 
divides feudal society into 3. Sui, Tang 
the five stages shown 4. Five Dynasties, Liao, 
opposite). Song, Xi Xia, Jin, Yuan 
5. Ming, Qing (to 1840). 
Semi-feudal, semi-colonial, Qing ost-1840 Modern History 1840-1919 
Bureaucratic capitalist, Republic of China 1911- Contemporary History 
1840-1949 1927 (Warlordism) 1919- 
Nanjing Government 1927- 
1949 (Nationalist Party) 
Socialist 1949 - People's Republic of China 
strikes and boycotts to protest against foreign imperialist exigencies, and single- 
handedly leading the people in fighting the `War of Resistance against Japan', while 
also improving rural conditions through land reform and education in CPC-held 
`liberated areas'. Conversely, the Nationalists were shown to have been profoundly 
corrupt, to have brutally exploited the people, and capitulated to or collaborated with 
the enemy, while simultaneously attempting to exterminate the Communists. Chiang 
Kai-shek and his (bourgeois self-seeking) Nationalists thereby forfeited the ruling 
mandate to the morally `superior' and more `patriotic' CPC and the (virtuous, 
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disciplined and working class) People's Liberation Army (PLA). This allowed the 
CPC to establish the People's Republic, ending the period of disunity and the 
`hundred years of humiliation' caused by foreign invasion, Qing conservatism, 
warlord rapacity and KMT perfidy. 66 
As demonstrated above, history not only legitimised regimes, but also defined the 
parameters of the nation-state over which the regime presided, and to which entity 
citizens were expected to show loyalty. For symbolic reasons of national continuity, 
strategic concerns to maintain buffer zones between China and potential enemies, and 
pragmatic interests in exploiting natural resources to expedite modernisation, the 
PRC, like the Republic, claimed (most) territories formerly controlled by the Qing 
empire. 67 History thus charted the evolution of the nation-state in such a way as to 
demonstrate incontestable sovereignty over ethnic minority regions, Taiwan, and 
assorted oil- and mineral-rich atolls in the surrounding seas. A cornerstone of CPC 
ideology, however, was promoting egalitarianism and, like the Nationalists, opposing 
imperialism. Unlike the Nationalists, however, the Communists did appear to see 
problems with simultaneously opposing European imperialism and lauding Chinese 
expansionism. They thus sought to prove that minority territories were not, as 
traditionally regarded, simply Chinese imperial conquests or that ethnic minorities 
were the culturally and technologically `inferior' objects of a Han civilising mission. 
Instead, non-Han or internationally contested territories were portrayed as `indivisible 
parts of China from ancient times onwards' (zigu yilai buke fenlie de lingtu), and a 
primordial conception of the Zhonghua minzu was promoted, entwining both the 
majority Han and diverse minority nationalities in a common ancestry from Peking 
Man and a common destiny in a Communist utopia. Thus, what were once considered 
`invasions' by `barbarians' (the Xiongnu, Mongols, Manchus), bringing `disaster' for 
the legitimate (ethnic Han) rulers (Han, Song, Ming), were recast as internal clashes 
erupting within eternal national borders, or were lauded as national unification 
movements, and the themes of integration and friendship between nationalities were 
emphasised. Such inter-ethnic confrontations were predominantly classified as `class 
contradictions' to emphasise the dominant theme of integration, unity and friendship 
66 'Chuji zhongxue Zhongguo lishi jiaoxue dagang' [1956], COH, ppl46-152; PEP Zhongguo lishi 
[1956], Vol. 4, Ding Xiaoguang, Zhongguo jindai jianshi. 
67 The Mongolian People's Republic and those parts of the USSR originally ceded by the Qing to 
Czarist Russia in `unequal treaties' were not claimed, as they were now liberated from capitalism and 
imperialism and flew the flag of international socialism. After relations with the USSR deteriorated, 
however, these territories once again became `lost' parts of China. 
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between nationalities. Meanwhile, uprisings against the dynasty, which were not led 
by the peasantry, or which asserted independence from the centre, were simply 
labelled as `treasonous rebellions' (fanpan, panluan). Despite efforts to portray 
ethnic relations as harmonious and egalitarian, however, traditional prejudices 
persisted in historical materialist guise, with most minority cultures categorised as 
`feudal' (backward), thus requiring the Socialist (advanced) Han to modernise them. 68 
Integrating non-Chinese history and political ideology was relatively 
straightforward, mainly because there was far less at stake politically, but also 
because the deeply ingrained Sinocentric worldview meant that there was no long- 
standing tradition of studying the histories of other states or societies, a deficiency 
Soviet influence had failed to redress. 69 Furthermore, world history was primarily 
Eurocentric, sitting more easily, therefore, with a historical materialist interpretation. 
Proving the `objective laws' of historical materialism appears to have been the 
principal purpose of world history, although it was also charged with inculcating 
`internationalism' and further inspiring patriotism and commitment to the Chinese 
revolution. Major ancient `slave' civilisations (Egypt, Greece, Rome) and the cultures 
of `feudal' empires in Europe, Asia and the Arab world were thus surveyed both to 
demonstrate the relevant historical materialist stage and to prove China's greater 
antiquity and longevity; as one text on patriotic education explained 
Of the ancient civilisations which emerged on the stage of history at approximately 
the same time as China, some had long terminated their historical development, such 
as Ancient Greece and Babylon, while others had for long periods of time lagged far 
behind China in historical development, such as Egypt and India. Only when China 
had completed the great developmental phases of the Ch'un-ch-iu, the Warring States 
and the two Han periods, did the English of today begin to establish a number of 
small unintegrated states. As for the United States of America, it is hardly 
comparable to us, with its less than two hundred years of nation-making, 70 
Most world history content, however, focused on the origins of capitalism, the evils of 
imperialism-colonialism, and their inevitable demise and displacement by 
communism. This involved great emphasis on changing modes of production, modern 
and contemporary European `revolutions', and anti-colonial or independence 
movements in the oppressed, `proletarian nations' of Asia, Africa and Latin America. 
68 For a full discussion of the `civilising' project and PRC historiography of minority nationalities, see 
Stevan Harrell ed. Cultural Encounters on China's Ethnic Frontiers. 
69 On the dearth of research, publication and education in non-Chinese history see Croizier, `World 
history in the PRC', pp 151-169. 
70 Cit. in Hu, `The Teaching of History in Communist China', pp8-9. 
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Political Change and the Place of History History 
From 1952-1956, History remained heavily influenced by Soviet models, and China 
both sent teachers to the USSR to learn from Soviet experiences and welcomed many 
Soviet education and history experts to recommend ways to improve Chinese 
practice. 71 Unlike in science subjects where Soviet textbooks were simply translated 
and modified to suit the Chinese schooling system, History did not, as the above- 
quoted Zhao has claimed, `blindly copy' the USSR; indeed, the CPC established two 
special committees in 1953 to oversee issues in History and Chinese language 
education (lishilyuwen jiaoxue wenti weiyuanhui), and ensure that theoretical, 
ideological and pedagogical matters pertaining to these subjects were fully addressed 
in light of China's particular needs and characteristics. 72 As relations with the USSR 
deteriorated following Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin and China reverted to a 
more Sinocentric and isolationist stance, however, the old 2: 1 Chinese: world history 
ratio and the repetition at junior and senior secondary levels was restored. 73 By the 
late 1950s, China had vowed no longer to borrow from its revisionist European 
neighbour - now viewed as just another European imperialist power masquerading as 
an international socialist one - but would find its own way to Communism and walk 
there on `two legs', blazing a revolutionary path for other oppressed peoples to 
follow. In revolutionary China, the elite status, common sense and work ethic of the 
`red' agricultural and urban proletarian classes were championed over effete, 
`bourgeois' and potentially `counter-revolutionary' academic learning. The three 
`cores of revisionism' (textbook knowledge, classroom teaching and the teacher's 
role) were criticised, and teachers and students were instructed to leave the classroom 
and engage in `situational education' (xianchang jiaoxue). 74 Total class hours were 
cut, labour education was increased, and Politics supplanted History as the 
cornerstone of moral-ideological education. 75 World history was first to be excised 
from the junior secondary curriculum, as it was deemed unnecessary for basic moral- 
ideological training; ancient history was next, for the revolutionary ethos focused on 
71 Xiong, Zhongguo jinxiandai jiaoxue gaige shi, p330. 
72 These committees were established following Politburo discussions on educational work in May 
1953. They were both overseen by Hu Qiaomu. (JYSD, p16; see also references to Committee work in 
`Guanyu zhongxue lishi, dili, wuli, shengwu deng ke jiaokeshu de jingjian banfa' [1/8/1957], COH, 
pp236-237). 
73 `Chuji zhongxue Zhongguo lishi jiaoxue dagang' [1956], `Chuji zhongxue shijie lishi jiaoxue 
dagang' [1956], COH, pp135-181. 
74 Xiong, Zhongguo jinxiandai jiaoxue gaige shi, p332. 
65 
the present and the utopian future. Although after the Great Leap Forward, education 
was re-centralised and academic learning reinstated as part of the gradualist path to 
socialism, it was but temporary and by 1965, only one year of History was taught, and 
content was oriented primarily to the Chinese revolutionary tradition, with peasant 
rebellions and vitriolic attacks on historical `class enemies' increasingly prominent. 
Fig. 1.4 History class hour distribution 1950-1965 
Abbreviations 
I, II, III first, second, third year of school A ancient history 
i., ii. First, second semester M modem history 
x class hours per week C contemporary history 
Ch Chinese history 
W World history 
Jun ior Secondary Senior secondary 
Li Lii 11.1 ILii III. i IiI. ii Li I. ii II. i ILii III. i IILii 
1950 Ch Ch Ch Ch w W Ch Ch Ch Ch w W 
3x 3x 3x 3x 3x 3x 3x 3x 3x 3x 3x 3x 
1953 W W W Ch Ch Ch w W W Ch Ch Ch 
A A A A A A M-C M-C M-C M-C M-C M-C 
3x 3x 3x 3x 3x 3x 3x 3x 3x 3x 3x 3x 
1954 Ch Ch Ch w W W W W W Ch Ch Ch 
A A A A A A M-C M-C M-C M-C M-C M-C 
3x 3x 3x 3x 3x 3x 3x 3x 3x 3x 3x 3x 
1955 Ch Ch Ch Ch w W W W W Ch Ch Ch 
A A A M-C A A M-C M-C M-C M-C M-C M-C 
3x 3x 3x 3x 3x 3x 3x 3x 3x 3x 3x 3x 
1956 Ch Ch Ch Ch w W W W Ch Ch Ch Ch 
A A M-C M-C 3x 3x M-C M-C A A M-C M-C 
3x 3x 3x 3x 3x 3x 3x 3x 3x 3x 
1958 Ch Ch Ch Ch w W W W Ch Ch Ch Ch 
3x 3x 2x 2x 2x 2x M-C M-C A A M-C M-C 
2x 2x 2x 2x 2x 2x 
1959 Ch Ch Ch Ch w W W W Ch Ch Ch Ch 
2x 2x 2x 2x 2x 2x M-C M-C A A M-C M-C 
2x 2x 2x 2x 2x 2x 
1963 Ch Ch Ch Ch w W 
3x 3x 3x 3x 3x 3x 
1964 Ch Ch W W 
4x 4x 3x 3x 
When the Cultural Revolution was launched following the suspected allegorical 
criticism of Mao in historian Wu Han's play, Hai Rui Dismissed from Office, 
proletarian politics were put `in command', and education through productive labour 
further increased. Schools and colleges, accused of being `breeding grounds for 
bourgeois intellectuals, ' run by `traitors, spies and capitalist roaders, ' were closed 
down or transformed into sites of political slogan-mongering, 76 while many education 
professionals were persecuted and dismissed from their posts. The entire education 
system was fragmented, and where classes were available, they were mainly staffed 
by under-qualified personnel teaching a piecemeal curriculum which prioritised Mao 
7' Lu Dingyi, `Jiaoyu bixu yu shengchan laodong xiang jiehe', published in Hongqi, July 1957 (cit. in 
JYSD, p36); CPCCC and State Council directive, 'Guanyujiaoyu gongzuo de zhishi' [1958] (cit. in 
JYSD, p37). 
76 JYSD, p53. 
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Thought and a correct political viewpoint above all else. Perhaps aggravated by the 
subversive Hai Rui, History was singled out as `a stew of feudalism, capitalism and 
revisionism' (feng, zi, xiu da zahui), and the MOE Party Committee ordered printing, 
distribution and use of existing textbooks to cease. Politics and Chinese were to be 
integrated and History classes abolished altogether. 77 As one veteran PEP textbook 
editor has recalled, `the status and role of History were completely negated. '78 
Farewell to Revolution 
By the early 1970s, it was decided that `stopping classes to make revolution' (tingke 
nao geming) was obstructing China's modernisation goals, and efforts were made to 
regularise education and re-establish a broad curriculum under the slogan `restore 
classes to make revolution' (fuke nao geming). 79 Indeed, Zhou Enlai even questioned 
the wisdom of sending `educated youth' to the countryside and recruiting university 
students based on their class background when he told a visiting foreign academic that 
he believed university students should be recruited directly from secondary school 
based on academic qualifications. 80 Although the April 1971 National Education 
Conference delivered the `Two Appraisals', which asserted that during the entire 
1949-1966 period the bourgeoisie had exercised dictatorship over the proletariat in 
education, and that the political outlook of all intellectuals remained fundamentally 
bourgeois, education restoration was tentatively begun. Central control was not, 
however, reasserted and administration remained at the provincial or local level, albeit 
supervised by the State Council Science and Education Committee, which had 
replaced the defunct MOE (and the National Science Commission) in 1970.81 History 
was reintroduced to the curriculum, and seven provincial-municipal education 
authorities were instructed to produce new curricula and textbooks, as the Two 
Appraisals rendered a return to pre-Cultural Revolution Outlines and textbooks 
unacceptable. 
Both Chinese and world history textbooks (consisting of two volumes of the 
former, one of the latter) were drafted, apparently modelled on those produced by the 
77 `Guanyu 1966-1967 niandu zhongxue zhengzhi, yuwen, lishi jiaocai chuli yijian de qingshi baogao' 
[ 13/6/1966], cit. in Tian and Zeng, Zhongxiaoxue kecheng jiaocai gaige yu shiyan, p334. 
78 Su, Shibian shiyi, p243. 
79 This slogan had originally been used in 1967 for the same purpose, but had had little effect on 
revolution-minded students, especially in tertiary education institutions. 
80 Deng Xiaoping, `Setting Things Right in Education' [19/9/1977] SWDX. 
8 From 1973, the Committee was only responsible for education, as responsibility for scientific work 
was transferred to the Academy of Sciences. 
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Beijing Municipal Education Committee. 82 It is difficult to know exactly what was 
taught, however, as no curricula were drafted and I was, unfortunately, unable to 
locate any Cultural Revolution textbooks. Indeed, when I expressed interest in 
Cultural Revolution textbooks to library staff, I was simply told that they had not been 
preserved being `worthless, ' `full of lies' and `Gang of Four propaganda. '83 Foreign 
researchers have not investigated this topic and reform-era Chinese writings on the 
matter have been brief, simply remarking on the extreme `leftist orientation' and the 
heavy weighting towards modern-contemporary history (houjin bogu), 84 and noting 
how the history of `struggle' - between Confucianism and Legalism, peasants and 
landlords, the `two lines' within the Party, and the international proletariat and the 
ruling classes - replaced the systematic study of historical periods in Chinese and 
world history. 85 The majority of writers, however, have not even written this much, 
merely asserting that `during [the Cultural Revolution] period, there was no 
educational quality' for `politics replaced history' and `the masses of youth became 
`historically illiterate'. History courses reintroduced during the early 1970s are thus 
typically dismissed as `a disaster' and `a travesty, ' in which History was `a small boat 
in a vast ocean, tossed violently by the unremitting waves of politics, ' with `the 
previous outline and textbooks repudiated and the ratio of ancient to modern, Chinese 
to world history thrown into chaos. '86 It is interesting, however, that a number of 
these writers, although clearly fearful of the erratic Cultural Revolution regime, were 
far from languishing on the Mongolian steppes or in labour reform camps; rather, they 
were employed in textbook production at regional education institutions. Yet, none of 
these History textbook writer-editors (many of whom have remained in the profession 
in the reform era) have offered any substantial insight into History during the latter 
Cultural Revolution period. It seems that, like many of their contemporaries, their 
collaboration - however unwilling - in the Cultural Revolution administration is a part 
of history they prefer to forget. 
The restoration of education begun in 1970 was temporarily interrupted by a 
last wave of revolutionary zeal, culminating in `the campaign to criticise Lin Biao and 
Confucius', but it was clear that the majority of CPC leaders favoured re- 
centralisation and standardisation of education over the Gang of Four's revolutionary 
82 Wang, Lishijiaocai de gaige yu shijian, pp 14-15. 
83 Personal communications with staff at PEP and various universities in Beijing and Shanghai. 
84 Wang, Lishijiaocai de gaige yu shijian, pp14-15. See also Su, Shibian shiyi. 
85 Zhao, Zhongxue lishi jiaoyuxue, p113. 
S6 Su, Shibian shiyi, p240; Xiong, Zhongg-uo jinxiandai jiaoyu gaige shi, p332. 
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model. PEP was re-established in 1972 and many former editors were reinstated, 
charged with drafting new textbooks for all primary and secondary school subjects. 
In January 1975 the MOE was re-established. Although in February 1976, Zhang 
Chunqiao instated a `temporary leading group' at the MOE to ensure continued 
revolutionary guidance, its influence was short-lived. With Mao's death, MOE 
leading group chief Chi Qun and his colleagues were arrested along with their 
masters. The Cultural Revolution was officially over. 
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Chapter 2 
The Political and Intellectual Context 
After the Cultural Revolution, there was a brief period of hesitancy, during which Hua 
Guofeng followed the `Two Whatevers' policy of rigid adherence to all things 
Maoist. ' It was soon acknowledged, however, that the ideological zealotry of the 
Cultural Revolution, which had exalted manual labour and derogated much 
intellectual endeavour as `bourgeois' and `counter-revolutionary', had not only failed 
to deliver the long-promised modernist utopia, but had also severely discredited the 
CPC and its legitimating ideology, bequeathed China with systemic chaos and a 
chronic shortage of skilled personnel, and excluded many individuals and groups from 
full membership in the ranks of the national People. 
When Deng Xiaoping assumed leadership in December 1978, revolution and 
isolationism were repudiated, and a new era of `socialism with Chinese 
characteristics' announced, in which pragmatism would take precedence over 
ideology, and expertise over `redness', famously summarised in his dictum, `it doesn't 
matter whether the cat is black or white, as long as it catches the mouse. ' The `reform 
and opening' policy was adopted to accelerate the Four Modernisations (agriculture, 
industry, science and technology, national defence) and the construction of `socialist 
material civilisation', which aimed to deliver strength, prosperity and international 
prestige. Over the past two decades, this has entailed policy changes in many areas, 
including fiscal decentralisation, increased regional autonomy, development of a 
market economy, and re-establishment of normal relations with the outside world. 
Additionally, several government departments have been abolished, merged or 
enlarged in an attempt to rationalise tasks and responsibilities and maximise 
efficiency. Many ageing Party cadres have been retired, replaced by younger 
technocrats, and ostensible efforts have been made to increase extra-Party 
participation in policy-making. 
While reforms have clearly facilitated economic development, `modernisation' 
has not been a universally unqualified success. Administrative devolution and the 
' The `Two Whatevers' refers to the statement, `We will resolutely uphold whatever policy decisions 
Chairman Mao made, and unswervingly follow whatever instructions Chairman Mao gave'. This 
statement was included in a joint editorial, `Study the Documents Well and Grasp the Key Link', 
published in RMRB, Hongqi and Jiefangjun Bao on 7/2/1977. 
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transition to a market economy have diffused interests and loyalties, and allowed 
official and commercial corruption to go unchecked; unemployment, regional and 
socio-economic disparities, rising crime rates and other social ills that have 
accompanied economic boom have led to popular discontent in both industrial and 
rural areas and catalysed ethnic minority unrest; `opening', meanwhile, has permitted 
an influx of new ideas, culture and values which potentially challenge the political 
status quo. Official calls for construction of `socialist spiritual civilisation' to 
promote ideological uniformity and prevent `blind West worshipping' have been 
ineffectual, and consequently punctuated by sporadic campaigns to suppress dissent, 
`bourgeois liberalism' and `spiritual pollution', and by populist appeals to nationalist 
sentiment. 
As the site of contest for the hearts and minds of the young, and thus the future, 
basic education (primary and secondary schooling) has been integral to the post- 
Cultural Revolution rehabilitation and modernisation process. It has accordingly been 
charged with aiding in the repudiation of past ideological `errors' and renewing 
support for the Party, cultivating human resources for economic development, and 
combating modernisation-related problems. Such weighty responsibilities have 
required both structural and conceptual-ideological reforms in administration, 
curriculum development, textbook production, standard examinations, teacher training 
and recruitment, and classroom teaching. Many of these reforms remain theoretical, 
for although they are supported by legislation and a lively debate is ongoing in 
academic circles and in the media, implementation has faced tremendous obstacles, 
such as lack of investment and vast numbers of under-qualified teachers, as well as 
political concerns to promote ideological orthodoxy. 2 There have, nonetheless, been 
some noteworthy changes, including the introduction of compulsory education and 
limited textbook pluralism, and the recent restoration of central government subsidies 
for education in poorer areas. There has also been a concerted effort to downplay 
overt political dogmatism and to restore the primacy of subject knowledge over 
ideological correctness. This has resulted in a substantially modified Politics 
curriculum and the gradual reinstatement of History as a more `subtle' vehicle for 
moral-ideological education, regime legitimation, discrediting old policies and 
2 The education budget still represents less than 3% of GNP, despite a stated goal of raising spending to 
4% of GNP during the 9"' five-year plan (figs. announced in a speech in Nov. 1995 by then-Minister of 
Education Zhu Kaixuan, translated in CES, 1997, no. 3). Average education spending in other 
developing countries, by contrast, is 6% of GNP, in Asia, 5% (figs. cit. in Rong, `Compulsory 
Education: a Chinese Dilemma'). 
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promoting new ones. History's official status in the curriculum has thus been 
consolidated (see Chapter 4, Tables 4.1 and 4.2). 
History's actual status, however, has not necessarily matched the attention it has 
received from central government, for it is not normally included in senior secondary 
entrance examination (SSEE) papers, and is often shunted aside to make room for 
extra classes in `core' science subjects (rangbu gei like) which are. 3 Members of the 
History education community have been constantly searching, therefore, for ways to 
defend their territory and resources in a school curriculum which is dominated both 
by examinations and by `new' or `more useful' subjects, such as IT and foreign 
languages. Many History education professionals in China, like their British and US 
counterparts in the 1970s, have highlighted the role History can play in skill-training, 
both to defend their subject's contemporary `relevance' and to address genuine 
pedagogical concerns. That promotion of skills in Europe and North America 
originally arose in part also as a call to greater democratic participation, however, has 
not been widely discussed in China, for not only the government, but many educators 
themselves view History as a central component of moral-ideological education, even 
if their ideas of what exactly should constitute correct morality and ideology do not 
always accord with official dictates. 
The following discussion examines views regarding the nature and purpose of 
History over the past two decades against the backdrop of political, social and 
economic change. It focuses principally on central government objectives, but also 
situates History in the changing intellectual climate with regard to new or resurrected 
debates in the field of education, where the concept of `curriculum' and issues in 
pedagogy and child psychology have become major research areas, and in academic 
history, where both theory (lun) and data (shi), and the relationship between them 
have undergone considerable re-evaluation in recent years. As shown both here and 
in subsequent chapters, despite some significant developments, History lags behind 
many other school subjects in the pace and scope of tangible reform; in part, because 
the historical legacy weighs heavily on contemporary thinking, but primarily because 
History remains unavoidably implicated in regime legitimacy and current political 
concerns. 
Senior secondary entrance examination requirements are determined by provincial-level education 
departments. In the post-Mao era, most regions examine Chinese, Mathematics, English, Physics, 
Chemistry and Politics. The implications of this system for History are discussed further in Chapter 7. 
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Although no formal divisions into temporal units or stages of development have 
been specified by the Ministry of Education or by History curriculum developers and 
educators, I have adopted a loose and informal periodisation, similar to that used by 
Ye. 4 That the development phases to which I refer also roughly correspond to five- 
year plan cycles is not entirely coincidental, since economic decisions are often 
precursors for changes in other areas and have direct bearing on policy-making and 
implementation. 
I. `Bringing Order out of Chaos' (boluanfanzheng), 1976-1980 
Regularisation of education began in earnest in the early 1970s and although briefly 
interrupted by the `Struggle against Confucius and Lin Biao', by the time of Mao's 
death and the arrest of the Gang of Four, it was widely believed that Cultural 
Revolution education policies had hindered modernisation and that, at the very least, 
education should be returned to its pre-Cultural Revolution status and functions. 
Under Hua's leadership, education restoration was initially tentative, for 
`Whateverism' prevented formal revocation of the `Two Appraisals'. The intention to 
rehabilitate personnel dismissed from their posts during the Cultural Revolution and 
raise the status of academic learning, however, was soon clarified when the MOE 
Criticism Group announced that the Gang of Four had `distorted' earlier assessments 
of intellectuals by labelling them all as bourgeois and in need of re-education, and 
thereby `damaged the economic base of socialism. '5 These views were reiterated 
more strongly by Deng Xiaoping in May 1977 when he called for `respect for 
knowledge and respect for talented persons. ' If China were to modernise 
successfully, `science and technology are the crux. [But] science and technology 
cannot be developed without first grasping education. ' Comparing China to 
industrialised countries, he declared China twenty years behind, and called for the 
restoration of the elite `key-school' system which would recruit the best students 
through rigorous examinations, thereby `concentrating excellence. ' Furthermore, it 
was to be acknowledged that those who labour with their minds are also workers, who 
4 Ye describes ten stages of History curriculum development from the founding of the PRC to 1999: 1. 
1950-1953; 2.1953-1956; 3.1956-1963; 4.1963-1966; 5.1966-1976; 6.1976-1981; 7.1981-1987; 
8.1987-1990; 9.1990-1992; 10.1992 - 1999 (Yu, Ye and Zhao, Lishi xuekejiaoyuxue, pp 109-115). 
Most Chinese scholars use a simpler periodisation: for example, Xiong (Zhongguo jinxiandai jiaoxue 
gaige shi, pp330-334) 1949-1957; 1958-1966; 1966-1976; 1976-1980; 1981-1990. See also Zhao, 
`Zhongxue lishi jiaoxue shijian sishinian', pp2-7; Feng, `Chuyi jianguo yilai zhongxue lishi jiaocai 
jianshe', pp30-34. 
5 `Dang de zhishi fenzi zhengce bu rong jianta', published in RMRB, 2/2/1977, (JYSD, pp56-57). 
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demonstrate `red' ideological commitment through cultivation rather than derogation 
of expertise. 6 By September, Deng was openly denouncing the Two Appraisals as 
absurd - if all other spheres of social and economic life had been liberated and the `red 
line' had been basically dominant prior to 1966, how could education have been the 
only exception? 7 - and in December, the Two Appraisals were branded `a counter- 
revolutionary crime. '8 
Such pronouncements allowed the reinstatement of former `class enemies', the 
reopening or reorganisation of schools and universities, and the reintroduction of 
university entrance examinations. After much debate over whether to adopt the ten- 
(5-3-2) or twelve-year (6-3-3,5-4-3) system of primary, junior and senior secondary 
schooling, it was decided initially to restore the ten-year system to expedite 
production of skilled personnel. This was intended as a temporary measure, however, 
for, as Deng had observed, `opinions are still divided, and the question will have to be 
studied further. ' A far more pressing issue, he continued, `is the teaching materials 
we use. They must reflect the advanced levels of modern science and culture, while 
conforming to the actual conditions of our country. '9 Only through re-centralisation 
of curriculum development and textbook production, it was thought, could this be 
achieved. New curricula and textbooks were thus needed to replace the Cultural 
Revolution-era local policies and teaching materials which were still in use. Between 
autumn 1977-1978, the MOE accordingly drafted new Teaching Plans and education 
regulations, and commissioned teams of reinstated PEP writer-editors and academic 
subject experts to produce new Teaching Outlines and textbooks in time for the 1978- 
1979 academic year. '0 
In History, as shown in Chapter 4, this primarily involved reproducing the data 
and viewpoints of the 1963 Outline and textbooks, with a hefty dose of Mao Thought 
and anti-Gang of Four rhetoric, since central government had not issued a formal 
repudiation of Cultural Revolution historiography. Those historians who had thus far 
been rehabilitated had just begun tentative discussion of some questions pertaining to 
Cultural Revolution ideology, such as the `struggle between the Confucianists and 
6 Deng Xiaoping, `On respecting knowledge and respecting talented persons' (JYSD, p57). 
7 Deng Xiaoping, `Setting things right in education' [ 19/9/1977] SWDX, Vol. 2. 
8 Conference convened by Beijing CPC Municipal Committee, 10/12/1977 (JYSD, p59). This 
followed the MOE Criticism Committee's repudiation of the Two Appraisals published in RMRB and 
other leading newspapers in November 1977. 
4 `Some comments on work in science and education' [8/8/1977] SWDX, Vol. 2. 
10 MOE, `Quanrizhi zhong(xiao)xue zanxing gongzuo tiaoli' [22/9/1978] and `Quanrizhi shinianzhi 
zhongxiaoxue jiaoxue jihua shixing cao'an' [1978], COCP, pp303-329. 
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Legalists' and the struggle between `restoration and counter-restoration' .1 These 
issues, however, were primarily related to ancient history, although during the 
Cultural Revolution more recent history had also been analysed in terms of these 
particular line struggles. With little willingness among historians to touch the more 
sensitive area of modern-contemporary history or to discuss much other than peasant 
rebellions (almost the only topic on which any research had been carried out during 
the Cultural Revolution itself), 12 History education professionals could do little other 
than wait before advancing any plans for reforming the content of their subject. 
Articles in those history education journals, such as Lishi jiaoxue and Lishi jiaoxue 
wenti, which had just been re-established after a ten-year suspension during the 
Cultural Revolution, thus primarily published `safe' papers condemning Lin Biao and 
the Gang of Four, and urging teachers to uphold Mao Thought, while avoiding any 
real discussion of historical events and issues, or what direction reforms in school 
History should take. Even after Deng assumed control in December 1978, neither 
professional history nor school History education began immediate reform, for 
Deng's leadership and the direction of reform were not yet confirmed, final verdicts 
on the Cultural Revolution and those who had participated in its excesses were not yet 
determined, and the closing of Democracy Wall indicated in no uncertain terms that 
the Party remained extremely sensitive to criticism. 
II. Construction and Consolidation, 1980-1986 
By the early 1980s Deng's leadership was more secure. Hua had been ousted and 
replaced by Deng's proteges: as Premier by Zhao Ziyang and as Party Chairman by 
Hu Yaobang. The official (if not exactly final) verdict on the pre-Cultural Revolution 
years had been delivered in the June 1981 `Resolution on Certain Questions in the 
History of Our Party, ' and reform programmes had begun in earnest, albeit modified 
by continued emphasis (in principle at least) on conservative ideology, such as the 
Four Cardinal Principles, which affirmed the socialist road, the dictatorship of the 
proletariat, leadership by the Party and the centrality of Marxism-Leninism-Mao 
Zedong Thought. 13 
" Kaifeng shiyuan lishixi tongxunzu, `Kaifeng shifan xueyuan lishixi juxing shixue taolunhui', GMRP, 
1911/1978, translated in CE Vol. 12, spring-summer 1979, ppl27-132. 
12 See Harrison, The Communists and Chinese Peasant Rebellions. 
13 Deng first spoke of the Four Cardinal Principles in 1978, but they were not published until 1981. 
They were subsequently included in the preamble to the 1982 constitution. 
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Having focused almost exclusively on restoring tertiary education to full 
functioning in the initial post-Cultural Revolution period, official attention now 
turned towards basic education, which under the `three-face' (sauge mianxiang) 
policy advocated by Deng was to `face modernisation, face the world and face the 
future'. 14 This entailed reforming all areas of education from administration to 
textbooks to classroom teaching, expurgating old thinking and borrowing where 
appropriate from the examples and experiences of `advanced nations'. Particular 
attention was paid to the education programmes of countries such as Singapore and 
South Korea, not simply because they were Asian societies, but because they were 
politically authoritarian societies that had explicitly and successfully focused on 
education both for `developing human capital' (rencai kaifa) to drive rapid economic 
growth and for strengthening moral and patriotic education. 15 A similar approach in 
China, it was hoped, would expedite the development of a skilled workforce, able to 
adapt to new technologies to serve the construction of socialism with Chinese 
characteristics. '6 
Accordingly, from the early - mid-1980s, the twelve-year school system was 
incrementally restored, for graduates from ten-year schools were found to be ill- 
prepared for the challenge of university courses. Plans were also made to universalise 
nine-year compulsory education (primary and junior secondary, split 6-3 or 5-4). In 
1985, in the `Decision on Reform of the Education System' (hereafter the 1985 
Reform) education administration was restructured to co-ordinate macro-planning, 
and to facilitate flexible implementation of reform in accordance with disparate 
regional needs and resources. This upgraded the MOE to the status of State 
Education Commission (SEdC, the title MOE was restored in a 1998 reshuffle), 
giving it increased powers of oversight and policy-making, and devolved micro- 
management to regional education bureaux and their subsidiary agencies. 17 
14 Deng formulated this dictum in an address to Jingshan School in Beijing 1/10/1983. It was later 
included in the 1985 Decision on Reforming the Education System, and is almost universally 
incorporated in most official directives and academic articles on education reform. 
15 In Singapore, this began after the split from Malaysia in 1965 as it was realised that the land- and 
natural resource-poor city-state had only its people as `capital'. In South Korea, `developmental 
education' (meaning education for economic development) was also begun in the 1960s under 
Syngman Rhee's presidency, and was consolidated under the dictatorship of General Park during the 
1970s. For more detail on the theory and practice of education for economic development in 
Singapore and South Korea, see Osman-Ghani, `Human Capital Development in Singapore'; Goh and 
Gopinathan, `History Education and the Construction of National Identity in Singapore'; Wilson, Ford 
and Jones, `The History Text'. 
16 Hayhoe, Education and Modernisation, Lin, Education in post-Mao China. On current approaches 
to `human capital' in China, see Yang et al `National Human Resource Development in the PRC'. 
17 7 'Zhongyang guanyu jiaoyu tizhi gaige de jueding' [27/5/1985], JYFQS, pp66-72. 
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Compulsory education was then legislated (1986), with implementation timelines 
staggered according to local conditions. '8 Additionally, it was decided to extend 
participation in curriculum development to include more `expert' advice from 
academics, teacher training personnel and senior teachers, and to introduce limited 
textbook pluralism, under the `one Outline, many editions (of textbooks)' (yigang 
duoben) system. New Outlines and textbooks would henceforth be ratified by the 
recently created Teaching Materials Inspection Committee (TMIC), which aimed at 
independent adjudication and `objectivity', although since committee members were 
to be MOE-appointed and supervised it is difficult to imagine how such goals could 
be attained. At the same time, it was also decided to grant the economically advanced 
regions of Shanghai and Zhejiang permission to design their own curricula as well as 
teaching materials as a pilot project in curricular devolution. 
In an echo of Chiang Kai-shek's New Life Movement and similar efforts in the 
early socialist transformation of China's citizens, education reform was not only to be 
`practical' or systemic, but from an ideological perspective was also intended to 
create `a generation of new people' (yidai xinren), with a high level of `culture', 
committed to the revised vision of socialist modernity and resistant to the pernicious 
influences of the `West', already beginning to slip in through the open door. 
Although primary emphasis continued to be placed on subjects, such as sciences and 
foreign languages, which were perceived as `value-free', and overt politicisation of 
curriculum content was gradually muted, it was still expected that all subjects, and 
humanities and social sciences in particular, would continue `to make the most of 
[their] role...... as hidden lessons in moral education. ' 19 History was thus gradually 
restored to a more prominent place in the curriculum, allocated 25% more class hours 
in the 1981 Teaching Plan. 
Exactly what kind of morality and ideology History was expected to teach was not 
yet entirely clear. At the Fifth National People's Congress (NPC) in 1981, Zhao 
Ziyang delivered a report in which he called for the strengthening of History and 
Geography education in order to inculcate patriotism. 20 It was soon decided, 
however, that `patriotism' needed more precise definition, and that the vague call to 
18`Yiwu jiaoyu fa' [passed 12/4/1986, effective 1/7/1986], JYFQS, pp72-73. 
19 Wang Shenghong, excerpts from `Speech at the Inaugural Conference of the Shanghai Primary and 
Secondary Curriculum and Teaching Materials Reform Committee', pp55-56. The Three Lines are 
discussion of ideology, study of national and social situations (guoqing), civics; the `one face' is the 
common aim of emphasising the moral and ethical content regarded as inherent in all subjects and 
activities. 
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love socialist China and uphold CPC leadership was not providing enough moral- 
ideological guidance to prevent China's youth from being swayed by the bourgeois, 
decadent ideas currently peddled by assorted `Western-influenced', `rightist' 
intellectuals. Informal discussions on ideological education and spiritual pollution 
held in autumn 1982 were leaked to the press, and over the following year numerous 
articles were published criticising writers who `propagate sex and religion, distort the 
history of the revolution and deviate from the thinking of the Party. 21 Scholars who 
had begun to discuss Marx's humanism and had mooted the theory of alienation in 
socialist society were also denounced for equating socialism with capitalism and 
blindly following Western intellectual trends. 22 
In this ideological climate, the Propaganda Ministry and the Research Department 
of the Party Secretariat issued an `Opinion on strengthening patriotic education' in 
July 1983 as a buffer against the influence of the tiny minority who `have lost faith in 
socialism, have weak sentiments towards the motherland, and have embarked on an 
evil path. Q3 This document acknowledged, nevertheless, that some people 
understandably 
are confused about and lack confidence in the motherland's future... especially those 
comrades who grew up during the ten years of chaos, for they have not experienced 
the hardships of oppression, exploitation or enslavement which characterised the old 
society, and therefore lack emotional understanding of how diametrically opposed 
are the old and new societies. They have not been tested by the revolutionary 
struggle, and just when they most needed education [in these matters], they did not 
receive systematic schooling, and know little about the motherland's history, her past 
and present realities, the glorious tradition of the Zhonghua minzu or the basic 
principles of Marxism. Consequently, they are sometimes unable to analyse past and 
present problems scientifically, and may even reach the conclusion that socialism is 
not very good and that the motherland is not particularly loveable. 24 
Such views were not to be punished, except in the case of unreconstructed rightists 
who deliberately manipulated the confusion of the ignorant, but were instead to be 
eradicated through all kinds of formal and informal education. The achievements of 
socialism were to be lauded, and the spirit of individual heroes and `progressive 
groups' to be promoted by the press and in literature as role models. Television 
documentaries, books and photographs were to draw public attention to world 
renowned engineering projects such as the Great Wall and the Grand Canal, and to 
20 RMRB 14/3/1981. 
21 RMRB, 31/10/1983, cit. in Ladany, The Communist Party of China and Marxism, p469. 
22 Ladany, ibid, pp472-475. For more detailed analyses, see Dirlik and Meisner, Marxism and the 
Chinese Experience; Brugger and Kelly, Chinese Marxism in the Post-Mao Era. 
23 `Zhonggong zhongyang xuanchuanbu, Zhonggong zhongyang shujichu yanjiushi guanyujiaqiang 
aiguozhuyi xuanchuan jiaoyu de yijian' [7/2/1983], JYFQS, p602. 
24 Ibid, p602. 
78 
areas of natural beauty and cultural heritage. This, it was hoped, would interest the 
public and simultaneously increase their historical knowledge and their love for the 
motherland and socialism. Special attention was to be paid to historical events and 
persons, and to the modern period (1840-1919) in particular, to stimulate awareness of 
past ignominy and recognition that `only socialism can save China. ' Minority 
contributions to the greatness of the national whole were also to be emphasised, and 
patriotic education propaganda work to be carried out especially diligently in areas 
where concentrations of ethnic minority populations were high. Patriotic education 
was to be promoted in all spheres of social and economic activity, from schools to the 
media to businesses, thereby raising patriotic consciousness and sentiment among all 
Chinese citizens, consolidating national unity and furthering the socialist 
modernisation enterprise. 25 
The MOE responded promptly to the call, issuing, first, a `Notice on Improving 
and Strengthening History and Geography Education in Secondary Schools, ' then 
another on studying and implementing the Propaganda Ministry `Opinion. ' The first 
`Notice' declared that History and Geography had hitherto been neglected, that 
schools had either reduced officially mandated class hours or cut the subjects 
altogether, that many trained History and Geography teachers were being transferred 
to teach other subjects while those actually teaching were the `teachers who are 
unable to teach anything at all. ' Education administration and research institutes 
responsible for in-service teacher training and support did not have people or 
departments assigned to History and Geography, and teacher quality could not 
therefore be improved. Moreover, the narrow focus on senior secondary and 
university entrance examinations which were weighted towards sciences (like) had a 
devastating impact on humanities (wenke), and not only did students lack knowledge 
of these important subjects and develop `one-sidedly, ', but such deficiency was 
impeding the development of their political -ideological consciousness (sixiang 
zhengzhi juewu), which would in turn affect `the establishment of a revolutionary 
outlook and belief in communism. ' Accordingly, education departments and schools 
were instructed to ensure that they followed the timetables provided in Teaching 
Plans, developed a corps of qualified teachers and added more variety to teaching 
methods, including, where possible, combining classroom learning with visits to 
museums and important historical sites, and using assorted audio-visual materials to 
25 Ibid, pp603-606. 
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stimulate students' interest. 26 These instructions were bolstered by the second 
`Notice, ' which reiterated the centrality of History and other humanities in patriotic 
education, and ordered education departments to organise publication and distribution 
of the July `Opinion' to every school teacher. Study groups were then to be organised 
to discuss how to improve patriotic education. From the earliest possible age the 
concept of the motherland was to be `engraved on children's minds, ' and the 
motherland, the CPC and socialism were to be integrated as a single object of 
devotion. 27 
While the official view of school History's purposes had been clarified, History 
education professionals had not yet articulated any new perspectives, presumably glad 
simply that their subject was finally being granted recognition as `useful' and 
unwilling to jeopardise their improved position by calling for more substantial reform, 
if indeed, they even felt it necessary. Journal editorials at this time typically promoted 
MOE directives, and most articles focused on `safe' topics, either reiterating official 
goals or discussing lesson plans and examination questions. Several PEP curriculum 
developers/textbook editors also published papers explaining the content of the 1980 
Outline and the corresponding 1981-1982 textbook revisions, all basically repeating 
the official line, with frequent references to the `higher authorities' of Marx, Engels 
and Lenin. Mao, however, was somewhat downplayed following the debunking of 
the personality cult and the 1981 `Resolution, ' while appeals to ancient history to 
legitimise present decisions and to stress the longstanding importance attached to 
history in Chinese culture increased. 28 Following developments in education, which 
was becoming rapidly established as an autonomous academic discipline, and 
psychology, which had been recently rehabilitated as a legitimate field of research 
(having been suppressed in the Cultural Revolution as bourgeois, reactionary and 
unscientific), History educators also began to address pedagogical concerns, to 
explore theories and methods of enhancing the teaching and learning of history and to 
focus on the intellectual and personal development of the individual child. At the 
same time, they began to assimilate developments in professional historiography. The 
major trend in professional historiography away from `using theory to lead historical 
26 `Jiaoyubu guanyu gaijin jiagiang zhongxue lishi he dill jiaoxue de tongzhi' [1/8/1983], JYFQS, 
pp666-667. 
27 `Jiaoyubu guanyu xuexi guanche `guanyu jiagiang aiguozhuyi xuanchuan jiaoyu de yijian' de 
tongzhi' [24/8/1983], JYFQS, pp607-608 
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data' (yi lun dai shi) - often cynically punned as `using theory to replace data' - 
towards `integrating theory and historical data' (shilun jiehe) was rapidly adopted, 
although the more radical notion of `deriving theories from data' (lun cong shi chu) 
was rejected; 29 in part, because History educators could not incorporate the breadth of 
academic debate into their work, even had they wished to do so, for many discussions 
were far too abstruse for teachers, let alone students. It was also, however, because 
such ideas were not yet established as mainstream, and thus were unsuitable for young 
impressionable schoolchildren. 
IIL History in Flux 1986-1989 
The mid-late 1980s were a period of rapid change as central government attempted to 
implement economic liberalisation without granting significant concessions in the 
direction of political reform. Intellectual freedom in academia and cultural 
production, however, was increasingly asserted, and criticism of corruption, cronyism, 
and the progress and scope of reform grew ever more vocal. Serious theoretical 
challenges to orthodox Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought were mounted, and 
China's political future was hotly debated in the `salons' which had sprung up in more 
developed urban areas. In 1986, student demonstrations calling for `democracy', 
`human rights' and `freedom' erupted across Chinese cities. This was not what the 
Party had envisaged as part of `reform', and a crackdown against `bourgeois 
liberalisation' ensued. As in the 1983 anti-spiritual pollution campaign and the 
directives on patriotic education, the young were not held fully accountable for their 
erroneous notions, but were regarded largely as having been led astray by anti-Party, 
anti-socialist, bourgeois intellectuals. The campaign against bourgeois liberalisation 
culminated with the ousting of Hu Yaobang, who was perceived as too soft towards 
the students' demands, and the expulsion from the Party of prominent intellectuals 
Liu Binyan, Fang Lizhi and Wang Ruowang. The formal campaign dissipated shortly 
thereafter, but the demonstrations led to renewed official concern over moral- 
ideological education and the teaching of History in particular, which had yet again 
failed to immunise young minds against bourgeois diseases. Clearly, History, and 
especially the modem history of China's struggles and the history of the revolution 
28 See for example, Li, `Tixi, jiegou, zhongxin' [KJJ, 1982, no. 1], `Jiaoliu, shentou, shidai tese' [KJJ, 
1983, no. 11, `Fenxi, renshi, jiejian' [KJJ, 1984, no. 3] all reprinted in Li, Lishi wengao xuancun, ppl- 
23. 
29 On shi and lun in Chinese historiography, see Weigelin-Schwiedrzik `On shi and lun: toward a 
typology of historiography in the PRC'. 
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(mostly synonymous with Party history), needed to be both further reformed and 
comprehensively reinforced; as one senior Party historian, Guo Xianxiu, wrote in 
1987, 
The students' movement at the end of last year cannot but lead us to critically 
contemplate our teaching of history, especially our teaching of revolutionary history. 
How come slogans calling for democracy, freedom and human rights which the CPC 
and progressive intellectuals were fighting for and using to mobilise the masses in 
their fight against imperialism and feudalism some sixty years ago are now used by a 
small group of people to attack the CPC? How come a small group of people 
pretending to `reform ideas' can consider the political programme of establishing a 
bourgeois republic and the slogan of `total Westernisation' as an ideal worth being 
worshipped and longed for although the programme has long ago already been 
declared bankrupt and been blown away by history? And furthermore, how come 
they can exert so much influence and stir up so many people? We do not have too 
many reasons to criticise the young misled students. After pondering cold and 
cheerlessly over the question and after disposing of the influence of bourgeois 
liberalism we will easily find that we have not disseminated enough knowledge on 
the history of the Chinese revolution among today's students. There is nothing to be 
astonished about if these specially enthusiastic young students are stirred up by the 
ideological trend of bourgeois liberalism and regard the garbage of history as the 
miraculous cure for all their problems. 30 
The solution to this problem was not simply to transmit more information or insist 
more dogmatically on theoretical purity, but to convey a history of China's revolution 
which was less bound to the Party and abstract political principles and theories, and 
which instead narrated the history of the motherland and its struggle for national 
sovereignty and dignity. This would nurture concrete identification with the nation 
and patriotism, and would provide the young with a permanent locus of loyalty. 
Inculcating only loyalty to theory and revolutionary principles, on the other hand, 
would leave them with nothing solid in times of crisis, and even lead them to doubt 
the veracity or efficacy of ideology. 31 Historical materialism was not, of course, to be 
abandoned entirely as the guiding theoretical principle, but standpoints (lichang), 
methodology (fangfa) and viewpoints (guandian) were not to be conflated, and 
history was not to be reduced to mathematical proofs of the correctness of theory. If a 
liberalising trend was apparent among Party historians, it was still more prevalent 
among other academic historians, who were not only integrating theory and data, but 
were also boldly re-appraising a number of hitherto sensitive issues, such as the role 
of the nineteenth century reformers (once vilified as the incarnation of all things evil) 
and the origins and development of capitalism in China. Furthermore, their 
conclusions were increasingly `unorthodox', influenced in large part by the influx of 
30 Guo Xianxiu `Zhongguo geming shiqi huafen ji zhonggguo gemingshi jiaoxue zhuyi' in Zhongguo 
xiandaishi 1988, no. 3, pp 15-20 (first published in Guangzhou shiyuan xuebao, shekeban 1987, no. 4, 
pp51-56), cit. in Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, `Party history or history of the Chinese revolution? ', pp4-5. 
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foreign discourses on the philosophy and methods of historical research, many of 
which were now being translated into Chinese. 32 
In the more lowbrow sphere, Chinese history was increasingly used as subject or 
setting for popular cultural production (some perhaps following the 1983 exhortation 
to make more history-based films and television programmes), many of them 
addressing the disruption caused by CPC-launched campaigns such as the anti- 
Rightist Movement and the Cultural Revolution. 33 At the same time, journalists and 
writers were beginning a wave of historical investigative journalism (lishi jishi) and 
`problem literature' (wenti baogao wenxue), which tackled difficult historical issues 
for the mass audience, and served as counter-narrative to the official history, 
indirectly and sometimes directly criticising past Party decisions. 34 The revisionist 
trend in history was perhaps most famously exemplified in the documentary series, 
Heshang, broadcast in 1988. Heshang went much further in its criticisms than other 
works, lambasting traditional `yellow' (Chinese) culture, and ridiculing symbols of 
Chinese greatness as evidence of myopia, backwardness and ignorant isolationism. 
Furthermore, it implied that the CPC had wrought no improvements. Like the cultural 
iconoclasts of the New Culture Movement seventy years earlier, Heshang advocated 
reorientation towards the `blue' (maritime) culture and outlook perceived as 
characteristic of `Western' civilisation. 35 
Although it did not launch another official campaign, the CPC responded to these 
challenges by banning various `bourgeois liberal' works including Heshang. It then 
commissioned a rebuttal of Heshang, `On the Road: A Century of Marxism, ' a 
historical documentary which demonstrated how China's travails since the mid- 
nineteenth century had finally, under Party leadership, ended with the establishment 
of the PRC. 36 The SEdC, meanwhile, issued a Moral Education Outline (deyu 
dagang) reiterating the need to encourage the young to dedicate themselves 
31 Ibid, pp5-6. Weigelin-Schwiedrzik notes that this mirrored arguments advanced in the 1930s-1940s 
and the early 1960s in the Great Leap aftermath. 
32 Foreign theorists translated during the 1980s include E. H. Carr (What is History? ), Croce (The 
Theory and Practice of History), Collingwood (The Idea of History) and Popper (The Poverty of 
Historicism) (cit. in Qu, `Tashan zhi shi, he yi wei cuo', GMRB, 19/10/1988 reprinted in Qu, Shixue Yu 
shixuepinglun, pp311-315). 
33 See for example Xie Jin, The Legend of Tianyun Mountain (set in the late 1950s), Hibiscus Town 
(about the Cultural Revolution) and the television drama (also set in the Cultural Revolution) Kewang 
(Longing). Discussions of these and other works may be found in Zha Jianying, China Pop and 
Banne, `History for the Masses'. 
34 Barme, `History for the Masses'. 
35 The full text of Heshang is translated in Su, Deathsong of a River. 
36 This documentary is described by Barme, `Small Screen, Small Minds', Far Eastern Economic 
Review, Oct. 25 1990, p32. It was not broadcast until August 1990. 
83 
wholeheartedly to modernisation for the sake of national pride and the commonweal. 
It also emphasised developing a sense of public morality and a concept of democracy 
and upholding the law, which `little emperors' were thought to lack. 37 Presumably 
this did not press strongly enough the importance of counteracting the negative 
influences of Western bourgeois individualism and liberalism because, four months 
later, the Party issued its own `Notice on Reforming and Strengthening Moral 
Education Work in Primary and Secondary Schools. ' This document repeated much 
of what had been said in the 1983 Ministry of Propaganda directive on patriotic 
education about properly disseminating historical knowledge among the people, as 
well as reiterating the content of the Moral Education Outline, but it also stressed 
socialism more heavily and the need to strengthen Party leadership in ideological 
education work. 38 
Despite crackdowns on cultural production, and various government and MOE 
directives attempting to persuade or coerce the unruly into model behaviour and 
correct attitudes, professional thinking about school History does not appear to have 
been profoundly affected, although numerous articles on using History to construct 
socialist spiritual civilisation and promote patriotism were duly published in early 
1987 at the zenith of the campaign to eradicate bourgeois liberalism, and again in the 
wake of the Tiananmen massacre. 39 It must also be assumed that the widespread 
public debate over China's past and future which followed the broadcasting of 
Heshang would have touched History educators on a personal if not also a 
professional level. In general, however, History educators seem to have avoided 
public discussion of specific political issues and academic historical debates at this 
time, and to have focused primarily on more general moral and pedagogical matters. 
Being in the spotlight as one of the primary resources for moral-ideological education 
may have bolstered the official status of History and the prestige of those who worked 
in the field, but it also made them far more vulnerable to accusations of ideological 
deviance. It is hardly surprising, then, that they chose simply to avoid either 
affirming or rejecting the official line with any degree of conviction. 
37 `Zhongxue deyu dagang' [20/8/1988], JYFQS, pp596-601. For more discussion on this MOE 
directive and its implications, see Lan and Sun, Zhongxue deyu dagang shiyan baogao xuan bian. 
38 `Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu gaige he jiagiang zhongxiaoxue deyu gongzuo de tongzhi' 
[25/12/1988], JYFQS, pp588-592. 
39 See for example, Bao, `Jianchi gaige, chongfen fahui lishi jiaoxue zai shehuizhuyi jingshen wenming 
jianshe zhong de teshu youshi', pp 10-11; Qian, `Peiyang xuesheng shehuizhuyi wenming shi lishi 
jiaoshi de guangrong shirring', pp17-18; LSJX editorial, `Lishi jiaoxue yu jingshen wenming jianshe', 
p2; Fan, `Aiguozhuyi shi lishi jiaoxue de yongheng zhuti'. 
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IV. From Socialism to Nationalism 1989-1995 
By the end of the 1980s, rampant nepotism and corruption had combined with 
spiralling inflation, wage stagnation and abolition of subsidies to cause increasingly 
widespread dissatisfaction with the Party. When students took to Tiananmen Square 
in April 1989 to lament reformist leader Hu Yaobang's death, protest against 
corruption and call for further reforms, therefore, they were soon joined by thousands 
of disgruntled workers. The subsequent suppression is well documented, and need 
not be discussed here, but the complete failure of calls for rejection of bourgeois 
liberalism and strengthening of morality, which had been adopted to avert the crisis, 
led the Party to reassert its patriotic credentials as China's past, present and future 
saviour, for had not even the Party's critics claimed to be seeking to save China? The 
Tiananmen students had also specifically demanded to be recognised as patriots as a 
condition of leaving the Square. Perhaps patriotism was a doctrine which could unite 
almost everyone; indeed the Party itself had admitted as much in acknowledging 
`patriotic' contributions to China's recent history and development made by overseas 
Chinese, and reassessing many historical figures formerly labelled `class enemies' as 
loyal patriots. The Party thus averred that having saved the nation from feudalism, 
imperialism, Japan, the KMT, the USSR and USA, it now had to protect it from 
China's youth, who had, it was believed, tasted only the sweet fruits of modernisation 
and not the hard years of bitter struggle, and were thus easily `led astray' by the 
pernicious influences of `decadent' Western culture. Unlike their `ignorant' Cultural 
Revolution predecessors cited in the 1983 directives, this generation did not have the 
excuse of not having received a systematic education. Clearly then, what was being 
taught in schools was not accurately transmitting the official message, or was 
providing insufficient preparation to enable the young to resist the infiltration of 
subversive ideas sponsored by Western capitalist-imperialists. 
Tiananmen thus prompted intensified focus on education, and especially on 
History, as a source of moral and ideological renewal and consolidation. In November 
1989, the SEdC issued the `Opinion on Strengthening Political-Ideological Education 
and Education in National Conditions (guoqing) through Primary and Secondary 
School Chinese, History and Geography' This was far more aggressive and pro-Party 
than previous directives, emphasising that China would never `capitulate to foreign 
forces, nor completely Westernise (quanpan xihua), nor take the capitalist road' and 
that the Party is `great, glorious ... and the correct long-term choice of the Chinese 
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people. Only under Party leadership will the Chinese minzu be able to stand up in the 
world of nations. 40 In an apparently unprecedented move, the Teaching Plan and 
Outline provisions were overridden mid-academic year, and from the spring semester 
of the 1989-1990 school year, modern and contemporary Chinese history were to be 
added to the first year senior secondary curriculum, which since 1978 had taught only 
world history (two years of Chinese history were taught in junior secondary). 41 
Second year students (who had started senior secondary in 1988) were also to join this 
course, and from 1990, it was to be permanently integrated into the regular senior 
secondary curriculum. World history content, meanwhile, would be reduced, since as 
of 1986 it had been reintroduced to the junior secondary curriculum, albeit as a minor 
component. 42 This was justified by an assertion that the current content of world 
history was too difficult for students, but it seems far more likely that it was simply 
necessitated by the greater emphasis to be placed on Chinese history as the vehicle for 
patriotic education. 43 
In spring 1990, a further `Opinion' was issued on strengthening moral education. 
Without mentioning Tiananmen by name, this document stated that great progress had 
been made `over the past year, ' but that much was still to be done to eradicate 
subversion at the roots. Party leadership was again highlighted, and Politics was also 
emphasised over History for the first time since before the Cultural Revolution. In an 
ominous tone, the 1990 Opinion advised education administrations and schools to 
`absorb deeply the lessons of calming that 1989 tidal wave, to rectify the guiding 
ideology of education, and to resist bourgeois liberalism. '`W Similar guidelines on 
ideological education were also issued specifically for Tibetan students, amid fears 
that the intense Tibetan hostility towards central government which prevailed after the 
suppression of the 1987 demonstrations had been exacerbated by Tiananmen. 45 The 
most comprehensive education guidelines to emerge in response to the late 1980s 
40 `Guojia jiaowei guanyu zai zhongxiaoxue yuwen, lishi, dili deng xueke jiaoxue zhong jiagiang 
sixiang zhengzhi he guoqing jiaoyu de yijian' [8/11/1989], JYFQS, pp619-621. 
41 For a complete break-down of class hour allocations for the 1978-2000 period, see Chapter 4 Tables 
4.1 and 4.2. 
42 This is discussed further in Chapter 4. 
43 'Guojia jiaowei guanyu zai zhongxiaoxue yuwen, lishi, dili deng xueke jiaoxue zhong jiagiang 
sixiang zhengzhi he guoqing jiaoyu de yijian' [8/11/1989], JYFQS, p621. 
' `Guanyu jinyibu jiagiang zhongxiaoxue deyu gongzuo de jidian yijian' [13/4/1990], JYFQS, pp592- 
596. 
45 `Guojia jiaowe bangongting guanyu jiagiang neidi Xizangban zhengzhi sixiang jiaoyu gongzuo 
youguan wenti de tongzhi' [14/6/1990], JYFQS, pp186-187. In Tibetan schools, this resulted in a half- 
day being set aside each week for patriotic education to the detriment of other subjects (Bass, 
Education in Tibet, p59). 
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crises, however, were not promulgated until 1991. In March then-Party General 
Secretary Jiang Zemin had written a letter to SEdC leaders, Li Tieying and He 
Dongchang, calling for greater attention to be paid to modern-contemporary Chinese 
history and to education in China's national conditions (guoqingjiaoyu) as a means of 
inculcating right attitudes to socialist modernisation and due caution with regard to 
foreign ideas and culture. `ý6 Unsurprisingly, this letter was subsequently published 
and widely circulated, and immediately taken as a basis for new SEdC directives, 
which were issued in August. 
The `General Guideline on Strengthening Modern and Contemporary Chinese 
History and Education in National Conditions' used much more extremist language 
and was clearer in its targets of attack than earlier documents. The Guideline's stated 
objectives dwelled primarily on strengthening patriotism, faith in the Party, and 
cultural pride; on teaching the young that foreign ideas of `democracy', `human 
rights' and `peaceful evolution' are the sugar-coated bullets of `reactionary enemy 
forces' (capitalist and imperialist) conspiring to return China to a weak and easily 
exploited, semi-feudal, semi-colonial state; and on teaching the young to understand 
China's `national conditions', which would give them patience and determination to 
strive for socialist modernisation, so that China would never again be humiliated. 
`Western capitalism' was singled out for special attack, not only for its past 
imperialist transgressions against China, but as innately evil. This evil, exploitative 
nature was to be exposed through History and, in language reminiscent of the anti- 
Rightist and Cultural Revolution campaigns, `a clear line' was to be drawn between 
socialism (China, good) and capitalism (the West, bad). Although the working people 
of Western countries were to be recognised as fellow sufferers exploited by the ruling 
classes, the distinction between political-economic systems and national character 
(guomin jingshen) was not made very clear, and the general tone certainly had more 
than a whiff of anti-foreignism about it. History was to be the core of this educational 
endeavour, and the guideline listed three key components: `five-thousand years of 
glorious culture, ' `more than one hundred years of struggle to save the nation from 
humiliation and annihilation by invading enemy forces, ' and forty years of `world- 
beating transformation' and the establishment of `glorious future prospects' under the 
leadership of the CPC. CPC `errors, ' meanwhile, were to be examined from a 
46 'Jiang Zemin zongshuji zhi Li Tieying, He Dongchang qiangdiao jinxing Zhongguo jindaishi, 
xiandishi ji guoging jiaoyu', written 3/1991, first published in RMRB, 1/6/1991, reprinted in COH, 
pp. 607-608. 
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`positive' standpoint and narrating them was to result in `positive conclusions. ' 47 An 
appropriate `syllabus' was accordingly drawn up in the form of a `Guideline for 
Political-Ideological Education in Primary and Secondary School History. ' This in 
fact did not differ significantly from the existing Outline, and was merely a list of 
topics deemed relevant to conveying the Guideline's core message. Education 
authorities, however, were to draw up more specific plans and `within two-three years 
should have integrated all the provisions of the guidelines into the curriculum of every 
school, ' although how this was to be done other than `to pay special attention to those 
subjects most important for this kind of education' was not specified. 48 
The 1991 directives thrust History further into the spotlight, and the new Teaching 
Plan for compulsory education raised its official status even higher by adding an extra 
weekly class hour in the second year of junior secondary to be devoted to modern- 
contemporary history. The reaction from History professionals, however, was less 
dramatic than the 1991 guidelines might suggest, although as always, numerous 
articles and books on guoqing education were published, as well as various children's 
patriotic education books designed as supplementary reading since they could not 
legitimately be incorporated into the already crowded curriculum. 49 History 
education professionals, however, predominantly continued the trend towards 
pedagogical rather than ideological research; in part for safety reasons, but also 
because the crackdown and renewed vigilance against `poisonous (foreign) weeds' 
had not been a total conservative victory, for socialist modernisation was still to be 
attained through reform and opening, as Deng made abundantly clear in his 1992 
`Southern tour'. Foreign books and articles on education and psychology therefore 
continued to be translated, and increasing numbers of senior educationalists travelled 
abroad to study the ways in which other countries were carrying out History teaching. 
Much like the late nineteenth-early twentieth century reformers, Chinese 
educationalists saw foreign education and particularly the emphasis on skills and 
creativity as one of the bulwarks of economic success. If China wanted to compete 
successfully in the globalised knowledge economy, she would be foolish not to learn. 
As one History educator has described, 
47`Guojia jiaowei guanyu lingfa `zhongxiaoxue jiaqiang jindai, xiandaishi ji guoging jiaoyu de zongti 
gangyao (chugao)' de tongzhi', [1991], reprinted COH, pp609-610; `Zhongxiaoxue jiagiang jindai, 
xiandaishi ji guoging jiaoyu de zongti gangyao (chugao)' [ 1991 ], pp. 610-636. 
48 `Zhongxiaoxue lishi xueke sixiang zhengzhi jiaoyu gangyao', [8/1991], reprinted COH, pp637-655. 
49 See for example Zhang and Wang, `Guoging jiaoyu yu lishi jiaoxue chuyi'; Zhongguo jiaoyubao ed. 
Zhongguo jinxiandai shi he guoqingjiaoyu duben. 
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Times are changing, society is developing, the world economy and the scientific and 
technological spheres are ceaselessly advancing; creative consciousness and creative ability 
have already become important factors in overall national power and international competition. 
The capital with which to engage in international competition is thus the quality of the national 
people (minzu suzhi), and science and technology; that is to say, education and talented 
persons..... The times call for the emergence of wise and able persons such as a modern day 
Zhuge Liang, Nobel or Einstein, not for the merely knowledgeable, such as the likes of Zhao 
Kuo or Ma Su. 5° 
V. Quality Education 1996-? 
Since 1991, central government has issued only one major decree on ideological 
education with the 1994 `Guideline for Implementing Patriotic Education' which was 
slightly more moderate in tone than its predecessors, although it reiterated many of 
their suggestions for promoting historical knowledge. 51 It also pointedly emphasised 
national defence, guarding against `splittism' and promoting minzu unity, and appears 
to have had wider ramifications for education policies in minority regions than in Han 
areas. 52 Since the mid-1990s, however, reform and opening have accelerated 
dramatically and with economic prosperity for the educated elite, their vocal 
opposition to the government has been reduced to mere grumbles, although it is 
another matter in poverty-stricken rural areas and dismantled industrial complexes 
where official corruption, high unemployment and lack of welfare support regularly 
spark demonstrations and riots. Exposure to foreign ideas has also gathered pace 
through the burgeoning academic translation market and the growing numbers of both 
government cadres and private individuals who travel abroad for study or research, 
often returning to take up key positions as `expert' participants in policy-making. 
This has certainly been the case in education, where great efforts have been expended 
to `absorb the experiences of developed nations' and create an education system that 
is both modern and relevant to China's particular needs and circumstances. As 
always, reforming `value-free' subjects has been most straightforward, but with little 
government guidance since the 1991 directives, History education researchers have 
been able to explore and even to publish almost anything they choose. This is 
certainly not the same as saying that there has been completely open discussion, free 
from editorial or self-censorship, let alone that `new' ideas and practices have been 
widely implemented, but as argued below and in Chapter 3, the voices of reform- 
50 Ouyang, Banghua, `Lishi ketang jiaoxue yu chuangzaoxing siwei', p18. 
s' `Aiguozhuyi shishi gangyao' [231811994], JYFQS, ppl 17-122. 
52 Bass, Education in Tibet, pp54-60; Harrell and Bamo, `Combining Ethnic Heritage and National 
Unity', p70. Harrell and Bamo do not refer specifically to these directives, but note that since 1995 
control over production of Nuosu language textbooks has become more centralised and content has 
been significantly altered to emphasise the importance of national unity over local attachment. 
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minded History education professionals are increasingly driving the debate from the 
bottom (or at least the middle) up and influencing the decisions of senior policy- 
makers. 
Over the past several years, the most important - indeed almost the only - topic of 
discussion in History education and education as whole has been `quality education' 
(suzhi jiaoyu). There is much debate surrounding its precise definition and what it 
should entail, but the core of the argument revolves around the word suzhi which, as 
with the English term `quality', has many cognates with various shades of meaning 
that must be largely inferred from the context in which it is used. Generally speaking, 
suzhi denotes: elements or attributes (yaosu) that together comprise a whole; the 
nature or character (xingzhi) of an entity; or its qualitative value (pinzhi). 53 Drawing 
somewhat unevenly on these overlapping meanings, the term suzhi until recently had 
widest currency in the fields of physiognomy and psychology, where it commonly 
refers to innate (tiansheng) physical, intellectual or psychological traits and abilities 
which, it is believed, may be - indeed, must be - nurtured through various forms of 
training if they are to be brought to fruition. Since the mid-1980s, however, suzhi has 
been appropriated (and some might say distorted) to serve various political, 
ideological and social purposes. The most significant of these has involved the drive 
to `improve population quality' (tigao renkou suzhi). As Murphy has recently shown, 
the one-child policy is a cornerstone of this project, seen as a means by which parental 
and societal resources can be concentrated to produce `higher quality' individuals, 
thereby raising the quality of the population as a whole and contributing to national 
development goals. 54 Barely distinguishable from population quality improvement is 
the idea of `raising the quality of the national people' (tigao minzu suzhi); the two 
slogans have, it seems, even been used interchangeably, although in general 
`population quality' can be seen as having slightly stronger eugenicist connotations, 
and is typically cited when referring to specific domestic matters, particularly rural 
issues and the one-child policy, while raising national quality is more commonly 
invoked in broad discussions on how to `arouse China' (zhenxing Zhonghua) and 
engender `a revival of the great national people' (weida minzufuxing) who will then 
53 Cihai, p1479; Xiandai Hanyufenlei cidian, p405, p 1074. 
sa Murphy, `Turning Chinese Peasants into Modern Citizens'. As with many contemporary Chinese 
government policies, the concept of `population quality' echoes Singaporean thinking; indeed, the 
Singaporean government's policy of offering material incentives to highly educated couples to have 
larger families is much praised in China. As yet, this remains mostly implicit in public discussion on 
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triumph in economic and cultural competition against other national peoples. As 
indicated by another common slogan, `science and education for the rise of the 
country' (kejiao xingguo), education is regarded as a key means of fostering quality, 
both for imparting the necessary scientific and technical know-how to compete in the 
global knowledge economy and for consolidating a moral-ideological foundation that 
will ensure wholehearted dedication to the motherland's socialist modernisation 
cause. `Raising the quality of the national people', along with `producing more 
talent' (duo chu rencai) and `producing high quality talent' (chu hao rencai), was 
accordingly adopted as an official objective of the 1985 Reform, and has featured 
prominently in all subsequent education directives. 55 
It has, of course, been but a short step from `raising the quality of the national 
people' through education to the emergence in the mid-1990s of a doctrine of `quality 
education' - quality people cannot, after all be produced by an inferior education. It 
would be erroneous, however, to think that discussion of quality education has merely 
arisen in response to government calls to raise national quality, even if the language 
and many of the overall objectives of official and academic suzhi discourse frequently 
coincide. As already noted, educationalists have been talking about pedagogical 
reform and the need to make schooling more relevant to `real life' for many years, 
especially in History and other humanities and social sciences where discussing 
content has frequently been off-limits and where there is a felt need to justify the 
existence of subjects with few obvious real world applications in an increasingly 
crowded curriculum. This has led them to focus on the role schooling plays in the 
development of `character' (renge) and `skills' (nengli) which, it is alleged, were 
direly neglected `during the era when class struggle set the parameters of educational 
research' and `the demands of politics provided the criteria for educating people': 
renge because it was regarded as `a bourgeois academic term bearing the toxic 
remnants of feudalism', and skills because redness superseded expertise. 56 Even in 
the reform and opening era, it is thought that too much emphasis has been placed on 
creating a small elite that can meet the country's scientific and technological demands 
and too little on the educational needs of majority. This, it is believed, has 
perpetuated an inflexible, narrowly academic, examination-centred curriculum which 
the matter, although the idea of allowing urban residents who have access to superior `cultural and 
educational conditions' and whose quality is higher to have more than one child has been mooted. 
ss 'Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu jiaoyu tizhi gaige de jueding', JYFQS, p66-67. 
56 Zhao, Lishi jiaoyuxue, p39. 
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is over-reliant on spoon-feeding and rote-learning of data, thereby overloading 
students with work, stifling creativity, neglecting the psychological and social facets 
of the individual's child's development and completely failing to prepare them for life 
beyond the school. Quality education has thus emerged primarily as a potential 
solution for these many problems. 
Needless to say, such grand objectives in combination with a pre-existing official 
suzhi discourse and the nature-nurture conundrum underlying physiognomic and 
psychological definitions of suzhi have meant that the meaning and substance of 
quality education have been matters of great debate. 57 Some adopt a view of suzhi as 
innate quality or qualities, assuming fundamental differences between each child and 
limitations to their potential; as Sun and Cheng have succinctly expressed it, `quality 
may be developed, it cannot be taught. '58 Some highlight the `social component' 
(shehui yinsu) of suzhi and tend towards an emphasis on the educative process rather 
than the raw materials. Others focus on the finished product, the `complete person', 
and see quality education in terms of goals which may be reached by assorted 
methods appropriate for the starting point of the individual child. Quality education 
in practice, or in the theory of practice, meanwhile, has been quite consistently set up 
in diametric opposition to traditional `examination-oriented education' (yingshi 
jiaoyu), and although, as has more recently been argued, this binary thinking is too 
simplistic and implies that all education prior to the past few years has been `anti- 
quality', repudiating examination-oriented education remains a core feature of quality 
education discourse. 59 If there is agreement on what quality education is opposing, 
there is also broad consensus on what it should achieve. Drawing on the work of 
contemporary foreign scholars, as well as the Deweyan pedagogical thinking of the 
1920s and even ancient Confucian and Daoist approaches to teaching and learning, 
educationalists maintain that the fundamental objective of quality education should 
be, to quote Bruner, to `cultivate excellence', to enable not only the best students, but 
the entire student body (zhengti xuesheng) to attain their maximum potential. 60 This 
requires the promotion of `holistic' (quanmian) development through delivering a 
57 For a scholarly analysis of suzhi definitions and contradictions see Huang, `Suzhi jiaoyu beilun'. 
51 Sun and Cheng, `Quality, Development and Education'. 
59 Yang, `Examinations, Coping with Examinations and the Relationship between Exam-oriented 
Education and Quality Education', p16. 
60 Bruner, The Process of Education, p9. This book (translated as Jiaoyu guocheng, Wenhua jiaoyu 
chubanshe, 1982) and others by the same author, such as Jiaoxue lilun tantao and ? REFS) are 
frequently cited by educationalists. (See for example, Zhu, Lishi jiaocaixue gailun, p8; Zhao, 
Zhongxue lishi jiaoyuxue, p399; Peng, `Peiyang zhineng shi lishi jiaoxue gaige de hexin', p36. ) 
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rounded moral, intellectual, physical and aesthetic education (de zhi ti mei) to each 
child, nurturing individual strengths and improving areas of weakness, and ensuring 
psychological and social well-being. The holistic ethos is further reflected in an effort 
to integrate teaching and learning, preactive and active curricula, abstract knowledge 
and concrete practice. 61 This, it is hoped, will foster a more democratic, participatory 
classroom environment, nurture creativity and independent thinking in students, and 
equip them with transferable skills. 62 Although as shown in Chapter 7 this has yet to 
have significant effects on redirecting classroom practice away from teacher- and 
textbook-centrism and omnipresent examinations, 63 quality education has been 
unquestioningly accepted as the way forward for education; indeed, it was adopted as 
the official education policy mantra in 1999.64 
As is clear from the above discussion, most quality education goals are applicable 
across the school curriculum, and History has been no exception. As in other 
subjects, current thinking on History education has focused on formulating 
appropriate strategies for nurturing or optimising suzhi, especially what is often 
termed `cultural quality' (wenhua suzhi) or `cultivation in the humanities' (renwen 
suyang), and for developing intellectual skills. These are hardly new ideas, having 
been seriously discussed by specialists in History pedagogy since the late 1980s, 65 and 
the focus on cultural quality, of course, has an ancient pedigree, owing much to 
classical views of history and the arts. Thinking behind skill-training, however, is 
somewhat more recent, and follows the UK model developed in the 1970s, in 
particular the work of Lee, Dickinson and their colleagues discussed in the 
introduction, some of which has been translated into Chinese. For those with the 
requisite language skills, British influences are also available indirectly through the 
Hong Kong History curriculum, and directly through the UK national curriculum and 
GCSE examination papers which are widely circulated in Education and History 
61 General works which define quality education and spell out some of its core objectives include: Lu 
and Wang eds., Suzhi jiaoyu: jiaoyu lixiang yu mubiao; Zhou, Suzhi jiaoyu: li/un, caozuo, jingyan; Yu, 
Jichujiaoyu xin gainian: suzhi jiaoyu. 
62 Zhang, Suzhi jiaoyu de jiban. 
63 Yu, Jichu jiaoyu xin gainian: suzhi jiaoyu, pp28-31. 
64 `Zhonggong zhongyang guowuyuan guanyu shenhua jiaoyu gaige quanmian tuijin suzhi jiaoyu de 
jueding' [13/6/1999] and `Shenhua jiaoyu gaige, quanmian tuijin suzhi jiaoyu, wei shixian Zhonghua 
minzu de weida fuxing er fendou' [15/6/1999] in Beijing jiaoyu kexueyuan, Jiaoyu wenxuanji, pp45- 
78. 
65 See for example Ye, `Peiyang he fazhan xuesheng lishi siwei nengli de tansuo' and `Peiyang he 
fazhan xuesheng lishi siwei nengli de jiaoxue shijian'. This theme was taken up by the LSJX editorial 
team the following year (1992) in its August editorial, `Yingdang kaizhan dui jiaocai nengli peiyang de 
yanjiu . 
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departments at several Normal Universities. Japanese pedagogical research has 
similarly attracted the attention of many Chinese History education professionals, 
which given the ongoing controversy over textbooks between the two countries may 
seem somewhat surprising. It should be remembered, however, that many History 
educationalists in Japan are outspoken critics of atrocity-denying nationalists such as 
Fujioka Nobukatsu and his `Liberal View of History' group (Jiyushugi Shikan 
Kenkyukai) who seek to reverse what they see in the post-war period as a masochistic, 
self-denigrating national narrative. 66 Chinese educationalists can therefore study 
these `leftist' Japanese scholars' work without compromising their patriotic integrity. 
Furthermore, as in the late nineteenth - early twentieth centuries, Japan is of particular 
interest because it is seen to have successfully adapted `Western techniques' to 
`Eastern essences'. Japanese textbooks, while despised for their whitewashing of the 
wartime past, are thus often admired for their contemporary pedagogical style and 
format. 67 History education in the US and Canada have also been studied, and 
cursory investigations have been made of the field in South Korea and assorted 
European countries. 68 A few writers, meanwhile, have looked into China's own past, 
examining ideas and experiments developed in the Republic; 69 Zhao has even gone 
back to the Xueji and concluded that holistic education - skills and critical thinking, as 
well as moral development - was exactly what was being promoted then. 
70 The main 
outcome of this research has been an attempt to cultivate intellectual skills (zhineng) 
rather than simply force-feeding knowledge (zhishi); that is, to develop students' 
powers of `historical thinking' (lishi siwei) and imagination (xiangxiang). 71 It has 
also meant considerably less emphasis on positivism and immutable laws of 
development and greater emphasis on the individual mind and personality as an 
element of reconstructing history; as Ye has written, `History is a subject through 
66 One prominent Japanese History pedagogy specialist and critic of nationalist history, Nitani Sadao, is 
widely known and often translated in the PRC [EGS]. For information on the Liberal View of History 
group, see, for example, chapters by McCormack and Gerow in Hein and Selden eds, Censoring 
History. 
67 Zhao, Lishijiaoyuxue and Riben xuexiao shehuike jiaoyu yanjiu; Zhu, Lishi jiaocaixue gailun, 
pp267-274. 
68 Wang and Li, Bijiao lishi jiaoyuxue; Zhu, Lishi jiaocaixue gailun; Yu et al, Lishi xueke jiaoyuxue. 
69 Jin, `He Bingsong dui lishi jiaoyu de gongxian'. Dewey is also frequently referenced by 
contemporary writers. 
70 Zhao, `Liji `Xueji' jiaoyulun de xiandai yiyi'. 
" Numerous articles on this subject have been published. Some representative examples include: Yao, 
Tun lishi xueke zai suzhi jiaoyuzhong de dute zuoyong ji qi shishi tujing'; Ouyang, `Lishi ketang 
jiaoxue yu chuangzaoxing siwei'; Wu, Shouzhi. Tun lishi siwei'; Zhang, `Dui lishi kecheng 
xianzhuang de fenxi'. One of the most sophisticated discussions of what quality education might entail 
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which one apprehends the historical process of human social development, and this 
historical recognition unavoidably brings subjectivity into selection and explanation 
[of historical data]'. 72 This has led, in turn, to an increasing emphasis on 
`independent thinking' (duli sikao) and on developing and expressing personal 
opinions. There are, of course, numerous contradictions inherent in on the one hand 
demanding the development of independent views, and on the other insisting that 
students arrive at `correct' historical viewpoints and verdicts, something which 
continues to be advocated by many educationalists, reform-minded or otherwise; it is, 
after all, widely believed that ideological and moral education is not just a politically 
motivated add-on to History, but is integral to the subject, and that in light of `little 
emperor' syndrome, building character (renge) and moral quality (pinde) has become 
more urgent than ever. 73 There are indications, nonetheless, that this contradiction is 
being acknowledged in some quarters, and while no viable solutions have yet been 
publicly advanced, the very notion of `correct viewpoints' is beginning to be 
implicitly criticised in the new pedagogical goal of developing `correct' historical 
approaches or conceptions of history (zhengque de lishiguan) - that is, critical 
thinking and analysis of evidence. 74 
Another significant development is the trend towards following the path taken in 
primary education and integrating History into Social Studies at secondary level. 
Unsurprisingly, this has been staunchly opposed by many History educators who view 
it as a threat to their own status and job security, and thus continue to emphasise its 
traditional role in understanding the present and predicting the future as well as 
reiterating its place in moral-ideological education. While this may play well with 
conservative Party elders, however, it is the reformists who appear to be gaining the 
upper hand. Many of the more vocal critics of the History subject as it currently 
stands have become increasingly involved in curriculum development since they are 
at the forefront of research into skill-training. Their emphasis on the `practical' 
applications of History and their tendency to look abroad for successful pedagogical 
models have been among the primary factors driving the integrationist campaign. As 
for the History subject can be found in a series of articles by Zhao, `Gexing, chuangzaoxing: xin shiji 
zhongxue lishi jiaoxue de hexin'. 
'2 Ye, `Dui lishi jiaokeshu zuoyong de fansi', p43. 
73 Wang, Lishi jiaoyuxue, p45; Yu et al, Lishi xueke jiaoyuxue, p87. 
74 Feng is among those who have publicly highlighted the individual opinion/correct viewpoint clash 
(`Lishi xueke chuangzaoxing siwei de kaocha yu peiyang'), although like most she does not offer a 
solution. In personal conversations with assorted History education researchers, I also found that many 
95 
in so many aspects of educational reform, Social Studies is not a wholly new or 
foreign idea, having been pioneered at the primary level in Republican times. Social 
Studies has in fact already replaced secondary level History, Geography and General 
Knowledge (changshi) in Zhejiang, introduced when the province developed its own 
curriculum in the late 1980s (see Chapter 5), and a similar course has also been on 
trial in Shanghai's Yangpu district. Although Zhejiang's curriculum and textbooks 
have been privately derided and did not pass the TMIC inspection (this does not 
prevent them being used in Zhejiang as shown in Chapter 3), the current interest in 
introducing Social Studies at secondary level has led to a sudden surge of interest in 
what Zhejiang has been doing. In the past few years, concrete action has been taken 
nationally in the shape of trial curricula for `Social Studies' as well as for a 
compromise subject of `History and Society', which is theoretically integrated, but 
prioritises the History component of the course. 
Despite this explosion of liberal and experimental ideas, which are widely 
discussed by senior researchers and academics, and which have received at least token 
acceptance by the government in its ongoing public support for quality education, 
implementing avant-garde pedagogical practices in all but the most elite schools does 
not seem likely to happen in the immediate future, for as Zhou reminds us, the basic 
questions still have not been fully resolved. 
Some people say that the contemporary history of educational development in China since 1949 
is in fact a history of educational reform, a history of the search for socialist education with 
Chinese characteristics. In the process of development, this history has continually raised 
fundamental questions which demand answers: What is education? That is, what is the nature 
of education and its application/use? Which people does education serve? How does it serve? 
What are the aims of education? Who should lead education? Who should run schools - the 
state or the people? Should there be a unified system or multiple educational models? In 
regards to content, should theoretical (indirect) knowledge or practical (direct) knowledge be 
emphasised? With respect to goals, should we stress progressing to the next level [of 
education], or should we [prepare students] for employment? And then there is the related 
question, should we prioritise key schools or universal education? Regarding the speed of 
implementation, should stable, incremental development be promoted or great leaps forward? 
And in quality of rencai, should we emphasise the unity of politics and professionalism, redness 
and expertise or their diametric opposition? 75 
had noted the problem, and some explicitly denounced the concept of correct viewpoints. Few, 
however, are prepared to express such radical minority views in writing. 
75 Zhou, Suzhi jiaoyu: lilun, caozuo, jingyan, Introduction, p2. 
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Chapter 3 
The Institutional and Administrative Context 
A note on terminology 
Ministry of Education (MOE) is used in all general discussion of the PRC's highest education 
authority. It was named the MOE from 1949-1985, the State Education Commission (SEdC) from 
1985-1998, and MOE again 1998 present. SEdC is used to refer to specific instances during the 1985- 
1998 period. 
I. Public Policy and Education Administration 
Most policy-makers no doubt long for an ideal world in which decisions are swiftly 
and unanimously agreed, smoothly implemented and produce the outcomes for which 
they were formulated. In the real world, even the most charismatic and brutal 
dictators typically seek their acolytes' advice and co-operation in setting policy, and 
however authoritarian the state, it is impossible to guarantee that what is ordered by 
senior officials is accurately performed by their minions, let alone that the desired 
policy outcomes obtain at grassroots level. How then do government bureaucracies 
(or any other large public organisations) operate to achieve policy consensus and to 
ensure that agreed-upon policies are maximally implemented? Economists, 
sociologists and political scientists have had much to say on these matters, and have 
devised or adapted from other disciplines (such as mathematics and psychology) a 
number of theories to explain, predict and/or improve the public policy-making and 
implementation process. Indeed, new hybrid academic disciplines, such as policy 
studies and public administration, have evolved specifically to address these concerns. 
While some theorists focus on institutions as the basic unit of analysis, arguing that 
the structure and function of organisations determine the decisions and actions of their 
members, others maintain that it is the goals and choices of individual rational actors 
that shape policy-making and implementation. ' Needless to say, both approaches 
have been criticised: the former for overlooking the importance of individual 
motivation, the latter for aggregating individual choice to determine public choice, 
and both have been accused of neglecting the issue of power relations between 
individual and collective actors. 2 Few empirical studies of public policy apparatuses, 
however, adhere rigidly to a single theoretical approach, and most acknowledge the 
significance of both institutional and individual factors. Furthermore, it has been 
' Coleman and Fararo eds., Rational Choice Theory: Advocacy and Critique; Ashford ed., History and 
Context in Comparative Public Policy, especially chapters by Furniss, `Functionalism and public 
Policy', pp189-210, and Rothstein, `Marxism and Institutional Analysis', pp85-116. 
2 Zey, Rational Choice Theory and Organizational Theory. 
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found that theories which appear adequately to describe policy processes in one area 
of administration do not always apply to another, even within the same society. 
Education, it has been argued, has been particularly difficult to squeeze into neat 
theoretical frameworks or compare to other policy areas, in part, because education 
systems are so diverse, ranging from the highly centralised (as in France) to the 
locally funded and operated (as in the USA). Education is also an extremely emotive 
issue because it typically consumes a high proportion of national and local budgets 
yet generates no tangible revenue, and because it is so palpably about the future of 
individuals, families and society as a whole. In education more than any other sphere, 
therefore, everyone thinks they should have a say: on how schools are run, how 
budgets are allocated, which textbooks are used and what is in them. In short, the 
implementation of macro-policies, especially at the local or school level, may be 
bitterly contested. 3 
Goodson examines precisely these issues of contestation and discrepancies 
between education policy-making and implementation in his seminal study of the 
school curriculum. School subjects, he argues, are not fixed categories of knowledge 
handed down fully formed from central governments or other education policy- 
making bodies; rather, they are `made' over time through `struggle' and `negotiation' 
over `territory, ' `resources' and `status' between individual and collective `curriculum 
stakeholders, ' such as national and local government education agencies, textbook 
writers and publishers, education researchers, academic subject experts, schools and 
teachers. Proposed changes to existing curricula may also be hotly debated in the 
media and passionately fought for or opposed by parents and concerned citizens, 
sometimes forcing education policy-makers to reconsider. The intended or 
`preactive' curriculum which emerges from this `struggle' then undergoes further 
modification or distortion during implementation at subordinate levels, resulting in an 
`interactive' school curriculum that often diverges significantly from what was 
originally planned or even officially mandated. 4 
Although most public policy theory has been formulated in and about institutions 
in liberal democracies (primarily in Western Europe and North America), and 
Goodson's curriculum thesis is derived almost solely from research conducted in the 
UK, and England in particular, it does not mean that these theories are irrelevant to 
the analysis or application of administrative practices in the rather different political 
3 Coombs, `Education Policy', p591. 
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and cultural setting of post-Mao China. Indeed, this has been acknowledged in the 
PRC itself where university courses in public administration, which were abolished in 
1952 for being based on capitalist theories and systems and thus inapplicable to 
socialist government, have been re-established and dramatically expanded since 1982, 
drawing heavily on imported ideas in an effort to create a more efficient, expert 
cohort of administrators. 5 Outside China, Hamrin, Zhao, Lampton, Lieberthal and 
their many Chinese and non-Chinese collaborators have also applied public policy 
theories to their analyses of PRC decision-making and implementation, and have 
found that policies are not simply determined through ideological or personal battles 
between elite rational actors within the Communist Party leadership, but are also 
negotiated between the Politburo, government ministries and public institutions. The 
resulting declarative policy, in turn, may be modified or subverted by regional and 
local authorities. 6 This has led some commentators to characterise the PRC system as 
one of `fragmented authoritarianism'; that is, while the regime and the political and 
administrative system remain largely authoritarian and central government continues 
to wield substantial coercive power, administrative structures and procedures 
necessitate both vertical and horizontal cross-department co-operation on many 
projects, resulting in far less command and far more bargaining and compromise than 
had previously been supposed. 7 
Needless to say, institutions in some policy areas have more leverage to pursue 
their objectives than those in others, even if they are of equivalent status; whether 
because their bosses are well connected to seats of legislative and coercive power, or 
because the institution itself is revenue-generating or plays a critical role in priority 
projects. In education, the 1985 Reform upgraded the MOE to the status of State 
Education Commission (SEdC, renamed MOE in 1998) making it administratively 
parallel rather than subordinate to the State Planning Commission, thereby unleashing 
education from its strict ties to economic planning which was primarily oriented to 
industrial and agricultural development. The leadership's commitment to education 
was further signalled by the appointment of then-vice premier Li Peng to serve 
4 Goodson, The Making of Curriculum. 
5 Zhang, `Public Administration in China' pp9-10. 
6 Hamrin and Zhao eds., Decision-Making in Deng's China; Lampton ed. Policy Implementation in 
Post-Mao China; Lieberthal and Lampton eds. Bureaucracy, Politics and Decision-making in Post- 
Mao China. 
Lieberthal, `Introduction: The Fragmented Authoritarianism Model and Its Limitations'. This model 
is derived principally from research into economic decision-making and institutions, the area to which 
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concurrently as SEdC head. 8 The enhanced autonomy and power over macro-policy 
conferred on the SEdC were, as noted in the previous chapter, matched by devolution 
of central administrative control, and by increased flexibility to adapt national policies 
to local needs and resources and to carry out experimental projects. Over the past two 
decades, the MOE has thereby gained high official status, but its capacity to pursue 
many policy options remains limited, since as a `non-productive sector' it has few 
tangible bargaining chips to deploy in negotiating for co-operation and support with 
other ministries and agencies. 9 The MOE also struggles to assert its authority over 
policy implementation at lower levels because only rarely are education policies 
enacted as law. Instead, they are typically promulgated as `opinions' (yijian), 
`guidelines' (gangyao), `rules' (guize) or `notices' (tongzhi) which the MOE has 
limited power to enforce since subordinate education departments are directed by the 
MOE only in a professional capacity (yewu guanli); they are financially and 
administratively controlled (xingzheng guanli) by the corresponding level of People's 
Government (see figure 3.1). Not only does the MOE have few legal recourses, but as 
Paine has shown, with approximately 90% of its budget tied to ongoing expenses such 
as salaries, it cannot offer material incentives to either local governments or education 
departments for compliance with national policies. 10 Policies are further 
circumscribed to some extent by public opinion which, as elsewhere, can be very 
vocal on education. (Even in authoritarian China, public opinion is rarely ignored 
indefinitely). In order to implement its preferred policies, therefore, the MOE must 
rely chiefly on building consensus on macro-policy goals and values, sustaining 
commitment to education from the leadership and persuading other government 
organs to co-operate on cross-departmental issues. 
Despite the relative powerlessness of the MOE to assure adherence to its 
directives, and vast disparities in the ways in which local governments choose to 
support, obstruct or simply neglect the efforts of their education departments to 
implement policy initiatives, various normative mechanisms have ensured that in 
many ways the education system remains highly centralised. Among the most 
foreign researchers have had most unfettered access. As the contributors to the above-cited Lieberthal 
and Lampton edited volume show, the model is not always applicable to other policy areas. 
8 Politburo members typically head national commissions (weiyuanhui), demonstrating the importance 
of these organs in the administrative hierarchy (Hamrin, `The Party Leadership System', p96). Li 
served as head of the SEdC from 1985-1988. Subsequent SEdC/MOE leaders have been less 
illustrious, and none has held an equivalently high government or Party post outside the MOE whilst in 
MOE office, although several have gone on to become State Council or politburo members. 
9 Paine, `The Educational Policy Process: A Case Study of Bureaucratic Action in China', p181. 
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Fig. 3.1 The hierarchy of education administration 
Parallel control systems (shuangchong guanli) 
Left: Professional hierarchy (yewu guanli) 
Right and across: Administrative hierarchy (xingzheng guanli) 
important of these mechanisms have been the national university entrance 
examinations, which tend to be the focal point of secondary education and to 
encourage a conformist approach to teaching and learning. In addition, barring 
periods of curricular devolution briefly in the late 1950s and again during the Cultural 
Revolution, from 1953 until 1986 only one set of textbooks was permitted to be used 
by all schools, and even with the introduction of textbook pluralism, differences 
between textbook sets have been minor. Likewise, the new, more flexible national 
curriculum piloted in 2001 and the many textbooks drafted to its specifications which 
are currently on trial in selected regions thus far appear fairly generic. This does not 
mean, however, that school subjects in the PRC have simply been dictated from on 
high and not `made' through a process of struggle and negotiation between curriculum 
10 Ibid 
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stakeholders. As Au Yeung has shown, curricula - for the subject of Chinese at least 
- are not entirely `politically motivated and centrally initiated' by the Party-state and 
transmitted unaltered to school pupils. In fact, `within the central government, the 
lack of co-operation and the competition between the various departments and 
curriculum agents results in a great deal of complexity, adaptation and confusion. ' 11 
Leung has found the same holds true for Geography, with rival academics involved in 
curriculum and textbook development bitterly contesting the parameters of curriculum 
content among themselves, and at the same time uniting to battle for improved subject 
status and increased class hours in the overall school curriculum. 12 Paine's research 
on teachers and teacher training, meanwhile, reveals how decentralisation has resulted 
in policies increasingly being initiated at local levels where education experiments 
may be carried out relatively unimpeded. Successful models are then adopted or 
adapted elsewhere and may eventually be taken up as national policy. 13 It would 
appear, therefore, that although central government attempts to monitor and 
standardise education through assorted exhortatory and regulatory mechanisms (such 
as advisory `guidelines' and `notices', national curricula, textbook inspection and 
approval systems), it exercises somewhat less top-down control than superficial 
markers of uniformity suggest. 
Au Yeung, Leung and Paine conducted their research in the mid-late 1980s, and 
since then the devolutionary trend in administration and the expansion of expert 
participation in policy-making has accelerated. It seems reasonable to assume, 
therefore, that the debate, negotiation `adaptation and confusion' that have 
characterised the formulation of the Geography and Chinese subjects might also be 
evident in History; Geography and Chinese are, like History, clearly regarded by the 
leadership as important vehicles for moral, political and patriotic education, and 
indeed, as noted in preceding chapters, the three subjects have long been linked, often 
listed together in central directives on strengthening ideological orthodoxy. At the 
same time, however, neither Geography nor Chinese is as profoundly implicated in 
regime legitimation as History, the primary factor, presumably, which has convinced 
Chan that `Party control over the teaching of history in schools is almost watertight. '14 
11AuYeung `Curriculum Dissemination in the People's Republic of China', p84. 
12 Leung, `Curriculum Development in the People's Republic of China'. 
13 Paine, `The Education Policy Process', pp 194-195. 
14 Chan, `Introduction', p4. 
102 
As discussed in Chapter 2, extreme political sensitivity has certainly limited the 
possibilities for vigorous and open debate over the purposes and content of History, 
leading most education professionals to concentrate on promoting ostensibly value- 
free skills and on reforming teaching, learning and assessment methods. This by no 
means implies, however, that the content of the History curriculum (both intended and 
implemented) has not been contested or undergone some reorientation of emphasis 
and interpretation, and while Chan is largely correct in asserting that such changes 
have been made 'completely in line with shifts in official orthodoxy, ' 15 it is argued 
here that reforming curriculum content has not been an entirely one-way, top-down 
process. What has been reformed will be discussed in subsequent chapters. The 
purpose of this chapter is to outline the institutional and procedural framework within 
which the History subject is `made' and to clarify how power and responsibility are 
distributed among various individual and collective curriculum stakeholders. This 
will contribute to a better understanding of how, why, by whom and to what extent 
policies and practices are replicated, diluted, transformed or subverted (consciously or 
otherwise) in the process of transmission between the MOE and school History 
classrooms. 
II. Macro-policy 
The MOE has many responsibilities and pre-collegiate schooling is just one of them. 
Most MOE departments are concerned with various aspects of higher education 
policy and administering those tertiary institutions under its direct authority - mainly 
large prestigious ones such as Beijing, Fudan, Beijing Normal and Huadong Normal 
Universities - and managing other subsidiary agencies such as the People's Education 
Press (PEP). 16 In fact, only the Basic Education Department (jichu jiaoyusi; 
henceforth BEdD), which replaced the Common Education Department (putong 
jiaoyuchu) in the 1985 Reform, is directly involved with primary and secondary 
education. The BEdD is, in turn, subdivided into several sections and offices 
responsible for various aspects of pre-school, primary and secondary education, and 
for improving adult literacy. Its overarching purpose is to achieve nation-wide 
success in the `two basics' (liangji) - that is, `basically to universalise nine-year 
compulsory education' (jiben puji jiunian yiwu jiaoyu) and `basically to eradicate 
child and adult illiteracy' (jiben saochu qingzhuangnian wenmang) - and its ongoing 
15 Ibid, p6. 
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responsibilities include guiding basic education reform and drafting relevant policy 
documents, setting assessment standards and overseeing and approving curriculum 
and textbook development. In regard to this last task, the BEdD produces Teaching 
Plans (jiaoxue jihua), which set out the general objectives of primary and secondary 
schooling and allocate class hours to each subject. It also convenes committees to 
draft individual subject Teaching Outlines (jiaoxue dagang) and oversees other 
committees that evaluate and approve curricula and textbooks. New curricula and 
textbooks, however, are only drafted every few years, and most of the BEdD's day-to- 
day policy work is concerned with more fundamental matters such as raising 
standards of putonghua, promoting health and hygiene and reducing drop-out rates. 
With the exception of Teaching Outlines, therefore, very little attention is devoted to 
individual school subjects, and only rarely does the MOE issue additional subject- 
specific instructions. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, however, several SEdC/MOE directives specifically 
concerning the History subject have been issued over the past two decades. I have 
been unable to ascertain precisely by whom these supplementary History policy 
documents were drafted and how much debate there was over them within the 
SEdC/MOE, since, as Lieberthal has noted, it is extraordinarily difficult to gain access 
to the highest decision-making levels in the PRC. 17 It is clear, nonetheless, that these 
policies were not spontaneously initiated within the MOE, nor were they a result of 
upwards pressure from a History education community seeking to augment its own 
status vis-a-vis other school subjects. As shown in the previous chapter, these 
documents have in each instance blown with the prevailing political winds of 
campaigns such as those against spiritual pollution and bourgeois liberalisation and 
the Tiananmen crack-down, and have been drafted immediately following 
pronouncements on using history to promote patriotism and commitment to socialist 
modernisation issued by Party leaders, such as Zhao Ziyang and Jiang Zemin, or by 
the Propaganda Ministry. It cannot, of course, be inferred from this that the MOE has 
been in any way opposed to reiterating the moral and patriotic significance of History, 
or that the heavily ideological language and content of these supplementary guidelines 
have been designed merely to placate anxious Party leaders. Senior personnel at the 
MOE have, after all, been appointed partly because of their political affiliations, and 
16 The MOEd lists all its departments and responsibilities at http: //www. moe. edu. cn/ 
17 Lieberthal, `Introduction: The Fragmented Authoritarianism Model and Its Limitations', p4. My 
own research access only went as high as the History TMIC, a sub-committee of the national TMIC. 
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evidently there has been a relatively high degree of consensus among the Party 
leadership on what purposes History should serve, with both `liberals' and 
`conservatives' calling for its application to patriotic education. Yet, the fact that the 
MOE has not issued any unprompted directives on History education, does suggest 
that it has not normally been thought necessary to do more than incorporate ideology 
into Teaching Outlines. Indeed, the content of the 1991 `Guideline for Political- 
Ideological Education in Primary and Secondary School History' was in essence a 
simplified listing of Teaching Outline topics prefaced with a formulaic political 
diatribe that was wholly devoid of concrete instructions on how local education 
authorities and History educators were to make their subject any more patriotic and 
moralising than it already was. 18 Other supplementary MOE guidelines for History 
have been similarly unimaginative and vague, and apart from reinstating Chinese 
history to the senior secondary curriculum in 1990 and adding an extra weekly class 
hour in 1992 to the second year of junior secondary for modern and contemporary 
Chinese history (a class hour which was taken away in 1994), no serious commitment 
to changing or strengthening History's place in the school curriculum has been 
indicated by the MOE. 19 With this evident lack of focused MOE concern for History, 
coupled with its general inability to guarantee accurate replication of national policies 
at local levels, it is hardly surprising that local education authorities have not normally 
taken these guidelines very seriously, although numerous articles and editorials on 
properly implementing their provisions have appeared in education journals in the 
immediate aftermath of the guidelines' publication. Similarly, the status boost given 
to History education professionals by these supplementary policies has been short- 
lived as the realities of the senior secondary and university entrance examination- 
oriented curriculum, in which History is eminently disposable, have set in. As we 
shall see below and in subsequent chapters, this has been an important (although by 
no means the only) cause of disillusionment and apathy among History educators. 
18 `Zhongxiaoxue lishi xueke sixiang zhengzhi jiaoyu gangyao', [8/1991 ], reprinted COH, pp637-655. 
19 On the 1990 changes to the senior secondary curriculum, see Chapter 2. The extra class hour for 
junior secondary was introduced with the 1992 Teaching Plan (also see Chapter 2), but was cancelled 
by a 1994 directive concerning the reduction of the working week, which in turn led to a reduction of 
total class hours. The extra History class hour was an obvious choice for excision, especially in light of 
the desire to expand IT and foreign language provision (`Guanyu yinfa `Shixing xin gongshizhi dui 
quanrizhi xiaoxue, chuji zhongxue kecheng (jiaoxue) jihua jinxing tiaozheng de yijian' he `Shixing xin 
gongshizhi dui gaozhong jiaoxue jihua jinxing tiaozheng de yijian' de tongzhi' [5/7/1994], reprinted in 
COCP, pp385-392). A full break-down of class hour allocations from 1978-2000 is given in Chapter 4 
(Tables 4.1 and 4.2). 
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The direct impact on classroom practice of MOE History guidelines, including 
Teaching Outlines, should not, therefore, be overestimated. 
III. Curriculum development 
if MOE policies and central government exhortations on the importance of History 
have frequently met with widespread apathy from educators, it has been another 
matter when it comes to drafting Teaching Outlines. As noted in Chapter 1, the 
textbook writer-editors at PEP gained almost sole responsibility for Outline 
production in 1957, a monopoly they have only finally been forced to relinquish in the 
past few years. Answering directly to the MOE, PEP has unsurprisingly followed 
Party and MOE directives fairly diligently when drafting Outlines, incorporating 
much of the language and spirit of these directives. As shown in the following 
chapter, however, precisely where in the Outlines such language has been 
incorporated and how thoroughly the ideological tone has permeated the substance of 
the Outlines may be very revealing, indicating that in some cases History curriculum 
developers may simply be paying lip service to leadership pronouncements. The 
trend towards a more autonomous development process for school curricula, 
moreover, appears to be accelerating as increasing numbers of experts are invited to 
participate. 
The curriculum development process is a long one, involving several stages and 
many personnel. First, the Teaching Plan must be drawn up, and the general trend 
desired for education over the next several years decided. At this stage, the timetable 
is determined and class hours allocated to each subject. As Leung has shown, there is 
considerable jockeying for position during this time as representatives of each subject 
lobby to enhance or protect their share of the timetable. 2° When the Teaching Plan 
has been decided, individual subject committees are appointed to draft Outlines. This 
stage of curriculum development is much longer than the drafting of Teaching Plans 
and involves far more lower level personnel; even at the height of PEP's monopoly, 
draft curricula were always sent out to local education departments and academics for 
comments and suggestions before they were promulgated nation-wide. 
Since 1986, the BEdD has overseen the curriculum development (and textbook 
production) process through its Curriculum Development and Teaching Materials 
20 In 1987, Geography specialists attempted to have their subject reclassified as a science (like) in order 
to gain class hours. As a science, it would have been allocated between 6-9% of total class hours, as a 
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Administration Sections, and the MOE Basic Education Teaching Materials 
Inspection and Approval Office, which the BEdD directly supervises. Under the 
present system, the BEdD appoints a core group of curriculum developers who may 
invite other participants to provide additional expertise. For History, this core group 
has normally been drawn from the ranks of senior PEP editors, and key advisors have 
mostly been drawn from among university academic subject specialists and retired 
PEP editors. The 1988 draft Outline, for example was compiled by the History 
editorial department at PEP, Beijing Normal University professors, and a handful of 
senior teachers and education researchers, who were assisted by the Central 
Nationalities Institute, Shandong University and the Beijing Education Institute. 21 In 
a major turnaround, however, the drafting of the 2001 curriculum - the name of which 
has been changed from History Teaching Outline to History Curriculum Standards 
(lishi kecheng biaozhun), the term used under Nationalist rule - was entrusted to a 
single academic from Beijing Normal University's History department, who then 
invited four experts to form the core group, and numerous others to advise on 
particular topics and issues. Only one of the core group members was a PEP editor, a 
source of considerable resentment at PEP where some editors feel that their many 
years of curriculum drafting experience are being discarded in favour of newfangled 
fads. 22 Other core group members and supplementary advisors to the 2001 
curriculum were recruited mainly from normal universities and education research 
units (see below), with experts in pedagogy favoured over academic subject 
specialists. 23 
Despite major personnel changes, the process of curriculum development remains 
fundamentally unchanged. Once the curriculum developers have produced a 
complete draft Outline, it is submitted for preliminary approval to the History 
Teaching Materials Inspection and Approval Committee (History TMIC). This 
committee, which was established in 1986, serves under a multi-subject TMIC that 
includes representatives from all disciplines as well as pedagogical experts, each of 
whom is directly appointed by the MOE for a renewable period of three years. The 24 
humanities subject (wenke) only 4%. Their efforts failed and Geography has remained a lowly 
humanities subject (Leung, `Curriculum development in the PRC', pp66-67). 
21 Su, `Tan tan dui `jiunianzhi yiwu jiaoyu quanrizhi chuji zhongxue lishi jiaoxue dagang (chushen 
gao)' de jidian tihui', p2. 
22 Criticisms made of HCS by PEP editors are discussed further in the conclusion. 
23 Personal communications with curriculum development group participants. 
24 `Guojia jiaoyu weiyuanhui quanguo zhongxiaoxue jiaocai shending weiyuanhui gongzuo 
zhangcheng' [ 10/10/1987], JYFQS, pp 1091-1093. 
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History TMIC is likewise appointed and consists of both subject and pedagogy 
specialists, the majority of whom are retirees from normal universities, education 
research institutes and PEP. 25 After the History TMIC has granted preliminary 
approval, the draft is sent out to education commissions (jiaoyu weiyuanhui) at the 
provincial level (provinces, self-governing municipalities and autonomous regions; 
henceforth, PMAR). The PMAR education commissions distribute it to selected 
regional and local education departments which convene committees of education 
department officials, academics from local colleges, education research unit personnel 
and school teachers to discuss the draft. Key criticisms and suggestions recorded by 
these committees are then sent back to the curriculum development group, which 
evaluates the comments and makes changes as it sees fit. The process may be 
repeated several times until a consensus has been reached. The final draft is re- 
submitted to the History TMIC for approval to begin the trial phase. 
The trial curriculum (shiyangao) and their accompanying set(s) of trial textbooks 
(see below) are tested in a broad cross-section of regions in order to gauge their 
applicability to the country as a whole. The 2001 History Curriculum Standards 
(HCS), for example, went on trial in autumn 2001 in twenty-seven provinces and 
municipalities, in thirty-nine diverse areas. Some of the initial trial regions were 
entire cities, including large ones such as Liuzhou, Nanning, Guiyang and Dalian, but 
most were individual districts or counties under municipal jurisdiction such as 
Nanshan in Shenzhen, Chengguan in Lanzhou and Dagang in Tianjin. The trial 
region was expanded more than ten-fold in 2002-2003, and will continue to expand 
until the 2001 HCS formally replaces the current (2000) Outline. 26 During this phase 
each trial region conducts surveys, classroom observations and holds meetings to 
discuss their findings before reporting back to the curriculum development group. 27 
These findings are incorporated into a revised draft of the curriculum, which after 
several years is re-submitted to the History TMIC. Some further changes may be 
required by the History TMIC, but once it has approved the final draft and has 
25 Additional members have included, inter a/ia, historians from the Party archives and the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences. A list of the then-members may be found at the front of the PEP History 
textbooks published during the 1990s. As of 2000, six of the seven original members were still serving 
on the expanded fourteen-member committee. I am grateful to Liu Zonghua (Bejing Jiaoyu Xueyuan, 
and History TMIC member since its inauguration) for giving me details of the members' backgrounds 
and discussing the committee's work during the curriculum development and textbook approval 
process. 
26 `Jiaoyubu bushu quanguo jichujiaoyu xin kecheng gaige shiyan jiang tuiguang dao 500 duoge 
xianqushi' [4/4/2002], http: //www. moe. edu. cn/news/2002 04/46. htm 
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received permission from the general TMIC, the new curriculum may be promulgated 
nation-wide. With the exceptions of Shanghai and Zhejiang which were permitted to 
develop their own curricula in the late 1980s (primary-senior secondary in Shanghai, 
primary and junior secondary in Zhejiang), and Beijing which followed suit in 2001, 
all regions were subject to Outline stipulations as of 2001, although they may be 
somewhat modified to suit local conditions and resources. Indeed, such modifications 
do not even require official permission, and must simply be reported to higher 
authorities `for the record' (bei 'an). 28 As Paine, has shown, this latitude is what 
allows regional and local education authorities both to evade regulations and to 
implement innovative practices. 29 
IV. Textbook production 
For much of PRC history, PEP has had a monopoly on drafting and publication of 
both Teaching Outlines and textbooks. With the introduction of the `one Outline, 
many textbooks' (yigang duoben) system following the 1985 Reform, however, other 
agencies have also been permitted to produce textbooks. For History, this was at first 
limited to a few select groups, but textbook pluralism has since been greatly extended 
and, in theory, anyone can produce a textbook albeit subject to stringent regulations. 30 
At PEP, full-time professional textbook writer-editors are grouped into individual 
subject teams responsible for producing textbooks for all school levels, as well as 
supplementary materials (such as exercise books) and teacher handbooks . 
3' Although 
all team members participate, History textbooks are by and large a collation of text 
sections drafted separately by editorial team members, each of whom is responsible 
for his or her area and historical period of specialisation. Specialisation in this 
instance is, of course, meant in a broad sense. PEP textbook writers are not normally 
recruited from among university department faculty, and few have postgraduate 
degrees in their subject. The majority are former teachers who have spent most of 
their careers working at PEP, and are specialist textbook writers, not academics. PEP 
27 Many of these reports are available online at the NCCT website (www. ncct. og v. cn) as is a full list of 
the original trial regions. 
28 `Jiunian yiwu j iaoyu quanrizhi xiaoxue, chuji zhongxue kecheng jihua (shixing)' [6/8/1992], JYFQS, 
p727. 
29 Paine, `The Education Policy Process'. 
30 `Guojia jiaoyu weiyuanhui zhongxiaoxue jiaocai songshen banfa' [10/10/1987], JYFQS, p1090. 
More detailed instructions for prospective textbook writers and a plan for developing a more 
competitive textbook market were issued the following year (`Jiunianzhi yiwu jiaoyu jiaocai bianxie 
guihua fang'an' [21/8/1988], JYFQS, pp 1093-1095). The most recent regulations were issued in 2001 
`Zhongxiaoxue jiaocai bianxie shending guanli zanxing banfa' [7/6/2001]. 
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cannot support a limitless staff either, and the areas and periods in which History 
editors specialise, therefore, are expansive, such as modem Chinese or ancient world 
history. To ensure accuracy and adherence to mainstream historical and pedagogical 
research, therefore, there is also some external input from university academics and 
retired PEP editors, the most important of which are normally acknowledged at the 
front of the textbook as advisors (guwen). 
Elsewhere, textbook writing is not yet a full-time professional affair, and other 
History textbooks have mostly been produced under the auspices of PMAR education 
commissions, compiled by groups of academics and education researchers with some 
input from senior teachers, and published by the provincial education press. The first 
sets of non-PEP textbooks drafted after textbook pluralism was legislated were the 
`coastal edition' (yanhaiban) produced in Guangzhou, the `inland edition' (neidiban) 
produced in Sichuan, and another set aimed at four-year junior secondary schools 
drafted by Beijing Normal University. Shanghai also produced its own textbooks in 
accordance with its local curriculum, as did Zhejiang, although as already noted, 
Zhejiang replaced History (and Geography) with Social Studies at junior secondary 
as well as primary level. It was intended that these textbooks would meet differing 
needs in diverse regions. Thus, the Shanghai and Coastal editions were aimed at 
economically developed areas, the Inland edition at rural areas. In the late 1990s an 
additional set of History textbooks was drafted in Hunan, also directed at 
underdeveloped areas. It was, however, allegedly a plagiarised version of PEP's 
textbooks, and although the matter did not make it to the courts, compensation was 
ordered paid to PEP in 2000.32 In autumn 2001, Beijing introduced its own textbooks 
in line with its new local curriculum, and numerous others have been produced in 
accordance with the 2001 HCS. 
It is, of course, one thing to draft a textbook; it is quite another to get it adopted 
for use in schools and, in order to do so, textbooks must be officially approved. Once 
a draft is complete, it must be submitted to the PMAR-level teaching materials 
inspection committee, which operates along similar lines to the national TMIC. 
Adjustments may be required, but once these have been made and the textbook has 
31 A summary of PEP's responsibilities and a list of its publications may be found at www. pep. com. cn 
32 Personal communication with PEP History editors, confirmed by Liu Zonghua. Given that all 
textbooks are remarkably similar and attitudes to intellectual property rights are fairly lax, this seems 
somewhat ironic, and it can only be surmised that the Hunan edition copied PEP texts verbatim. 
Unfortunately, however, I was unable to obtain copies of the Hunan textbooks to conduct my own 
comparisons. 
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passed PMAR inspection it may be used in schools within the province. 33 In order for 
a textbook to be eligible for use country-wide, however, it must undergo a trial period 
and pass the national History TMIC inspection. This process is similar to that 
required for Outlines, and involves testing the textbooks in various localities; the 
inland edition, for example, was piloted in rural areas of Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan 
and Hainan, while the coastal edition was tested in Guangdong and Fujian. 34 During 
this trial period comments and suggestions for areas of improvement are solicited 
before the editorial team revises and re-submits the textbooks to the History TMIC. 35 
Each member of the History TMIC is supposed to study the complete set of textbooks 
and contribute to the decision-making process, although in practice the main 
contributions tend to be made by those with particular expertise in the relevant area. 36 
The texts are evaluated for their `scientific' (kexuexing) and `ideological' 
(sixiangxing) suitability; 37 that is, on whether the `facts' are accurate, whether the 
academic level is appropriate for the target audience, and whether the political 
orientation accords with current orthodoxy, or at least the orthodoxy held by the MOE 
and TMIC. This last concern has meant that the sensitive area of modern and 
especially contemporary Chinese history has typically received closest scrutiny. 
Many changes have frequently been required, and these volumes have usually been 
revised and re-inspected numerous times before they have been passed. By contrast, 
changes required for ancient Chinese and world history have been far fewer and texts 
have often passed after one round of minor revisions. 38 Some textbooks, however, 
have failed the TMIC inspection altogether despite numerous revisions, including 
Hunan's plagiarised volumes and Zhejiang's Social Studies textbooks. 
Interestingly, despite regulations stipulating that textbooks must `comply with all 
the requirements stipulated by the Teaching Plans and Outlines'39 in order to pass 
TMIC inspection, neither of the History TMIC inspectors with whom I spoke cited 
this as a factor they took into consideration during the inspection process. It is 
probable, of course, that were a textbook to diverge significantly from the Outline, it 
33 For an example of PMAR-level inspection processes, see regulations drafted by the Beijing 
Municipal Education Commission at http: //www. bjedu. gov. cn/zhinan/shenpi! sp5. htm. 
34 Preface, Inland Edition, Chinese History, Vol. 1; Preface, Coastal Edition, Chinese History, Vol. 1. 
35 `Guojia jiaoyu weiyuanhui zhongxiaoxue jiaocai songshen banfa' [10/10/1987], JYFQS, pl090. 
36 Interview with Liu Zonghua. 
37 `Guojia jiaoyu weiyuanhui zhongxiaoxue jiaocai shending biaozhun' [10/10/1987], JYFQS, pp1090- 
91. 
38 Interview with Liu Zonghua. 
39 'Guojia jiaoyu weiyuanhui zhongxiaoxuejiaocai shending biaozhun' [10/10/1987], JYFQS, pp1090- 
1091. 
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would meet neither scientific nor ideological criteria for approval, and for this reason 
it would not be worth the textbook writers' while to spend time and resources on 
something that has little chance of acceptance. Au Yeung has found, nevertheless, 
that some major discrepancies between Outlines and textbooks have still been 
permitted, either because they are undetected or disregarded during inspection. The 
PEP junior and senior secondary Chinese language and literature textbooks she 
examined in the 1980s, for example, in many cases omitted some items listed in the 
Outline and included others that were not, despite the fact that the writers of these 
textbooks were the very persons who had produced the Teaching Outline in the first 
place. This, she argues, is because Outlines have been written to satisfy the MOE and 
the Party leadership, textbooks to suit the requirements of examinations and 
examination-oriented teaching. 40 Textbooks have thus sometimes diverged from 
Outlines to reflect demands from PMAR education authorities, which set senior 
secondary entrance examinations, and from a teaching community that desires a 
single comprehensive set of textbooks to allow educators to achieve the highest 
promotion rates among their students in the most straightforward manner possible. 
The same has evidently been true for the subject of English. Indeed, in recent years, 
PEP has received a significant volume of direct, unsolicited complaints and requests 
for revisions to current textbooks from teachers and education researchers. No longer 
protected by a textbook monopoly, or perhaps simply in a genuine attempt to meet 
pedagogical needs, PEP has made serious attempts to respond to `bottom-up' 
pressures. 41 
Such discrepancies between Outlines and textbooks and the degree of negotiation 
and accommodation between the higher and lower ends of the education hierarchy, 
however, have not been universal. History Teaching Outlines and textbooks, as we 
shall see in subsequent chapters, have been far more congruent than appears to be the 
case for Chinese and English. This is no doubt in part because of History's special 
ideological status in the curriculum and its corresponding sensitivity, but it is also a 
product of the education system itself in which History is not normally tested in senior 
secondary entrance examinations (unlike Chinese and English). Since History does 
not `matter' in this context, educators just do not care as much about the content of 
ao Au Yeung, `Curriculum Dissemination in the PRC', pp84-85. 
41 Personal communication with Edward Vickers, who worked as a writer-editor of English textbooks 
at PEP from 2000-2001. See also references to Adamson, English in China: The Junior Secondary 
School Curriculum, 1949-94 (Unpublished PhD. thesis, The University of Hong Kong, 1998) in 
Vickers, History as a School Subject in Hong Kong 1960's-2000, p80. 
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History textbooks. This is not to say that there have been no demands for change. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, desire to enhance the low status of History in the 
curriculum has certainly impelled education researchers, normal university History 
faculty and many school teachers to write extensively in education journals on the 
need for reform to make the subject more relevant and useful (and thus more 
appealing) to the student body. In response to these pleas as well as to the wider trend 
towards pedagogical reform, History textbooks have thus been partially overhauled in 
format and style and, to a lesser degree, in content. 
Textbook pluralism and the new market it has theoretically created should also be 
an incentive for reform, as textbooks passed by the History TMIC are eligible for 
nation-wide use. Until recently, however, this market has hardly been competitive 
since PMAR authorities have simply mandated a single textbook for all schools under 
their jurisdiction. Furthermore, since until the past few years only Shanghai has had 
its own senior secondary textbooks and everyone else has had to use PEP, most areas 
have also chosen to use PEP History textbooks for junior secondary to ensure 
continuity. Additionally, many teachers may prefer to continue teaching what they 
already know, or feel reluctant to familiarise themselves with new textbooks without 
material incentives. The result of this has been continued nation-wide PEP 
dominance. Admittedly, in those areas where non-PEP textbooks have been 
produced, there has been some degree of local protectionism (difang baohuzhuyi) in 
an effort to make money for the provincial education press: coastal edition textbooks 
are the officially mandated texts in Guangdong, the inland edition in Sichuan and 
Shanghai textbooks in Shanghai. Yet, even with local protectionism, many schools, 
with the exception of those in Shanghai (because it has its own senior secondary 
textbooks and holds it own university entrance examinations) and Zhejiang (because 
History is no longer taught at junior secondary level) have actually been using PEP 
textbooks because, like their colleagues elsewhere, they prefer to maintain continuity 
between junior and senior secondary textbooks. It is not only textbook protectionism 
and teacher reluctance, however, that determine textbook selection. In one 
Guangzhou district, for example, local officials found that schools evaded education 
department instructions to enforce the use of the coastal edition by ordering both the 
coastal and PEP textbooks, and teaching the latter. Although this meant students had 
to pay for two sets, the practice was apparently a response to demands not from 
teachers, but from parents, who hoped that textbook continuity between junior and 
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senior secondary stages would ultimately give their precious only-child a better 
chance of success in the national university entrance examinations despite the fact that 
42 History is not even compulsorily examined. 
Clearly then, there are many factors that determine precisely what is included in a 
textbook and whether it is adopted for classroom use. Whether the switch to the 
prescriptions of the 2001 History Curriculum Standards will permit the emergence of 
genuine pluralism and a more competitive, less PEP-dominated textbook market when 
the trial phase is complete, therefore, is debatable. Certainly, PEP editors have found 
it difficult to draft textbooks that conform to someone else's curriculum guideline, a 
guideline, moreover, that is far less detailed than its predecessors. 43 In addition, 
recent expansion of textbook pluralism in the senior secondary arena and the 
permission granted to several regions to develop their own curricula for basic 
education and to set all or part of the local university entrance examinations 
potentially removes the continuity condition, while the devolution of curriculum 
administration means that local education departments and even individual schools 
should eventually be free to select from any of the approved textbooks. 44 It may also 
be that PEP textbooks come to be seen as representing old-fashioned ways, even if 
they are keeping up with current trends towards cartoon-style formats and colloquial 
language which are thought to be more child-friendly. Nevertheless, as long as the 
polity remains illiberal, and texts continue to require official approval, it is unlikely 
that there will be any far-reaching substantive changes, or that textbooks will 
dramatically diverge from one another in the immediate future. And as long as 
History remains a peripheral subject in the school curriculum, it is unlikely that 
anyone will care. 
V. Policy Dissemination 
Teaching Outlines, MOE supplementary guidelines, textbooks and their 
accompanying teacher handbooks are the principal written forms in which macro- 
policies for History are concretely manifested, even if they are not always wholly 
consistent with one another. In order to ensure that the general intent and content of 
42 Personal communication with local education department History subject officer. 
43 Personal communications with PEP editors. Further details of their criticisms of the 2001 HCS are 
given in the concluding chapter. 
44 Since 2002, Shanghai has been joined by ten other areas in setting university entrance examinations 
at the regional level, including Beijing, Guangdong, Liaoning and Tianjin. In March 2005, Shandong, 
Jiangxi and Anhui were added to this group. It is too early to know what effect this will ultimately 
have on education, but some of the possible implications will be discussed in the conclusion. 
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these texts are correctly interpreted and universally applied, therefore, the BEdD 
holds training sessions for PMAR education commission and research unit personnel 
whenever new guidelines or Outlines are published. These PMAR-level cadres are 
then expected to run similar training programmes for regional level cadres, who in 
turn hold them at the local level. Local education research unit (ERU) staff are 
responsible for liasing with schools and teachers and establishing and supervising 
`study groups' to discuss issues pertaining to new guidelines and textbooks. Further 
instructions and explanations are offered through BEdD television broadcasts on the 
Education Channel (Zhongguo jiaoyu dianshitai)45 and through numerous books, 
study guides and journal articles published by members of the History TMIC, the 
Outline drafting committee and textbook editors. 46 
As discussed above, education, to quote Paine, is `a weak bureaucratic actor'; 47 
that is, the MOE does not operate from a position of parity in its dealings with other 
ministries, nor does it exercise absolute authority over subordinate education 
departments. If it is difficult to ensure that there is 100% congruence between Party 
directives, History Teaching Outlines and textbooks, it is still harder to guarantee that 
lower level education authorities are actually carrying out the tasks with which they 
have been entrusted, and if they are, whether they are doing them diligently and 
correctly. Likewise, it is possible to pressurise local education departments, ERUs 
and schools into ordering copies of History education journals and guides for studying 
new regulations and guidelines, but it is not possible to ensure that education officials, 
researchers and teachers actually read them, let alone closely follow their 
recommendations. Indeed, I found that in the case of teachers at least, few of them 
had even a passing familiarity with the content of the current History Teaching 
Outline, and some freely admitted that the last time they had read an Outline was in 
teacher training college. Wang has similarly observed that schools frequently do not 
even bother to order copies of new Outlines, and that teachers focus solely on 
textbooks and teaching those topics with which they are familiar regardless of 
45 Programming information can be found at www. cetv. edu. cn 
46 These books and articles are too numerous to list here. Some representative examples, however, 
include: BEdD ed. Lishi jiaoxue dagang (shiyong): xuexi zhidao, a collection of articles written mainly 
by TMIC inspectors and textbook writer-editors past and present; Wang Hongzhi (NCCT, former PEP 
editor), `Tan tan guoduxing `quanrizhi zhongxue lishi jiaoxue dagang' de xiuding'; Su Shoutong 
(TMIC and History TMIC, former PEP editor), `Tan tan dui `jiunianzhi yiwu jiaoyu quanrizhi chuji 
zhongxue lishi jiaoxue dagang (chushen gao)' de jidian tihui'; Gong Qizhu (Sichuan Education 
Institute, editor of Inland edition textbooks), `Tan tan jiunianzhi yiwu jiaoyu chuzhong lishi jiaoxue 
dagang de tedian he sheng bian chuzhong lishi shiyong keben de bianxie yitu' and `Guanyu lishi jiaocai 
bianxie de jidian sikao'. 
115 
whether they are specified in the Outline. 48 There are, of course, assorted inspection 
mechanisms to ensure that policies are being thoroughly implemented. As in the UK, 
where schools are provided with advance notice of Ofsted inspections (and 
universities of Teaching Quality Assessments), however, schools in the PRC are 
forewarned of inspection visits giving teachers adequate time to prepare model 
lessons. Furthermore, although senior inspection staff occasionally conduct 
classroom observations, most school-level inspections are carried out by the same 
local ERU History subject officers who are responsible for organising the 
dissemination of official policy in the first place. Teachers' success or failure in 
policy implementation, therefore, reflects directly on the local ERU, making it more 
likely that they will be deemed compliant. 
Macro-policy implementation is not the only function of the above-mentioned 
agencies and mechanisms; they are also involved in ongoing research and 
experiments, and devising and disseminating new policies and practices. Perhaps the 
most important agency involved in these projects is the ERU which exists at all levels 
of administration from the national Basic Education Centre for Curriculum and 
Teaching Materials Development (jichu jiaoyu kecheng jiaocai fazhan zhongxin; self- 
titled National Centre for School Curriculum and Textbook Development or NCCT), 
which answers directly to the MOE, down to those which are merely a handful of staff 
working at the local education department. 
Operating at the national level, the NCCT has a broad remit. It consists of 
separate sections for curriculum, pedagogy and evaluation, all of which work closely 
with the relevant BEdD departments in organising curriculum development 
committees, drafting regulations for textbooks, liasing with TMIC, and overseeing 
inspection work. The NCCT also monitors experimental work, particularly the trial 
phase of curriculum and textbook implementation. In addition, it organises the 
writing and publication of teaching materials for Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwanese and 
other foreign readers that `reflect the culture, history and geography of the Chinese 
national people, ' presumably to ensure that the correct internal perspectives on these 
sensitive topics are represented externally. 
49 
47 Paine, `The Education Policy Process', p 181. 
48 Wang, `Chaikai lishi jiaoxue xinde yiye', p33. 
49 `Jiaoyubu jichu jiaoyu kecheng jiaocai fazhan zhongxin zhize renwu'. For more information on the 
various NCCT departments and their responsibilities see www. ncct. gov. cnl gsz. html 
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At the PMAR and regional levels are ERUs that work within education 
departments and those that are affiliated education research institutes (jiaoyu 
xueyuan), which offer in-service teacher training courses as well as carrying out and 
reporting on research projects and making recommendations for policy adjustments. 
ERUs at this level usually have whole departments allocated to single subjects, with 
individual staff members responsible for research and development in particular 
aspects of the subject. Where History is concerned, PMAR ERUs have also been 
largely responsible for organising and drafting local curricula and/or teaching 
materials, such as those used in Shanghai, Guangdong and Beijing, as well as 
textbooks on local history, which as shown in Chapter 4, has been listed as a 
compulsory component of the curriculum in the Teaching Outlines since 1992, even if 
it has not always been enforced. More recently, many of their senior members have 
been called upon to advise on national curricula, as well as continuing their 
organisational and supervisory role in piloting trial Outlines and textbooks. 
At the local level there may be one or more staff members responsible for a single 
subject in larger ERUs, but in smaller ones, especially in rural areas, a single officer 
will often take charge of several subjects. As already noted, these local ERUs 
(jiaoyanshi) are the frontline of interaction between education administration and 
teachers, policy and praxis. With the current emphasis on `raising the quality of 
teachers' (tigao, jiaoshi suzhi), which ties in to the broader goals of `raising the quality 
of the national people' and promoting `quality education', creating a fully qualified 
cohort of teachers has become increasingly important. Local ERU personnel, 
therefore, organise workshops and demonstration classes to disseminate new or 
existing thinking on `best practice' to teachers. They also mentor new teachers to 
ensure that these novices complete the requisite number of in-service training credits 
within the allotted time-frame of their probationary period (normally one year). In 
addition to training workshops, they conduct classroom observations of all teachers to 
identify areas in which individuals or subject departments need particular 
improvement and to make appropriate recommendations. They also participate in 
teacher evaluations and help to determine teacher promotions and awards. 
The principal focus of ERUs, then, is pedagogical research and teacher quality 
improvement, and for this reason, the majority of ERU History subject officers are 
themselves former History teachers, although many senior ERU staff, especially at the 
higher administrative levels are many years or even decades removed from everyday 
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classroom experience. Additional and often innovative pedagogical input comes from 
normal university History departments, where there are some prominent academics 
working in the field of subject-specific pedagogies as well as those in Education 
departments who work on more general pedagogical theories and practices. The 
majority of normal university history faculty members, however, are academic subject 
specialists like their counterparts in standard universities, and this is reflected in a 
continued emphasis in pre-service teacher training on acquiring historical knowledge 
rather than teaching skills, despite efforts to expand the pedagogical component of the 
curriculum. As shown in the final chapters, this has often made the work of reform- 
minded ERUs extremely difficult as History teachers are almost invariably inclined to 
place the textbook at the core (yi keben wei zhu) of their classroom practice. Much 
ERU experimental work, therefore, is oriented to going beyond the textbook, utilising 
supplementary materials and stimulating active student participation. 
If ERU personnel and normal university academics are the chief innovators of 
pedagogical experiments, education journals provide the support or avenues for 
disseminating new ideas and practices. Lishi jiaoxue (History Education) and Lishi 
jiaoxue wenti (Issues in History Education) are the oldest and most prestigious of 
these journals and are run by a full-time professional editorial staff. In addition, 
several universities in conjunction with PMAR ERUs or professional associations also 
publish monthly or bi-monthly journals. Zhongxue lishi jiaoyu cankao (translated by 
the publishers as Reference to Middle School History), based at Huazhong Normal 
University in Xi'an is probably the most widely circulated of these. Others include 
Lishijiaoxue yanjiu tongxun (History Teaching Research Journal), based in Shanghai, 
and Lishi jiaoxue yanjiu (History Education Research) published by Huanan Normal 
University in Guangzhou. As noted in the introduction, these History education 
journal articles are not always platitudinous reiterations of official policies, and there 
are often reports on local teaching experiments, sample examination papers, model 
examination answers and lesson plans and even on History education outside the 
PRC, which teachers are far more inclined to read than editorials in praise of the latest 
MOE guidelines or articles explaining revisions of Outline content. 
Another avenue for academic exchange is the History Education Association (lishi 
jiaoxue yanjiuhui) which was established as the primary professional association for 
History educators in 1981 as a branch of the National Education Society (Zhongguo 
jiaoyu xuehui). This organisation hosts meetings at local levels and annually 
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convenes a large national conference, which somewhat misleadingly is termed 
`international' since a handful of foreign - usually Japanese, Taiwanese or Hong 
Kong - delegates are often invited. 50 As elsewhere, this is typically a paid-for jaunt to 
a far-away city, available primarily to more senior educators. At the five-day 
`International Conference on History Education' (guoji lishi jiaoxue xueshu 
yantaohui) that I attended in Shanghai in November 2000, for example, a couple of 
hours were devoted to the opening and closing ceremonies and speeches, one morning 
to `small group' (about twenty people) discussions, and one afternoon to presenting 
the fruits of those discussions to the whole conference, a session which only one-third 
of the delegates attended. The remainder of the time was dedicated to sightseeing, 
banquets and socialising, with one token visit to an elite school where we were shown 
round the outstanding facilities and observed a model History class. 
Although the 2000 conference apparently erred rather more than usual on the 
pleasure side, 51 and many delegates clearly were far more interested in sightseeing 
and shopping than in discussing History education, it does not mean that these 
occasions are not sites at which ideas are exchanged. Self-censorship in conference 
discussion as in print is, of course, pervasive and the public forum is normally 
dominated by uninspired and uninspiring `politically correct' speeches given by 
members of the History TMIC, NCCT, PEP and senior academics from prestigious 
universities, which may subsequently be published along with some of the conference 
papers in an edited volume. 52 Even the small group discussion I attended was hardly 
discursive, involving primarily the reading out of prepared papers, and predictable - 
one might almost say ritualised - performances and exchanges between the 
participants that basically mirrored what had been iterated in the main conference 
forum. Perhaps the most striking example was the performance of Japanese and 
Chinese delegates for one another. At the opening ceremony, one of the History 
Education Association chairs gave a speech, a significant proportion of which was 
50 At the 2000 conference I attended in Shanghai, in addition to myself were one Korean and four 
Japanese. One Hong Konger and one Taiwanese were also present and were variously designated as 
`foreign' and `compatriots' as suited the hosts. As Yeung Sau-chu, the Hong Kong delegate, said to 
me, `They make it very clear here when I am Chinese and when I am not. ' The Taiwanese delegate 
Wang chong-fu, (a History professor at National Taiwan Normal University and of Mainland origin) 
and one of the Japanese professors, Natani Sadao, are regulars at the conference. Peter Lee and Alaric 
Dickinson whose work was discussed in the Introduction and in Chapter 2 have been among previous 
attendees. 
51 On the final day, the History Education Association chairman berated the poor attendance at general 
discussions and the over-emphasis given to `fun' by the Shanghai organising committee. 
52 See, for example, the proceedings of the 1993 conference, Zhongguo jiaoyu xuehui lishi jiaoxue 
yanjiuhui and PEP eds., 
Mianxiang 21 shl i lishijiaocai he lishijiaoxue. 
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devoted to emphasising the importance of remembering past aggression against 
China, especially the atrocities committed by Japan. The most senior Japanese 
delegate then presented a paper on world history pedagogy in Japan, but spent much 
of his allotted time apologising for those textbooks that fail to acknowledge Japan's 
war crimes. Likewise, in the small group discussion, a Japanese delegate was 
supposedly speaking on pedagogical research in Japan, but followed his colleague at 
the opening ceremony and dedicated much of his time to denouncing textbooks that 
whitewash the war. The Chinese respondent then berated Japan for past atrocities and 
present denial, wholly ignoring the pedagogical issues that had been raised. As the 
small group chair later said to me, `Every year it is the same. We denounce Japan for 
their textbook portrayals of the war, and the Japanese apologise for it. Similarly, all 
the Taiwanese delegates we invite are pro-unification. We should invite some 
Japanese militarists and supporters of Taiwanese independence - that would be much 
more interesting'. While rather less emotionally charged, much of the interaction 
between Chinese delegates is equally performative, since it is evidently governed by 
tacit rules of self-censorship and identikit phraseology showing deference to the 
achievements of History educators of the past and reiterating support for the current 
official goals of History education. Precisely for which `audience' they put on this 
`face theatre' (to borrow Gries' terminology) is not always clear; 53 what is certain is 
that the public performance normally changes only in very small increments as 
individual or group actors take calculated risks to move the parameters of legitimate 
discourse. The considerable time allowed for socialising at these conferences thus 
permits informal gatherings at which the real discussion and debate which lies behind 
such boundary-pushing takes place, at which new ideas, practices and plans may be 
shared and contacts and networks established and consolidated. As argued below and 
in the concluding chapters, it is these networks of reform-minded educators that are 
slowly beginning to reshape the History subject. 
53 Gries (Face Nationalism) uses the concept of `face theatre' in the somewhat larger context of 
Chinese nationalism, in which he argues that `Face theater involves elites on the political stage vying 
for legitimacy before audiences of popular opinion'. He proposes that in official dealings with Japan 
(and also the US), Chinese leaders' often belligerent stance is not merely about one-upmanship over a 
former (current? ) enemy, but is a performance constructed to satisfy domestic nationalist sentiment. I 
would argue that similar dynamics apply in the much smaller context of both national and international 
academic exchange. 
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VI. Institutions, Individuals, Power and guanxi 
The political and ideological, bureaucratic, systemic and procedural factors discussed 
above and in the previous chapter are clearly the major factors determining how the 
History curriculum is produced, what is in it and how it is disseminated to the various 
levels above the individual school classroom. As we have seen, there are ongoing 
tensions within the bureaucratic hierarchy as well as in the often conflicting 
pedagogical and ideological goals of the History subject. It should not be forgotten, 
however, that there are other tensions, perhaps more indirect, but by no means 
unimportant or less political, that affect History education. Before turning to the 
content of the school curriculum, both intended and implemented, therefore, it is 
worth briefly addressing some of these issues. 
As McCormick has argued, the Chinese political and bureaucratic system is 
largely `patrimonial' rather than `legal-rational'. Although in the reform and opening 
era attempts have been made to codify and legislate rather than simply issue Party 
orders or instructions where bureaucratic structures and processes are concerned, and 
thereby to make politics and administration professional rather than `charismatic', 
personalities, rivalries, patronage and guanxi networks continue to inform the ways in 
which policies are formulated and implemented. 54 As elsewhere, the functions and 
structures of organisations and networks may shape individual and group attitudes, 
choices and behaviours within institutional settings, but individual and group actors 
also contribute to the ways in which these systems, institutions and processes and the 
ideologies that underpin them evolve. Another important consideration is the growing 
power and independence of certain regions, such as Shanghai and Guangdong, which 
have been catalysed by decentralisation of budgetary control and the abolition of 
inter-provincial fiscal transfers. History education has not, of course, been able to 
escape these influences, and the development of the subject has thus been both 
constrained and enabled not only by the macro-politics of central government and its 
quest for legitimacy and by the politics of administrative systems and processes, but 
also by the politics of inter- and intra-institutional, regional and personal 
relationships . 
55 
Some examples of institutional and administrative obstacles to smooth 
implementation of central government objectives have already been cited, such as the 
sa McCormick, Political Reform in Post-Mao China. 
$5 For an analysis of the place of personal and structural/systemic factors involved in policy-making, 
see Hamrin, Zhao et al, Decision-making in Post-Mao China. 
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lack of authority each level of education administration has over its subordinates 
owing to the two-tier administrative system. Inter-institutional rivalry was mentioned 
in the context of the reassignment of curriculum development responsibilities for the 
2001 HCS from PEP to Beijing Normal University. Interdisciplinary competition was 
also remarked upon in the context of class hour allocation to individual school 
subjects. Almost nothing, however, has yet been said about regional rivalries or the 
effect of personal relationships on determining who has the power to do what in 
shaping the History curriculum or the agenda for its reform. 
Regional rivalries and locale-based cliques are well known in China, and have 
been around for much longer than the PRC; indeed, most Chinese governments have 
gone to much trouble to prevent the development of local power. Although this has 
been as true in the PRC as it was in imperial times, members of leadership factions 
today often hail from the same area, and policy disagreements are commonly 
portrayed by outsiders as a Beijing-Shanghai (or Northern-Southern) contest. 
Friedman has even suggested that the very locus of national authenticity has been 
framed in competitive regional terms, moving with reform and opening from an 
inward-looking Northern-centred peasant/proletarian identity to an entrepreneurial, 
outward- and forward-looking Southern-centred one. Whether Friedman is correct in 
his claim that the South is shaping a new national identity is debatable, although it is 
certainly true that there have been some local attempts to move the national narrative 
away from the Yellow River and re-centre or disperse it elsewhere. 16 As shown in 
Chapters 4,5 and 6, however, this has not yet had a profound effect on the national 
narrative currently purveyed by the History subject. Regional rivalry and contest, 
nonetheless, have pervaded History education. Regional tensions were palpable, for 
instance, at the 2000 History Education Association conference which was hosted by 
the Shanghai branch of the Association, but which was chaired primarily by more 
57 senior members from Beijing. It would be difficult, however, to claim that such 
56 Friedman, `Reconstructing China's National Identity', pp67-91. He elaborates further on these ideas 
in National Identity and Democratic Prospects in Socialist China, especially Chapters 1,2,5 and 6. 
57 The chairman's criticism of the over-emphasis on wining, dining and sightseeing the delegates at the 
Shanghai conference (see n52) was couched in such a way as to imply that the lack of professionalism 
on the part of the local association was a Shanghai problem, rather than a personal or institutional one. 
(The chair is from PEP, the Shanghai organising committee mainly from Huadong Normal University 
and the Shanghai Educational Research Institute). This tension had been evident from the outset, when 
the Shanghai committee asked me (and the other foreign delegates) to pay almost ten times more than 
the Chinese delegates for the hotel room. We had been invited to the conference by the Beijing branch 
committee, and the lower room price had been stated on the invitation letter. The Shanghai committee 
had booked several floors of the hotel for a bulk price, but stated that as `all foreigners are rich' we 
should pay more. Despite the intervention of the Association's more senior Beijing members, the 
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tensions have resulted in a strikingly regional cast to the national History Outlines and 
textbooks drafted in Beijing, their local equivalents in Shanghai or Zhejiang, or the 
textbooks drafted in Guangdong and Sichuan. Yet, it is equally difficult to deny that 
the sense of regional separateness or distinctiveness that clearly exists throughout 
China (albeit to varying degrees) has encouraged History curriculum developers, 
textbook writers and educational researchers at least to try to stand out as exemplars 
of local excellence worthy of national emulation. As we shall see in Chapter 5, this 
has been quite pronounced in Shanghai and Zhejiang where History and Social 
Studies curriculum developers have attempted to move to the forefront of reform in 
the areas of pedagogical innovation and subject integration. Whether born out of 
genuine concern to improve educational provision in History, or whether it is a case 
of simply trying to be more `modern' than Beijing/the rest of the nation, it has put the 
onus on the MOE and PEP to take more concrete, if sometimes somewhat reluctant, 
steps towards reform. 
The promulgation of a local curriculum for Beijing in 2001 and the permission 
granted simultaneously to many other regions to develop their own curricula, 
meanwhile, have further accentuated the trend towards regionalisation. Beijing in 
particular, once regarded as synonymous with central government, has recently 
stepped up its local profile, no doubt in large part to dissociate itself from unpopular 
aspects of national policy, but also to free itself from the burden of association with 
the rest of the country, so much of which is considered `backward', and thus to 
compete on an equal footing with buoyant Shanghai, and to a lesser extent 
Guangdong. In History education, Beijing ERU and university staff have been at 
pains to stress their reformist credentials; indeed, they have been among the most 
vocal and radical critics of the Teaching Outlines and traditional pedagogical 
practices, and have produced a curriculum that from a pedagogical standpoint goes 
much further towards introducing a genuinely skills-oriented approach than those 
introduced in Shanghai and Zhejiang a decade earlier. They have also sought to stress 
their Beijingness; the 2001 local curriculum opening statement claims to be designed 
specifically to provide a twenty-first century education suited to Beijing residents. 
58 
The selection of a Beijing Normal University professor to take over responsibility 
from PEP for production of the national History Curriculum Standards in 2001 has 
Shanghai organisers refused to back down, it appeared, in large part, to show Beijing their 
independence (and, no doubt, also to pocket the extra cash). 
58 `Beijingshi 21 shiji jichu jiaoyu kecheng gaige fang'an (zandinggao)' [2000], pl. 
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also represented something of a coup for Beijing; even if the college is a national 
institution under direct MOE control, it is still regarded as local, while PEP, despite 
being Beijing-based and staffed by many Beijingers, is seen as a conservative central 
government organ. As already noted, PEP staff have unsurprisingly resented their 
unit's gradual marginalisation, especially in light of the monopoly it once enjoyed. 
Regional rivalry, then, has obviously contributed to accelerating the pace and 
scope of reform in History education since it has led education authorities to grant 
considerable latitude to the tertiary institutions under their control and to their ERUs 
so that they can `get ahead' of the competition. Co-operation, however, has also been 
a crucial element of reform, whether between different types of institutions, such as 
ERUs and normal universities, or between similar institutions in different regions. As 
already discussed, journals and professional associations have provided a public 
avenue for sharing ideas and experiences, but informal personal and professional 
guanxi networks, it was argued, have been more influential in driving change from 
behind the scenes. This is exacerbated by the nature of the administrative system 
itself in which participants in all aspects of policy-making, from TMIC to the local 
ERU, are not hired from a pool of job applicants, but are recruited from among one's 
proteges or recommended by close contacts, even if the procedures of the 
Nomenklatura appointments and promotion system are formally observed. Who gets 
to be involved in History curriculum development, textbook production and 
experimental projects, therefore, is typically determined by personal connections 
within and sometimes across institutions, and good personal contacts may allow 
voices that might otherwise not get aired to be heard; indeed, it seems that several of 
the more outspokenly radical reformers have sponsors in high places. At the same 
time, of course, personal relationships and institutional affiliations may hinder the free 
exchange of ideas, since the patrimonial nature of Chinese politics means that those 
who owe their success to the patronage of more senior figures, especially within their 
institution, may not wish to criticise their mentors or colleagues even if they disagree 
with them. The increasing professionalisation of curriculum development and 
educational research and the intensified focus on expertise, however, has meant that 
these patron-client ties based chiefly in institutional affiliations are being slowly 
weakened while those based in professional networks of like-minded thinkers are 
being consolidated. As more of these experts are brought on board by their patrons 
and friends to assist in curriculum development and textbook production, so the 
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curriculum is increasingly shaped by competing academic ideas from the `middle-up' 
rather than by `top-down' orders from the political centre. 
PART TWO 
THE INTENDED CURRICULUM 
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Chapter 4 
History Teaching Outlines, 1978-2000 
Many states produce national guidelines outlining general aims of the school 
curriculum as a whole and specifying teaching and learning objectives for individual 
subjects, but only in a few have curricula been as prescriptive as those issued in 
China. We have already seen some of the key political, ideological, institutional and 
administrative factors that have determined what precisely is included in the national 
History curriculum. The purpose of this chapter and Chapter 5, therefore, is to 
describe the `intended' or `preactive' curriculum that has emerged from these debates 
and struggles between curriculum stakeholders, and to show how the many influences 
outlined in Part One have affected curriculum goals and content. 
As explained in Chapter 1, individual subject curricula for History (as for other 
subjects) were introduced after the 1922 Education Decree, and under the Nationalists 
became increasingly detailed. In the PRC, a similar curriculum format was adopted, 
although, presumably to emphasise difference, the name was changed from 
`Curriculum Standards' (kecheng biaozhun) to `Teaching Outlines' (jiaoxue dagang). 
Despite increased non-governmental, `expert' participation in the drafting process 
over the past several years, this format was retained almost in toto up to the 2000 
Outline in current use. Only in the 2001 curriculum, which is still at the experimental 
stage, has the format been significantly altered and the name changed back to 
`Curriculum Standards'. 
Prior to 1978, the MOE had issued only two Outlines, in 1956 and 1963, 
although MOE Teaching Plans and other central government directives had led to 
revisions in class hour distribution and in the ratios of Chinese to world and ancient to 
modern-contemporary history (see Chapter 1, fig. 1.4). Since 1978, it may be said 
that two `sets' of Outlines have been promulgated, with each Outline in a set being a 
revision of the previous version: the first, 1978,1980,1986,1990; the second, 1988 
(trial draft of Outline), 1992,2000. Barring radical devolution of the school 
curriculum (a plan currently advocated by some educationalists) or a complete switch 
to the integrated subjects of History and Society or Social Studies discussed in 
Chapter 2, a third set of History curricula will probably derive from the 2001 History 
Curriculum Standards (HCS) after it has been used nation-wide for several years. (See 
conclusion for a discussion of the 2001 HCS). 
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Each Outline (abbreviated for reference purposes as `LJD' with the date of 
promulgation in parentheses) contains five parts: 1. overall objectives; 2. basic 
principles determining the framework within which content is organised (this was 
excised in 2000, and a new section on assessment was added); 3. a brief note 
explaining class hour distribution; 4. general instructions on teaching methods; 5. the 
syllabus. The syllabus constitutes the bulk of the Outline and is divided into Chinese 
and world history, and subdivided into ancient, modem and contemporary sections. 
In each section a general outline of historical events during that period is summarised, 
followed by lengthy topic lists. In the first set of Outlines, these topics were arranged 
into major `parts' (bian), often corresponding to a sub-stage in historical materialist 
development; each part was further divided into `chapters' (zhang) (usually 
corresponding to a period of dynastic rise and fall) some of which were subdivided 
into `lessons' (/ie), under which numbered `points' (yaodian) constituting the main 
content of that topic were listed. The second set of Outlines was designed for nine- 
year compulsory education and the `one Outline many textbooks' system inaugurated 
by the 1985 Reform, and was supposed to be less prescriptive/more flexible to 
accommodate regional disparities and to allow textbook writers some freedom to 
arrange content. It accordingly dispensed with the bian, zhang and jie labels, 
replacing them with numbers in various fonts and sizes. This has, unsurprisingly, 
made almost no difference whatsoever to the structural arrangement of content, and 
has therefore offered little flexibility in the writing of textbooks since they must 
`comply with all the requirements stipulated by the Teaching Plans and Outlines' in 
order to be approved by the Teaching Materials Inspection Committee (TMIC). 1 The 
initial switch to numbers, nonetheless, seems to have been hailed as an important 
innovation, although since many of those praising it were involved in the drafting 
process, and ideological reorientations are best left unsaid (even if they have been 
made, no-one wants to draw too much attention to them), it is hard to believe that this 
was seriously regarded as the major `breakthrough' it was claimed to be. 2 
Ideological reorientation in Outlines may not always be highlighted by those 
commenting on it in the public forum, but as this chapter will demonstrate, it does not 
mean that there have been no changes in `viewpoints' on historical events or persons, 
1 `Guojia jiaoyu weiyuanhui zhongxiaoxue jiaocai shending biaozhun' [10/10/1987], JYFQS, pp1090- 
1091. 
2 See for example, Su, `Tan tan dui `jiunianzhi yiwu jiaoyu quanrizhi chuji zhongxue lishi jiaoxue 
dagang (chushen gao)' de jidian tihui'; Sun, `Tan tan jiunian yiwu jiaoyu quanrizhi chuji zhongxue 
lishi jiaoxue dagang' de tedian'; Huang, Ain dagang, xin jiaocai de tanxing'. 
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or even on theories of historical development itself. `Viewpoints' are not always 
explicitly stated in the Outlines, although the first two parts on `objectives' and 
`principles' and the sub-sections giving event summaries make the general ideological 
tone fairly unambiguous. Some viewpoints, however, are conveyed in the topic lists 
themselves by the addition or removal of simple descriptors, such as `national hero 
XXX' or `XXX, a great XXX', and by the use of value-laden terminology, such as 
`righteous uprising' (qiyi) or `treasonous rebellion' (panluan, fanpan). Along with 
explicitly ideological statements and the relative allocation of space to particular 
topics or themes, therefore, it is such details on which I draw in this chapter (and also 
in Part Three) to evaluate the ways in which the intended curriculum has been revised 
to meet changing ideological imperatives, and to assess the shifting importance of 
these ideological objectives vis-a-vis often conflicting pedagogical goals and the 
academic professionalism of History curriculum developers. 
As already noted, the official status of History has been raised since 1978, with 
class hours increased almost continuously until 1992. To avoid lengthy narrative 
descriptions of the exact ways in which class hours have been distributed between 
Chinese, world, ancient, modern and contemporary history, and at which stage of 
schooling they have been taught, the following tables are provided as reference. 
Distribution of class hours for Chinese and world, ancient, modern and contemporary history. 
Abbreviations 
I, II, III first, second, third year of school A ancient history Ch Chinese 
i, ii first, second semester M modern history W World 
x class hours per week C contemporary history 
Dates in bold font indicate a History Teaching Outline, other dates refer to Teaching Plans or other 
MOE/SEdC directives affecting class hours. # indicates a trial version of an Outline. 
Table 4.1 Junior secondary 
I. i I. ii II. i II. ii 111.1 IIl. ii 
1978 Ch/A/2x Ch/A-M/2x Ch/M-C/2x Ch/C/2x 
1980 Ch/A/2x Ch/A/2x Ch/M/2x Ch/C/2x 
1981 Ch/A/3x Ch/A-M13x Ch/M-C/2x Ch/C/2x 
1986 Ch/A/3x Ch/A-M/3x Ch/C/2x W/A-C/2x 
#1988* Ch/A/2x Ch/A/2x Ch/M/2x Ch/C/2x W/A-M/2x W/M-C/2x 
1990 Ch/A/3x Ch/A-M/3x Ch/C/2x W/A/2x 
1992 Ch/A/2x Ch/A/2x Ch/M/3x Ch/C/3x W/A-M/2x W/M-C/2x 
1994 Ch/A/2x Ch/A/2x Ch/M12x Ch/C/2x W/A-M/2x W/M-C/2x 
2000 Ch/A/2x Ch/A/2x Ch1MI2x Ch/CI2x W/A-M/2x W/M-C/2x 
#2001 Ch/A/2x Ch/A/2x Ch/M/2x Ch/C/2x W/A-M/2x W/M-C/2x 
*Class hours listed here are for the more common 6-3 (6 year primary, 3 -year junior secondary) 
system. Where the trial Outline was tested in 5-4 system schools, however, History was taught in 
junior years I, II and IV, with 3 hours per week in the second year. When the 1988 draft was 
promulgated nation-wide as the 1992 Outline, it allotted equal hours to both systems, and moved 
History from year IV to year III in the 5-4 system. 
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Table 4.2 Senior secondary compulsory (bixiu) classes 
Li Lii Iii ILii 
1978 W/A-M/2x W/M-C/2x 
1980 W/A-M/2x W/M-C/2x 
1986 W/A-M/3x W/M-C/3x 
1990 Ch/M-C/2x W/A/2x WIM/2x W/M-C/2x 
1996 Ch/M/3x Ch1C/3x W/M/2x W/M-C/2x 
2000 ChIM/3x Ch/C/3x 
1.1978 
Following Deng Xiaoping's exhortation to update teaching materials to `reflect the 
advanced levels of modern science and culture, while conforming to the actual 
conditions of our country, '3 the MOE convened a conference of more than two 
hundred reinstated PEP editors and university academics at Xiangshan in September 
1977 and organised them into individual subject editorial groups (bianxiezu) to plan 
production of a new curriculum and accompanying textbooks. After much discussion, 
the History editorial group, headed by long-time PEP editor Su Shoutong, submitted 
`Preliminary opinions on handling issues and principles of History teaching outlines 
and textbooks' to the MOE Party Committee, which in turn referred it to the Standing 
Committee of the Politburo. 4 Once approved, the History editorial group was able to 
begin work, and in spring 1978, the first draft of the History Teaching Outline and the 
first volume of the new textbook set were published. 
The 1978 Outline was profoundly influenced by the uncertain political climate, 
departing minimally from the basic narrative described in Chapter 1, and closely 
following the `Whateverist' political `line' espoused by Hua Guofeng. There were 
several practical and political reasons for the lack of innovation. Firstly, time was 
limited; a central directive had instructed the editors to complete both Outline and 
textbooks in time for the 1978 autumn term, `so that books arrive before classes begin 
and each child has his/her own copy. '5 Secondly, `Whateverism' prevented formal 
revocation of the `Two Appraisals' and although Deng Xiaoping had denounced the 
`Appraisals', 6 MOE leaders remained loath to initiate reform. It was unthinkable, 
therefore, that their subordinates would do so. Additionally, history had been heavily 
targeted during the Cultural Revolution with `theoretical and factual issues severely 
3 `Sonne comments on work in science and education', 8/8/1977 (SWDX, Vol. 2). 
4 Su, Shibian shiyi, p239. Su joined PEP in 1953 and was reinstated when PEP was re-established in 
1972. 
5 Su, Shibian shiyi, p240. 
6 `Setting Things Right in Education, ' 8/1977 speech (SWDX, Vol. 2). 
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distorted by the Gang of Four' and `the ideology of the academic world in chaos. '7 
`New' or `reformed' interpretations of the past had not yet been agreed, and `the most 
urgent priority was to erase the Gang of Four's pernicious influence on 
historiography. ' 8 
Besides transmitting `basic knowledge' of the past, teaching and learning 
objectives in the 1978 Outline were chiefly concerned with the longstanding purpose 
of using the past to explain the present and anticipate the future, although teachers 
were advised to avoid historical `allegories and metaphors, ' presumably as an oblique 
warning against using the past to critique the present. 9 Adhering closely to 
Whateverism and the yet-to-be-debunked personality cult of Mao, Marx, Engels, 
Lenin and especially the Helmsman were cited extensively; indeed, the Outline's 
opening sentence proclaimed the importance and relevance to the present of History 
as a school subject with Mao's statement that `for any political party leading a great 
revolutionary movement, victory is impossible without revolutionary theory and 
knowledge of history. ' History was thus to continue teaching historical materialist 
laws, which would reinforce the `inevitability' of CPC rule, and to convey the related 
`two basic viewpoints': that the masses create history and that the forces and relations 
of production and class struggle are `the motive force driving economic and social 
development. ' It was to `raise high and resolutely protect the banner of Chairman 
Mao, provide a full and accurate understanding of his theories and directives and use 
them as a guide. ' In this way, students would arrive at the `unity of [history's] 
revolutionary and scientific nature, and the unity of data and viewpoints. ' Through 
following and applying these principles, `correct' conclusions about historical events 
and persons would be reached. At the same time, `all forms of historical idealism, of 
the kind espoused by Liu Shaoqi, Lin Biao and the Gang of Four' were to be 
eradicated and `the pernicious effect on history of using the past to serve the Gang 
corrected. ' 10 
With principles and standpoints clarified, the Outline turned to data, stating that 
History was to provide education in the revolutionary tradition, patriotism and 
internationalism, teaching students to love the CPC, revolutionary proletarian 
exemplars, the masses and the motherland. 'Through studying the noble spirit of 
Su, Shibian shiyi, p240. 
8 Wang, Lishi jiaocai de gaige yu shijian, p389. 
9 LJD[1978], COH, p330- 
10 Ibid., p327. 
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revolutionary heroes, ' students would gain `the confidence and determination to 
struggle for socialism and communism, ' and `raise their consciousness of class 
struggle, line struggle and ongoing revolution under the dictatorship of the 
proletariat. "' Despite the advocacy of internationalism, Chinese history remained the 
centre, world history the periphery, and following the 1963 Outline, only Chinese 
history was taught in junior secondary, with one year of world history in senior 
secondary (Table 4.2 above). The senior secondary course, however, was moved 
from year III to year I, both to ensure greater continuity with the junior secondary 
curriculum and to free up revision time in the final year of senior secondary for all- 
important university entrance examinations. 
Teaching the centrality of historical materialist laws and the Chinese revolutionary 
tradition involved continued focus on changing forces and relations of production and 
many class hours were allotted to peasant uprisings, although the chapter headings 
remained tied to dynastic rise and fall. Correctly discerning the nature of uprisings 
was still an important concern, continuing the pre-Cultural Revolution debates over 
the extent to which such uprisings were spontaneous (zifa) responses to oppression 
and hardship, or whether they were also self-aware (zijue) class struggles against the 
forces of oppression. The nature of class contradictions and the social composition of 
rebel groups and those who opposed them were accordingly identified for each period 
of history. These differentiations became increasingly specific in the modern period 
(1840-1919), with the contradictions characterising each rebellion clearly noted, for it 
was then that the awakening of class consciousness was accelerating towards 
revolutionary overthrow of the class system. 
To demonstrate legitimate succession in more traditional terms of the moral 
mandate and restoration of territorial unity, and also to promote patriotism, there was 
continued emphasis on the `one hundred years of humiliation' (bainian guochi) China 
had suffered (beginning with the Opium War and ending with the establishment of the 
PRC) at the hands of first, European capitalist-imperialists, then the Japanese; indeed, 
modern-contemporary history was allocated 60% of total class hours (previous 
Outlines and Plans had normally maintained a 1: 1 ratio for ancient to modern- 
contemporary Chinese history), since this was deemed most relevant to the formation 
of revolutionary and patriotic consciousness. 
12 Establishing moral superiority 
primarily involved continuing the pre-Cultural Revolution practice of derogating the 
" Ibid., pp327-328. 
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Qing dynasty and the Nationalists for feudal thinking, weakness, corruption and 
collaborating with foreign enemies, implying a degree of free will and moral choice in 
their actions which conflicted with the theory of innate class morality. The 
Nationalists were thus omitted completely from the Northern Expedition and 
portrayed in a wholly negative light in the War against Japan, while nothing was 
included about the period of Nanjing government. The Communists were thereby 
exalted as single-handedly leading the patriotic struggle for national unity and 
sovereignty. ' 3 
Perhaps the most distinctive feature of modern-contemporary history and the 
Outline as a whole was the obsequious treatment of Mao, who was revered as `the 
founder of the CPC, the PLA and the PRC, ' whose `revolutionary guidance' both 
before and after 1949 had `led the whole Party, the whole army and the People of 
every race of the entire nation' to glorious victory over enemies without and within. 
Surmounting such daunting challenges had been further complicated by the struggles 
within the Party itself: between Mao's always `correct' (even if inconsistent) `lines' 
and the incorrect `rightist, capitulationist' line of Chen Duxiu, the `rightist, 
opportunist' line of Liu Shaogi, the various leftist lines of Li Lisan, Qu Qiubai and 
Wang Ming, the splittist line of Zhang Guotao and the reactionary, counter- 
revolutionary plots of Liu Shaoqi (again), Lin Biao and the Gang of Four. 14 
Ethnic relations and national unity, meanwhile, featured more prominently in the 
1978 than in previous Outlines, presumably to counteract secessionist and anti- 
Chinese/anti-Han sentiment in minority and border areas, which had been exacerbated 
by Cultural Revolution excesses. This entailed not only reiterating the primordial 
one-nation message and warning against the twin evils of ethnic (Han) `chauvinism' 
and (minority) `localism' (i. e. separatism), but also re-imagining periods of `disunity' 
(fenlie geju de jumian) as characterised principally by integration or `ethnic melting' 
(minzu ronghe). Such integration had been achieved through `class struggles' and 
`the struggle for production, ' trade, cultural exchange and population movement. The 
dominant theme of integration (positive) which superseded political disunity 
(negative) thus inverted the 1963 Outline assessment in which ethnic integration was 
merely an unintentionally positive outcome from a negative state of affairs, and broke 
completely from the traditional view of barbarian tribes invading and vying for 
12 LJD[ 19781, COH, p329 
13 Ibid., pp345-366. 
14 Ibid., pp352-363. 
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control of the `civilised' (Han) central plains (of which there were some vestiges in 
the 1956 Outline). Furthermore, the `rival states' which had formed during these 
periods, were now reclassified as `rival centres of political power' to emphasise the 
continuity of the national whole from ancient times to the present. 15 
The 1978 Outline moved beyond the scope of the 1963 chronology, which had 
ended with the founding of the PRC, and extended detailed syllabus coverage from 
1949 to 1956, just prior to the Hundred Flowers and anti-Rightist movements, the 
period of CPC rule that was almost unanimously regarded as successful. This 
outlined the economic and political consolidation of CPC rule, covering topics such as 
land reform, suppression of counter-revolutionary activities, the Three and Five Antis 
campaigns, and the success of the first five-year plan. It also highlighted the `Resist 
America, Aid Korea' movement, and the Soviet imperialist, revisionist betrayal of the 
revolution. The period from 1957 and the Great Leap Forward on was also covered, 
including the `great victory of the socialist construction general line' (the Great Leap 
and the establishment of People's communes), `victory over temporary economic 
difficulties' (the Leap was not mentioned as a cause and Liu Shaoqi's role in 
stabilising the economy was omitted), and finally, the Cultural Revolution victory of 
the proletariat (over `revisionism' and `rightist deviations'). 16 Broad-brush treatment 
of this period, however, was recommended, commensurate with the many issues 
awaiting formal address and resolution. In fact, the 1978-79 textbooks drafted on the 
basis of this Outline did not even venture into broad-brush treatment territory, ending 
their coverage in 1957 with a section on the publication of Mao's `On handling 
contradictions among the people'. 17 As Deng had advised the History Outline and 
textbook editorial committee, `it is best to say little about the living. ' 18 
II. 1980 
The February 1978 Outline was slightly modified that December, and more 
substantially in 1980, after Deng Xiaoping had assumed leadership and Whateverism 
and the Two Appraisals had been revoked. With Deng's authority not yet fully 
consolidated and the direction and pace of reform undetermined, however, curriculum 
developers remained unsure of History's (and, by extension, their own) future status. 
When reworking the Outline, therefore, they exercised extreme caution, avoiding 
Is LJD[1978], COH, p331. 
16 Ibid., pp362-363. 
17 Quanrizhi shinianzhi xuexiao chuji zhongxue keben: Zhongguo lishi, vol. 4 [1979] 
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sensitive issues, such as the role of Liu Shaoqi (whose posthumous rehabilitation was 
apparently contested among the leadership), 19 and omitting post-1949 history 
altogether. 
The 1980 revision retained basic narratives, viewpoints and aims of the 1978 
Outline, but made some noteworthy alterations, in particular, removing some of the 
more revolutionary goals and language. History's indispensability to the revolution 
was thus replaced by an assertion of its `certain place' in the school curriculum, while 
`line struggle' and `ongoing revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat' were 
eliminated, and students urged instead to `devote themselves to the Four 
Modernisations. '20 Class struggle was considerably muted, with the lengthy section 
detailing class contradictions at different stages of social evolution replaced by a brief 
exposition of contradictions between forces and relations of production, which `are 
the basic motive force of social development, ' and of their manifestation in class 
struggle which `is the direct motive force driving historical development. ' (The 
differences between `basic' and `direct' were not elucidated. ) Downplaying of class 
struggle was also reflected in warnings against simplistically ascribing `struggles 
between ethnic groups' to class contradictions, although the class viewpoint was 
nonetheless to be used to analyse such problems `concretely. ' 21 Additionally, the 
exhortation to `love the revolutionary proletarian exemplars' was deleted, since the 
Cultural Revolution over-emphasis on `red' class background had been officially 
condemned. Teaching the laws of development remained paramount, but Mao's 
quote - `Now we have reached the era in which capitalism is definitely dying, and 
socialism is flourishing'22 - was excised, since tentative `opening' after two decades 
of isolationism had shown the Chinese people that despite a less than stellar economic 
performance in the 1970s capitalism was far from being extinguished, and that 
18 Su, Shibian shiyi, p240. 
19 Liu's rehabilitation was decided at the February 1980 Fifth Plenum of the Eleventh Central 
Committee, although the memorial service formally announcing his rehabilitation was not held until 
May. Ladany (The Communist Party and Marxism, pp428-430) suggests this was because opinions on 
his rehabilitation were divided, with some among the leadership still regarding him as not having been 
a `good communist' noting that both Ye Jianying and Li Xiannian, then vice-chairmen of the Central 
Committee, absented themselves from the service. That a memorial service was held at all testifies to 
the authority of Deng, but that curriculum developers chose to straddle the fence and simply remove 
Liu completely from the Outline suggests that they were not certain that Deng and his acolytes would 
remain in control. 
20 LJD[1980], COH, p386. 
21 LJD[1980], COH, p387. 
22 LJD[ 1978], COH, p228. 
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socialism, especially of the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution variety, was 
equally far from inevitable victory. 
Although the syllabus was virtually unchanged, a 1: 1 ratio for ancient and modern- 
contemporary history was restored. (The 1: 3 ancient to modern-contemporary 
balance in the senior secondary world history course was not altered. ) These 
additional ancient history class hours allowed curriculum developers to include 
marginally more cultural history, while the slightly more liberal climate permitted 
them to reinstate several `Great Men' who had formerly been derogated as feudal 
oppressors or supplanted in the limited timetable by revolutionary peasant leaders. 
The most significant of these was Confucius, who, in 1978, had been portrayed as a 
reactionary ideologue and advocate of `restoring slave society, '23 whose negative 
influence had shackled China in feudal darkness, obstructing social and economic 
development for almost two thousand years. In the 1980 Outline, he was tentatively 
rehabilitated as `a thinker' and `educator, ' who had advocated adherence to the `rites' 
prescribed in the Liji and believed that the ruler should exercise `benevolence' 
towards his subjects. 24 Other thinkers, such as Sima Guang and Zhu Xi, were also 
added to `cultural history' sections, while Wu Zetian, who had been included in the 
1963 Outline but omitted in 1978, was restored to the section on Sui-Tang rule. 25 
Class hours allocated to peasant uprisings were slightly reduced, while the Self- 
Strengthening movement, given short shrift in 1978 - and then mainly as a backdrop 
to the emergence of the proletariat - received more extensive coverage. Although 
Self-Strengthening ultimately failed to preserve China's political and territorial 
integrity, its contribution to proto-capitalist development and the formation of a 
`national bourgeoisie' was now acknowledged. Coverage of the 1898 Hundred Days 
Reforms was similarly extended, and the bourgeoisie who participated in the 
movement were credited with desiring `independence, strength and prosperity for 
China. ' Although the reform movement `could not defeat the conservative feudal 
forces, it opened the way for the development of capitalism. '26 This reflected the 
gradual resurrection of the debate among professional historians over the `sprouts of 
capitalism' in China's past, as well as modest attempts to promote reform and 
23 LJD[ 1978], COH, p334. 
24 LJD[1980], COH, p392. 
25 In no writings on the rationale underpinning curriculum development have I found any reference to 
Empress Wu's 1978 omission. It may perhaps be that the resemblance to Jiang Qing's assumption of 
authority in Mao's dotage was a little too close for comfort, and that there was a wish to avoid any 
possible positive comparison between the two. 
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downplay revolution. It was also an acknowledgement that all Chinese, regardless of 
class background, could be patriots. In a similar effort to embrace `opening' and 
dispel isolationist xenophobia, the Boxer movement, formerly a heroic `anti- 
imperialist struggle, ' was criticised for its `narrow and backward nature and generally 
anti-foreign methods. '27 
Reflecting leadership changes and the anti-personality cult ethos, flattering 
references to `sagacious (former) Chairman Hua, ' were conspicuously absent, and, 
more importantly, Mao's role was downplayed. The 1978 Outline's sycophantic 
ascription of all China's revolutionary `successes' to Mao's genius was thus replaced 
with a relatively subdued emphasis on collective Party leadership, noting that `the 
CPC led the Chinese people in overthrowing the reactionary rule of imperialism, 
feudalism and bureaucratic capitalism, established the PRC, and achieved a great 
victory in the Chinese revolution. '28 Nowhere was Mao's `correct line' mentioned. 
As with the Liu Shaoqi issue, caution was paramount, and curriculum developers 
consequently chose both to credit other revolutionary leaders, many of whom were in 
senior government positions in 1980, and to dissociate themselves from the awkward 
task of dispensing `praise and blame' where Mao and his `correct' (and incorrect) 
`lines' were concerned. As Su later noted, `In the past, the influence of leftist 
ideology meant that many historical issues were regarded as political issues.... 
History curriculum developers and textbook writers did not dare to question matters in 
this regard. '29 
III. 1986 
By the mid-1980s, `historical issues' were still `political issues', and although 
curriculum developers enjoyed greater latitude in revising traditional narratives, 
History remained extremely sensitive. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, education 
administration was undergoing a process of reconstruction at this time and it had been 
decided to introduce compulsory education, limited textbook pluralism and also to 
strengthen the role of `experts' in curriculum development and textbook production. 
It would take some time, however, before drafting and comprehensive testing of new 
curricula and textbooks could be completed, and in the interim `transitional' Outlines 
were commissioned, to be promulgated in 1986. 
26 L. 1D[ 19801, COH, p403. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid, p411. 
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By 1986, History's official status in the curriculum had been strengthened. Firstly, 
the 1981 Teaching Plan had increased History class hours by 25%. It had also moved 
the History course from junior secondary years II and III, to years I and II, 
presumably to ensure that students actually completed the course, as History classes 
were frequently abandoned in the third year to allow additional revision time for the 
`core subjects' tested in senior secondary entrance examinations. Secondly, then- 
Premier Zhao Ziyang's 1981 call to strengthen patriotism through History and 
Geography education and the somewhat later Propaganda Ministry `Opinion' on 
promoting patriotic education had been formally adopted in two 1983 MOE 
directives, which emphasised the importance of History and Geography for 
understanding China's `national conditions' (guoqing) and constructing `socialist 
spiritual civilisation', and warned against arbitrarily curtailing time-tabled class 
hours. 30 
Increased political stability and improved status partially freed History curriculum 
developers from their earlier caution, and although the SEdC had instructed them to 
`take the current (1980) Outline and make few changes, ' 31 continued efforts to reduce 
`leftism' and promote reform and modernisation were evident. To minimise `the 
salience of `struggle philosophy"32 - widely believed to be not only inappropriate in 
the post-Cultural Revolution era, but also tedious and difficult for students to 
comprehend - many peasant `revolutionary struggles' were simply listed as 
unspecified `wars' or `uprisings, ' or were omitted altogether; even coverage of the 
great nineteenth century rebellions, once regarded as essential to demonstrate the 
awakening of revolutionary consciousness, was curtailed, with only the Taiping and 
Boxer movements retained. 33 Conversely, to provide respite from dry political history 
and promote patriotic appreciation of China's traditional heritage, the previous 
practice of `neglecting the (ancient) past, and emphasising the present' (houjin bogu) 
was reversed, and ancient history was allocated 60% of class hours. 
29 Su, Shibian shiyi, p256. 
30 `Zhonggong zhongyang xuanchuanbu, Zhonggong zhongyang shujichu yanjiushi yu jiaqiang 
aiguozhuyi xuanchuan jiaoyu de yijian' [2/7/1983] JYFQS, pp601-606; `Jiaoyubu guanyu gaijin 
jiagiang zhongxue lishi he dilike jiaoxue de tongzhi', [1/8/1983] JYFQS, pp666-668; `Jiaoyubu guanyu 
xuexi guanche `guanyu jiagiang aiguozhuyi xuanchuan jiaoyu de yijian' de tongzhi' [24/8/1983], 
JYFQS, pp607-608. These documents are discussed in more detail in Chapter 2. 
31 Wang, Lishi jiaocai de gaige yu shijian, p396. 
32Wang (ibid. ) states that `several comrades' have coined this phrase to describe the overarching theme 
of history as told over the preceding 
decades. 
33 L JD[ 1986], COH, pp452-464. 
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With the greater ancient history weighting, additional space was allotted to cultural 
and scientific developments of which the nation could be proud, and also to the Great 
Men who had contributed to (or detracted from) China's former pre-eminence. A 
token effort both to increase female representation and to counteract the hitherto 
predominantly negative portrayal of the few women who appeared (Bao Si, Yang 
Guifei, Cixi) was also made with the inclusion of the Song poet Li Qingzhao and the 
martyr to the 1911 Revolution, Qiu Jin. Moreover, in accounts of all historical 
figures, unequivocal distribution of praise and blame was repudiated. `Negative' 
figures thus no longer needed to be `exposed, ' but were instead to be `analysed' in 
their proper historical context, although they were still subsequently to be 
`criticised. ' 34 They were, however, to be evaluated in the spirit of `seeking truth from 
facts, ' rather than denigrated according to class background. While this may have 
been a simple repetition of the reform mantra, it also suggests a desired move away 
from overt politicisation of history towards attempts at balanced judgements and 
`scientific objectivity'. Justifying this decision in the standard mode of appealing to a 
`higher authority', Wang insisted that `negating historical persons without analysis is 
not a Marxist attitude. ' Instead, she argued, the actions of both positive and negative 
historical figures should be properly situated and examined in their own historical 
context. 35 Such a view clearly drew on the broader trend among academic historians 
towards `integrating data and theory' (shilun jiehe) rather than `using theory to lead 
data' (yi lun dai shi). 
In a similar spirit of de-emphasising `theory', and to minimise overlap with Politics 
(much of which also focused on the historical materialist stages of social and 
economic evolution), historical materialist laws were simplified and their role 
downplayed. The forces and relations of production were demoted to `one of the 
motive forces of development, ' and neither class struggle nor the masses were said to 
create history, although the socialist `People' (renmin) remained the `main actors. ' 
Furthermore, the masses, like the `revolutionary proletarian exemplars' in 1980, were 
omitted from the Outline's `to love' list, suggesting clearly that in the entrepreneur- 
friendly, get-rich-quick climate of creating socialist material civilisation, the 
agricultural masses toiling in the fields and the proletariat clutching their iron rice 
bowls in lumbering state enterprises were no longer to be exalted as role models for 
the young. Instead, inspiration to strive for modernisation and the construction of 
34 LJD[ 1986], COI, p449. 
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socialist spiritual civilisation was to be sought in the achievements and noble spirit of 
`outstanding (youxiu) persons' in Chinese history, most of whom, given the 
historiographical tradition, have, of course, been educated, ruling class males. 
Reflecting this reorientation, communism was pushed into the background and 
patriotism highlighted as a timeless, class- and ethnicity-transcending, unifying force. 
The motherland thus moved into first place on the `to love' list, followed by the 
socialist modernisation enterprise, with the CPC dropping to third and last place. 36 
The general portrayal of ethnic relations was unchanged, including the standard 
rhetoric of unity since time immemorial, the outstanding contributions of all ethnic 
groups to the development of the motherland (occasionally interrupted by 
`contradictions' and `struggles'), and the shared love of the Chinese minzu for peace, 
equality and development. `Eradicating ethnic chauvinism and localism, ' however, 
was no longer listed as a curricular objective. No reason for this is immediately 
apparent, although Wang asserts that since 1949 `ethnic contradictions' had steadily 
diminished, and by 1986 had disappeared completely, obviating the need for further 
mention. Moreover, she suggests that the concepts involved were `abstract and 
sweeping', and that drawing attention to the issue may even have caused problems 
where none existed. 37 Ethnic problems, however, had not been eradicated and were 
tacitly acknowledged, for example, in the highlighted historical role and epithet `hero 
of the national people' (minzu yingxiong) awarded to Great Men from minority 
nationalities who had contributed to the glory of 'China'. Prominence was also given 
to `the peaceful liberation of Tibet. ' The former was presumably intended 
prophylactically, to demonstrate to wary minorities the inclusive nature of the Chinese 
nation, but the latter, which had not been mentioned in the 1978 Outline, was most 
probably a response to the growing pro-independence movement within Tibet. One 
interpretation of these changes, therefore, might be that `localism', insofar as it 
involved resurgence of religious and cultural traditions and did not threaten territorial 
unity, was now to be tolerated. From a more cynical perspective, however, it could 
also be surmised that Han chauvinism was no longer regarded as a problem, but 
simply an `honest' if implicit acknowledgement of Han `superiority' over `backward' 
minority peoples, many of whom were (are) widely believed to be 'stuck' at the 
feudal stage of development. 
35 Wang, Lishi jiaocai de gaige yu sh/ian, pp392-393. 
36 LJD[ 1986], COH, p448. 
37 Wang, Lishi jiaocai de gaige yu shUian, pp393-394. 
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Two major changes were made in modern-contemporary history. Firstly, the 1911- 
1949 period, which had previously amounted to little more than a `history of the Party 
and the revolution, '38 was substantially revised to include a more positive portrayal of 
the Nanjing government and its active participation in the United Front, the Northern 
Expedition and the Anti-Japanese War. 39 While this change reflected curriculum 
developers' professionalism in pursuing accuracy and their stated desire to move 
away from political dictates, they were, at the same time, obeying new `political' 
demands, since the revised narrative fitted neatly with gradual detente between the 
PRC and Taiwan begun in the early 1980s. Secondly, with the official verdict on pre- 
Cultural Revolution history having been proclaimed in the 1981 `Resolution on 
Certain Questions in the History of Our Party, ' contemporary history coverage was 
extended up to the 1980s. Some issues remained sensitive, however, and references 
to factional struggles were omitted, so as to avoid discussing divisions within the 
Party, while the anti-Rightist campaign was portrayed simply as having `over- 
expanded, ' leading to `errors. ' By contrast, economic difficulties following the Great 
Leap were no longer euphemised as `temporary, ' but admitted to have been `serious, ' 
and the Cultural Revolution was roundly denounced as `ten years of domestic chaos, ' 
albeit resulting from an unintentional leadership `mistake', exploited by the `counter- 
revolutionary cliques' of Lin Biao and Jiang Qing. 40 
Perhaps the most important change in 1986 was the restoration of world history to 
the junior secondary curriculum, for it was recognised that the many students who did 
not progress to senior secondary level were receiving no instruction in non-Chinese 
history. In the context of `reform and opening in China and the consequent contact 
with many countries, ' this lack of knowledge was deplored'41 although it is debatable 
whether it was simple ignorance or a lack of state-authorised knowledge that the 
world history course aimed to redress. The world history syllabus was restricted to a 
sweeping one-semester survey from primitive times to the 1980s, and was actually an 
abridgement of the senior secondary course. Unlike Chinese history, world history 
had undergone little change during the reform era, maintaining a consistent emphasis 
on historical materialist laws, revolutions, imperialism and anti-colonialism, and a 
strong bias (at least 2: 1) in favour of modern-contemporary history. This conservatism 
38 Ibid, p401. 
39 LJD[ 1986], COH, pp474-477. 
40 LJD[ 1986], COH, p481. 
41 Wang, Lishi jiaoyuxue, pp68-69. 
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was reflected in the new junior secondary syllabus, which was even more heavily 
slanted towards the present, with ancient history constituting only 20% of class hours. 
The addition of world history, however, was not unequivocally welcomed, and 
several academics, curriculum developers among them, can be found in assorted 
papers praising the inclusion of world history, but simultaneously complaining about 
the diminution of Chinese history and the consequent necessity of condensing a four- 
semester syllabus with extended chronological scope and four textbooks into three 
semesters and three volumes. In fact, total Chinese history class hours were simply 
returned to the amount stipulated in the 1980 Outline, and the textbooks were 
reorganised into three longer volumes. While these changes undoubtedly necessitated 
some reductions in various areas of Chinese history, it appears that the real grievance 
was that there had been no moves to increase total History class hours with the re- 
introduction of twelve-year schooling, and that Chinese history had not been added to 
the senior secondary curriculum. The combined class hour total for junior and senior 
secondary History was thus divided equally between Chinese and world history 
courses, which `given that China has such a long history, is not really appropriate. '42 
(That world history is also `long' does not seem to have had any bearing on the 
matter, nor does the fact that in primary school, a one-year History course, weighted 
3: 1 in favour of Chinese history, was also taught). Such sentiments manifestly echo 
the antipathy felt towards the equal distribution of Chinese and world history adopted 
briefly in the 1950s under USSR influence, and reinforce the impression that world 
history has continued to be considered as peripheral and relatively unimportant. 
Although but a few words, the 1986 Outline included a significant addition to what 
in the 1978 and 1980 Outlines had been a brief section describing `the most basic 
teaching requirements and methods. '43 This had simply reiterated the centrality of 
correct analysis and conclusions and cautioned against departing from textbook 
content, while somewhat contradictorily instructing teachers to `encourage students to 
think actively, and to oppose spoon-feeding. ' 
44 The 1986 Outline retained this section 
verbatim, but added that `attention must be paid to nurturing students' ability to 
analyse, summarise, compare and generalise' and that classroom teaching and 
extramural activities must be `fully integrated' and `mutually reinforcing. ' 
45 This 
42 Yu, Ye and Zhao, Lishi xueke jiaoyuxue, pp 113 
pp256-257. 
43 Wang, `Chaikai lishi xinde yiye', p34. 
'4 LJD[1978], LJD[1980], COH, p330, p388. 
45 LJD[ 1986], COH, p450. 
Similar remarks are made by Su, Shibian shiyi, 
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reflected the growing influence of pedagogical theory, which was developing rapidly 
as an autonomous academic discipline. It also acknowledged that skills were 
desperately needed for economic development, and was an attempt to prove History's 
usefulness to the modernisation project in practical as well as ideological terms. 
IV. 1988 
The mid - late 1980s were a tumultuous period for China as reform and opening 
accelerated, bringing a potent mixture of economic growth, unemployment and social 
problems. Criticism of `orthodox' Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought and by 
extension, challenges to the Party itself, became increasingly vocal despite 
government-launched campaigns against `spiritual pollution' and `bourgeois 
liberalisation'. In the context of heightened anti-Party sentiment, increased regime 
sensitivity to allegorical criticism through history and renewed witch-hunts for 
political dissidents, curriculum developers followed their highly developed instinct for 
caution, attempting to balance a pro-modernisation, pro-opening ethos with a 
reassertion of `traditional' values. 
In 1987, the History editorial department of PEP and professors from Beijing 
Normal University (BNU), assisted by the Central Nationalities Institute, Shandong 
University and the Beijing Education Institute, began to draft a new curriculum for the 
compulsory education system. 46 Expanded `expert' participation and a lengthy 
consultation process entailed greater negotiation over the content of the 1988 draft 
than had been the case with previous Outlines. Additionally, several older curriculum 
developers had retired, and their younger successors were typically more reform- 
minded and also directed more attention towards pedagogy. This was, in part, 
because `opening' had allowed new (mostly foreign) ideas and theories to be studied, 
and it was felt that traditional pedagogies were inadequate for the modernisation task, 
but also because matters such as teaching methods were perceived as apolitical and 
value-free. The History TMIC approved the draft Outline in 1988, permitting 
implementation on a trial basis, with nation-wide promulgation slated for 1992- 
47 1993. 
46 Su, `Tan tan dui `jiunianzhi yiwu jiaoyu quanrizhi chuji zhongxue lishi jiaoxue dagang (chushen 
gao)' de jidian tihui', p2. 
47 I have not been able to locate data detailing precisely which regions were involved. Both Gong 
('Tan tan jiunian yiwu jiaoyu chuzhong lishi jiaoxue dagang de tedian he shengbian chuzhong lishi 
shiyong keben de bianxie yitu') and Sun (Lishi jiaoxue de yishu yujiqiao) name Chengdu, Chongqing 
and Wuhan, but it is likely that it was also tested elsewhere. 
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The 1987 provisional Teaching Plan further boosted History's status, extending the 
course from two to three years. (This restored it to parity with Politics, the first time 
History had been in such a position of strength since the mid-1950s. ) With extra class 
hours, the 1988 Outline expanded the world history course to a full year, although it 
remained a simplified version of the senior secondary syllabus. The draft also 
stipulated class hours (approximately 5% of the total) for ethnic minority or local 
history, the teaching of which had hitherto been sporadic, since previous Outlines had 
designated it as `supplementary, ' allowing PMAR education departments to decide 
whether or not to include it `after all the tasks required by the Outline have been 
completed. '48 Furthermore, although the Outlines had instructed PMAR education 
departments to take responsibility for drafting relevant local history textbooks, there 
was, in fact, no organised publication of teaching materials, with some authorities 
taking an enthusiastic approach and others evading the task altogether. 49 It is unclear 
whether the inclusion of local history was a politically correct effort to celebrate, or at 
least display tolerance for ethnic and regional diversity, or a more cynical attempt to 
dictate the content of non-national histories and prevent assertion of separate 
identities and secessionist dreams. What is certain, however, is that it aimed to 
promote greater understanding of local conditions and love for one's hometown, and 
thereby inspire the young to strive for local development. By extension, it was 
thought, this would nurture patriotism and contribute to national modernisation 
goals. 5° 
Although the format was not changed from previous Outlines, there was 
considerable reorganisation of content, with the start-date of contemporary history 
moved from 1919 to 1949. $1 Additionally, many points which had originally 
48 LJD[1978,1980,1986], COH, pp327-328, p388, p450. 
49 Ye, `Guowai lishi jiaoxue zhuangkuang yu woguo zhongxue lishi jiaoxue de gaige he fazhan'p34 
so Song, `Dui jiaqiang xiangtushi jiaoxue de sandian renshi', pp38-39. 
51 Chan and Scott assert that it was changed to 1927 and the establishment of the Nanjing government, 
but this is incorrect. They have probably made this error because in the PEP textbook set they 
examined, vols. 3 and 4 of Chinese History cover the modem-contemporary period, and vol. 4 begins in 
1927. They have thus assumed it to be the `contemporary history' section. It states clearly in the 
contents page, however, that the 1927-1949 period is a continuation of modern history, as it does in the 
Outline. For contemporary history to begin in 1927 a dramatic re-conceptualisation of the past and the 
place of the Communist Party would have been necessary. The switch from 1919 to 1949, by contrast, 
is not without logic, since it ties the notion of `contemporary' to the fresh start made in `New' China 
(both for society and for the CPC). The change may also have been made because the extension of 
coverage up to the 1980s (initiated in the 1986 revised Outline) entailed an almost seventy-year (as 
compared to the previous thirty- forty-year) span for what was considered `contemporary'. Perhaps 
this was considered too long a period for young minds to conceptualise as `contemporary' because the 
start-date of contemporary history remained 1919 
for professional historians. Since there was no 
periodisation debate regarding the modern-contemporary transition in the years leading up to this 
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appeared as `aims and requirements' were moved to the lesser section on guiding 
principles. The importance of History education to the construction of socialist 
spiritual civilisation was reiterated, but where previously its relevance was 
unexplained, it was now elaborated as `an important means of realising [students'] 
complete moral, intellectual, physical and aesthetic development and nurturing a new 
generation possessed of ideals, morals, culture and discipline. '52 History would thus 
play an `active role in raising the quality of the national people (tigao minzu suzhi), 
and strengthening national self-confidence. '53 History was also claimed to be 
`beneficial to the study of other subjects, ' although how it was beneficial was not 
specified. The language employed in defining the objectives of this Outline reflected 
the growing influence of theories of child development and pedagogy, and was also, 
more importantly, an attempt to define a new `higher purpose' for History, 
transcending simple knowledge transmission, to replace its former emphasis on 
revolution and historical materialist laws which were now increasingly downplayed. 54 
Using the notion of a higher purpose to stake out a particular territory in the broader 
modernisation project and thereby guarantee History's status in the curriculum seems 
to have been the major motivation here; as Wang remarked, 
History education has hitherto not received the attention it deserves. Apart from the 
objective problem of staff shortages, from a subjective perspective, education 
departments at all levels and the leadership of some primary and secondary schools 
have neglected History education and this has affected the normal implementation of 
the History curriculum. This [Outline], therefore, is intended to remind education 
departments and schools at all levels to pay attention to History's role and status. " 
Su insists that the draft remained essentially guided by Marxism and its (Chinese) 
derivative theories, 56 but he had already retired from curriculum drafting to the 
History TMIC, and his successors evidently decided that Marxism-Leninism-Mao 
Zedong Thought no longer required excessive mention, replacing it in most instances 
with the more `scientific' terminology of `dialectical and historical materialism. ' 57 
The role of historical materialist theory, and its corollary of emphasising forces and 
relations of production, class struggle and peasant uprisings was, however, further 
curriculum revision, it must be assumed that this was a decision taken by curriculum developers and 
TMIC on their own initiative. Unfortunately, however, I have been unable to find any explanation for 
this significant change in the secondary literature. 
52 These are known as the `Four Haves' (siyou). 
53 LTD[ 1988], COH, 510. 
54 Gong, `Tan tan jiunian yiwu jiaoyu chuzhong lishi jiaoxue dagang' de tedian he shengbian 
chuzhong lishi shiyong keben de bianxie yitu', p28. 
ss Wang, Lishi jiaocai de gaige yu sh ian, pp406-407. 
56 Su, `Tan tan dui `jiunianzhi yiwu jiaoyu quanrizhi chuji zhongxue lishi jiaoxue dagang (chushen 
gao)' de jidian tihui', p3. 
57 LJD[1988], COH, p510. 
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downscaled, while space devoted to cultural history and Great Men was again 
expanded. This reflected continued repudiation of `revolution, ' and the promotion of 
patriotism and `national self-confidence' through nurturing pride in China's past 
glories. The demotion of `theory' was also influenced by professional historical 
research, which increasingly attempted not only to integrate theory and data, but also 
to release Chinese history from its historical materialist straitjacket altogether, and 
`derive (new) theories from data' (lun cong shi chu). Such an approach was not 
evident in world history, which remained principally concerned with providing 
illustrative examples of historical materialist theory and demonstrating past 
imperialist transgressions to alert the young to continued imperialist threats. 
Nonetheless, some cultural topics were added, and, in a nod to internationalism, 
students were required not only to strive for socialist modernisation in China, but also 
to develop `a sense of responsibility' to strive for the `peace and progressive 
undertakings of humanity. ' International relations were thus portrayed as having been 
typified by peaceful trade and cultural exchange, albeit punctuated by occasional 
wars. This internationalist spirit was, however, somewhat undermined by Sinocentric 
arrogance, which asserted that China had made great `contributions' (gongxian, 
purely positive) to humanity, while other cultures had `influenced' (yingxiang) China 
(in both positive and negative senses). 58 
One notable change of format was the separation of the `three great tasks' of 
`knowledge transmission, ideological education and skill training'59 in each section of 
the syllabus. `Basic knowledge' (jichu zhishi) thus contained a narrative chronology 
of `major' events for each separate period of Chinese and world history, while 
`ideological education' (sixiang jiaoyu) reiterated in added detail the goals of 
patriotism, preserving national unity, teaching the laws of development, emulating the 
lofty morals and actions of outstanding persons, and upholding the Party's `basic line' 
at the preliminary stage of socialism. 60 Despite the clarification of the different task 
areas, neither basic knowledge nor ideological education differed significantly in 
content from the 1986 Outline. `Skill training' sections, on the other hand, 
represented a serious attempt to emphasise both the need for improved pedagogy and 
the usefulness of History in terms of transferable skills. These sections were quite 
detailed, although also rather repetitive. Some general requirements were concretely 
58 LJD[ 19881, COH p510-511. 
59 Ibid., p512. 
60 Ibid., pp515-516,525,532. 
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specified, including note-taking, summarising texts verbally and in writing, and 
locating past civilisations on modern maps. Other skills were more complex, such as 
applying dialectical and historical materialism to analysis of past events, and 
comparing historical events and persons across spatial and temporal divides. 61 Little 
guidance on how to foster these skills was provided, however, other than to suggest 
using `lively teaching methods, ' to encourage students to relate classroom and 
textbook learning to other sources of historical information (novels, films, cultural 
artefacts), and to `research the skill and art of teaching, so as better to elicit students' 
active thinking and learning. '62 Such vagueness indicates that a coherent 
understanding of how History related to skills, and how skills related to knowledge, 
and especially to ideology, had not yet been properly formulated by curriculum 
developers. 
V. 1990 
The 1986 revision had been intended to cover the transition to the new compulsory 
education curriculum, which was due to be implemented nation-wide in 1992-3. In 
the wake of Tiananmen, however, senior secondary class hours had been suddenly 
revised mid-school year to include a semester of modern-contemporary Chinese 
history (see Chapter 2), and in 1990, the SEdC issued `Opinions on the adjustment of 
the current Teaching Plan for senior secondary schools, '63 formally incorporating the 
stipulations of the 1989 directive and also dividing the curriculum into compulsory 
and `elective' courses (normally compulsory for students in the humanities stream). 
This required a revision of the Outline to reorganise the syllabus into the appropriate 
categories. It was decided at the same time to make some minor changes to the junior 
secondary section of the Outline to reflect the spirit of compulsory education and the 
1987 provisional Teaching Plan. These were mainly concerned with the old theme of 
lightening students' `learning burden, ' which had been a constant concern since the 
1950s, and was thought to be particularly necessary in the case of rural students, who 
would struggle, it was thought, with `difficult or excessive content and overly high 
requirements. ' 64 
61 LJD[19881, COH, pp516,525-526,533. 
62 Ibid., p512. 
63 For the full text of this document and explanatory notes, see COCP, pp364-364. As with the 1981 
Teaching Plan, the SEdC attached a notice indicating that regional education authorities may make 
adjustments in implementation according to local conditions (COCP, p359). 
64 LJD[ 19901, COH, p659. 
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It might be expected that the June 1989 events in Tiananmen Square and the 
subsequent crackdown would also have necessitated some significant modifications to 
History content, but in fact, the junior secondary curriculum remained almost 
identical to the 1986 Outline. One minor change was made in the opening section on 
`Aims and Requirements' with `providing education in upholding the Four Cardinal 
Principles' added to the existing list of revolutionary tradition, patriotism and 
internationalism, presumably as a post-Tiananmen response designed to remind the 
young (teachers and students alike) not to follow the erroneous path of bourgeois 
liberalisation. 65 The syllabus also remained virtually unchanged, but in an effort to 
distinguish between essential and supplementary knowledge, certain topics, or aspects 
thereof, were underlined to indicate that they were optional content only and should 
not be included in examinations. These optional topics were mostly related to 
systems of tenancy, taxation and administration, or were `minor' peasant rebellions 
which had neither catalysed dynastic fall nor resulted in dramatic reforms. There was 
also a slight de-emphasis on individual battles, especially in the War against Japan, 
the War of Liberation and World War Two, and a reduction of coverage of the Cold 
War following the collapse of the European Communist bloc. In contrast, cultural 
history, which had been substantially expanded since 1978, was barely touched, 
suggesting a growing desire to move away from political and military history towards 
a more holistic history, which would also, it was hoped, be more appealing to students 
and provide them with a broader historical education. With the consequences of 
recent events still uncertain, curriculum developers were perhaps also attempting to 
stay away from the dangerous realm of politics, and thus followed Deng's earlier 
advice to `say little. ' 
VI. 1992 
If the uncertainty which characterised the aftermath of the Tiananmen crackdown had 
meant that few changes were made in the 1990 revised Outline, by the time the 1988 
draft Outline for compulsory education had been fully tested and approved for 
promulgation in 1992, the official line had been clarified. Following Jiang Zemin's 
65 The Four Cardinal Principles are rarely mentioned in texts on History education. In the aftermath of 
the campaign against `bourgeois liberalisation' in 1986-87 and the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations, 
however, a spate of articles was published exhorting teachers to inculcate the Four Cardinal Principles 
as a prophylactic to ward off the `influence of 
bourgeois liberals such as Fang Lizhi, Wang Ruowang 
and Liu Binyan' (LSJX editorial, `Jianchi sixiangjiben yuanze 
dejiaoyu shi shenke de aiguo zhuyi 
jiaoyu', p2. ) 
148 
letter to SEdC leaders Li Tieying and He Dongchang calling for renewed emphasis on 
modem-contemporary Chinese history, 66 the SEdC had issued several directives on 
strengthening education in modern-contemporary Chinese history and guoqing 
education, and had drafted special guidelines on political-ideological training for 
primary and secondary school History. 67 As described in Chapter 2, these directives 
were particularly vitriolic, although in terms of data they merely followed the 
Outlines in emphasising China's glorious (pre-modern) cultural history, and 
demonstrating how the twin evils of imperialism, and hopeless incompetence and 
ossified thinking on the part of China's feudal rulers had brought China to a nadir, 
from which the nation could never have recovered without the CPC. The language, 
however, was much more emotive than that mostly used in Outlines, and greater 
emphasis was also placed on the themes of historical materialism, the place of 
revolution, and the Party's leading role in bringing China out of feudal darkness into 
the light of socialist modernity. 
The 1991 SEdC guidelines were explicitly stated to have been incorporated into the 
1992 Outline, and according to one of the History TMIC inspectors, this resulted in 
`significant progress [compared to the 1988 draft] in both political-ideological and 
scientific terms, as well as necessitating some adjustments in the structure of data. '68 
In the initial sections on aims and principles there were indeed several omissions, 
additions and changes in terminology which indicated a return to a more 
`conservative' approach to History. The importance of understanding national 
conditions (guoqing), upholding the Four Cardinal Principles and opposing `peaceful 
evolution plots, ' for example, was stressed, and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong 
Thought was reinserted into the section on guiding principles, although the forces and 
relations of production and the role of the masses in creating history were no more 
prominent than in 1988. There were, however, two additions which drew especially 
heavily on the spirit of the 1991 directives. Firstly, it was stated that 
Western capitalism has developed through frenzied exploitation and extortion both at 
home and abroad. When capitalism entered the imperialist stage, it intensified its 
expansionist invasions. Oppression and plundering by imperialism and capitalism 
are the root cause of poverty and backwardness in undeveloped countries. History 
66 `Jiang Zemin zongshuji zhi Li Tieying, He Dongchang giangdiao jinxing Zhongguo jindaishi, 
xiandishi ji guoqing jiaoyu', written 3/199 1, first published in RARB, 1/6/1991, reprinted in COH, 
pp. 607-608. 
67 `Guojia jiaowei guanyu lingfa `zhongxiaoxue jiaqiang jindai, xiandaishi ji guoging jiaoyu de zongti 
gangyao (chugao)' de tongzhi', [ 1991 ], reprinted COH, pp609-610; `Zhongxiaoxue jiagiang jindai, 
xiandaishi ji guoging jiaoyu de zongti gangyao (chugao)' [1991], pp. 610-636; `Zhongxiaoxue lishi 
xueke sixiang zhengzhi jiaoyu gangyao', [8/1991 ], reprinted COH, pp637-655. 
68 Wang, `Jiunian yiwu jiaoyu chuzhong `lishi jiaoxue dagang' shencha shuoming', ppl4-15. 
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education must place emphasis on exposing the invasive nature and extortionist 
crimes of capitalism and imperialism. 69 
This intensification of a strong anti-imperialist ethos appears to have been a warning 
against the much feared `blind West worshipping, ' particularly since Tiananmen had 
been largely blamed on the evil influences of degenerate `Western' thinking. To 
reassert the innate malignancy of `Western' capitalism was by association to denigrate 
domestic calls for greater democracy and human rights as just another strategy 
invented by imperialists to exploit China and destroy socialism through collusion with 
Chinese counter-revolutionaries or manipulation of naive students. 
While derogating the ways of the totalised `West', it was also acknowledged that 
socialist China was not yet perfect, and an exhortation to patience was accordingly 
added immediately below the anti-imperialist principle. 
In the history of the world, creating and consolidating any new [political] system has 
always involved a long period of struggle, during which there have been many twists, 
turns and switchbacks; feudalism was like that, capitalism is like that, and socialism 
is even more so. History education must demonstrate the laws of this phenomenon 
through historical facts, to make students understand that socialism will inevitably 
triumph the world over, but that the road to victory will be tortuous; it must also 
make them understand the imperialist countries' `peaceful evolution' strategy for 
defeating socialist countries and our counter- strategy. 70 
Quite what the counter-strategy was to be was rather ambiguous, specifying little 
other than emphasising patriotism and strengthening of national `self-respect and 
pride' as well as nurturing `national self-confidence' as advocated in 1988.71 At the 
same time, however, China was not, as stated in the official policy advocated by Deng 
on his 1992 Southern Tour, to revert to isolationism, but was to continue the reform 
and opening process, while education was to continue Deng's `three-face' policy of 
`facing modernisation, the world and the future. ' Reflecting the continued reform and 
opening impetus, therefore, the Outline stated that `the closed door' policies of late 
imperial times were to be criticised for having retarded China's development. 72 
While some of the vitriol of the 1991 directives was definitely present in the 
explanatory sections on objectives and guiding principles of the 1992 Outline, finding 
corresponding changes to the syllabus (and textbooks) is much like searching for the 
proverbial needle in a haystack. To the trained eye of a curriculum developer or 
TMIC member, however, even the most subtle nuances convey important messages, 
and the few changes in the phraseology of the syllabus cannot, therefore, be regarded 
69 LJD[ 1992], COH, p658 
70 LJD[1992], p658. 
71 Ibid., p656. 
72 LJD[1992], COH, p667. 
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as accidental. For example, in the ancient Chinese history `basic knowledge section', 
Sui Yangdi's `brutal rule' (canbao tongzhi), which in 1988 had `made Sui a short- 
lived dynasty, ' had, in 1992, `incited peasant uprisings' following which `the Sui 
dynasty had fallen. '73 It does not take much imagination to see this as an allegory for 
the CPC and Tiananmen, and either a curriculum developer or a TMIC inspector 
doubtless decided that `short-lived' was probably `inappropriate' in the 
circumstances. 
Another concession to Party sensibilities was the removal of the Rectification 
Movement from the Yan'an period, and its replacement by the Seventh Party 
Congress at which `Mao Zedong Thought was affirmed as the guiding ideology of the 
entire Party. ' 74 The most obvious change, however, was the attachment of `socialist' 
to each mention of `motherland, ' and in the `ideological education' section of 
modern-contemporary Chinese history, socialism was, furthermore, said not only to 
have `saved' China, but to be the sole force which could `develop' China, presumably 
implying that the CPC must remain in power for the foreseeable future. 75 Other 
changes mostly involved slightly extra emphasis on the evils of imperialism, and the 
weakness of China's feudal rulers in the modem period. The peasantry were also 
further demoted, with substantial cuts in space allocated to peasant rebellions. The 
failure of many rebellions, furthermore, was attributed not only to contradictions 
within their leadership, which had hitherto been among the principal causes cited, or 
to the peasantry's `class limitations' (another common explanation), but to 
unspecified innate limitations of the peasants themselves. Finally, there was one 
minuscule change in a more liberal direction with an addition to the ancient Chinese 
history `skill-training' section, which exhorted teachers to encourage students `to 
express their own opinions about the historical events and persons they have 
studied. '76 Clearly, having one's own opinions about modem, and especially, 
contemporary, history was rather less desirable. 
VII. 2000 
The 1992 Outline was implemented in schools nation-wide from autumn 1993, and 
over the following few years attention turned to the senior secondary curriculum and 
in particular to the need for university entrance examination reform. The junior 
73 LJD[1988], LJD[1992], COH, pp514,660. 
'a LJD[1992], COHp670. 
75 Ibid., p671. 
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secondary Outline was thus untouched until the late 1990s. In the meantime, the pace 
of research on teaching methods, child psychology and curriculum theories 
accelerated dramatically, and the doctrine of `quality education' was formulated. As 
has already been discussed, quality education is at best a vague philosophy, 
encompassing a broad range of concepts, theories and objectives, but the net result 
has been increasingly vocal criticism - chiefly from educationalists - of all aspects of 
education from national curricula to classroom teaching and examinations. History 
Teaching Outlines have primarily been criticised for restrictions they impose on 
production of teaching materials, lack of teaching, learning and assessment flexibility, 
over-emphasis on knowledge at the expense of skill-training, and even for being too 
`political' yet simultaneously failing to provide adequate moral guidance and 
instruction. 77 Although the 1988 draft and 1992 Outline stated that History education 
goals not only include a grasp of `basic knowledge' (jichu zhishi) but also training in 
practical skills and critical analysis, 
only basic knowledge has been clearly prescribed, while [definitions of] viewpoints 
and skills have been vague and abstract.... [Furthermore], outline content simply 
states what `must' and `should' be studied, lacking necessary analysis ... of the 
correlation between content and students' level of psychological 
development...... [Required skills], such as `understanding', `grasping', `application', 
`analysis' and `synthesis' are not defined or explained, nor are examples provided. 
Thus, in textbook writing, teaching and assessment, interpretation is determined 
individually and subjectively. 78 
Such critics represent a growing body of educators who increasingly view the goal 
of History as training in critical and creative thinking skills. Whether this is simply an 
attempt to defend History's territory and status in the school curriculum, or derives 
from genuine concern to make History more `useful' to the holistic development of 
both individual students and the student body as a whole, or is perhaps even a 
subversive promotion of critical thinking as the basis of informed citizenship is 
difficult to ascertain. Their critiques, however, have profoundly influenced thinking 
about the purposes and, in particular, the practice of History education, and have been 
reflected most dramatically in the new draft curriculum (HCS) on trial in selected 
regions since autumn 2001. As in the past, this experiment will continue for several 
years before the new curriculum is implemented nation-wide. In the meantime, the 
76 LJD[1992], COH, p662. 
77 See for example, Nie, Zhongxue lishijiaoyu lun, ppl9-23; Zhao, `Gexing, chuangzaoxing: xin shiji 
zhongxue lishi jiaoxue de hexin'; 3i, `Zhongxue lishi jiaocai gaige chuyi', p93; Zhang, `Dui lishi 
kecheng xianzhuang de fenxi', pp423-424. 
78 Nie, Zhongxue lishi jiaoyulun, pp21-22. Nie has been arguing this point for a long time, and as early 
as 1989 was openly criticising the prescriptive and restrictive nature of Outlines ('Zhongxue lishi 
xueke jiaoxue mudi de bianzhi 
ji qi zai xuexi pingjia de yingyong', pp31-37). 
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1992 Outline has been revised, and was promulgated in 2000 and implemented in 
autumn the following year. 
The 2000 Outline retained the basic 1992 format and syllabus, but goals and 
teaching methods were considerably revised to reflect the new priorities outlined 
above. History was no longer said to contribute to abstract ideological goals of 
constructing socialist material or spiritual civilisation, but to occupy an essential place 
in junior secondary education, necessary for understanding past and present (but not 
future) relationships between mankind, society and nature. Pedagogical goals, in 
particular, were highlighted, with `teaching students to learn' as the most fundamental 
objective, to be accomplished through a variety of activities and methods which must 
be appropriate for students' `level of cognitive development. ' The Outline insisted 
that History also be used to develop skills and abilities, such as `historical thinking, ' 
`creative consciousness, ' `independent study, ' and `co-operation with others, ' as well 
as the more specific skills of note-taking, using maps and so forth, elaborated in the 
1988 draft and 1992 Outline. 79 Although skills and abilities remained rather ill- 
defined, guidance on methods of fostering them became more detailed in response to 
criticisms of vagueness and a lack of concrete examples and explanations, such as 
those made by Nie. More suggestions for both group and individual classroom and 
extramural activities were thus advanced, including, among others, organising 
classroom discussions and debates, writing and performing historical plays, recreating 
historical artefacts, and gathering oral data in the community. Scope for the use of 
audio-visual aids, such as slides and videotapes, which had also been suggested in 
previous Outlines, was expanded by the latest technological advances, and teachers 
were exhorted to make `creative use of multimedia and computer-assisted learning, ' 
although this seems unrealistic, since few schools are likely to have these resources. 80 
Focus on pedagogy by no means entailed the demise of ideology, although in 
keeping with the holistic imperative of quality education, it was reintegrated with 
knowledge and skill-training in each section of the syllabus. Nurturing love of the 
motherland (no longer prefixed by `socialist'), and developing national self-respect 
and confidence remained central goals, although fostering `national pride' was 
excised. The importance of education in `patriotism, socialism, the revolutionary 
tradition, national conditions and ethnic unity' was also emphasised, while references 
to the Four Cardinal Principles and following the Party's `basic line' were expunged. 
79 LJD[2000], COH, p715. 
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In fact, nowhere other than in the basic syllabus were Marxism or the CPC mentioned, 
and although dialectical and historical materialism were retained, this appears to have 
been merely a superficial concession to the legitimating ideology; indeed, `integrating 
theory and data' and, more importantly, `deriving theories from data' were explicitly 
stated to be the guiding theoretical principles which must be upheld. 81 Moreover, the 
`analysis and evaluation' of historical events and persons was no longer explicitly 
required to be `correct', and students were to use `imagination, association, 
comparison and generalisation' to develop their own opinions based on data from 
both the textbook and other sources. In an apparently more genuine internationalist 
spirit, History was also to be a means of `enhancing understanding of the world..... 
leading students to respect the fruits of other countries' and peoples' civilisations, ' 
although this did not result in substantial reform of the world history syllabus. 
Finally, personal development and public morality were highlighted, with History 
described as assisting students to develop a rounded personality, `healthy aesthetic 
consciousness and interests' and the `determination to strive for ideals, honesty, and 
goodness. ' 
Despite much talk of individuality and independent thinking, however, the 
morality and viewpoints even `quality' History education is expected to inculcate 
remain fundamentally prescriptive, with `correct" recurrently used to define desirable 
types of `consciousness' and `values. ' Curriculum developers may thus increasingly 
reject the tenets of historical materialism and `old' historical narratives, and they may 
scorn direct imposition of ideas and values, but they seem neither ready nor willing to 
challenge absolutist concepts of `true' and `false', `right' and `wrong' in discussions 
of either the past or the present. 
80 Ibid., pp715-716. 
81 LJD[2000), COH, p715. 
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Chapter 5 
Local Curricula: Shanghai, Zhejiang, Beijing 
When textbook pluralism was introduced following the 1985 Reform, Shanghai and 
Zhejiang were simultaneously granted permission to develop their own curricula, for 
they were regarded as having `special conditions', being more economically and 
`culturally' advanced than other regions. Indeed, so exceptional was Shanghai 
thought to be that it was also permitted to develop its own curriculum and teaching 
materials for senior secondary education, and to hold its own nationally recognised 
university entrance examinations separate from those taken by the rest of the country, 
a privilege, which as noted in Chapter 3, has only been extended elsewhere in the past 
two - three years. Zhejiang's curriculum was limited to primary and junior secondary 
education, but provincial education authorities took reform in a new direction with 
experiments in subject integration at junior secondary as well as primary level. 
History was thus merged with Geography and `common knowledge' (changshi) in a 
new Social Studies course, an experiment which was also attempted in Shanghai, 
albeit only in the single city district of Yangpu. 
The Shanghai and Zhejiang experiments in curricular devolution have in many 
ways provided models for the rest of the country. Although Zhejiang's Social Studies 
textbooks did not pass the national TMIC inspection and are thus ineligible for use 
outside the province, recent interest in developing integrated Social Studies courses 
for junior secondary schools elsewhere has led many educators and textbook writers 
to visit Zhejiang, study their textbooks and observe classes there. Shanghai's History 
Curriculum Standards, meanwhile, appears to be a precursor of the national 2001 
History Curriculum Standards currently on trial, and not merely in rejecting the title 
`Teaching Outline' in favour of the Nationalist terminology. Although, as shown 
below, Shanghai's curriculum shared many aspects of its format with the 1988 draft 
Outline, it also pioneered a more pedagogically oriented approach to the syllabus 
which has been adopted and developed in the 2001 national History Curriculum 
Standards. 
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly given its levels of wealth, education and economic 
development, Beijing has only recently developed its own curriculum, which was 
phased in city-wide beginning in autumn 2001. At this time, Shanghai and Zhejiang 
also revised their existing curricula, while permission to develop curricula at the local 
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level was further extended to many other regions of the country. None of these new 
curricula or textbooks were available at the time of fieldwork, however, and this 
chapter focuses principally, therefore, on the `first phase of curricular reform' (diyiqi 
kegai) (up to 2001) for History in Shanghai which is the foundation of the Shanghai 
textbooks discussed in Part Three. Although Zhejiang's curriculum has been for 
Social Studies rather than History, it is also discussed here, as is Beijing's then-draft 
History curriculum, primarily because of their relevance to current developments in 
History and Social Studies education which are analysed further in the conclusion. 
Shanghai 
The Shanghai curriculum for basic education was first developed in the late 1980s 
with the `second phase of curricular reform' (erqi kegai) coming into effect in 2001- 
2002. Neither the textbooks nor the curricula for the second-phase were available for 
analysis. Much like the national system, Shanghai has issued general `curriculum 
plans, ' which stipulate overarching teaching and learning objectives, and individual 
subject `curriculum standards' (kecheng biaozhun), perhaps initially reverting to the 
Nationalist term to emphasise their local distinctiveness vis-a-vis national Outlines 
drafted in Beijing. As noted in Chapter 3, these curricula have been largely drafted by 
educationalists and subject experts from ERUs and normal universities - in this case, 
the Shanghai Education Institute, the national Huadong Normal University and the 
municipal Shanghai Normal University, working under the auspices of the Shanghai 
Municipal Education Commission's Committee for the Reform of Primary and 
Secondary School Curricula and Teaching Materials. 
The first Shanghai History Curriculum Standards (henceforth, Shanghai HCS), 
as already noted, adopted a similar basic structure to the 1988 draft History Teaching 
Outline, including a preface, a summary of overall objectives, teaching and learning 
requirements and a summary of class hour distribution, which followed the national 
Teaching Plan in allocating two class hours per week for each of the three junior 
secondary years, with the first and second years to be devoted to Chinese history, and 
the third to world history. 5% of class hours were also allocated to the teaching of 
local history which could be taught either separately or integrated with Chinese 
history at the relevant junctures. In a departure from the national norm, however, 
Chinese and world history were integrated at senior secondary level. 
The syllabus comprised the bulk of the Shanghai HCS for junior secondary 
schools and was divided into separate ancient and modem-contemporary Chinese 
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history sections and a single world history section. As in the 1988 Outline, these were 
subdivided into sections on basic knowledge, ideological education and skill training. 
The preamble and general objectives stayed on familiar ground, reiterating the 
importance of History for understanding the present and anticipating the future, 
raising the quality of the nation and fostering socialist spiritual civilisation through 
creating a generation of `new people' in possession of the `four haves' (ideals, 
morality, culture, discipline). History was highlighted as a core subject in basic 
education, useful for teaching the young about national conditions (guoging jiaoyu), 
socialism, patriotism and internationalism, promoting dedication to modernisation and 
world peace, and nurturing the historical materialist viewpoint which proves that 
communism is the highest stage of social development and will inevitably be reached 
through following the socialist road. ' At the same time, however, the Shanghai HCS 
emphasised the importance of History as a social science that `encompasses all eras 
from ancient times to the present and touches on all aspects of human society. '2 In 
addition, historical thinking skills, such as understanding relationships of cause and 
effect, comparing events and persons across related eras and societies, using maps and 
reference works and being able to describe historical events orally and in writing, 
were included in the basic objectives section. The section on teaching and learning 
requirements elaborated upon these skill-training tasks, indicating a somewhat greater 
commitment to - or at least more detailed exposition of - pedagogical goals than was 
evident in the national Outline. Basic knowledge (jichu zhishi) was to include 
historical data and historical theory, and two levels of understanding were to be 
nurtured: `knowing' (zhidao), meaning `understanding basic content, memorising key 
points of information, ' and `requiring direct recall to complete [assigned] tasks'; and 
`understanding' (lijie), meaning to `grasp the implications of [historical] knowledge' 
and requiring students `to think (sikao) in order to complete [assigned] tasks. ' Skill- 
training (nengli peiyang) was similarly regarded as a two-stage process, involving 
first a preliminary grasp of skills, progressing to full, independent capability, although 
it was not specified exactly how this process was expected to unfold. Ideological 
education (sixiang jiaoyu) was also described as progressive, including the 
differentiated components of `interest, emotion, attitude and viewpoint, ' which were 
to be developed through ascending levels of cumulative understanding. 
3 
Shanghai HCS, p 111. 
2 Ibid., p 111. 
3Ibid, p112. 
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Following the division of each task area into levels of understanding, the 
syllabus was designed as a table consisting of columns for stages of social 
development (such as slave, feudal society), eras (such as the Warring States period 
and dynasties), general topics grouped under each era, and one column each for 
`knowing' and `understanding'. Next to each topic a tick was placed in either the 
`knowing' or the `understanding' column to indicate the depth to which the topic was 
to be studied. These topics did not differ much from those listed in the Outline, and 
continued the broader trend in History education towards minimising coverage of 
peasant rebellions and class struggle and increasing topics on culture, economic 
development and national heroes. Presumably in recognition of the broad swathe of 
history the course was expected to cover and the difficulty of allocating adequate time 
for a peripheral subject such as History, however, the majority of topics were marked 
as requiring only the lower level of understanding. In ancient Chinese history (up to 
1840), forty-six topics were to be `known', nineteen to be `understood'; in modem 
and contemporary Chinese history the proportion of topics requiring higher 
understanding increased somewhat with fifty-nine `knowing' and thirty 
`understanding' topics, while in world history, the inequity between knowing and 
understanding was re-established with a respective allocation of one-hundred and 
eight and thirty-five topics. The topics selected for `knowing' and `understanding, ' 
however, made the orientation and overarching goal of History clear. In ancient 
Chinese history, for example, eight of the nineteen `understanding' topics concerned 
the laws of historical materialism, five related to national unity and the process of 
ethnic integration (minzu ronghe), four to the glories of ancient Chinese culture and 
its superiority over its contemporary civilisations, and three (overlapping with some 
of the other topics) to reforms carried out under various enlightened rulers. 4 These 
key areas correlated directly and proportionally to the goals listed in the ideological 
education section immediately following the basic knowledge syllabus. The 
ideological purpose of ancient Chinese history was to instil patriotism and `national 
pride, national self-respect and national self-confidence' - qualities also listed in the 
1988 Outline - through emphasising that China has five thousand years of history and 
a glorious culture and for most of its history stood at the forefront of the world. It was 
also to reiterate the multi-ethnic nature of the PRC, and to reinforce the message that 
only with political stability and ethnic unity can socio-economic development be 
4 Ibid., pp 112-114. 
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achieved. The remainder of the instructions focused on historical materialism and its 
basic laws: that labour creates society, that `the broad masses of the people (renmin 
qunzhong) are the creators of history, ' and that individuals `can only take their place 
[in society] if they adapt to the tides of historical progress. ' Class struggle was also 
mentioned as one of the motive forces driving historical development, and students 
were to understand that progress from lower to higher socio-economic forms is 
inevitable and is thus a fundamental law. 
In modern Chinese history, the emphasis of the `understanding' topics 
changed to those related to China's humiliations at imperialist enemy hands, patriotic 
resistance, and national self-strengthening and reform movements and the lessons to 
be learnt therefrom. 5 The considerably shorter contemporary Chinese history section 
(which like the 1988 Outline moved the start-date of the period from 1919 to 1949), 6 
skipped quickly, meanwhile, from 1949 to the reform era. Two key `understanding' 
topics related to the establishment of the PRC were listed, but only one was given for 
the difficult years between 1949-1978, on `the chief successes and lessons of socialist 
revolution and construction in the pre-Cultural Revolution period. '7 Attention then 
turned suddenly to the post-Mao era in which the historical significance of the 
eleventh plenum, and the consolidation of socialism and reform under the guidance of 
the Four Cardinal Principles were highlighted. The ideological education section for 
modem-contemporary Chinese history elaborated on the purpose of `understanding' 
these topics, stressing education in national conditions and nurturing patriotic 
sentiment. Much as in the national Outline, children were to learn that corrupt feudal 
dynasties had led China to suffer one hundred years of foreign oppression and 
humiliation, but that the national people had resisted fiercely and given their lives to 
assure China's independence and prosperity. Through studying the sacrifices and 
achievements of these national heroes, they would not only have role models to 
emulate and be inspired to defend the nation against capitalist-imperialist 
encroachment, but would also come to understand some key national qualities of the 
Chinese people, such as bravery, determination and love of truth and justice, which in 
turn would enhance their national pride and self-confidence. In this section, the 
Communist Party was also mentioned for the first time (other than in the topic tables), 
in a reiteration of the cliche `without the CPC, there would be no new China' (meiyou 
5 phid, pp 115-116. 
6 See Chapter 4, n51 for a more detailed discussion of this change. 
7 Shanghai HCS, p118. 
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gongchandangjiu meiyou xin Zhongguo). From the history of New China, the young 
were to learn the superiority of the socialist road, and that despite some twists and 
turns along the way, `all who attempt to obstruct the progress of history will 
inevitably fail. '8 The contemporary period was also to reinforce the spirit of 
resistance as unspecified foreign powers had apparently attempted to invade China 
numerous times since 1949, presumably a somewhat distorted reference to border 
disputes with India and the USSR, and perhaps the 1979 war with Vietnam. Like the 
national Outlines, Shanghai's HCS did not fully abandon revolution as a central 
concept and from the modern-contemporary period students were also to imbibe the 
`revolutionary tradition' of their forefathers and diligently cultivate similarly high 
levels of personal and collective political virtue. 9 
In world history, the 3: 1 ratio of `knowing' to `understanding' topics suggested 
clearly that world history was primarily about learning data, but as in Chinese history, 
`understanding' topics also focused on broad ideological themes, the most dominant 
of which involved examples proving the historical materialist theory of social and 
economic development. In ancient history, topics to be `understood' thus included 
Egyptian and Roman slave societies, the overthrow of slave society through rebellions 
and changes in ownership of the means of production, and the subsequent 
development of feudalism. 10 Modern world history `understanding' topics focused 
on `bourgeois revolutions', such as the overthrow of the British monarchy in 1649, 
the US war of independence, the French Revolution and the Meiji Restoration, and 
the development of capitalism and imperialism and various cycles of reform. These 
were followed in the contemporary section by an emphasis on the evolution of 
socialism and the struggles for independence in European colonies, as well as the 
conflicts between capitalist-imperialist states, the eruption of global war and the 
beginning and end of the Cold War. " Other key `understanding' topics included the 
place of Christianity (as the bastion of feudalism and, after the Reformation, as an 
impetus for the Renaissance and, indirectly, socio-economic progress), the 
development of science and technology, and the profound influence of `Eastern 
culture' on the rest of the world, by which was evidently meant Chinese culture, since 
Japan's status as a beneficiary thereof was also highlighted as a topic to be 
8 Ibid., pp 118-119. 
9 Ibid, p119. 
1° Ibid., pp119-120. 
" Ibid., pp121-123. 
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`understood. ' The final `understanding' topic emphasised the rise of the Third World 
as the key force striving for global peace, a Third World of which China has, of 
course, sought to present itself as leader. The purpose of emphasising these topics as 
described in the ideological education section was principally to teach the laws of 
historical materialism and the place of class struggle therein, that `capitalism is built 
on cruel exploitation and oppression of the world's working people, including the 
Chinese, ' that the Chinese people reject such evil ways, and that socialism will 
inevitably triumph. Indeed, forty years of socialism in China, it was stated, had 
achieved far more than one hundred years of capitalism, proving the former's infinite 
superiority. Children were to understand the differences between capitalism and 
socialism, and also to adopt the `correct attitude to foreign cultures'; that is, to 
`absorb their outstanding successes, and reject the dross of capitalism and feudalism. ' 
In addition, world history was explicitly to serve the goals of nurturing patriotism, in 
part through the denigration of capitalism and understanding the superiority of 
socialism, but also through historical comparison and learning how Chinese culture 
has contributed to world civilisation. This would reinforce national self-confidence 
and provide a basis for `ideological awareness of international competition and 
exchange. ' Wholly out of context, a reference to global overpopulation as a 
longstanding historical problem was appended to this section, providing a convenient 
opportunity to reiterate the importance of the one-child policy. This was tied in to the 
laws of development in a statement emphasising that only through population control 
could economic progress be achieved, although quite why curriculum developers 
chose to include this in a History curriculum for junior secondary schools is 
something of a mystery. 
Although the `understanding' topics and the ideological sections clearly 
demonstrate that political, moral and patriotic education were among the core 
purposes of History, the three skill-training sections which followed each part of the 
syllabus and its ideological goals indicate that a serious effort to reform traditional 
pedagogies was being made, even if, as shown also in the national Outline, the 
concept of skill-training in History had not yet been fully developed. Attempts were 
made, nevertheless, to stipulate general and specific skills for each year of junior 
secondary, building on or reinforcing those previously learnt. By the end of the first 
year (during which ancient Chinese history would be studied), children were to have a 
basic grasp of chronology, an understanding of the relationship between centuries and 
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decades in the Christian and pre-Christian eras, and knowledge of where in this time- 
scale and in what order different dynasties fitted in. They were also to develop a 
basic ability to interpret illustrations and maps and to recognise the persons and 
events with which they were associated. In addition, they were expected to be able to 
draw up general chronologies, to locate pivotal events and persons and key points in 
written texts and to describe the trajectory of important historical events and the lives 
of major historical figures verbally and in writing. Rather more vaguely, they were to 
have a preliminary grasp of `all kinds of historical concepts, ' although what these 
concepts were was not identified. 12 
In the second year (modern-contemporary Chinese history), students were to build 
upon their first-year skills, learning the relationship between the traditional dynastic 
(ganzhi), Republican (minguo) and Christian dating systems. Maps, illustrations and 
photographs were now to be more thoroughly interpreted and students were expected 
to be able to outline the historical events associated with them rather than just 
recognise names and places. Their oral and written skills were to evolve considerably 
at this stage and they were to be able to provide a comprehensive description of 
persons and events. There were also to begin acquiring the skills of note-taking in 
class, to distinguish key from subsidiary points and to draft tables and chronologies 
from their notes. Additionally, they were to be encouraged to locate similarities and 
differences between events and persons, and to deploy some analytical and 
comparative skills in relating extra-curricular sources of historical knowledge, such as 
historical fiction, cinema, theatre and television, to the data they were learning in 
class. 13 
By the third year of junior secondary (world history), these skills were to have 
evolved substantially, and in addition to reinforcing geographical knowledge of the 
world's countries and cities past and present, students were to have a thorough grasp 
of the relationships between different events, persons and eras world-wide and to be 
able to compare them with what they had already learnt about Chinese history. They 
were also to develop critical skills at this stage, integrating theory and data (shilun 
jiehe) to analyse and evaluate historical events and persons, to express their own 
opinions and to critique those of others. This, it was hoped, would prepare students 
12 Ibid, p 115. 
13 Ibid, p 119. 
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for the rigours of senior secondary education and equip them with transferable 
skills. 14 
The final section of the Shanghai HCS was an instruction on the production of 
corresponding teaching materials. That it was included may have been because 
textbook pluralism within Shanghai was perhaps being considered, or because it was 
directed at the production of local history textbooks. Since the textbook market in 
Shanghai was not free, however, it seems more likely that it was added in imitation of 
the 1988 Outline, which included a similar section giving instructions for textbook 
writers, designed to meet the requirements of textbook pluralism. The instructions in 
the Shanghai HCS, nonetheless, revealed more clearly the commitment to improving 
pedagogical approaches to History. Previous (PEP) textbooks were thought to be dry 
and difficult, in part because they had closely followed the prescriptive rigidity of 
Outlines, 15 and it was hoped that Shanghai's textbooks would raise the pedagogical 
bar. Much was accordingly made of both simplicity and flexibility. Textbooks were 
to use language and styles appropriate for their audience's level of intellectual and 
psychological development, incorporating plenty of images and tables to aid 
understanding and stimulate interest. They were to follow the Shanghai HCS closely, 
but were permitted to `make appropriate adjustments, ' such as rearranging the order 
of the topics, as long as they retained the `logic' of the curriculum guideline and its 
historical chronology and ensured that the texts were conducive to accomplishing key 
ideological and skill-training objectives. They were also permitted, and even 
encouraged, to include supplementary materials not specified in the curriculum, such 
as recent historical research findings and established theories, although this was to be 
kept to a small proportion of the total text. Finally, the importance of maintaining 
horizontal connections to the subjects of Chinese, Politics and Geography was 
stressed as a means by which knowledge, skills and understanding in all four subjects 
could be deepened. 16 
If textbook pluralism within Shanghai was ever seriously considered, in practice 
only one set of History textbooks was actually used, a set drafted, moreover, by more 
or less the same group of ERU and normal university staff who had participated in 
writing the HCS. In this respect, Shanghai's History curriculum closely resembled its 
national counterpart, merely transplanting national systems and processes to the local 
14 Ibid, p 124. 
15 Nie, `Zhongxue lishi xueke jiaoxue mudi de bianzhi ji qi zai xuexi pingjia de yingyong', p35. 
16 Shanghai HCS, p124. 
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level. Yet, as shown in Chapter 3 and in the following chapters, despite closely 
following national models of history production, and sharing much in common with 
the goals and content of national Outlines and PEP's textbooks, Shanghai's HCS and 
textbooks have represented a concerted effort to assert the city's difference from - 
and perhaps its superiority over - Beijing, and to set itself up as a centre of reform- 
oriented excellence. 
Zhejiang 
Zhejiang's Social Studies curriculum, as noted above, has also proven to be 
something of a pioneer in forging new directions for basic education, even if it was 
not initially very highly regarded by TMIC inspectors or History educators. This may 
have been in part because History education professionals clearly felt (and many still 
feel) threatened by a move towards subject integration. It is also because the 
integration of History, Geography and common knowledge in Zhejiang's `Teaching 
Guideline for Full-time Compulsory Education Junior Secondary Social Studies' 
(yiwu jiaoyu quanrizhi chuji zhongxue shehui jiaoxue zhidao gangyao, henceforth 
SSTG) and textbooks was in many ways somewhat superficial, consisting in practice 
of separate sections for each subject area. Nonetheless, it marked a clear attempt to 
increase the relevance of social science subjects to everyday life, and to give them a 
more solid place in the curriculum; indeed, Zhejiang has continued to demonstrate its 
commitment to Social Studies through including it in its senior secondary entrance 
examinations, unlike most provinces which no longer test either History or 
Geography. 
Although at the time of drafting, there was no national Social Studies 
Teaching Outline for Zhejiang's curriculum developers to follow, they adopted the 
basic format of the History and Geography Outlines, including a preface, a brief 
statement of general teaching and learning objectives and principles, and a break- 
down of class hours. In a departure from the Outlines, however, class hours and 
content were separated into compulsory and elective sections and extra-curricular 
activities, while a new section on implementation of the guideline and assessment of 
teaching and learning was added, something which was not included in national 
Teaching Outlines until 2000. As in the Outlines, the majority of the text was devoted 
to the syllabus, which was arranged by year of study, each subdivided into two 
sections: teaching and learning objectives and content. 
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The core purpose of Social Studies as stated in the guidelines was to teach 
children that everyone is part of society, so that they would be better able to take their 
part in it and contribute to social development - in this case, the socialist 
modernisation of China. The integrative nature of the subject was also emphasised as 
it was written that the `main thread [of the subject] is man's relationship to society, 
and its primary content is the politics, culture, population, traditions and environment 
of both past and present, China and foreign countries. It also stresses education in 
local matters (xiangtu jiaoxue) and putting knowledge into practice. ' 17 Through 
Social Studies, children would come to understand the environment in which they and 
others live and the laws and progress of historical development. They would also 
acquire basic knowledge about all aspects of social life, and intellectual skills, such as 
`observation, analysis, generalisation and comparison, ' which would enable them to 
adapt to and participate in political, economic and cultural life. The other core 
purpose of Social Studies tied in more closely to the traditional objectives of History 
(and Geography and Politics), emphasising its relevance to nurturing patriotism 
through learning to love China's natural and social environment and understanding its 
past. Children were to learn how China had suffered at the hands of foreign invaders, 
and to develop the spirit of patriotic resistance. Unlike in the Outlines and Shanghai's 
HCS, this key section only exhorted students to develop national self-respect and self- 
confidence (minzu zizunxin, zixinxin), not national pride (minzu zihaogan), although 
the latter was included in the syllabus goals. They were, however, to learn to love not 
only socialism, but also the Communist Party, an instruction which had by then 
disappeared from the national Outlines and was never included in Shanghai's HCS. 
They were also to acquire a basic grasp of historical materialist theory and learn to 
apply it to analyses of both past and present phenomena. In short, Social Studies was 
to teach children a sense of social and historical responsibility, to their locale and to 
the nation, and to prepare them for active civic participation. 18 
In order to do this, they were to spend the first year learning about China's natural 
history and environment, its many peoples and general information about everyday 
life and institutions. In the second year, they would mostly study Chinese and world 
history up to the mid-twentieth century, and would continue their domestic and global 
historical studies and learn about current affairs and other national and international 
matters in the third and final year. The historical content of the syllabus closely 
17 SSTG, p148. 
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followed that of the Outlines, but was somewhat truncated since the breadth and depth 
of the national curriculum could not feasibly be included in the reduced time-frame 
available for history. The usual main topics were included, however, with an 
emphasis on China's former glories, its contributions to world civilisation and its one 
hundred years of humiliation. World history trod similarly well-worn ground, 
covering principally those topics most relevant to proving the laws of historical 
materialism. What was significant about Zhejiang's history coverage, however, was 
that it attempted to integrate Chinese and world history during the second year of the 
Social Studies course. '9 Thus, it began with the study of human evolution, and led on 
first to Egypt, Babylon and India, then to ancient China (up to the Spring and Autumn 
period) and Rome, Greece and the Americas. 20 Although the remainder was less well 
integrated - ancient Chinese history up to 1840, followed by world history up to 
World War I, then Chinese history up to the establishment of the PRC, and finally 
world history up to World War II - and the third year of contemporary history did not 
integrate Chinese and foreign history at all, it started (or perhaps resurrected given 
China's early Soviet-influenced History curricula)21 a trend towards a more holistic 
and integrative approach to history which is currently being pursued elsewhere. 
Another notable feature of the Social Studies course was that it placed particular 
emphasis on local history, culture, politics, geography and so forth, which were 
allocated 10-15% of total class hours, the study of which it was hoped would 
encourage a love of Zhejiang and the determination to strive for its development. 
Other topics, such as population control, environmental protection, education in 
national defence (guofang jiaoyu) and basic philosophy, were recommended as 
optional subjects which could be incorporated should time and student interest permit. 
Textbook learning was to be reinforced through the use of audio-visual materials, and 
beyond the classroom through both organised and independent extra-curricular 
activities after school and in the holidays, with a particular focus on local issues. 
Setting a trend which has evidently been followed in the latest national and local 
curriculum guidelines, these activities were quite clearly specified, including not only 
the obvious visits to sites of natural beauty, man-made technological achievement, 
historical memorials and museums, but also reading historical fiction and travel 
18 SSTG, ppl48-149. 
19 Ibid, pp164-190. 
20 Ibid, pp 165-167. 
21 See Chapter 1 for more detail on early Soviet influences on History education in the PRC. 
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literature, watching relevant television documentaries and films, interviewing local 
people about the recent past and finding out about the lives of famous historical 
figures from the area. On a more explicitly ideological note, extra-curricular learning 
was also to emphasise discovering how past capitalist-imperialist incursions had 
afflicted the area and how recent changes had benefited it, so as better to understand 
`the nature of capitalism, ' `the superiority of socialism and the correctness of reform 
and opening policies. '22 This ideological tone, which was rather more heavy-handed 
than that of the national and Shanghai curricula of the time, was further elaborated in 
the subsequent section on teaching principles, the most fundamental of which was to 
`uphold the Four Cardinal Principles, Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought and 
Deng Xiaoping's theory of socialism with Chinese characteristics, instil dialectical 
and historical materialist viewpoints, and fully integrate ideology and science, 
viewpoints and data. '23 
Ideological goals were covered in still more depth in the teaching and learning 
objectives section of the syllabus, and made far more frequent mention of 
Communism and Marxism than either the national Outline or Shanghai's HCS. 
Indeed, it was heavily emphasised that despite the then low ebb of international 
socialism (following Perestroika and the subsequent collapse of the Eastern bloc), this 
was merely preparation for the future high tide of the movement when Communism 
would inevitably triumph. 24 Yet, skill-training was also included in these sections of 
the syllabus, with considerable attention paid to practical activities and to the nature 
of assessment, which made it plain that skills as well as knowledge were to be tested 
and reinforced through examinations and other evaluative mechanisms. 25 Evidently, 
being ideologically correct was not the only central objective of Zhejiang's 
curriculum, and one cannot help but wonder whether the more solidly conservative 
ideological line taken by the SSTG was perhaps an attempt to provide a nominal 
counterbalance to the heavy emphasis on education in Zhejiang history and 
geography, and to restate for those watching from above its primary commitment to 
national over local goals. 
22 SSTG, pp150-151. 
23 Ibid., p 151. 
24 Ibid., p 165, p 182. 
25 Ibid, p 152. 
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Beijing 
As has already been remarked, it is rather surprising that Beijing was so late in 
introducing its own curriculum for basic education, although this may perhaps have 
been because as the capital it was thought best that the city and its environs should be 
seen to represent national rather than local trends. By the new millennium, however, 
rapid development of major urban centres and the growing disparity between these 
international metropolises and the remainder of the country had become too great to 
ignore. It was decided, therefore, to draft a new, locally oriented curriculum which 
would nurture `a generation of new people to allow twenty-first century Beijing to 
continue its development, and a Beijing education to nurture the needs of its new 
people. '26 As in Shanghai and Zhejiang, the Beijing curriculum has been principally 
the work of ERUs with assistance from normal university History lecturers. 27 
Beijing's History Curriculum Standards (henceforth Beijing HCS) has been designed 
as a single curriculum covering both junior and senior secondary schooling in 
anticipation of soon universalising the latter in the city. In many respects, it has been 
influenced both by the local curricula of Shanghai and Zhejiang, and by the concept 
of quality education and the latest developments in History pedagogy, which many of 
its writers have played key roles in developing. 28 The format of the Beijing HCS is 
not wholly dissimilar to earlier Outlines, and includes a preface and a lengthy section 
describing general objectives and the value of studying History, before launching into 
the syllabus, and concluding with two sections on, respectively, teaching and 
assessment methods. The new era and spirit in which it has been drafted, however, 
are clearly reflected in the wording and the focus on pedagogical objectives. 
One of the key features of Beijing's HCS has been the switch to an 
`integration-separation-integration' approach; that is, an integrated Chinese and world 
history curriculum at junior secondary level (grades 7-9), separate courses in Chinese 
and world history during the first and second years of senior secondary (grades 10- 
26 `Beijingshi 21 shiji jichu jiaoyu kecheng gaige fang'an (zandinggao)' [2000], pl. 
2? These included seven writers and four primary discussants drawn from the Beijing Institute of 
Educational Research, Beijing Normal and Capital Normal Universities, the Beijing Education Institute 
and the Central Institute of Educational Research. 
28 Zhang Jing (Beijing Institute of Educational Research) and Ye Xiaobing (Capital Normal University) 
have been very prominent in this field, publishing numerous articles on the subject. Some of these 
have already been cited in Chapter 2 (see n55 and n57). Other examples include: Zhang, `Xuesheng 
lishi xuexi xintai yu jiaoxue celue de tantao'; Ye, `Jiaoxue fangfa yu jiaoxue guannian'. Ye is head of 
Capital Normal University's History Department and part of a cohort of pedagogical specialists there, 
which includes the former head of 
department, Yu Youxi (now retired) and current associate professor 
Zhao Yafu. Zhang Jing is one of Ye's former graduate students. 
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11), and an integrated Chinese and world cultural history course in the final year. 
29 
This aims to overcome the longstanding `negative practice' of excessive repetition at 
junior and senior secondary levels and to expand student imaginations and 
understanding through presenting them with a more holistic view of history, 3° much 
as the Zhejiang curriculum intended. Class hours in Beijing's new curriculum have 
also departed from the national norm, reducing first year junior secondary History 
classes from two to one per week, and increasing senior secondary final year classes 
to three, retaining two per week for the four grades in between. 
The stated overarching objective of Beijing's HCS also follows Zhejiang in 
focusing on history as a science of human actions in society over time, rejecting the 
`academic- and knowledge-centred' orientation of existing curricula in favour of a 
`human-centred approach' that also places weight on putting knowledge and skills 
into practice. This is it thought, will better enable students to develop a `scientific 
world-view' and a `correct view of humanity, ' equipping them to adapt to society and 
become useful contributors to its development. 31 In order to achieve this, three key 
areas should be nurtured: attitudes and values (taidu yu jiazhiguan), skills (nengli), 
and knowledge (zhishi). Clearly, these have much in common with the basic 
knowledge, ideological education and skill-training components introduced in the 
1988 draft Outline and Shanghai's HCS. That knowledge has been moved from the 
top to the bottom of the hierarchy, however, strongly reinforces the statement of 
commitment to moving away from what is thought to have been an overly academic, 
and by extension dull and taxing, curriculum, and to focus firmly, first, on using 
History to teach values and nurture cultured, humanitarian citizens (renwen suyang), 
and second, on teaching transferable intellectual skills. This does not, however, mean 
that traditional ideologies have been abandoned or that the informational content of 
the curriculum has been drastically curtailed. Students are still required to learn `the 
basic viewpoints of dialectical and historical materialism, correctly understand the 
objective laws of social development, and acquire scientific historical 
consciousness. '32 They are also to understand China's place in the world past and 
present, to develop `a patriotic spirit, ' national pride, self-respect and self-confidence, 
`a sense of responsibility' to the nation and fellow citizens, and to `learn the lessons of 
29 Beijing HCS, p341. 
30 Ibid, p342. 
31 Beijing HCS, p341. 
321bid, p342. 
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the past, '33 so that mistakes will never be repeated nor humiliations re-experienced. 
The syllabus, meanwhile, retains most of the same general topics that have been 
included in recent Outlines. 
Yet, both the ideological and knowledge components of the curriculum also reveal 
some significant changes. While the six general `values' points open with a focus on 
patriotism and historical materialism, they turn rapidly to promoting a view of History 
as a tool to teach the young not only about, but also a sense of responsibility for 
society and the outside world, which is clearly commensurate with the reformist 
attitude of Beijing's curriculum developers. Students are thus to learn to respect other 
national peoples and view them as equals, and to recognise the necessity of 
international unity and co-operation. They are also to study social problems past and 
present to develop a consciousness of human suffering and a sense of responsibility 
for social development. They are to understand concentric circles of individuals' 
relationships to one another, to the national people, the state, society as a whole and 
nature and thereby to develop civic consciousness and become better citizens. Finally 
they are to develop a `healthy' morality and aesthetic sensibilities which will lead 
them to continue the great traditions of both the Chinese and other peoples and to 
build a better brighter future for everyone. 34 `Values' are thus more broadly 
conceived than heretofore, no doubt in part to emphasise the value of History itself, 
indeed, a whole section discussing the value of the History curriculum has been 
included to highlight the subject's relevance to self and society. 
The syllabus, of course, comprises a large part of the curriculum, although it has 
been summarised into far less detailed topic areas than the national Outlines. As 
already noted, Beijing's HCS integrates Chinese and world history throughout the 
junior secondary years. A somewhat better job of integration appears to have been 
done here than in the Zhejiang SSTG , with 
far more regular interspersion of periods 
of Chinese history with those of world history. As in the Shanghai HCS, 
differentiated levels of understanding are indicated by a tick in the relevant column. 
Three ascending levels of understanding are given in the Beijing HCS, and as in 
Shanghai's HCS, the majority are assigned to the lowest and middle levels, meaning 
that students are merely required to have a basic knowledge or a preliminary 
understanding of the topic. This is especially true for the first and second years of 
junior secondary, but as students progress, more topics are assigned to the middle and 
33 ibid, p342,345 
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highest levels of understanding. In Chinese history, the topics requiring the 
intermediate and more profound levels of understanding are mostly related to 
unification or reunification of the state and ethnic integration, with a more 
concentrated focus on reform movements and conflict with foreign powers in the 
modem and contemporary periods. In world history, only the history of the Roman 
empire is required to be understood at the intermediate level in the earlier period, with 
the remainder of intermediate and higher understanding topics chosen from the 
modem-contemporary period. Like Shanghai's HCS, these focus heavily on socio- 
economic forms, the industrial revolution, the development of capitalism, imperialism 
and communism, and conclude with topics on the dissolution of the USSR and the 
Eastern bloc and the emergence in the post-Cold War period of a `multi-polar' 
(duojixing) world. 35 
In common with Zhejiang's SSTG and more recent national History Teaching 
Outlines, Beijing's HCS makes several general suggestions for extra-curricular and 
classroom activities to stimulate student interest and reinforce understanding of 
textbook learning. In addition to visiting museums, famous historical sites and 
memorials, students should be encouraged to carry out their own historical research 
projects, gathering information from various sources, interviewing family members 
and local people about the recent past, collecting old stamps, coins and other small 
artefacts, and using these resources to write reports and make classroom 
presentations. 36 Somewhat greater detail, however, is given on what these 
supplementary activities and regular classroom teaching are intended to achieve. The 
teaching and assessment sections that complete the curriculum thus focus on 
broadening the practical application of History, emphasising the links between 
History and other school subjects, and how history touches on all aspects of daily life. 
The practical orientation is also mirrored in the precedence given to `deriving theories 
from historical data' (lun cong shi chu), although `unifying theory and data' (shilun 
tongyi) is also a stated teaching principle. Perhaps the most important aspect of the 
new curriculum, however, is the emphasis on students rather than on knowledge. 
Attention is to be paid to the psychological aspects of the educative process, with a 
focus on developing inter-personal, co-operative skills and creating interactive 
classroom learning opportunities which encourage student participation rather than 
3¢ Beijing HCS, pp342-343. 
35 Ibid, pp346-348. 
36 Beijing HCS, pp348-349. 
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passive silence. This is to be reflected in student assessments which should no longer 
be determined by single end-of-term or annual examinations, but through a variety of 
methods, including essay-writing, research projects and even in-class discussion, 
which seek to give all students a better chance to prove their capabilities. 37 Whether 
these high-minded, child- rather than text-centred pedagogical ideals or the more 
holistic, comparative teaching approach attempted through Chinese and world history 
integration herald a radical change in the way History is taught and learnt in Beijing's 
schools remains to be seen. There is little doubt, however, that many History 
education professionals throughout the country subscribe to the reforms advocated by 
these new curricula, and increasingly view child-centred holistic approaches as long- 
term goals which should be pursued, not only in History but in education as a whole. 
37 Ibid, pp358-359. 
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Chapter 6 
Textbooks 
As discussed in the introduction, in almost all societies there is an official history that 
is disseminated through the school curriculum and especially through textbooks. In 
some societies, however, the state is heavily involved in the production of textbooks, 
whether directly, through supporting a state-run textbook-writing agency, or 
indirectly, through employing vetting mechanisms to ensure that commercial 
publishers do not transgress particular boundaries (be they ideological or pedagogical) 
of what is deemed appropriate content. State control over history production for 
schoolchildren has been fairly rigid in much of East Asia, and particularly in the PRC 
where there has mostly been a highly centralised system of curriculum development 
and textbook production in which both tasks have been carried out by the same 
institution or personnel. For these reasons, textbooks might legitimately be regarded 
as part of the intended or preactive curriculum. At the same time, however, the 
examination-centred curriculum has meant that textbooks are usually the most 
comprehensive vehicle for transmitting historical knowledge and viewpoints, and are 
frequently the dominant, and sometimes the exclusive, teaching and learning resource. 
Currently, textbook pluralism is also permitted, and although, as discussed in previous 
chapters and below, there are various guidelines that regulate how textbooks may be 
produced and distributed, and inspection and approval systems ensure that textbook 
content remains relatively standardised, textbooks nonetheless increasingly represent 
an interpretation rather than a replication of national guidelines, shaped by academics 
and education researchers seeking to fulfil the real or perceived needs of teachers and 
students. Furthermore, the effect of textbooks - their success or failure in accurately 
transmitting their explicit and implicit messages - can only be understood in light of 
their audience and the medium in which they are encountered. Textbooks are 
accordingly treated here as part of the implemented or interactive curriculum. 
How the interaction between text and audience takes place in school classrooms 
when textbooks are the chief vehicle for implementing most teaching and learning 
practices is the subject of Chapter 7. This chapter examines the content of the 
textbooks with which teachers and students interact, evaluating the extent to which 
the textbooks faithfully follow the preactive curriculum guidelines on which they are 
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supposed to be based, and analysing the ways in which certain themes and topics are 
presented. 
I. Textbooks: A Comparative Overview 
The textbooks examined in this chapter are principally those drafted immediately 
following the introduction of limited textbook pluralism in the late 1980s, which were 
formally promulgated in 1992-1993 and which were still in use as of 2000-2001 when 
the fieldwork for the present study was conducted and classes in which some of these 
textbooks were taught could be observed. As described in Chapter 3, several sets of 
textbooks were produced during this time, mostly by academics and ERU personnel, 
with Shanghai and Zhejiang drafting their textbooks based on locally produced 
curricula, while the other sets of textbooks initially permitted under the `one Outline 
many textbooks system' followed the national Teaching Outline. These included 
PEP, Beijing Normal University's four-year junior secondary system textbooks, 
Guangdong's `Coastal edition' (yanhaiban) and Sichuan's `Inland edition'(neidiban), 
as well as a handful of minority-language texts. ' The number of textbooks for History 
(as for other subjects) has expanded since the 2001 History Curriculum Standards 
went on trial, and several textbook sets currently have preliminary approval for use in 
trial areas from the History TMIC. With the exception of the first volume of PEP's 
2001 HCS-compliant textbooks, however, none of these were available at the time of 
fieldwork. The remainder of PEP's textbooks have been made accessible online soon 
after they have appeared in print (one per semester) and I have acquired drafts or 
isolated copies of single volumes from other textbook sets, but since all are currently 
still on trial, these are not the focus of the current discussion, although they will be 
addressed briefly in the concluding chapter. This chapter, therefore, analyses the 
content of PEP, Shanghai, Coastal and Inland edition textbooks that were in use as of 
2000-2001 with some comparisons to Zhejiang's Social Studies textbooks where 
relevant, as well as to earlier (PEP) textbook editions, although the latter comparison 
is kept to a minimum to avoid duplicating the general outline of ideological, 
1 The 1984 Nationalities Autonomy Law reinstated many minority scripts that had been banned during 
the Cultural Revolution. Following the 1985 Reform, permission was granted to produce textbooks in 
these languages on condition that they properly `adhere to the Outline, relate to reality, and combine 
[textbook] writing with translation [of existing textbooks]'. (Harrell and Bamo, `Combining Ethnic 
Heritage with National Unity', p63. ) 
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pedagogical and historical data and viewpoint changes identified in Chapters 2 and 4.2 
Beijing Normal University's textbooks, unfortunately, are not considered here 
because I was unable to obtain a set. 
While this chapter seeks to avoid a diachronic analysis that charts how textbooks 
drafted in the immediate aftermath of the Cultural Revolution have changed between 
then and now, its purpose is, nonetheless, comparative insofar as it compares the 
content of four contemporaneous textbook sets both to one another and to the national 
or local curriculum guidelines. As noted in Chapter 3, they were drafted with 
somewhat different audiences in mind - Shanghai and Coastal editions for developed 
areas, Inland for rural areas - and, with the exception of PEP's set, were not produced 
by professional textbook writers, but by local academics and education researchers. 
Yet, the differences between them are relatively minor, limited principally to 
presentation format. The PEP set, perhaps because facing potential competition from 
other publishers as well as being influenced by changing pedagogical ideas, is, in 
contrast to its previous volumes, large and weighty, with thick, high quality paper, 
coloured pages and numerous images, 3 although a black and white edition was also 
produced to serve those who might not be able to afford the higher price tag attached 
to the colour version. 4 Despite the many criticisms levelled at Zhejiang's Social 
Studies textbooks over the years, their authors actually went much further much faster 
than any of their counterparts in augmenting text with visuals, including numerous 
maps, charts, pictures depicting important events or persons, and photos of 
archaeological artefacts, the majority of which are in colour. The Shanghai and 
Coastal sets, by contrast, are flimsier and made of poorer quality materials (thereby 
keeping them to about half the price of PEP's textbooks), but equally have plenty of 
drawings, prints and diagrams, albeit in black and white with the exception of some 
colour-printed pages at the front of each volume. Only the Inland edition is a much 
2 Most of these textbooks underwent minor revisions in 2001 following the promulgation of the 2000 
History Teaching Outline. As with the 2000 Outline, which was designated as an interim curriculum, 
these textbooks were intended to serve until new texts written in accordance with the 2001 History 
Curriculum Standards had been fully tested. It was originally expected that this process would be 
complete and the new curriculum in full operation by 2005, but various problems and disagreements 
caused the implementation date to be rescheduled for 2007. (Source: Beijing Normal University, 
History curriculum development committee member). 
3 For a detailed description of the changing publication format of PEP textbooks between 1978-1993 
see Chan and Scott, `Teaching Chinese 
History in Junior Secondary Schools in post-Mao China', 
pp 114-115. 
4 The price difference was not substantial, in the mid- 1990s averaging under I RMB, or between 10- 
20%. (Source: PEP textbook catalogues). Nevertheless, given the large number of textbooks a student 
is required to purchase, this 
difference may have been considered significant. 
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smaller (and cheaper) book with few images, much in same style formerly used by 
PEP, although like the other editions the first few pages of each volume are given to 
some colour photographs. 5 The presentation of text is also very similar, although the 
chapters frequently have slightly different headings, and the PEP textbooks are 
divided into `lessons' (ke), while the other editions retain the division into `chapters' 
(zhang) and `lessons' (jie) (meaning class hour) established by the earlier (pre-1988 
draft) Outlines. All editions use a mixture of large and small type to distinguish core 
from peripheral information (although in the Coastal edition this is rather unclear), 
with PEP, Shanghai and the Coastal editions additionally using text boxes to 
incorporate or highlight supplementary data. PEP, however, stands out in having a far 
higher volume of images and supplementary information than the other sets, and at 
the back of each of its final two Chinese history volumes includes five readings 
(extracts from the writings of famous persons such as Lin Zexu, Kang Youwei, Sun 
Yat-sen, Mao and Zhou Enlai) for independent study. The volume of material is 
perhaps one additional reason why PEP has continued to be favoured as a superior 
edition used even in many areas where it is not the officially mandated textbook, 
especially in better performing schools. 6 So much additional data is included, in fact, 
that almost every PEP volume is substantially longer than its equivalent in the other 
sets (Fig. 6.1). 
Abbreviations 
PEP People's Education Press 
SH Shanghai edition 
YH Coastal edition 
ND Inland edition 
Fig. 6.1 
No. of characters per volume (units of 1,000) 
Chinese histo r World history 
1 2 3 4 1 2 
PEP 200 221 198 270 218 174 
SH 139 131 143 121 146 145 
YH 170 117 210 160 88 95 
ND 90 100 104 168 120 108 
The distribution of content between the four editions is also slightly different. 
Although in all cases four volumes are given to Chinese history and two to world, and 
the topics covered are the same, the cut-off or starting point in a given volume may 
vary somewhat from its equivalent in another set (Fig. 6.2). Given that each volume 
5 Zhejiang's Social studies textbooks, from a visual standpoint, are the most `modem' and appealing, 
being in full colour and including numerous photographs, colour prints, charts, graphs, maps and other 
images. 
6 See Chapter 3, section IV, for a more detailed discussion of the factors involved in textbook selection. 
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Fig 6.2 Start and end-point of textbook coverage, by set and volume 
vol. PEP SH YH ND 
1 From Primitive Man Primitive Man Primitive Man Primitive Man 
To Northern, Southern Sui-Tang N, S dynasties N, S dynasties 
Dynasties 
2 From Sui-Tang 5 Dynasties, Liao, Sui-Tang Sui-Tang 
N. Song, Xia, Jin 
To End of Ming Qing re-1840) Qing re-1840) Qing re-1840) 
3 From Early Qing Opium War Opium War Opium War 
To Northern Expedition Northern Expedition Xi an Incident, Northern Expedition 
2°a United Front 
4 From Establishment of Establishment of War with Japan Establishment of GMD 
GMD government GMD government (post-1937) government 
To 1990s 1990s 1990s 1990s 
1 From Ancient civilisations Ancient civilisations Ancient Ancient civilisations 
(Egypt, Babylon civilisations 
India, Greece, Rome) 
To Italian and German Italian, German Meiji restoration 1$` International 
unification unification Paris Commune t 2 From 1St International, 1St International, Italian, German European and American 
° Paris Commune Paris Commune unification im erialism, colonialism 
To 1990s 1990s 1990s 1990s 
is to be covered in a single semester, this does suggest a minor variation in the 
prioritising of content, depending perhaps on the authors' own expertise or 
interpretation of the guidelines as well as the particular audience for which they were 
intended. It has been difficult, however, to ascertain the precise root of these and 
other differences from the authors' or their colleagues' own perspectives since few 
articles have been written comparing the various editions or outlining the thinking 
behind them, although there are many detailing the `special characteristics' (tedian) of 
each regionally produced set, or volumes thereof. 7 The few comparative discussions 
that have been attempted, moreover, are weak and preponderantly biased by the 
writer's affiliation with one or other of the editorial committees responsible for 
textbook drafting, or direct involvement in textbook production. They also tend only 
to compare PEP with the Shanghai and Coastal editions. 8 In fact, I have as yet found 
no articles in which the Inland edition is compared to any of the others, perhaps 
because the `quality' (suzhi) of its imagined audience is so low as to render the 
textbooks incommensurable with those produced by and for more developed areas. 
This suspicion was confirmed by several senior History educators who told me that 
the Inland edition is `simpler' to suit its rural audience, while the PEP edition is 
characterised by its `comprehensiveness', the Shanghai edition by its pedagogical 
7 Gong, `Guanyu lishi jiaocai bianxie de jidian sikao', pp7-12; Wang, Li and Zang, `Chuzhong 
"Zhongguo lishi ' (Renjiaoban), diyi, er, sance bianxie yuanze, tedian he shiyong shuoming', pp 15-19; 
Yan, `Jiunian yiwu jiaoyu chuzhong "Sh jie lishi' diyi, erce (Renjiaoban) de xin tese (shang, xia)'. 
8 See, for example, Zhao, `Tan renjiaoban, Shanghaiban, yanhaiban santao xin jiaocai', pp9-11. Zhao, 
formerly of PEP, latterly of the Beijing Educational Research Institute clearly favours PEP's textbooks. 
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innovation and attention to Sino-foreign interactions, and the Coastal edition by a 
strongly academic tenor. 9 While, as shown below, I have been able to investigate 
some of these and other assertions made by writers on the topic, and have found that 
their claims are not entirely without merit, the impression formed through my own 
reading of the texts was that such categorisations were made primarily because it was 
thought necessary to distinguish each set from the other rather than because each is 
inherently distinctive. I found the differences to be generally rather minor, with the 
Inland edition perhaps being marginally more `conservative' in the tone of its 
adherence to the tenets of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought than the 
`modernising' textbooks produced by PEP, Shanghai and Guangdong. Of course, if 
only those with high `cultural and scientific quality' (wenhua kexue suzhi) - by which 
is normally meant well-heeled urbanites - are ready for `modernity' in textbooks as in 
everyday life, and `conservatism' is more appropriate for the `low quality' people in 
the backward hinterland, it would then be logical to assume that the Inland edition 
was indeed pitched at a lower intellectual level than its counterparts. The Inland 
textbooks are, furthermore, considerably shorter and less detailed than PEP's. As 
shown in Figure 6.1 above, however, they are not substantially shorter than either the 
Shanghai or Coastal editions, which are clearly directed at those with supposedly 
higher suzhi. Furthermore, if the developmental trajectory of children's historical 
thinking outlined by scholars such as Lee, Egan and Carretero is correct, the historical 
materialist `structural explanations' of change emphasised by the Inland edition are in 
fact more appropriate for an older or more intellectually sophisticated audience. 1° It 
would appear, therefore, that the academic simplicity/complexity of a text, whether 
real or imagined, may ultimately be founded in little more than socio-biological 
determinist preconceptions about the `quality' of the audience for which a given set of 
textbooks is designed. This is certainly not to suggest that there are no differences in 
the level of cognitive understanding certain language and concepts deployed in each 
set may require, but as a non-native speaker with little theoretical knowledge of 
cognitive development processes, it has been difficult for me to make valid 
comparisons on linguistic bases, and such an analysis must await further investigation 
by others more qualified. 
9 Personal communications with TMIC inspectors and ERU personnel. The above-cited Zhao makes 
similar inferences. 
10 Lee, Dickinson and Ashby `Researching Children's Ideas about History'; Egan, `Accumulating 
History'; Carretero et al, `Historical Knowledge'. 
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There are other minor discrepancies between textbook sets, with, as already noted, 
writers of different sets giving somewhat more emphasis to certain topics or periods 
than to others. Some differences are also evident in the question or exercise sections 
that are included at the end of each chapter. These were included in earlier PEP 
textbook editions, but the section mostly consisted of two or three questions (xiti) that 
typically asked students to recall the information that had been covered and to 
describe its relevance to the historical materialist development process. By the late 
1980s, such questions were deemed not only overly difficult, but also old-fashioned 
and dull. The new question sections in PEP and also in the Coastal edition (lianxiti) 
have accordingly employed much more basic techniques to get students to remember 
information, asking them to fill in the blanks, or simply asking general factual 
questions about the chapter, the answers to which are often listed in a short multiple 
choice exercise. The Inland edition, by contrast, has retained the older PEP style, not 
asking questions, but listing several points at the end of the chapter as 'revision 
requirements' (fuxi yaoqiu) which are divided under the instructional headings 
`remember', `know about', `understand' and `generally describe'. The Shanghai 
edition, however, has earned its reputation for pedagogical innovation by heading its 
question section `think', `try' (xiangyixiang, shiyishi), asking its readers to answer 
short questions that occasionally require them to do more than regurgitate data, and 
sometimes to answer data-based questions from a selected supplementary passage, or 
to gather information on a topic from extra-curricular sources. As with the local 
curricula discussed in Chapter 5, however, it is difficult to detect a distinctly regional 
flavour to any of the sets. 
In general, then, it may be said that the similarities between textbook sets vastly 
outweigh the differences. Given that each set of textbooks had to pass the TMIC 
inspection, this is hardly surprising, although whether this was because the revisions 
required by the History TMIC before granting approval brought each into line with 
the other or whether they were all virtually identical from the outset is difficult to 
determine since I did not have access to the initial textbook drafts. There are, of 
course, various regulations that stipulate what textbook writers can and must put in 
textbooks, and it is according to these that TMIC is supposed to judge those texts 
submitted to them for inspection and approval. 
" Although, as shown in Chapter 3, 
`Guojia jiaoyu weiyuanhui zhongxiaoxue jiaocai songshen banfa' [10/10/1987], JYFQS, p1090-91; 
`Jiunianzhi yiwu jiaoyu jiaocai bianxie guihua fang'an' [21/8/1988], JYFQS, pp 1093-1095; 
`Zhongxiaoxue jiaocai bianxie shending guanli zanxing banfa' [7/6/2001], 
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these have not, in practice, always been absolutely binding and much has been left to 
the discretion of TMIC inspectors, it seems that most History textbook writers have 
followed the guidelines fairly closely. Another reason why the PEP, Coastal and 
Inland editions may well have differed little in their initial pre-inspection drafts is the 
prescriptive nature of Teaching Outlines which, together with the above-cited 
regulations, set the parameters of what must be included (or excluded) to ensure a 
reasonable expectation of passing inspection. Outlines, as we have seen, provide not 
only general ideological and pedagogical guidance, but also an extremely detailed 
syllabus in which long topic lists are given together with notes on the appropriate 
viewpoints that should be adopted. The curricula drafted in Shanghai and Zhejiang 
have also been very prescriptive and detailed, if marginally less so than the Outlines. 
The length and specificity of the syllabus in both the national and local curricula have 
thus left little to the imagination of textbook writers (who in many cases have anyway 
been the same persons who drafted the curriculum guidelines in the first place), and 
even if they wished to include additional topics, the limited time-frame available to 
cover the mandatory syllabus would preclude the incorporation of such material. 
It is not, however, only these systemic and procedural factors that have 
circumscribed the form and content of textbooks, nor is it even a straightforward 
reflection of the political and ideological influences identified in previous chapters. 
Rather, it is in large part, I would argue, because the long-time dominance of PEP has 
established a tried and trusted template from which few, especially PEP itself, have 
been willing to deviate. Each `new' edition of the PEP History textbook, for example, 
has closely resembled its immediate predecessor and, much like revised editions, has 
in essence taken the old one and added, removed, truncated or expanded some of the 
information, modified the distribution of praise and blame, and adjusted the 
ideological tone just as has been done in the Outlines. In the same way, the History 
textbooks produced by the different regions after the 1985 Reform not only follow the 
established national and global historical narrative, but at first glance appear to have 
taken the 1987 PEP textbooks and merely - to cite a common educational activity - 
`put the text into their own words' and occasionally re-ordered the data. 12 Some of 
12 Redistribution of the data, however, was carried out in all sets, since prior to the 1988 draft/1992 
Outlines, History was only taught for two years of junior secondary, with, according to the 1986 
revised outline provisions, three semesters 
for Chinese history and one for world (see Chapter 4 for 
further details), meaning that the 1987-1989 textbook set comprised three volumes of Chinese history 
and one of world. With the expansion of 
History classes into all three junior secondary years (i. e. six 
semesters), content was accordingly rearranged 
into four volumes of Chinese history and two of world. 
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the text and many of the photographs, images and diagrams are identical in all four 
textbook sets, with some having also appeared in the earlier PEP editions. It may be 
that this high degree of overlap is because there was close co-ordination between the 
various editorial teams or close supervision from higher authorities. It may also have 
been because non-PEP writers had little experience in the field on which to draw and 
thus borrowed directly from PEP. 
Yet, such `borrowings' may not have even been conscious or deliberate. Many of 
the local editorial teams included ERU staff and normal university academics, all of 
whom would have been very familiar with PEP's textbooks through their day-to-day 
work of pre- and in-service teacher training, and, if then under the age of about forty- 
five (and not of the Cultural Revolution generation), would themselves have studied 
PEP's earlier textbooks in secondary school. Moreover, the institutionalisation of 
textbook production in the PRC combined with the particular position history 
occupies in legitimising the polity has contributed greatly to the establishment and 
perpetuation of a dominant historical discourse which has certain narrative and 
linguistic structures and patterns at its core. 13 Obviously this discourse has not, as we 
have seen in previous chapters, evolved in isolation from contemporaneous 
developments in politics, professional historiography or education, or from the history 
of the History subject itself, but while it should be regarded both as a product of a 
historical process of development over the longue duree and as a discursive field in 
`dialogue' with related socio-cultural, political and academic discourses, History texts 
nonetheless constitute a distinctive `genre' of their own. 14 
Those working in the field of History education would, if not from childhood, at 
least from the outset of their professional careers, have been socialised into, as Kress 
has put it, `recognising certain routinised kinds of texts', and thereafter reproducing 
them. Through producing or reproducing these particular texts `in the one social 
place over a long period .... 
[they] come to make choices that have become habitual, 
Other than bringing contemporary history content up to the post-Mao era for Chinese history and the 
post-WWII period for world history, however, there were no major changes. This redistribution of data 
is not therefore treated as significant here, although it is one to which writers on the subject have 
inevitably drawn attention, much as they did when claiming the switch from the division of the 
Outlines into parts, chapters and lessons (bian, zhang, jie) to numbers in various fonts and sizes was 
important (see Chapter 4). 
13 Schoenhals (Doing Things with Words in Chinese Politics) makes a similar argument regarding 
political discourse, maintaining that a standardised `pan-national' language deployed since 1949 has 
effectively restricted thought and consciousness to the 
language of the polity. 
14 This concept of genre follows Fairclough's definition (Critical Discourse Analysis, ppl3-15). See 
also Kress, `The Social Production of 
Language', pp 120-121. 
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predictable, given'. 15 And through these predictable choices - in this case, following 
the established textbook template - the `institution' of textbook production (PEP and 
other textbook editorial teams and their parent organisations) which has produced 
these `linguistic and social subjects' (textbook writers) in the first place thereby 
reproduces itself and `its characteristic institutional meanings'. 16 This is not to say 
that there has been no `linguistic change' at all. In times of `interactions of conflict 
and contestation', as Kress' argument continues, `individual [linguistic and social] 
subjects represent [as opposed to reproduce] their institution and its meanings and in 
the process produce significant linguistic change'. 17 `Interactions of conflict and 
contestation', as we have seen in Chapters 2 and 3, have certainly characterised 
History education over the past several years with the recent expansion of textbook 
pluralism, growing pressure on History to appear more useful in the face of 
competition from new and existing school subjects, and the rapid development of 
pedagogical research which increasingly challenges old assumptions. Whether Kress' 
`intertextual analysis' accurately explains the dynamics of stability and change in 
History education in the Chinese context would require a far more profound analysis 
of its discourse than the scope of this study permits, but there is little doubt that the 
many changes taking place in the environment in which History texts are produced 
have catalysed some concrete movement in the presentation formats, language and 
meanings of History textbooks. Some common value-laden phrases or words that 
were once universally dominant have been replaced by or at least compete for space 
and usage with others: `renmin' (the people in the proletarian sense), for example, has 
in many instances been supplanted by `minzu' (the national people in a primordial 
ethno-cultural sense); `guomin' (nationals in a political, territorial and civic sense, a 
term favoured by the KNIT both on the Mainland and in Taiwan, and used in the early 
years of the PRC) has also made a comeback, and most recently `gongmin' (citizens) 
has appeared with increasing frequency. 18 The language of class struggle (jieji 
douzheng) and revolution (geming) in which slaves, peasants and workers featured (at 
least nominally) as the agents of historical change, meanwhile, has given way to an 
emphasis on economic, scientific and technological development (fazhan) catalysed 
by elite-led reform (gaige). Most recently, the quality education drive to make 
is Kress, `The Social Production of Language', p119. 
16 Ibid, pp139. 
17 Kress, `The Social Production of Language', p 140. 
'8 On the changing meaning and naming of citizenship in the PRC see Yu, `Citizenship, Ideology and 
the PRC Constitution', pp288-307. 
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learning more appealing and a lifelong pursuit has also begun to make inroads into the 
ways in which History textbooks present their information and the language that they 
use, with increasing numbers of cartoon figures shown engaged in dialogue and even 
debate (however simplistic) about historical events and persons, and efforts to write in 
a more accessible, child-friendly style. PEP is now in a position of trying to keep up 
with the latest trends being followed by the reformers in institutions such as Beijing 
Normal and Huadong Normal Universities (both of which have published 2001 HCS- 
compliant textbooks). Clearly, some of these changes suggest important shifts in the 
ways in which the nation, the people, society, the school, the teacher's role, and the 
learning process itself are conceived, or, as Fairclough, Kress and other like-minded 
discourse theorists might say, reconfigurations of the `power relations' that History 
texts `code'. It appears, nevertheless, that the History `genre' and the key narratives, 
concepts and structures of which it is comprised have been preserved intact in all four 
sets of History textbooks discussed here. 
The remainder of this chapter surveys the substantive content of History 
textbooks, analysing selected themes and topics that demonstrate the extent to which 
they faithfully reproduce the official narratives outlined in the intended curriculum 
and pursue the official objectives of teaching about the past. Specifically, this chapter 
asks whether the textbooks in question do in fact follow central government 
guidelines, Teaching Outlines or local curricula, and not only adhere to the syllabus 
mandated therein, but whether they effectively promote `patriotism, internationalism, 
communist ideology, historical materialism and dialectical materialism'; whether they 
promote `ethnic unity' (minzu tuanjie) and harmony; whether they are `scientific', 
appropriate for China's `national conditions' and `reflect the spirit of the times'; 
whether they teach `good morals, character and determination' and nurture `four 
haves' students (with ideals, morals, culture and discipline); and whether they 
encourage an approach to education that nurtures students' intellectual, moral, 
physical and aesthetic capabilities and teaches them transferable skills. 
19 How fully 
these objectives are realised, needless to say, cannot be determined simply by reading 
the textbook, since no reader is a tabula rasa, and encounters the text in a particular 
medium (the school classroom), mediated by a particular person (the teacher) who has 
his or her own experiences and understanding of the past derived both from formal 
and informal education. Textbooks are analysed 
in this chapter, therefore, in terms 
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chiefly of how they reflect the formal objectives of History and whether they thereby 
promote the likelihood that these learning objectives will be attained. 
As already discussed, the official objectives are not the only thing that textbooks 
convey; there is always a `hidden curriculum' of one sort or another that - to borrow 
from the critical discourse analysts once more - might be said to encode power 
relations between social, economic, political, gender and ethnic subjects, and to 
reflect the desire of those with power to sustain their own hegemony. Although in the 
case of PRC History textbooks, I would argue that some of these curricular objectives 
are barely concealed, there are, nonetheless, implicit messages that sometimes 
contradict stated goals. A comprehensive discourse or content analysis of History 
textbooks, while clearly a fruitful area of research, is, however, more than the 
limitations of this study can accommodate. The themes and topics examined here are 
accordingly restricted to a few examples in each period of Chinese and world history 
that have been selected in part as representative examples of harmony or conflict 
between explicit and hidden goals and partly for their importance in shaping the 
national or global narrative. Some of them have also been chosen to coincide with 
lessons I was personally able to observe being taught in school classrooms and/or to 
discuss with teachers and students, and thereby to allow me to draw some tentative 
conclusions about how accurately messages are transmitted from the top to the 
bottom, and the centre to the periphery. 
Fig. 6.3 
Chinese History 
PEP1,2,3,4 People's Education Press, Vols. 1-4 
SH 1,2,3,4 Shanghai Edition, Vols. 1-4 
YH 1,2,3,4 Coastal Edition, Vols. 1-4 
ND1,2,3,4 Inland Edition, Vols. 1-4 
World History 
PEPW1 2 People's Education Press, Vols. 1-2 
SHW 1,2 Shanghai Edition, Vols. 1-2 
YHW 1,2 Coastal Edition Vols. 1-2 
NDW 1,2 Inland Edition, Vols. 1-2 
Social Studies 
ZJ1,2,3,4,5,6 Zhejiang Social Studies, Vols. 1-6 
The History textbooks discussed here - that is, those in use as of 2000 - are 
identified throughout this chapter and the following one by the already stated 
acronyms referring to the set, followed by a number indicating the volume (Fig. 6.3). 
'4 `Guojia jiaoyu weiyuanhui zhongxiaoxue jiaocai shending biaozhun' [10/10/1987], JYFQS, pp1090- 
91; LJD[19881, COH, pp510-512. 
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A second number following the volume number indicates the chapter (zhang) or 
lesson (ke), and a third the lesson or class (jie); for example, YH2.3.1 refers to the 
Coastal edition, volume 2, chapter 3, lesson 1. Page numbers are indicated in the 
usual format. When citing earlier (PEP) editions I use the same format, but include 
the year of publication in parentheses The titles of other textbooks cited here are 
given in full. 20 
II. National History 
`Metahistory' 
The meaning and function of national history has already been analysed in the 
introduction, especially what was labelled the `national-history-for-patriotism' model 
or History for `moral and patriotic exhortation'. There is a great deal more that could 
be said in defining what constitutes national history and its social and political 
applications, 21 but suffice it to reiterate for the moment that national history is 
understood here as denoting what - land, people, culture, ideas - is perceived as 
`belonging' to the past of the present nation-state; to borrow from Kaviraj's remarks 
on nationalism, it is thus `a relentless project of enumeration .... It counts, 
it appears, 
every conceivable quantifiable thing'. 22 One of the core functions of national history 
in other words is to quantify the nation; that is, to ascertain who we are (who is 
included in `Us'? ), and what we have in tangible material and cultural terms (land, 
people, resources, cultural achievements, scientific discoveries). I would also 
suggest, however, that national history seeks to qualify the nation in intangible 
cultural or spiritual terms (national qualities, essences, or `what is special about us? '). 
As shown below and in the final chapters, this is a complex project in which 
quantitative definitions of the nation may conflict with qualitative ones. 
In addition to quantifying and qualifying the nation, national history also serves as 
a grand narrative conferring coherence on the current nation-state, and is commonly 
the story of an idea (or ideal) of a collective historical subject that moves changed- 
yet-unchanged through time. 
23 As already argued, national history thus conceived 
may embody many problems and contradictions, since certain aspects of the past must 
almost invariably be excluded or dragooned into performing functions for which they 
2° The full publication details of all textbooks published between 1949-2000 are given in the appendix. 
The publication details of all other textbooks are included in the bibliography. 
21 For a multi-perspectival analysis of national history in the context of an assortment of nation-states 
(and `stateless nations' such as Catalunya), see Lönnroth et al eds., Conceptions of National History. 
22 Sudipta Kaviraj, `The Imaginary Institution of India, ' in Subaltern Studies VII. - Writings on South 
Asian History and Society, (New York: Oxford, 1992), pp. 30-31, cit. in Gries, Face Nationalism, p74. 
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may not be entirely suited in order to maintain continuity and the idea of the nation. 
`Narrating' a nation, which in territorial or political terms may be somewhat 
historically discontinuous, is therefore often accomplished through imagining an 
ancient and/or `pure' national people or national `essence' which can provide 
continuity and a reason for national cohesion. 24 
In all editions of the Chinese history textbooks, the national past is presented in 
just such a teleological fashion, with the modern nation-state projected backwards 
over time to demonstrate its antiquity and the continuity of its political and territorial 
existence `from ancient times onwards' (zigu yilai); `the China of today has developed 
from the China of yesterday' as all the texts, following the Outlines, are wont to 
declare. Continuity is also provided through the concept of a primordial national 
people, `rooted in this land and soil' (yi tusheng tuzhang wei genben), albeit, in the 
spirit of multi-ethnic unity, having `amalgamated into one (Tong wei yiti) through 
ceaselessly receiving new blood'. 25 As shown in Chapters 1,4, and 5, the grand 
narrative that tells this story of the nation and its people is hardly new, having 
remained fundamentally unchanged at least for several decades, and conceivably for 
much longer; indeed, a comparative survey of texts produced during the Nationalist 
era and those produced in Taiwan prior to the `nativisation' (bentuhua) movement of 
the late 1990s reveals that the PRC interpretations of the past are considerably less 
revolutionary than their authors would care to admit, and follow a pattern that was 
already established long before the PRC. 26 
This narrative is what I term `the rise-and-fall (xingti) conception of history', and 
is, I maintain, the organising framework of all History textbook content. Although, as 
noted in Chapter 1, xingti traditionally referred to the cyclical rise and fall of 
dynasties, it has been adapted since the early twentieth century to fit a linear view of 
`History' (in the Hegelian sense), and to refer to the fortunes of the nation rather than 
23 Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation, Chapter 1. 
24 The `national essence' idea has enjoyed a great deal of support in China. Deriving from the late 
nineteenth -early twentieth century 
Japanese concept of kokosui (Chinese, guocui) , 
it was adopted by 
many early twentieth century Chinese reformers, and has recently enjoyed something of a 
recrudescence among neo-conservatives (Schneider, `Bridging the Gap', pp 129-146. See also Xu, 
`From Modernity to Chineseness'. ) 
25 SH I, preface, p3. 
26 On the Nationalist period see Peake, Nationalism and Education in China; see also the discussion of 
pre-1949 curricula in Chapter 1, this volume. 
For Taiwanese textbooks, see Guoli bianyiguan, Guomin 
zhongxue lishi: diyi, er, san, sice. 
These volumes were initially produced in the mid-1980s and 
modified several times up to the mid-1990s. 
The overlap with Mainland textbooks in some instances is 
striking. On the nativisation movement and 
its impact on History education since 1997, see Corcuff, 
`History Textbooks, Identity Politics and Ethnic Introspection in Taiwan'. 
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those of its rulers. In its present historical materialist incarnation, which is of course 
the stated organising principle of all PRC historiography, xingti describes the 
supplanting of one socio-economic form by another more `advanced' one. Re-framed 
in these evolutionary terms the rise-and-fall conception of history might be seen as 
coextensive with `progressivism' (fazhanzhuyi), but whereas progress is `inevitable' 
(biran), determined by `scientific laws' of historical development, rise-and-fall is 
determined by the will (yizhi) and moral character (pinde), or - to use a more recent 
term - the quality (suzhi) of its leaders and its people. Both `conceptions of history' 
(lishiguan) are intrinsic to PRC narratives of the Chinese (and, in slightly different 
configurations, also the global) past; they have both, for example, been incorporated 
into the Communist narrative of legitimate succession, wherein CPC legitimacy is 
demonstrated by scientific laws on the one hand, and by moral superiority over its 
predecessors on the other. 
Yet, despite the continued emphasis on understanding the laws of historical 
materialism as a core objective of History, I would argue that ultimately historical 
materialist progress tends to be subordinate to rise-and-fall. This is no doubt, in part, 
because the rise-and-fall model ties in to familiar narratives and deep-seated 
assumptions about the form and purpose of history. It is also because progress may 
be inevitable, but the pace of progress is predicated on the speed at which science and 
technology are developed since certain preconditions concerning the means of 
production (as well as the ownership thereof) must be met in order to catalyse the 
transition from one socio-economic form to the next. Thus, those whose national 
quality (minzu suzhi), especially their `scientific and cultural quality' (kexue wenhua 
suzhi), is low will not be able to develop scientifically or technologically, and thus 
will not progress as fast as those whose national quality is high. The Chinese people, 
as history proves, have high national quality, having `stood at the forefront of the 
world' for almost five thousand years. As we have seen in Chapter 2, however, 
quality requires training if potential is to be optimised. In a Darwinian struggle 
between nations, those who do not work ceaselessly to improve their quality and 
accelerate progress will fail to flourish (zing) and will sink into a state of stagnation or 
even decline (ti); `the backwards', as the much repeated aphorism goes, `will be 
beaten' (luohou jiu yao aida). This logic, bolstered by historical materialist laws, 
leads the narrative to the inevitable conclusion that since communism is the highest 
form of social development, the nation and the national people must follow the CPC 
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along the socialist road if they are to reach a state of perpetual rise (xing) and prevent 
another humiliating `beating' or fall (ti). 
The dominance of the rise-and-fall conception of history in PRC textbooks is not 
only because it has a long and glorious tradition in Chinese historiography, nor 
because, constructed in the way that it has been in past decades, it serves powerful 
moral and patriotic exhortatory functions and legitimises the Communist Party. As 
seen in Chapters 2 and 4, historical materialism has been gradually downplayed in the 
post-Mao era, in part because the socialist road (or the CPC) had clearly not delivered 
the rapid `world-beating transformation' once promised, but also because it has been 
thought to be too theoretical, difficult and dull for younger students to comprehend. 
The rise-and-fall model, by contrast, offers what Bruner has called a `narrative' rather 
than a `paradigmatic' construction of the past, or in similar vein, what Carretero and 
his colleagues, have termed `intentional' rather than `structural' explanations. 27 As 
discussed in the introduction, this distinction is one that has been drawn between 
teaching history through `stories' that focus on the role of individual heroes and their 
evil nemeses and so forth - or as Hayden White has put it `emplotting' history in 
narrative forms such as tragedy, comedy, satire and romance28 - and describing the 
past in abstract or conceptual terms of macro-social, political and economic forces. 
Bruner's `narrative mode', as researchers such as Lee, Dickinson and Ashby have 
found, is more appropriate for the cognitive psychology of younger children since 
narratives are `lifelike' and thus more accessible and meaningful than paradigms or 
`arguments' that attempt to persuade logically of their 'truth' . 
29 Although as students 
progress through schooling they develop their abilities to conceptualise more complex 
abstractions, the `narrative mode' tends to remain, nonetheless, the foundation of 
History textbooks up until or even through senior secondary education. 30 From a 
pedagogical as well as a political-ideological standpoint, therefore, the rise-and-fall 
conception of history, with its story of the transition from five thousand years of 
greatness, to one-hundred years of humiliation (bainian guochi), followed by a 
glorious resurgence since 1949, is the more suitable framework into which to arrange 
Chinese history, while, in view of the emergent critical and conceptual faculties of 
27 Bruner, Actual Minds, Possible Worlds; Carretero et al `Historical Knowledge: Cognitive and 
Instructional implications'. 
28 White, Metahistory. 
29 Bruner, Actual Minds, Possible Worlds; Lee et al `Researching Children's Ideas about History'; 
Husbands, What is History Teaching?; Carretero et al `Historical Knowledge'. 
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junior secondary students, also providing supporting `scientific' evidence through the 
structural explanations of historical materialist laws. The rise-and-fall and historical 
materialist or progressive conceptions of history, therefore, should be neither 
conflated nor seen as mutually exclusive, but should instead be regarded as different 
but closely related ways of representing the same story. 
`Why should we study Chinese history? ' 
The grand narratives of history are not normally identified as specific teaching and 
learning objectives in school curricula or textbooks, but PRC History Teaching 
Outlines do emphasise that students should have a basic understanding of the laws of 
historical materialism and should grasp the victor-victim-victor trajectory of Chinese 
history. Such objectives have normally had to be inferred from textbooks, but the late 
1980s History textbooks examined in this chapter each includes a chapter or preface 
entitled `Why study Chinese history? ' (SH, YH, ND) or `What can history tell us? ' 
(PEP). 31 This had never been included in earlier PEP editions, and appears to have 
reflected a felt need to reiterate the importance both of national history as an 
ideological construct and of History as a school subject declining in popularity and 
status. What is written in these sections, however, does not offer any substantially 
more persuasive reasons to study, let alone be enthusiastic about Chinese history than 
those offered in the Outlines, and certainly none that would likely appeal to a young 
audience, even if some of the language attempts to be more child-friendly. PEP, for 
example, opens this section by stating that 
We are fortunate today to live in the socialist motherland. No doubt you all want to 
know how our socialist motherland came to be. How come our lives are so fortunate? 
Who are our ancestors? How did they live? What kinds of changes have there been 
between their time and ours? History can answer these questions. 32 
It goes on to assert that `everyone has the great desire to contribute their energies to 
the socialist motherland', and to tell students how this can be done through 
developing their moral and ideological qualities. 33 
The other three editions offer similarly bland fare, and indeed appear to have 
followed the Outlines even more diligently than PEP in adhering to standard 
30 Egan, `Accumulating History'; Topolski, `The Structure of Historical Narratives and the Teaching of 
History'. 
31 Zdl also includes a preface that similarly discusses, or rather states the importance of learning Social 
Studies. Note the lack of the modifier `Chinese' in the PEP title. Answers given to this question in the 
opening chapter reveal that the question is not, in fact, `what can history tell us? ', but what can 
`Chinese history tell us? ', suggesting that history is Chinese history. 
32 PEPI, pl. 
33 PEPI, Pl 
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statements of how important Chinese history is for understanding national conditions, 
learning patriotism, national self-confidence, self-respect and pride, and emulating the 
worthy, learning from the wise and repudiating the bad. 34 Each of them also outlines 
the general rise-and-fall pattern that Chinese history has followed and that students 
will learn in more detail as they progress through the course: five thousand years of 
greatness, described as a `long history and glorious culture' (lishi youjiu, wenhua 
canlan); one hundred years of humiliating imperialist incursions during which 
`massacres were perpetrated on the Chinese people, territory was lost, sovereignty 
trampled and wealth plundered'; 35 forty years of dramatic progress and the restoration 
of national integrity and pride from the victory of the CPC and the establishment of 
New China; and a future which can only come to fruition in the way that the nation - 
given its glorious past - deserves with the CPC at the helm. 
Despite the familiar exhortatory tone and rhetoric and the verbatim repetition of 
many Outline provisions, the inclusion of such a section does seem also to represent 
an attempt to encourage students (and perhaps also teachers) to reflect at least 
somewhat critically on why and how they learn what they learn; indeed, the Inland 
edition specifically states in its first page text box that `the correct objective of study 
is to [develop] a strong motivation to learn; the scientific method of learning is the 
key to opening the treasure house of knowledge. In order to study Chinese history 
well, you must first clarify the objective of study and understand some learning 
methods'. 36 PEP, the Coastal and Shanghai editions also make a point of reminding 
students that there are numerous sources from which to learn about the past, although 
both PEP and the Coastal edition do emphasise that the point of entry is diligent 
reading and studying of the textbook without rigidly memorising it (si i yingbei). 37 In 
addition, PEP includes a short section in which it is remarked how evidence can 
change what we thought we knew about a subject, citing how the debate among 
historians over whether paper-making (one of China's `four great inventions') was 
discovered during the Western or Eastern Han was settled definitively in 1986 with 
the discovery in Gansu of a map dating from the Western Han period. 38 It also 
3¢ This may have been because their model was the 1986 revised Outline and its accompanying 
textbooks, whereas PEP was already engaged in writing the 1988 draft Outline and had already decided 
the direction in which changes were to be made. In this sense, PEP's textbooks could be regarded as 
more `progressive' than the other sets at the time. 
3s ND1, p2- 
36 NDI, pl - 37 PEP 1, p5; YH 1, p2; SH 1, preface, p7. 
38 PEP I, p4. 
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explains that there may be different viewpoints on historical figures and events, and 
that `some are even diametrically opposed'. This apparent introduction of a critical 
element, however, is undermined by the assertion that `only through using the Marxist 
viewpoint to analyse history can correct conclusions (zhengque jielun) be reached'. 
Thus, peasant uprisings, were `in ancient times seen by the ruling classes as violating 
the natural order and creating chaos (zuoluan)', but `using a Marxist viewpoint to 
analyse them, we reach the conclusion that peasant rebellions were righteous 
movements'. 39 Such an effort to introduce students to critical thinking at the outset of 
their history studies, however, has clearly been deemed either too overwhelming or 
simply superfluous to requirements as the section has been excised from all the 2001 
HCS-compliant textbooks. 
Ancient Chinese History: The Essential Self 
Five Thousand Years of Greatness 
The first two volumes of each History textbook set (and the beginning of the third in 
PEP's) are devoted to `ancient history' (gudaishi), which covers from prehistoric man 
and a hazy antiquity in which the dawn of `Chinese civilisation' is located, up to 1840 
on the eve of the Opium War. Sticking closely to the Outline syllabus, the narrative 
follows dynastic rise and fall while simultaneously illustrating the laws of historical 
materialist development as China moves from primitive matriarchal and patriarchal 
societies, to slave and feudal societies, and finally to the sprouts of capitalism and the 
cusp of a sudden descent into a semi-feudal, semi-colonial abyss. This period, as not 
only the textbooks, but almost every political, media and literary text reminds its 
audience, is at the heart of promoting patriotism, national self-confidence, self-respect 
and pride, for China, as everyone knows or ought to know, `stood at the forefront of 
the world' for five thousand years. A principal objective of these volumes, therefore, 
is to describe China's past greatness. Another key theme is showing how the PRC's 
present territory has `since time immemorial been an indivisible part of China' (zigu 
yilai buke fenlie de lingtu), and how the `Chinese national people' (Zhonghua minzu), 
composed of many `brother nationalities' (xiongdi minzu) have come to be `one'. 
Through examples of outstanding persons (youxiu renwu) it also demonstrates the 
national characteristics of the Chinese people who are said to be intelligent 
(congming), brave (yonggan), diligent (qinlao) and full of creative spirit (chuangzao 
39 PEP 1, p3. [This is not, of course, the case when it comes to `peasant movements' of the post-Mao era 
which are evidently regarded 
by the present leadership not as `righteous uprisings' (qiyi) against 
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jingshen). In other words, ancient history quantifies the nation in terms of what and 
whom it possesses, and qualifies it in terms of the virtues of the people that comprise 
the nation. In short, ancient history establishes what constitutes the `essential self. 
National People/National Territory 
After the suppression of minority cultures during the Cultural Revolution, the post- 
Mao regime officially espoused cultural pluralism which, according to Harrell and 
Bamo, `is seen as a specific vaccine against the disease of separatism'. Needless to 
say, this has been a `balancing act' because encouraging too much cultural autonomy 
and pride might promote the very separatism such policies have been designed to 
obviate. 4° Promoting ethnic and territorial unity is thus one of the core functions of 
History, and the first thing the textbook does to accomplish this is to create a `myth of 
descent' in which the Chinese people or Zhonghua minzu - that is, the (ill-defined) 
`Han' and the various minority groups that inhabit the PRC - are shown to have a 
common biological ancestry. Creation myths, needless to say, are dismissed and 
Darwinian evolution embraced as scientifically correct, although the `Out of Africa' 
theory of human evolution espoused by most palaeontologists is comprehensively 
rejected in China, primarily, as Sautman has argued, for reasons of racial prejudice 
which projects the perceived backwardness of Africa (or the innate `inferiority' of 
Africans) into antiquity. 41 This problematic aspect of evolution, however, is side- 
stepped altogether in textbooks and the national narrative begins with primitive 
Yuanmou and Peking man in a chapter variously entitled `Prehistoric humans within 
the borders of the motherland' (PEP), `Our country's beginnings' (SH), `Primitive 
society' (YH) and `The peoples living in primitive society' (ND). 42 This descent 
story is developed in the following chapters with the `legends' (chuanshuo) of 
Huangdi and the sage kings Yao and Shun, under whose rule the various tribes or 
clans (shizu) gradually amalgamated to form the Huaxia people, `the descendants of 
Yandi and Huangdi' (Yanhuang zisun), more commonly known as the 'Han'. 43 The 
legendary kings themselves also provide examples of persons of outstanding 
character, wisdom, benevolence and determination, who are shown through their 
corrupt local officials but as riots. ] 
40 Harrell and Bamo, `Combining Ethnic Heritage and National Unity', p63. 
41 Sautman, `Myths of Descent, Racial Nationalism and Ethnic Minorities'. See also his articles 
`Racial Nationalism and China's External Behaviour' and `Anti-black nationalism in China'. 
42 PEP1, pp7-12; SH1, pp1-4; YH1, pp1-7; ND1, pp6-10. 
43 PEP1.3; SH1.2; YH1.1.3; ND1.1.3. 
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leadership and achievements to embody the essential characteristics - intelligence, 
bravery, diligence and creativity - of the Zhonghua minzu. 
It is significant, however, that although these stories are categorised as `legend', 
they are written in such a way as to suggest they are fact, interspersed with 
supposedly `scientific' data on the socio-economic forms of matriarchal and 
patriarchal society through which the nation evolved before arriving at `slave society' 
with the `historical' event of Yu's establishment of the Xia dynasty. Nothing is said 
here about the doubt cast by historians on the existence of the Xia, let alone the 
authenticity of its founder, and there is no indication other than the single use of the 
word `chuanshuo' in each text to suggest that these stories should be read any 
differently from the rest of the volumes They are, furthermore, supported by 
photographs of the tombs of Yandi, Huangdi and Yu (in the Coastal edition) and by 
pictures of contemporary artefacts in all editions, further propagating an illusion of 
historical factuality. 45 Chinese nationalists, however, do not appear to view this as a 
cause for concern, as Lu has written, `There is no reason..... to object when antiquity 
draws no hard line between the human and the supernatural; it adds dignity to the 
past, and if any nation deserves the privilege of claiming a divine ancestry, that nation 
is our own. '46 
The next several chapters discuss the founding of the Shang and Zhou dynasties 
and the consolidation of China as a political entity, before turning to the Warring 
States period and the development of philosophical and political thought and culture, 
and restoring Confucius to a central position in the national narrative. It then 
describes the transition from `slave society' to `feudal society' under the Qin and Han. 
While clearly these periods are intended to demonstrate historical materialist laws 
through showing the transformation from one socio-economic form to the next, the 
reduction of coverage of peasant rebellions during this period suggests that another 
important purpose being served here is to instil national pride in the early 
establishment of feudal society (compared to the West where as shown in the world 
history textbooks, feudalism developed about a millennium later). 47 They also move 
44 Most doubters have unsurprisingly been foreign scholars, although in the 1920s many Chinese 
historians, notably Gu Jiegang, also questioned the veracity of China's antiquity. In very early PRC 
textbooks, the Xia dynasty was listed as part of the `legend' that included Huangdi, Yandi, Yao and 
Shun (PEP 1[ 1952], p7), but subsequent volumes have integrated the Xia with Shang and Zhou. 
45 YHI pp9-10. Huangdi's tomb is also included in the (unnumbered) colour photograph section at the 
beginning of the PEP, Shanghai and Inland editions. 
46 Lu, `From Historicity to Fictionality', p3 1. 
47 PEPW 1 . 
8. 
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away from the ethnic pluralism attempted in the descent story to focus almost 
exclusively on a culture and history that by most Chinese citizens (minority or Han) 
are regarded primarily as attributes or experiences of the Han. National pride is, 
thereby, conflated with Han pride. Only after the collapse of the two Han dynasties 
are minority groups again seriously discussed in any context other than the `internal 
contradictions' - that is, wars - between the Xiongnu and the dynastic regimes of 
China proper. 
Ethnic integration (minzu ronghe) is the chief subject of the remainder of the first 
volume (PEP, YH, ND), 48 which covers the long period of disunity (fenlie geju de 
jumian) that followed the fall of the Eastern Han dynasty and lasted until the 
establishment of the short-lived Sui and the glorious Tang dynasties. Despite the 
positive slant given to a period which had until the past few decades been viewed 
almost exclusively by historians as an aberration from the unified norm, the way in 
which reunification under the Sui and Tang is depicted nonetheless reinforces the 
view of unity as the natural tendency, the rule of even cooked barbarians as a 
temporary upset of the natural order, and the notion of Han (elite, advanced) culture 
and values as the key to regime stability. Thus, while some `national characteristics' 
and Confucian virtues are attributed to various ethnic rulers of the different states, 
ultimately it is shown that it was their pursuit of Han culture and adoption of Han 
socio-political norms and structures that made them the `enlightened' despots that 
they were. The fourth-fifth century Northern Wei Xianbei rulers who brought to an 
end the `Sixteen Kingdoms' period, for example, are shown to have advanced not 
only the cause of ethnic integration, but also social development through adopting the 
civilised ways of the Han under their rule. Once nomadic, herding peoples, their 
move southwards and contact with the agricultural (Han) peoples of the Yellow River 
delta taught them a more `advanced' way to live, and, eventually, following the 
Sinifying reforms (gaige) of the Emperor Xiaowen, they adopted Han names, Han 
clothes, Han customs and the ancient (Confucian) Han culture, and `immediately 
flourished', developing a thriving modern city at Luoyang. 49 That the revolts which 
subsequently caused the demise of the Northern Wei may have been catalysed in part 
by resentment among the Xianbei at enforced Sinification is not mentioned, and the 
48 SH1 also covers the Sui and Tang dynasties, opening volume 2 with the Five Dynasties, Northern 
Song, Liao, Jin and Xia (fig. 6.2). This, in fact, follows the content distribution of the earlier 4-volume 
PEP textbook set (PEP 1[ 1978]). 
49 ND 1, pp 130-133; PEPI. 25, pp155-157. 
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fall of Northern Wei is simply described as an `uprising of the people of all 
nationalities' against the brutal rule of Xiaowen's successor. 50 
The Sui-Tang period, together with the Yuan, Ming and early Qing periods are 
also key to enumerating China's peoples and territories and thereby claiming their 
rightful place in (or under) the PRC state. It is during the Tang dynasty that Tibet's 
place in the national fold is sealed through the granting of Tang princess Wencheng's 
hand in marriage to the (Tibetan) Tubo king, Songtsen Gampo, who had long `envied 
Chinese culture and persistently requested an alliance'. 51 This marriage strengthened 
relations, both cultural and economic, between the neighbours, and more importantly, 
through the diligence of Princess Wencheng and the willingness of her spouse to learn 
from her, began to `civilise' Tibet. Then, with no prior or further explanation of Sino- 
Tibetan relations, Tibet disappears from the national narrative altogether until its 
reappearance in the seventeenth century as part of the Qing empire with the 
`strengthening of administrative control over Tibet', and the conferral of the title 
`Dalai' and `Panchen' Lama on Tibet's local rulers by the Qing emperor. As even 
some Chinese historians have pointed out, the title was originally conferred by the 
Mongolian Altan Khan in 1578, yet only the Shanghai edition makes the matter 
slightly ambiguous by saying that the title was `formally' conferred by the Shunzhi 
Emperor. 52 A similar approach is taken to Taiwan, which makes its first appearance 
in Volume 1, during the prehistoric period, where archaeological finds in Taiwan are 
grouped together with those in Guangdong and Fujian as part of `our country's' 
heritage. 53 Its history is otherwise ignored until the European colonists (zhiminzhe) 
arrive and `invade' (qinru). `Brutal rule' by the Dutch incited hatred among the 
oppressed locals who `longed to return to the motherland's embrace'. 54 Thus, when 
Koxinga (Zheng Chenggong)55 fled the Mainland and the `entering' Manchu forces, 56 
and `regained' (shoufu) Taiwan, the locals were delighted. His plan to establish a 
base of resistance against the Qing on Taiwan is, furthermore, conflated with one to 
50 PEP1.25, p157. 
s' YH2, p19. 
52 SH2, p92. 
53 YH 1, p9. This section and earlier passages on southern primitive cultures provide a rare example of 
a local flavour to the textbook. 
sa ND2, p 125. 
ss It is not mentioned that Koxinga himself was half-Japanese, although it is acknowledged that he was 
born in Japan and in the Shanghai edition also that he was once a pirate, only later submitting to the 
Ming authorities and taking up arms in their name (SH2, p87). 
56 Having been re-imagined as part of the ancestral Chinese people the Manchus can no longer be 
portrayed as `invaders' and 
instead are said to have merely `entered the gates' (ruguan) of the Great 
Wall. The Mongol conquest is similarly represented as `entering' (jinru) the territory within the Wall. 
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`kick out the Dutch' and bring Taiwan back into the national fold. 57 When the forces 
of Koxinga's descendants were finally defeated by the Qing armies in 1683, his plan 
was thus accomplished as the motherland and Taiwan were 'reunited'. 58 
Other territorial claims are made vicariously through the Mongols, who as part of 
the Chinese national family, expanded the territory controlled by China to 
unprecedented levels under the leadership of that `great hero of the Chinese national 
people' (weida minzu yongxiong), Chinggis Khan, although like the Xianbei rulers, 
they too are shown to have succeeded largely through their co-optation of `talented 
persons' and the existing Han administrative system. 59 The expansionist expeditions 
of the Tang, Ming and Qing dynasties, meanwhile, which in the past were seen as 
imperial conquests (of which the Chinese writers of the time were proud) '60 
have in 
the PRC been depicted as `interactions with peoples on the borders' (bianjiang gezu 
de guanxi) or as `consolidation' (gonggu) of the multi-ethnic state. These interactions 
are portrayed as mostly peaceful, unfortunately punctuated from time to time by wars, 
either because of class (and occasionally ethnic) contradictions, because ethnic 
minority bandit elements were `harassing' (xirao) `border regions' 
(bianjiang/jiangyu), 61 or because local peoples under traitorous ecclesiastical, 
aristocratic or foreign imperialist sway were attempting illegitimately to secede from 
the motherland. 62 Furthermore, these interactions are depicted solely as domestic 
affairs, with the existence of Huihu and Gokturk empires, for example, wholly 
ignored. As shown in Chapters 1 and 4, such assertions serve to bolster the notion 
that current `minority' groups have never had an autonomous existence beyond the 
confines of China, and that this China is a peaceable nation that has never fought an 
unjust war and under no circumstances could be considered imperialist. Wars have 
thus been fought only to protect what from unspecified ancient times onwards has 
been `rightfully ours'. 
57 ND2, p 126-7; SH2, p87 
58 ND2, p 131. 
59 SH2, p27. 
60 See, for example, textbooks from the early Republic and GMD eras, such as Jin, Xin zhongxue 
jiaokeshu chuji benguo lishi (1923); Zhao, Xinzhuo benguoshi (1922); Zhou, Benguoshi (1947). 
61 For example, Tang expansion westwards into central Asia is portrayed as a necessary response to the 
trouble caused by marauding Gokturks, which ultimately resulted in the consolidation and development 
(kaifa) of the border region. Other Tang-'minority' relations are left largely unexplained, depicted 
vaguely as a harmonious coming together to 
form one (national) family (hetong wei yUia) (PEP2.4, 
pp22-24; YH2, p18. ) 
62 Examples include Jungar expansionism, portrayed as a collaboration between a territory-hungry 
Tsarist Russia and the `splittist' Jungar leader, Galdan, and the Uyghur rebellions of the 18`h century, 
stirred up by (again) `splittist' clerics. 
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National Characteristics 
Peace-loving is one of the many virtues that can be added to the core national 
qualities of intelligence, bravery, diligence and creativity. This peace-loving nature is 
definitively revealed in the expeditions of Zheng He in the early fifteenth century. 
Zheng He, as the texts tell us, travelled far and wide with no apparent aim other than 
to `strengthen links and exchange' with foreign states. 63 Great emphasis is placed on 
the scale of his expeditions in which more than 27,000 people travelled on more than 
two hundred boats, the size of which was theretofore unknown, to more than thirty 
countries in seven voyages over twenty-eight years. This, as the texts note, was almost 
a century before the expeditions of Columbus and Magellan and vastly more 
ambitious in scale. 64 Zheng He and his envoys were allegedly welcomed in almost all 
the countries to which they travelled and China's links with the rest of Asia and also 
Africa were thereby strengthened. 65 This friendly exploration contrasts dramatically 
with the pre-1949 story of Zheng He as a bold conquistador, who set sail at the 
Emperor Chengzu's behest in order to bring the surrounding areas with which China 
traded into the tribute system. Zheng He, as one 1920s' text states 
collected valuable goods and called upon all the states [with which he came into 
contact] to submit [to Ming authority]. When some did not obey this order, he sent 
his troops to invade and capture their kings, and held them hostage until they 
voluntarily capitulated. Thus, many kings accepted the Ming dynasty [as their 
overlord]. 66 
Even in the early 1950s, Zheng He's fellow travellers were still listed as `armies' and 
his mission to `proclaim the Ming Emperor's call for submission [to imperial 
authority] and demonstrate the might of China'. 67 Since the mid-1950s, however, 
`troops' have become `people', `sailors' or `craftsmen' and the missions friendly 
trading expeditions in keeping with China's stance as the leader of the victimised 
postcolonial third world and a seeker of peace. 
The peace-loving theme is further developed in the following sections of the same 
chapters in which the large scale migration of southern Chinese to Southeast Asia is 
addressed. According to the textbooks, these migrants left China to `make a living' 
(mousheng), bringing their advanced culture and skills to the local peoples. in Java, 
for example, Chinese families used developed irrigation techniques to transform 
63 SH2, p69; PEP2, p 164. 
64 Only the Coastal edition, however, precisely quantifies the differences in time-scale and magnitude 
(YH2, p102, nl). 
65 PEP2, pp 164-66; y2 101-3, SH 69-71 
66 Xinxuezhi lishi jiaokeshu, vol. 2, p13. 
67 PEPS[1953], pl 1. 
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sandy beaches into thriving agricultural land. Centres of trade also developed around 
Chinese communities and the Chinese people thus `expedited the economic and 
cultural development of Southeast Asia'. 68 This contrasts markedly with the nature of 
foreign peoples as demonstrated in the following two sections in which Japanese 
piracy and the arrival of the Jesuits on Chinese shores are discussed: the former 
causing great losses to the coastal Chinese peoples, but eventually being roundly 
defeated by the forces of Qi Jiguang, a good scholar and brave soldier; 69 the latter a 
story of scheming `colonists' (zhiminzhe, a term never applied to Chinese migrants)70 
upon whose heels the missionaries followed. While the former seems to be solely 
concerned with demonstrating longstanding Japanese ambitions towards China, in the 
latter case, the missionaries' acceptance of many aspects of Chinese culture which 
they subsequently transmitted to Europe, and the scientific knowledge they brought to 
the Chinese court is said `objectively' to have accelerated East-West cultural 
exchange'. 71 Otherwise, however, foreign contact is presented as largely negative, 
emphasising encroachment on Chinese territory by the Portuguese, Spanish and 
Dutch, inflicting on China the first wounds in its battle with European colonialism. 72 
Another key theme that clearly has contemporary resonance, albeit a less 
internationally competitive one, is the emphasis on the intelligence and forward- 
thinking of reform-minded leaders. The Tang Emperor Taizong is thus universally 
lauded for his `enlightened feudal rule' (gingming de , 
fengjian tongzhi); even if his 
ultimate goal was to consolidate his own power and that of the ruling feudal classes, 
he clearly embodied many of the desirable national qualities that are `inherent' in the 
Zhonghua minzu. The Empress Wu Zetian, who as noted in Chapter 4, had been 
omitted from the 1978 Outline but restored in 1980, also receives fuller treatment in 
these late 1980s/1990s volumes as a strong and intelligent leader, one of the rare 
68 PEP2, p 167. 
69 PEP2, p 168. 
70 This term was, however, used in the past, both during the early Republic and the Nationalist period. 
71 PEP2, p169. 
72 SH2, p73. The way in which this is phrased in the Shanghai volume implies that Spanish occupation 
of Luzon (alongside Portuguese acquisition of Macau) was part of the colonialist invasion of China 
(kaishile dui Zhongguo de qinlue). Whether this is an attempt to depict Asia as part of China's sphere 
of influence and thus off-limits to Europeans, or whether it is an indirect historical claim to the 
Philippines is not entirely clear. It seems more likely, however, to be the former as only when the 
Spanish conquer Taiwan is it explicitly stated to be Chinese territory (woguo Taiwan). Neither PEP2, 
ND2 nor YH2 discusses these Portuguese and Spanish intrusions here, and merely mention Macau 
briefly in a later chapter on the recovery of Taiwan from the Dutch and resistance to Tsarist Russia's 
invasion of Heilongjiang (PEP3, p8, YH1 ppl 14-115, ND2, pl25). 
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appearances of a female figure in the narrative. 73 Yet, unlike many of her male peers, 
she is shown to have had serious personal flaws, restoring military clans to greater 
power and building monasteries (and thereby sedating the people with the opium of 
religion). 74 Despite the less than subtle evaluation of these figures in the main body 
of the text, in the spirit of skill-training and encouraging students to develop their own 
opinions about historical figures and events recommended in the ancient history 
section of the Outline, 75 students are invited to evaluate Taizong and the Empress Wu 
Zetian in the question sections at the end of the relevant chapter, albeit with a more 
pronounced emphasis on Taizong. While the Shanghai volume leaves some room for 
formulating an `individual' opinion, even if it is shaped by a selection of views 
offered on Taizong that the students are supposed to discuss, the PEP verdict is 
predetermined by the phraseology of the question `Why was Tang Taizong an 
outstanding politician? '76 Whether intentional or not, language here as elsewhere 
thereby shapes or delimits the possibilities of what students are to think about the 
topic. 
National qualities are not, of course, only embodied by emperors and explorers; 
even a peace-loving people such as the Chinese may excel in battle. Generals such as 
Cao Cao, Zhuge Liang and Yue Fei are accordingly lauded both for their intelligence 
and bravery, even if, as in Yue Fei's case, their `patriotic' efforts were hindering the 
cause of multi-ethnic national unity. 77 While the truly superior man (junzi) combines 
both wu (military) and wen (cultural) excellence, exemplars of national qualities are, 
nonetheless, to be found in the cultural sphere among those with no battlefield 
prowess. Several chapters at the end of most macro-periods (such as Sui-Tang, Ming- 
Qing) are allocated to `culture' and to outstanding persons in various fields of 
intellectual and creative endeavour. As noted in Chapter 4, this has been an important 
73 Ma argues that under-representation of women in History textbooks (specifically senior secondary, 
but the same is true of junior secondary textbooks) has a negative impact on female students, 
undermining many of the qualities History aims to promote ('A Cursory analysis of the factors in 
senior secondary History courses that are disadvantageous for cultivating subjective awareness in 
female students'). 
74PEP2, pi1. 
75 LSD[1992], COH, p662. 
76 SH1, p100; PEP2, p10. ND merely requires students to memorise the topic (ND2, p29), while YH 
asks students to describe the period and the measures taken by Taizong to consolidate his authority 
(YH2, p13). 
77 It is worth noting that although the Liao, Jin, Xi Xia, Northern and Southern Song dynasties are all 
supposed to be contemporaneous `Chinese' dynasties, with equal legitimacy, the language used clearly 
arrogates virtue and legitimacy to Song's Yue Fei and his Righteous Army (yijun), who are shown as 
disciplined enough not to rape and pillage while determinedly resisting Jurchen `looting and massacre' 
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aspect of change to textbooks and has been designed to move History away from its 
former preoccupation with politics and the laws of development towards a broader 
picture of the national (and global) past that encompasses a diversity of topics and 
might thereby appeal to students. These extra chapters have largely been inserted at 
the expense of peasant rebellions and class conflict, and although this is not to suggest 
that these elements which remain vital to the Communist narrative of legitimate 
succession have been entirely obliterated, the focus has gradually shifted from one on 
class activism and consciousness which are manifest in rebellions, to an emphasis on 
more peaceful modes of economic development and progress, and on reform rather 
than revolution. Science and scientists accordingly play a prominent role in the 
culture sections. The Four Great Inventions (paper, gunpowder, printing and the 
compass) are much trumpeted in all editions, with an emphasis on their great 
contribution not only to China, but to the rest of the world. While there is a clear 
preference for science and technology, which ties in to current projects, many major 
literary figures are also included. Li Bai, Du Fu and Bai Juyi are all noted, both for 
their poems and for their desire to contribute to `national affairs' (guoshi) (Li Bai) and 
to expose the `suffering of the people' under corrupt and brutal rule (Du Fu, Bai 
Juyi). 78 Similarly, `progressive thinkers' such as Gu Yanwu are lauded for their 
`sympathy with the people' and their `opposition to imperial dictatorship'. 79 
While some outstanding persons from minority groups are also cited (Zheng He 
and Kublai and Chinggis Khan, for example) in various sections of the text, in 
general, national characteristics are demonstrated chiefly by Han rulers and cultural 
figures. Minorities are typically said to be `good at' (shanyu/shanchang) the martial 
arts (the Gokturks, Jurchen, Manchus, Mongols) or singing and dancing (Mongols, 
Tibetans, Uyghurs), rather than to be intelligent or creative. As Harrell has shown 
and the textbooks confirm, minorities are frequently infantilised or feminised, 
explicitly depicted as more backward than the Han and implicitly in need of 
civilising. 80 The current emphasis on scientific and economic progress and the move 
away from the historical materialist narrative have also meant that peasants and 
(lueduo tusha) and attempting to recover (shoufu - the term used for Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau) 
Song territory. (PEP2, pp87-91. Similar language is used in SH2, YH2 and ND2. ) 
78 YH2, pp34-35. 
79 YH2, p 125. 
80 Harrell, Cultural Encounters on China 's Ethnic Frontiers, Introduction. One of the most common 
ways in which the textbooks 
identify minority groups as backwards is to emphasise that they were/are 
nomadic or matriarchal, and thus at 
lower stages of evolution according to the historical materialist 
paradigm. 
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workers who once epitomised `red' national virtues are similarly depicted as 
somewhat backwards; national virtues are now the preserve mainly of the forward- 
and outward-looking bourgeoisie. Thus, while a quantitative, enumerative definition 
of the nation includes all the peoples presently living in the PRC, the nation defined 
qualitatively excludes or relegates to an inferior status those who do not possess the 
requisite Chinese national characteristics. Since these characteristics are innate, this 
suggests that despite all the talk of social equality and ethnic unity, History ultimately 
teaches that all PRC citizens are Chinese, but some are more Chinese than others. 81 
Modern Chinese History: From Victor to Victim to Victor 
One Hundred Years of Humiliation 
Modern history is the subject of volume 3, continuing into volume 4, and covers the 
`one hundred years of humiliation' (bainian guochi) endured by the Chinese people 
from the Opium Wars until the establishment of the PRC. As discussed in Chapter 4, 
this end-date for the period represents a change from earlier textbooks in which the 
May Fourth Movement marked the beginning of contemporary history. Possible 
reasons for this shift were suggested, but it seems most likely that 1949 was selected 
for the new start-date of contemporary history principally to separate `new' from old' 
China, and to reduce the time-frame covered by contemporary history following the 
addition of the post-Cultural Revolution period to the syllabus. It also ties in with the 
emphasis on the rise-and-fall narrative in which the CPC is depicted, if not exactly as 
a new dynasty, as representative of a new social order and a fresh start for a 
beleaguered nation. 
Another reason is that the focus on national humiliation has in recent years 
become particularly pronounced, perhaps in part because reform and opening have 
revealed just how `behind' China had become during the early years of socialism. 
The scapegoat for this backwardness has long been capitalism-imperialism and the 
foreign incursions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but the vitriol of recent 
directives on modern-contemporary history (see Chapter 2) indicates an increasing 
commitment to this view on the part of the leadership. Thus, just as ancient Chinese 
history is principally concerned with enumerating what belongs to the Chinese nation, 
so modem Chinese history has increasingly come to focus on quantifying what has 
been `lost' or stolen and how much the Chinese people have suffered. 82 As discussed 
81 Paraphrased from Orwell, Animal Farm, p63. 
82 Gries, Face Nationalism, pp7l-72. 
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in the introduction, this focus on national suffering is by no means unusual; as Renan 
has observed, `suffering in common unifies more than joy does .... 
Where national 
memories are concerned griefs are of more value than triumphs, for they impose 
duties and require a common effort. '83 Emphasising the hundred years of humiliation 
is thus part of an attempt to inspire Chinese people to strive for modernisation so that 
past `falls' (ti) will never be repeated, and the nation will flourish (zing); the 
convenient (and memorable) round number of one hundred years also neatly takes 
China from the eve of its fall to the dawn of its glorious resurrection. 
China's losses begin with the Opium Wars and are swiftly followed by an endless 
succession of unequal treaties (bupingdeng tiaoyue), that rob China of its sovereignty 
and plunge the nation into a semi-feudal, semi-colonial abyss. Almost every chapter 
recounts a new humiliation as territories are surrendered, and the people are oppressed 
by their backward-looking feudal overlords, wicked foreign capitalist-imperialists and 
their toadying Chinese collaborators (zougou). The text here, perhaps more than in 
most other sections, is reinforced by images that enumerate precisely what was lost. 
PEP, for example, contains several tables which reiterate information already outlined 
in the main text, such as one showing Chinese territory stolen by Russia under the 
unequal treaties, listing treaty name, region ceded and amount of territory lost. 84 
Another table shows which country wrested which treaty ports and spheres of 
influence from China in their efforts to divide the country between themselves, while 
another lists the names of banks established by foreign `countries' as part of their 
economic imperialist strategy. 85 The Shanghai and Inland editions, by contrast, make 
extensive use of maps, again showing which countries occupied which parts of China, 
while the Coastal edition includes numerous prints (albeit in black and white and of 
rather poor quality) of paintings and photographs of the time, including images of 
British gunboats, opium smugglers and smokers, various battles and the signing of 
unequal treaties. 86 The end of chapter exercises, meanwhile, ask students to recall 
information such as which country first invaded China, how much territory was ceded 
to various powers and how many people died as a result of imperialist brutality. 
While Britain, France and Russia are heavily criticised, it is the imperialist 
expansionism of Japan for which the greatest anger and opprobrium is, 
83 Ernest Renan, What is a nation?, quoted in Lowenthal, `Identity, Heritage and History', p50. 
94 PEP3, p55. 
85 PEP3, p74, p73. 
86 SH3, ND3, YH3. 
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unsurprisingly, reserved. 87 Much attention is accordingly paid to the Sino-Japanese 
War, which is shown to be a war of aggression on the part of Japan, and on China's 
part as disinterested support for the Korean Choson monarchy overwhelmed by the 
Tonghak peasant rebellion. The ensuing Treaty of Shimonoseki in which Taiwan was 
ceded marks the first steps in Japan's efforts to dominate China, and subsequent 
chapters go on to tabulate Japan's wrongdoing, with things reaching boiling point in 
the twentieth century with the infamous Twenty-one Demands, the Marco Polo 
Bridge incident and Japan's subsequent conquest of China. This narrative is of course 
so well known that it hardly needs repeating in great depth in History classes, but so 
central is this long War of Resistance against Japan (kangri zhanzheng) to the national 
story (and CPC legitimacy) that it overwhelmingly dominates the fourth volume. 88 
These chapters in both volumes 3 and 4 persistently reiterate Japanese brutality and 
endlessly enumerate Chinese deaths and suffering. Words such as `frenzied' 
(fengkuang), `savage' (yeman) and `evil' (zuinie) are used repeatedly to describe both 
Japanese actions and the Japanese themselves. They are shown also to be deceitful, 
seeking, for example to conceal their atrocities from worldwide public opinion. 89 The 
Chinese meanwhile are shown as innocent victims, with their homes looted and burnt, 
their women raped and their children murdered. Vast numbers of Chinese are said to 
have been killed in numerous massacres, with no mention of the longstanding debates 
among historians over the actual numbers of casualties. 90 Despite the litany of horror, 
as everyone knows, this is just a bitter interlude before the CPC and the Chinese 
people finally succeed in defeating their evil oppressors and after a relatively short 
struggle against the feeble KMT, establish New China. 
87 In an apparent backwards projection of tensions past and present, the USA, despite being a relatively 
minor imperial player in Qing China, is mostly lumped together in the same category as the then more 
aggressive imperial powers of Britain, France and Russia. 
88 In PEP4, kangri occupies 8/27 chapters; in SH4 7/25; YH4 appears somewhat more restrained in 
giving 5/30 lessons to the subject, but since the early years of the conflict are covered in the final 
chapters of YH3 (up to 1937), total coverage is roughly the same. ND4 also allocates only 3/27 
chapters under the kangri topic heading, but like the Coastal edition takes this to mean post-1937. 
Earlier conflicts with Japan are included in the previous section which covers the early GMD years, 
establishment of revolutionary base areas and the Long March. 
89 The Port Arthur (Lushunkou) Massacre, for example, which allegedly took place during the 1894- 
1895 Sino-Japanese War is a subject of some controversy, with many contradictory contemporaneous 
reports, some of which substantiated, some rejected the very existence of the atrocity. The textbooks do 
not make any reference to these debates. Furthermore, PEP (PEP3, p71) asserts that the Japanese burnt 
all the corpses to hide the number of people they 
had killed and protect their reputation. YH3 makes no 
mention of concealment, but emphasises the moral 
incommensurability of the two sides in the war by 
showing it as a case of Japanese 
`bandits' (qiangdao) attacking innocent `Chinese people' (Zhongguo 
renmin). 
90 All texts, for example, cite the official Chinese figure of 300,000 deaths in the Nanjing Massacre, 
while the above-mentioned controversial 
Port Arthur Massacre is said to have claimed 18,000 lives. 
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Humiliation and Modernisation 
Modern history may be a disaster for the nation in many ways, but it is considered 
crucial for understanding China's national conditions - that is, how China came to be 
as it is today. It is also central to the historical materialist narrative as it shows 
China's rapid transition from feudalism via the theoretically unorthodox stage of 
semi-feudalism, semi-colonialism, a brief foray into bureaucratic capitalism and 
onwards and upwards to socialism. Reform is a key component of the modem history 
narrative, with rather more attention paid here to the self-strengthening movement and 
1898 reforms than in earlier textbook editions, which weighted discussion of this 
period more heavily towards the evolution of the proletariat. 91 Perhaps most 
importantly, from the leadership's perspective, modem history relates the story of the 
Party and its role in leading China from feudal darkness to socialist light, although, as 
already noted, the laws of historical materialism and the heavy emphasis on the 
revolutionary tradition and the history of the Party have been somewhat downplayed 
in recent years. From a nationalist perspective, meanwhile, the period is naturally a 
source of shame, but it is also one of pride, for it demonstrates the outstanding 
resilience of the national people as they are subjected to one attack after another yet 
never capitulate. This period of history, therefore, is deemed essential for nurturing 
patriotism, learning from the examples of national heroes, teaching students that only 
socialism can `save' (jiu) and `develop' (fazhan) China, and that reform and opening 
are the way forward. 
These objectives are pursued through, on the one hand, recounting the details of 
China's modern suffering outlined above, and quantifying China's losses, and on the 
other, demonstrating the determined resistance of the people and highlighting the 
outstanding qualities, especially the patriotism and bravery, of the Zhonghua minzu, 
qualities which as shown above are vividly contrasted to those of the foreign 
imperialists. In other words, although the nation is quantitatively assailed during the 
modern period, national qualities are tempered and shine through adversity and 
comparison with the national qualities of others. 
With the move away from the peasant/proletarian-centred narrative, Chinese 
national characteristics have been increasingly demonstrated through the stories of 
Great Men who are deemed to have contributed to China's transition to modernity, 
although the Taiping and Boxer rebellions remain as part of the dwindling evidence of 
91 EEP3.2.1 [ 1979]. 
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peasant patriotic activism. Some of these modernisers, such as Lin Zexu, Kang 
Youwei, Liang Qichao, Tan Sitong and Ding Ruchang have enjoyed the status of 
loyal patriots and/or martyrs for many years, but others, particularly the self- 
strengthening `Westernisation Movement' (yangwu yundong) reformers, have only 
been gradually rehabilitated since 1978. Where once men such as Li Hongzhang, 
Zeng Guofan and Zhang Zhidong who had crushed the Taiping, Nian and other 
peasant rebellions were depicted as feudal relics seeking to enhance their own power 
and that of the corrupt and ailing dynasty, now they have been re-imagined as 
fundamentally patriotic and their reforms hailed as important steps on the road to 
modernisation that provided some small measure of resistance to the oppressive 
demands of foreign imperialism. 92 The reforms, however, were destined to fail, not 
only because the leaders of the movement were invested members of the ruling 
regime, and because the might of capitalism-imperialism was too great to overcome, 
but also because the feudal rulers of the `conservative faction' were ignorant 
isolationists who blindly rejected all things foreign. The Empress Dowager, Cixi, is 
of course the prime culprit, and while it is not explicitly stated, one cannot help but 
wonder whether the fact that she was both a woman and a minority is not somehow a 
factor in the degree of blame attributed personally to her. 
Moving into the twentieth century, national heroes become primarily those 
involved in the 1911 revolution, the development of the Communist Party and 
ongoing resistance against Japan. Sun Yat-sen, for example, who had earlier 
promoted reform along Western lines, soon realised that `the weakness of the country 
was the result of Qing feudal rule', and turned from reform to revolution, determined 
to overthrow the despotic dynasty, establish a bourgeois republic and `revive China' 
(xingzhong). 93 Chen Tianhua is lauded, like Ding Ruchang, for his `patriotic' suicide, 
while Song Jiaoren is shown still to be thinking of the nation's future on his 
deathbed. 94 While the GMD era is given more attention in these volumes than in 
previous ones, heroes of this period are primarily Communist sympathisers or Party 
members. Mao, Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping accordingly enjoy prominent 
positions as national heroes, although, as already noted in Chapter 4, the post-1978 
92 SH3, pp27-30; YH3, pp30-34. As shown in Fig. 6.1, volume 3 of the Coastal edition is considerably 
longer than the other volumes in the set, as well as being longer than the equivalent volumes in the 
PEP, Shanghai and Inland editions. Whether this is because the writers had particular expertise in this 
period is uncertain, but the extra 
focus on post-Opium War development, much of which took place in 
and around Guangdong, 
does suggest another rare instance of a local flavour to a textbook. 
93 ND3, pp82-83. 
206 
debunking of Mao's personality cult has led to somewhat reduced coverage of the 
Helmsman compared to the earlier volumes. As in ancient history, political and 
military figures are not the only outstanding persons held up as exemplars of national 
characteristics, but also include writers, such as Lu Xun, the historian Guo Moruo, 
and the educationalists Cai Yuanpei and Tao Xingzhi. Tao's maxims `life is 
education', `society is the school' and `the unity of teaching, learning and doing' are 
also cited in the Coastal edition, perhaps in part as a reminder to students that 
classroom learning is only a part of their education. 95 In the Shanghai volume, 
particular attention is paid to the establishment of the League of Left-wing Writers 
which was founded in the city, another minor example of a local slant given to a 
textbook. 96 Despite a few minor differences, however, the Great Men cited in all four 
textbooks are mostly the same, and almost all of them are Han. 
Contemporary Chinese History: China Stands Up 
New China 
Contemporary history, as noted above, has recently been rearranged to include only 
the post-1949 period and the story of New China's difficult path towards socialist 
modernity. If ancient history is principally about enumerating what the nation 
possesses, and modern history about what has been lost, contemporary history might 
be said to be concerned with narrating what China has regained, with counting the 
new victories of New China. This section of the textbooks is extremely short, 
however, leaving little space to count said victories, no doubt in part because many of 
the supposed victories have turned out to be less glorious than the great achievements 
they were once portrayed to be. The PEP edition, for example, contains only nine (of 
a total of twenty-seven) chapters in volume 4 on contemporary history; the Shanghai 
edition (which incidentally labels this period in its textbook contents page as `socialist 
society' rather than `contemporary history') nine out of twenty-five. Slightly more 
attention is paid to the contemporary period in the Coastal and Inland editions with 
seventeen out of thirty chapters devoted to it in the former and eleven out of twenty- 
seven in the latter, although there is no indication why this should be so. 
The contemporary period is broken down into roughly three stages: the early years 
including the establishment of the PRC and the people's democratic dictatorship, and 
the achievements of socialist transformation; the `tortuous path' of the Great Leap and 
94 PEPS, p97, p 129. 
95 YH4.12.1, p54. 
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Cultural Revolution; and the return to the path of socialist modernisation in the post- 
Mao era. The first and last periods are the primary areas towards which attention is 
directed, with a rather cursory treatment of the intervening stage. Clearly one of the 
key goals here is to emphasise the importance of the CPC to China's progress towards 
modernity and to disown - or at least establish some distance from - its errors, and it 
is hardly surprising, therefore, that the History TMIC has typically required at least 
three to four revisions of the fourth volume of the Chinese history textbooks to ensure 
that they are scientifically and ideologically correct. 97 Restoring national pride which 
may have been severely dented by the disasters of the modern period is also an 
apparent objective of this section, and in the early period, great emphasis is placed on 
China's military `victory' over the United States in Korea. 98 The importance of 
national unity is also reiterated here with a didactic account of the `peaceful liberation 
of Tibet'. Much like the Muslim minorities during the Qing dynasty, the Tibetan 
people are not directly implicated in resistance to liberation, but are portrayed as 
ignorant victims of reactionary ecclesiastical deceit, manipulation and collaboration 
with foreign imperialists. 99 The majority of the early years, however, is devoted to 
narrating the rapidity of China's economic recovery during the first five-year plan, 
and to eradication of reactionary, counter-revolutionary forces. 
The middle section covers the period from the mid-1950s to the end of the 
Cultural Revolution, including collectivisation and the establishment of communes, 
the Anti-Rightist Movement and the Cultural Revolution, with the Coastal edition 
dedicating the most space to covering the topics. 10° Yet, even the Coastal edition 
includes only two paragraphs on the Anti-Rightist Movement, a movement which is 
merely said to have started with good intentions, but have been taken `too far', 
101 a 
concession no doubt to the many CPC leaders who were involved in the campaign. 
The Cultural Revolution, by contrast, is given an entire chapter in each of the 
textbook sets and is, unsurprisingly, wholeheartedly denounced. It is presented, 
however, as something of a self-contained event, orchestrated by unpatriotic and anti- 
revolutionary megalomaniacs, the Gang of Four, with Mao mistakenly (as opposed to 
96 SH4, pp66-67. 
97 Even PEP has needed to revise its contemporary history sections numerous times despite the fact that 
it had drafted the Outlines upon which they were based. (Interview with Liu Zhonghua). 
98 ND4, pp 147-151. 
99 PEp4, p139. 
100 YH4.4-5. 
for PEP4, p162; SH4, p86 
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consciously and deliberately) going along with it. 102 The people, meanwhile, are 
exonerated of any blame and nothing is written of the mass participation in public 
denunciation sessions, although the sending of educated youth to the countryside is 
remarked. The Cultural Revolution is thus something that takes place among the 
upper echelons of power, but has profound ramifications for the country. In this 
narrative, history (order) is temporarily suspended by anti-history (chaos), and 1978 
essentially picks up where 1966 left off, as Deng Xiaoping and his acolytes `restore 
order out of chaos' (boluanfanzheng). 
With the rapid success of the reform and opening policy, clearly there is a desire 
to proclaim the achievements of the past two decades and to exhort students to 
continue to strive for the nation's further development and prosperity. The post-Mao 
period accordingly focuses on the outcomes of the eleventh plenum and adoption of 
the reform and opening policy. Economic development is pre-eminent in this section 
of the text, with a focus on rising industrial and agricultural output and the rapid 
growth of GDP. 103 Also mentioned are the ongoing efforts in `minority work', that is, 
to bring all China's peoples into the national fold and stifle any secessionist dreams. 
The `one country two systems' policy is likewise discussed here, first, in the context 
of Taiwan where the idea is said to have been welcomed by the Taiwanese people and 
created the conditions for national reunification; and second, in the context of Hong 
Kong and Macao, then still languishing in imperialist hands. 104 Foreign relations, 
meanwhile, are shown to have developed rapidly and China's international status to 
have grown. This generally rousing tale, however, omits any discussion of minority 
resistance in Tibet and Xinjiang (or resistance to reunification in Taiwan, Hong Kong 
and Macao) and glosses over the social problems and inequalities that have been 
exacerbated by the socialist market economy. And Tiananmen does not appear in any 
of the texts except obliquely in the Shanghai edition with one reference to 1989 
`proving that the CPC is the Party in power'. 105 Barring an additional chapter on the 
cultural achievements of socialism (in which the detonation of China's first atomic 
bomb takes pride of place), the reiteration of the CPC's centrality to China's future 
and the incontestably multi-ethnic, unified nature of the nation is where the national 
narrative ends. 
102 YH4, pp81-87 
103 PEP4, pp24-25. 
104 PEP4, pp 186-189. 
105 SH4, p104. 
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World History: Defining the Other 
'Why Study World History? ' 
One of the principal stated goals of the Teaching Outlines is `internationalism' 
(guojizhuyi), but although some discussion of Sino-foreign relations is attempted in 
the Chinese history textbooks, it comprises a minimal proportion of the national 
narrative, and it is left chiefly to world history to promote internationalism. 
Internationalism is not, of course, the only objective of teaching world history. As 
discussed in the introduction, world history may often reveal as much or more about 
our self-image as it does about those societies, peoples and cultures we seek to 
portray, and like national history may be harnessed to serve moral and patriotic ends. 
The objectives of studying world history in the Chinese context, however, are clearly 
stated in a chapter or preface at the beginning of each world history volume entitled, 
as in the Chinese history volumes, `Why study world history? '. According to the PEP 
textbook, the reasons are as follows: 
First, it is to understand the world better. No country or people on this earth can cut 
themselves off from the outside world. Human civilisation is increasingly developed, 
international exchange increasingly close. China does not exist all by itself; from 
ancient times onwards it has had all kinds of links with many countries and areas of 
the world. In modern-contemporary times, China's links with every country have 
become even closer, so we ought to understand the world and ought to understand 
world history. 
Second, China is presently carrying out the construction of socialist modernisation, 
and should absorb and learn lessons from the achievements of all countries' and 
peoples' material and spiritual civilisations, taking the good and rejecting the bad to 
use for ourselves in order to speed up the construction of socialism. World history 
can furnish us with certain knowledge in this regard. 
Thirdly, the ideological education we received through studying Chinese history can 
be broadened and deepened by studying world history on the foundation of Chinese 
history. Studying world history is beneficial to carrying out education in historical 
materialism and patriotism. 106 
The other three texts offer similar reasons to study world history, but as in this section 
of the Chinese history textbooks, there is little that does not appear in the Outlines or 
that might appeal to students, and like its Chinese history equivalent, it has been 
dropped from the latest HCS-compliant textbooks. ' 07 
While not an explicitly stated goal, the study of world history is also comparative 
in nature. As shown above, the nationalist narrative of Chinese history has centred on 
a victor-victim-victor transition, demonstrating that the innate and superior qualities 
106 PEPWI. I 
101 SHW 1, preface; YHW 1, preface; NDW I, preface. 
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of the Chinese minzu triumph inevitably over all adversity and all-comers. 1 08 This has 
necessitated much quantifying of Chinese glories and sufferings. The nationalist habit 
of quantifying, however, is meaningless if it is not also compared with the amount or 
frequency of victories and losses in other cultures, societies or countries. Another 
important focus of world history textbooks, therefore, is to demonstrate how China 
matches up in the international league table of achievement, pain and racial-cultural 
virtue. 
Many of the goals may be the same in Chinese and world history, but the 
differences between the ways in which the narratives are constructed and the topics 
that are covered are in some ways so great that Chinese and world history might as 
well be two entirely separate subjects as they are in Hong Kong. Nevertheless, like 
Chinese history, world history follows a historical materialist organising framework 
that presents the global past as a gradual evolution through different forms of socio- 
economic organisation. It also tends to project present nation-states and peoples 
backwards into the past as if they were timeless and primordial entities. Thus, Italian 
and German unification in the nineteenth century is represented as a reunification of 
homogeneous peoples who had been long kept asunder. 109 In world history, however, 
the rise-and-fall conception of history is far less pronounced as the narrative skips 
from one society, culture, country or region to another, each an example of a parallel 
or following stage of historical materialist development. There is also some effort to 
be inclusive, and to cover areas of the world that are frequently ignored, such as Latin 
America and Africa. According to Zhu, this is a world-beating breakthrough for 
school History, for elsewhere global narratives have been stymied by Eurocentrism 
(Ouzhou zhongxinlun), and, in modern-contemporary history, also America- 
centrism. 11 ° While Zhu's critique is not without foundation, it is somewhat ironic that 
Chinese approaches to global history should be portrayed as pioneering. As noted in 
the introduction, almost no research is carried out into world history in Chinese 
universities, a state of affairs that has persisted since the establishment of the PRC. 
111 
Even back in the 1960s, Soviet historians were taking their Chinese colleagues to task 
for their narrow view of world history and unwillingness to expand their intellectual 
108 Marks has made a similar assertion in the introductory chapter of his recent work, The Origins of the 
Modern World. Offering the metaphor of a painting on top of which another has been painted, Marks 
argues that the resurgence of China and 
India (and an Asia-centric world) may be inevitable; just as in 
the painting, with time, the overlay of paint wears off and the original 
image is once again revealed. 
109 WW2, pp 1-7. 
i'° Zhu, Lishi jiaocaixue gailun, p277 
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horizons far beyond their own borders. ' 12 Chinese approaches to world history, as 
shown below, are anyway extremely Eurocentric, as in fact is much of modern 
Chinese history, which focuses chiefly on the role of the foreign imperialists in 
bringing about China's decline, largely avoiding discussion of domestic contributory 
factors other than corrupt feudal rule. 113 The chapters devoted to Africa, Asia and 
Latin America are thus extremely sketchy and focus almost solely on their anti- 
colonial, independence movements rather than the indigenous development of their 
own cultures and societies. This reflects the similar lack of research at the tertiary 
level, since mainstream developments in professional historiography tend, eventually, 
to filter down to the school level. The purpose served by including such `obscure' 
topics, therefore, appears to be principally to reveal the evil nature of capitalism- 
imperialism, and by comparison to proclaim the virtues of socialism and those who 
espouse it. 
Learning from outstanding foreign persons and their achievements is also an 
important stated objective of world history, and in recent years the culture sections of 
the textbooks have, like their Chinese history counterparts, been significantly 
expanded, and now include numerous examples of famous scientists, philosophers 
and some literary and artistic figures. Compared to their Chinese history textbook 
counterparts, individual political figures play a somewhat lesser role in the unfolding 
of historical events, perhaps, again, in part because lack of academic research means 
far less is known about them, but also because of the more strongly historical 
materialist slant in which individuals are minor actors subject to the laws of 
inexorable socio-economic progress. 
Ancient World History 
Ancient world history is a very small component of the world history course, 
comprising only the first few chapters of the first volume of the world history 
textbooks. It covers from the ancient civilisations of Egypt, Babylon, India, Greece 
and Rome through to the Renaissance, after which Europe enters the capitalist stage. 
Clearly, the basic objective of teaching about ancient cultures is simply to describe the 
development of human civilisation and to provide examples of `slave society', but it is 
1° Croizier, `World History in the PRC' 
112 Viatkin and Tikhvinskii, `Some Questions of Historical Science in the Chinese People's Republic'. 
On approaches to world history in China, see also Martin, The Making of a Sino-Marxist World View. 
113 Cohen (Discovering History in China) makes a similar critique of 1960s `Marxist' Sinologists in the 
US who, he argues, have closely followed the Chinese narrative in developing their own interpretations 
of the Chinese past. 
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also a comparative display of one-upmanship insofar as the ancient civilisations that 
developed contemporaneously with China have not enjoyed historical continuity or 
survived intact as China has allegedly done. A similar comparative purpose is 
explicitly served by the account of European feudal societies which reached this stage 
of socio-economic evolution more than one thousand years after China; indeed, it is 
reiterated here that China was the first country in the world to reach the feudal stage 
of development. ' 14 China's superiority is further demonstrated in the development of 
feudal society in Korea and Japan, both of which are shown to have been profoundly 
influenced by their more advanced neighbour. ' 15 Showing Chinese superiority is not, 
of course, the only goal of the chapters on feudal Europe, West and East Asia, and 
these chapters also seek to demonstrate the historical origins of modern nation-states. 
Other key themes demonstrated by these early feudal societies include the role 
played by national unity in driving development and of reform programmes instituted 
by enlightened leaders. Silla's, and later Koryo's, unification of the Korean 
peninsula, for example, are said to be among the driving forces behind the 
development of Korean culture and economics. ' 16 Japanese progress meanwhile is 
shown to have accelerated following national unification and the Emperor Kötoku's 
Taika reforms in 646, which it is emphasised `replicated China's Sui-Tang system', 
and in matters of `education, religion, architecture, art, literature and so forth actively 
absorbed Chinese culture' . 
117 The development of Arab culture and power is 
similarly shown to be predicated on political and ethnic unity, and Arabs are also 
noted as important go-betweens facilitating cultural exchange between East and 
West. 118 By contrast, the Ottoman empire, despite being a unified political entity, is 
depicted as savage, expansionist and obstructive of cultural exchange. 
" 
National characteristics play a far lesser role in the global narrative than they do in 
Chinese history, no doubt in part because it is thought difficult to demonstrate 
national qualities when such limited time frames are covered for individual societies, 
and also because individualising other peoples beyond the macro-regions they inhabit 
is perhaps not seen as necessary. Although the focus here is predominantly, therefore, 
114 YHW1, p35; PEPWI, p45. 
11' NDW I, pp5 l -55; SHW I, pp42-47. Sino-Japanese and Sino-Korean relations 
during this period are 
also discussed in brief in the Chinese 
history textbooks under the sections on Tang dynasty foreign 
relations. In both cases, China is shown 
implicitly or explicitly as munificently bestowing high culture 
on its less civilised neighbours. 
116 pEpW 1, pp58-59 
117 pEPW 1, p60-61- 
118 PEPWI, pp53-57 
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on empires, states, societies and socio-economic development, important - or at least 
well known - individual cultural figures are included, to acquaint students both with 
key scientific and technological discoveries made outside China, and with dominant 
figures in (primarily) European history about whom any cultured global citizen `ought 
to know'. In the ancient period, these figures are mostly chosen from among the 
Greeks, and include various philosophers (Aristotle, Plato, Socrates), historians 
(Herodotus, Livy) and literary figures (Homer, Aeschylus, Aristophanes, Virgil). Bar 
a few references in the chapter on Arab empire to their translations of Greek writings 
and their introduction of numerals and algebra to Western Europe, no further cultural 
content appears until the end of the feudal period when the Renaissance is covered. 
All `advanced' non-Sinic culture is thereby essentially conflated with European 
cultures; it is thus against a totalised Europe (West) that China must be measured. 
Modern World History 
The modern period in world history begins somewhat earlier than in Chinese history 
since capitalism is shown to have emerged following the Reformation, with the 
Renaissance and the flourishing of the Italian city-states, such as Venice., 20 The 
discovery of new shipping routes to Asia (and later the Americas) is shown to be 
among the core factors contributing to the sudden and rapid rise of a once backward 
Europe, as well as to have accelerated Sino-European cultural exchange. 121 In stark 
contrast to the story of Zheng He, however, European explorers are portrayed chiefly 
as greedy colonialists seeking to plunder the wealth of others and to seize their land. 
Those migrants who followed in their footsteps are labelled `colonists', who - unlike 
the `Overseas Chinese' that `moved' to Southeast Asia to `make a living' and helped 
the local peoples develop - brought the `evils of colonialism' to indigenous peoples! 
22 
Nothing is said about the religious migrations from Europe and the `colonists' are said 
to be composed chiefly of `vicious and powerful aristocrats and businessmen' who 
imported slaves and oppressed the native peoples. 
'23 
Although the Renaissance and the development of shipping routes may be 
considered to be the stage during which capitalism was developed and the seeds of 
imperialism sown, it is the `English bourgeois revolution' (the Civil War) that 
119 PEPW 1, pp62-63. 
120 SHW1.5.1. 
121 SHWI, pp53-55. 
122 SHWI. 5.2. 
123 PEPW 1, p 100. 
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officially kicks off the modern period. The establishment of a republic, albeit a short- 
lived one thanks to the dictatorial rule of Cromwell, 124 thus catalyses a series of 
political changes across Europe and North America. The following chapters 
accordingly detail the American war of independence, the French Revolution, and the 
wars of independence in Latin America. 125 These revolutions and wars are portrayed 
as progressive (jinbu) movements or `bourgeois revolutions' that, together with the 
industrial revolution (which is allotted an entire chapter in each volume), 126 
accelerated the development of capitalism and propelled the world forward towards a 
higher form of socio-economic organisation. 
The following section opens with a more difficult, less narrative chapter on the 
evolution of `scientific socialism', which briefly outlines the context in which Marx 
developed his philosophy, noting the lesser `utopian socialism' (as Marx called it) of 
Saint-Simon, Robert Owen and Charles Fourier and several workers `uprisings', 
including those among textile workers in Lyon and Silesia and the Chartist movement 
in Britain. According to the textbooks, the failure of these ideas and uprisings only 
highlighted the contradictions between the emergent proletariat and bourgeoisie, and 
indicated that a new theory was needed to guide the ongoing struggle. Marx and 
Engels, of course, were on hand to provide a solution and the remainder of the chapter 
in all four editions goes on to provide a short bibliography for each and to describe 
some of their key ideas, with particular emphasis on the laws of socio-economic 
evolution outlined in the `Communist Manifesto'. 
With the communist ideology spelled out, the remainder of the modern history 
section covers topics that illustrate historical materialist laws of development as well 
as not-so-historical materialist preoccupations with the nation as the sole legitimate 
political entity. These chapters cover topics such as the 1848 European revolutions, 
the unification of Italy and Germany and the reforms undertaken in Russia under 
Peter the Great, and those introduced in Japan with the Meiji Restoration. While 
squeezed tightly into the historical materialist framework, other recurrent themes of 
revolution, reform and unity that are also emphasised in Chinese history are shown to 
be among the primary factors driving national development in each country examined. 
Japan and Russia thus are shown to have adapted the advanced technologies and 
military organisation of Western countries and thereby to have enriched and 
124 YHW1, p72. 
125PEPW1.14,1.16,1.17-18,1.19. 
126 PEPW1, ppl31-137; SHW1, pp72-77. 
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strengthened their nations; 127 Italian and German unification meanwhile not only 
restores territorial completeness to the national people, but also hastens the growth of 
capitalism. This growth, however, leads to competition between the European 
powers, and thence to an escalation of imperialist expansion as new lands, resources 
and markets are sought to support capitalist development. As shown also in Chinese 
history, this intensifies the oppression of peoples across Asia and Africa, and 
culminates in the eruption of World War 1.128 
Cultural topics are given somewhat more weight here, especially in the PEP 
edition which devotes a total of four chapters to the subject, although as is the case 
with the ancient history culture sections, the content here is almost exclusively 
Eurocentric. 129 Needless to say, intellectual developments in the modern period are 
deemed especially important since they catalysed rapid scientific and technological 
progress, and also gave rise to proletarian political activism and socialist thought. 
Accordingly, major figures in science and philosophy are highlighted both for their 
discoveries or ideas and as characters worthy of emulation; almost all of them are 
said, for example, to love studying. Although some figures are included in some 
editions but not in others, the most commonly cited are Descartes, Newton and 
Copernicus as well as contributors to the development of electromagnetism and 
atomic theory, Michael Faraday and John Dalton. Darwin receives considerable 
attention in all volumes, as does Einstein. In the artistic field, numerous authors are 
cited, including Moliere, Balzac, Dickens, Turgenev, Tolstoy, Goethe, Schiller and 
Twain, while in music Bach, Mozart and Beethoven are the most commonly noted. 
Only one female (Marie Curie) is included anywhere in the culture sections, and then 
only in the PEP edition, while no women writers are cited, and only in the PEP edition 
does any non-European writer appear. While the various editions perhaps here more 
than anywhere display some degree of individuality in their selection of 
`representative' cultural figures, they all tend, nevertheless, to share a strong 
preference for writers whose works comment critically on `capitalist society' and 
expose its ills. Art, in Europe as in revolutionary and - to a lesser extent - post- 
revolutionary China, is thus represented as somewhat utilitarian in nature, serving 
12' NDW1, pp138-142,149-154. 
128 YHW2, pp46-51 
129 YHW2.17, NDW2.17 and SHW2.12 each title these chapters scientific and cultural developments in 
`modern European and American history' although most of the discussion concerns European history. 
PEP does not do so, merely calling the chapters `Modern culture' (PEPW 1.27-29) and `Culture in the 
late modern period' (PEPW2.7). The content, however, is almost wholly European centred. 
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social and political purposes, but doing so with the kind of creative aplomb that 
ensures the ideologies embedded therein are more likely to be successfully 
transmitted to and embraced by the people. ' 30 
Contemporary World History 
Unsurprisingly, the October Revolution provides the starting point for contemporary 
history. Far less attention, however, is devoted to this topic than in the earliest PRC 
textbooks, no doubt in large part because from the late 1950s China pursued its own 
path to socialism and no longer regarded the USSR as the leader of the international 
socialist movement, and also because since reform and opening the PRC has moved 
ever further away from its revolutionary platform. From a historical materialist 
perspective, nonetheless, it is absolutely essential to demonstrate the transition from 
capitalism to socialism, signifying also the transition to modernity, and by analogy to 
legitimise China's own revolution and regime. Failed communist uprisings are also 
noted in this section showing the far reach of the international movement even if it 
had not yet succeeded, and are linked, implicitly or explicitly, to anti-colonial 
independence movements that were fighting the same capitalist-imperialist enemies. 
The Great Depression further demonstrates the decline of capitalism and `the 
suffering it brings strengthens the opposition of the people' to their exploitative 
capitalist rulers. '31 Even Roosevelt's New Deal which `alleviated the economic crisis' 
could not eradicate the root problems of capitalism, and was thus merely an 
`important reform', not (as some neo-conservative Americans have alleged) a form of 
socialism. ' 32 
The crisis of capitalism is shown to have underpinned the development of fascism 
and escalated the contradictions between the imperialist European powers. World 
War II is thus portrayed as having broken out principally over rivalry between 
Germany and Italy on the one side and Britain and France on the other. The Munich 
Conference sees the latter two capitulating to Germany, and even their subsequent 
declaration of war in 1939 is shown to be a sham as they strenuously avoid active 
conflict. Only after the entry of the USSR into the war in 1941, therefore, does the 
war cease to be an `imperialist war' and become `an all-out fight against fascism' (the 
130 See Mao's talks at the 1942 Yan'an Forum on Art and Literature for an elaboration of the role of art 
in disseminating political ideology and the revolutionary message. 
131 SHW2, p73. 
132 SHW2, p75. 
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USSR's earlier Non-Aggression Pact with Germany conveniently omitted). 133 The 
entry of the US into the war, by contrast, is depicted as far less momentous, merely a 
part of the wider Pacific war initiated by Japan. When Japan is finally defeated, 
therefore, this is not portrayed principally as an American victory, but as a result of 
China's long-standing resistance, the late involvement of the USSR and the rather 
more minor contributions of other allies. '34 
Despite the unity bred in fighting fascism, it is shown that the contradictions of 
capitalist society had not been overcome, and in the aftermath of victory, therefore, 
Communist revolutions across Eastern Europe broke out, resulting in the 
establishment of new socialist societies. The hegemonic powers of the capitalist- 
imperialist USA and the socialist-imperialist USSR, however, plunged the world into 
the Cold War in their efforts to assert supremacy over one another and `control the 
world'. In earlier texts when China was at loggerheads with the USSR, both the USA 
and USSR were assigned culpability in this. Following the break-up of the Soviet 
Union, however, and China's intermittently frosty relations with the sole remaining 
superpower, the texts examined here downplay, although do not negate, the place of 
the USSR and highlight the hegemony of the USA. As in Chinese history, emphasis 
is accordingly given to the Korean War and China's role in defeating the imperialists. 
The Cuban missile crisis and the Vietnam War are also covered briefly and it is noted 
that more than a thousand Chinese sacrificed their lives to help the Vietnamese fight 
against the USA. 135 (China's own 1979 conflict with Vietnam is not mentioned 
here). Needless to say, this provides another opportunity to contrast Chinese goodwill 
towards neighbouring states and fearless desire to defend the weak and battle against 
injustice with the forces of world domination-seeking Western imperialists. 
Intentionally or not, it also implicitly points up China's importance in Asia as 
powerful, benevolent and perhaps even morally superior to its neighbours, having, 
both here and in the Chinese history textbooks, repeatedly and altruistically come to 
their aid throughout history. 
The final chapters in world history cover contemporary culture, with a survey of 
scientific and technological developments in the twentieth century, including the 
atomic bomb, nuclear power stations, satellites and space missions and computers. 
As in modern history, the sections on art and literature again focus on those who used 
133 PEPW2, p99; NDW2, pp94-l 12. 
134 PEPW2. pp 108-109. 
135 pEpW2, p125; SHW2, pp103-105. 
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their work to criticise capitalism, and in colonial/post-colonial countries to resist 
imperialism and feudalism. It is, however, the penultimate chapters that tackle 
perhaps the most interesting (and sensitive) topic, for they discuss the success of post- 
war capitalism in Western Europe, the demise of socialism in Eastern Europe and the 
break-up of the USSR. Clearly, the analogies that could be drawn with China's own 
changes are manifold, and the text is accordingly careful not to imply that socialism is 
in any way a failed project, even if China has to all intents and purposes itself 
abandoned the socialist path in practice if not in rhetoric. Eastern Europe's 
abandonment of socialism is thus portrayed as a necessary `reform' and 
`transformation' that arose from the blind following of USSR models, over- 
centralisation and rigid economic planning which were unsuited to their own national 
conditions. 136 The break-up of the USSR, by contrast, is depicted as a result of 
Gorbachev's errors which brought ideological chaos to the Party and allowed `anti- 
socialist forces' to deepen the `political, economic and ethnic crises' besetting the 
country, and the Republics to declare independence. 137 While this is shown to have 
had a positive effect in fragmenting hegemonic power and creating a multi-polar 
world (duojixing) (in which China is an increasingly powerful player), the lessons to 
be learnt from these Soviet `errors' barely need pointing out, since throughout both 
the Chinese and world history courses students repeatedly learn the importance of 
unity, not only for national strength, but for a nation's very existence. 
136 SHW2, pp 115-116. 
137 Ibid, pp116-117. 
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Chapter 7 
Teaching and Learning History 
Had Vivian Preston not taught me East Asian history in secondary school, perhaps I 
would not have pursued tertiary studies in Chinese history. Had she not endlessly 
reiterated her favourite maxim, `History is not a shopping list of facts but an 
interpretation of them, ' and exhorted us to write multi-perspectival essays, I might 
never have developed an interest in historiography. And had we not watched 
countless documentaries about World Wars One and Two and written multiple 
projects on trench warfare and the Nazi Holocaust, I would probably not envisage 
Highland troops going `over the top' to fall in their thousands each time I hear the 
wail of bagpipes, nor would I perceive visceral displays of flag-waving patriotism as a 
mere step away from book-burning and concentration camps. History does not, of 
course, supply the substance and power of all historical `memories'. No-one arrives 
at school a tabula rasa on which ideas, opinions and emotions may be inscribed, nor 
can what is learnt in History lessons remain untouched by accounts of the past 
conveyed to us through family and other communities to which we belong, through 
local and national media, public sites and performances of collective commemoration, 
and all kinds of both elite and popular culture. Yet, as shown in previous chapters, 
what purposes History should serve and what should or should not be taught are 
issues which in most societies have received a level of attention from governments, 
educationalists, historians, the media and concerned citizens incommensurate with 
History's actual status as a proportion of the school curriculum. Evidently then, it is 
widely believed that school History lessons do influence the formation of historical 
memories, the values, opinions and identities we construct from them in the present, 
and our attitudes and actions in the future. In this penultimate chapter, an attempt is 
made to determine the extent to which such a conviction is warranted in the Chinese 
case, and if it is, whether learning outcomes correlate to curricular goals or, in 
Wertsch's terminology, whether official histories are cognitively mastered and 
affectively appropriated by their target audiences. Curricular goals, textbook 
narratives and the values and beliefs they attempt to inculcate, and the systems, 
institutions, ideas and ideologies that produce them have already been discussed. In 
order to understand their impact on learning outcomes, however, it is first necessary 
to examine the ways in which teachers transmit the curriculum and mediate the 
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textbooks in the school History classroom, and before examining the environment and 
methods by which they do so, first one must understand who History teachers are and 
how they themselves are produced. ' This chapter accordingly looks, first, at teachers 
and teacher training; second, at how the curriculum is actually implemented on the 
ground in classrooms; and finally, it attempts a preliminary evaluation of how 
students consume, discard or recycle official narratives of the past. 
I. Teachers and Teacher Training 
Perhaps the first thing that should be said about teachers in China is that, as in so 
many countries, the vast majority of them did not choose their profession since there 
are few incentives that might attract students to the field. Teachers may have been 
frequently exalted in public rhetoric, but the reality has long been low salaries and 
status, incommensurate with the vulnerability of the profession to the vagaries of 
politics. The Cultural Revolution hit the profession particularly hard, targeting 
teachers as exemplars of bourgeois intellectualism, bequeathing post-Mao China with 
a legacy of suspicion and disillusionment and a severe shortage of qualified teachers. 2 
Since reform and opening, there have been various campaigns and MOE regulations 
to enhance teacher status, as well as efforts to improve the level of teacher 
qualification. Salaries, however, remain low, and since authority over hiring and 
firing has been largely devolved to school principals, teaching is no longer an 
allocated job-for-life with a guaranteed pension in state-run schools. In better 
schools, therefore, teachers must compete for school posts, increasing numbers of 
which are contracted rather than tenured. In addition, the one child policy has meant 
that the number of school students is slowly beginning to decline and rather than 
simply allowing class sizes to be reduced from the current norm of forty students or 
more, classes and sometimes entire schools are simply merged or even closed down 
and teachers laid off. In rural areas, teaching is a considerably more precarious and 
even lower paid profession since many schools are locally run and financed, meaning 
1 This paraphrases Can (What is History? ), who famously wrote that before studying history, first one 
must study the historian, and before studying the historian, one must examine the contexts which 
produce the historian and in which he/she produces history. 
In 1985, the World Bank (China: Issues and Prospects in Education) reported that one-third of all 
teachers were fully qualified, one-third could become so with upgrading through training, and one-third 
were beyond redemption. In 1989, the State Statistics Bureau reported that 11% of college, 58.66% of 
senior high school, 64.39% of junior high school and 31.87% of primary school teachers were `not 
adequately prepared for their teaching posts' (cit. 
in Lan et al, `Education Reform in China since 1978', 
pp239-240). 
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that teachers do not always get paid when funds are wanted for other projects. 
Although as a whole teaching nevertheless remains a relatively stable occupation, the 
gradual erosion of the few attractions it might once have held makes it increasingly 
unlikely that senior secondary graduates will aspire to become teachers even if they 
acquire their tertiary education at a normal university. 
If this lack of vocation is true for teachers in general, it is still more so for History 
teachers; only one of the dozens of History teachers and normal university students I 
asked said that he had chosen to study History at a normal university and had `always 
wanted to be a History teacher'. 3 The rest had simply tested into a normal university 
History department in the university entrance examinations, and none were under any 
illusions about the status of History teachers. Despite the many directives issued by 
central government and the MOE on the importance of History, every History teacher 
is all too aware that Chan's claims that the `perception of the special role the subject 
plays in political-ideological-moral education ... enhances the status of the subject 
and hence that of its teachers' could not be further from the truth. 4 The ideological 
importance of History and the consequent rise in History teachers official status has 
never been matched by a commensurate improvement in working conditions or 
History teachers' status within the school. As repeatedly stated here, History is a 
subsidiary (fuke) not a core subject (zhuke), and although it may be somewhat more 
highly regarded than other subsidiary humanities subjects, humanities overall are 
widely perceived as inferior to sciences. This bias is reflected across the curriculum 
in a lower percentage of class hours for humanities, and come senior secondary or 
university entrance examination time History, along with Geography and other 
unimportant arts and humanities subjects, is typically dropped from the curriculum 
altogether to allow for extra revision classes in examinable subjects. 
5 It is, after all, 
success in entrance examinations that determines the status of the school, even if 
teachers are officially awarded merit pay based on graduation (biye) rather than 
promotion (shengxue) rates as a supposed disincentive to `teach to the top' (yousheng 
zhongxinhua). 
6 
3 Teacher at Beijing No. 4 zhongxue, personal communication. 
4 Chan, `Introduction', p7. 
5 When I conducted classroom observations in Beijing schools during spring-summer 2000, I was 
unable to observe any third year junior secondary History classes after early April as they had already 
been dropped from all the schools I visited. 
6 Ross, `The Crisis in Chinese Secondary Schooling', p73. 
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Given the low standing of the History subject, it is inconceivable that History 
teachers would `have an edge over their colleagues in matters such as promotion and 
resource allocation'. 7 On the contrary, if the higher administrative levels of the 
education system are anything to go by, History definitely does not provide a 
favourable foundation on which to build a career. All Ministers of Education in the 
past few decades have had educational backgrounds in sciences and engineering; 8 as 
of 2001, no member of the Beijing or Shanghai Municipal Education Commission had 
a History background, and only a tiny minority had studied a humanities subject at 
tertiary level; and none of the senior administrators I met in the Beijing and Shanghai 
schools I visited were former History teachers. This is certainly not to suggest that 
History teachers never advance up the administrative ladder; one former History 
teacher from Jiang Zemin's senior secondary alma mater, not only made it to school 
principal, but was appointed to serve on the History TMIC. With few champions of 
the subject in high positions of actual authority over resource allocation (as opposed 
to the political or symbolic `moral' authority over school subjects of the Party 
leadership), what limited resources are available to most schools are rarely invested in 
enhancing History education provision at the expense of other more `important' 
subjects; even designating certain classrooms specifically for teaching History and 
housing subject resources (something for which several official directives have 
called), which would require little investment and might be thought relatively 
straightforward, has rarely been carried out. 9 It is hardly surprising, therefore, that 
becoming a History teacher is not at the top of many senior secondary pupils' career 
choices, and that many History teachers, particularly the younger ones, would happily 
change their profession if the opportunity arose (Fig. 7.1). 
Lack of enthusiasm for taking up or remaining in this low-status, low-paying 
profession may be partly to blame for the level of teacher qualification in the History 
subject, which as the 1983 `Opinion on Strengthening Patriotic Education' and the 
subsequent MOE `Notice on Improving and Strengthening History and Geography 
Education' lamented, is relatively low. ' o This is not to deny that strenuous efforts 
7 Chan, `Introduction', p7. 
8 Of the current ministers at the MOE, only one, Yuan Guiren (a vice-minister), even has a background 
in the humanities, having graduated from the Department of Philosophy at Beijing Normal University. 
9 Only one school I visited had a `History classroom'. 
1° `Zhonggong zhongyang xuanchuanbu, Zhonggong zhongyang shujichu yanjiushi guanyu jiagiang 
aiguozhuyi xuanchuan jiaoyu de yijian' 
[7/211983], JYFQS, p602-606; `Jiaoyubu guanyu gaijin 
jiaqiang zhongxue lishi he dili jiaoxue de tongzhi' [1/8/1983], JYFQS, pp666-667. 
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have been made to improve overall `teacher quality' through recruiting more 
university graduates and through in-service training and part-time study for existing 
teachers, particularly those of the Cultural Revolution generation, to upgrade their 
qualifications to university level. " Enticing university graduates into entering or 
remaining in the teaching profession when, especially in developed urban areas, there 
are other more lucrative occupations available, however, is a challenging task, and 
many History teachers have only a junior college (dazhuan) education and may not 
even necessarily have specialised in History, or may be part-time teachers reassigned 
from other `related' subjects such as Geography or Politics. This is true not only in 
less developed areas, but even in the major metropolises. As a recent survey of 
Shanghai's level of History teacher qualification and specialisation revealed, only 
78% of History teachers in the metropolitan area and 66% in the surrounding counties 
are full-time instructors in the subject, with the remainder dividing their time between 
teaching History, teaching other subjects, and/or fulfilling administrative 
responsibilities. The proportion of History teachers with a university-level education, 
moreover, is not very high, and is not much higher among the youngest teachers than 
among the oldest and even the Cultural Revolution generation (Fig. 7.2), despite the 
fact that ever-increasing numbers of students are obtaining a tertiary education. The 
distribution of university qualified History teachers, meanwhile, predictably shows 
that there are far fewer of them in Shanghai's suburban districts than in the 
metropolitan area (Fig. 7.3), and far more of them in key schools than in regular 
junior secondary or `complete' (combined junior and senior) secondary schools 
(wanquan zhongxue) (Fig. 7.4). Given that Shanghai has infinitely better 
educational provision than almost everywhere else in the country (with nine-year 
compulsory education already universalised and universalisation of senior secondary 
education anticipated within the next five years or so), it can only be surmised that the 
level of History teacher qualification in other cities and counties is considerably 
lower, although it is likely that the distribution of qualified teachers between different 
types of secondary schools is fairly similar everywhere. 
The majority of those teachers that have a university-level education have, of 
course, studied in normal universities, with the remainder having studied in standard 
universities (zonghe daxue) or having obtained their qualifications through 
On the importance of teacher quality see, for example, Gong, `Chongfen renshi tigao lishi jiaoshi 
suzhi de zhongyaoxing', pp22-25. 
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Figs, 7.1 - 7.4 History Teachers in Shanghai: Motivation and Qualification'2 
7.1 `What would you do if you could choose your career again? ' 
Age Grou 
Under 30 30 - 40 40 - 50 Over 50 
Teach History 34.77% 44.39% 59% 57.47% 
Other work 47.97% 31.39% 18.64% 14.66% 
Haven't thought about it 17.26% 24.22% 22.36% 27.87% 
7.2* Secondary (junior and senior) school History teachers with university or postgraduate level 
education (by age group) 
Under 30 30-40 40-50 Over 50 Total 
59.35% 73.16% 46.47% 50% 55.77% 
* These figures are for Shanghai Municipality which includes both the Shanghai metropolitan area and 
its surrounding counties. 
7.3 Educational level of junior and senior secondary History teachers (by location) 
Shanghai 
Metro 
Suburban 
Districts 
Municipality 
Average 
Senior secondary 2.6% 6.2% 4.5% 
Junior college 31.9% 47.1% 40% 
University 64.9% 46.2% 55% 
Postgraduate 0.7% 0.4% 0.5% 
7.4 Educational level of History teachers (by secondary school type) 
Junior 
secondary# 
Complete 
secondary 
Key 
school 
Senior secondary 5.6% 3.38% 3.15% 
Junior college 49.64% 30.5% 8.96% 
University 44.24% 65.37% 88.34% 
Postgraduate 0.5% 0.72% 0.89% 
# The junior secondary category here includes three-year junior secondary schools, and nine-year 
combined primary and junior secondary schools. 
supplementary courses. Normal universities are generally considered to be of lower 
academic standing than standard universities, and thus, with a few notable exceptions 
such as Beijing and Huadong Normal Universities, usually have less stringent 
entrance requirements. Normal university History students, moreover, have in most 
cases not only failed to get into a standard university, but have also been unsuccessful 
in gaining a place to study another more prestigious subject. The perceived academic 
level of the student body, therefore, combines with deep-seated assumptions about 
what History teachers ought to know and teach to limit the way in which the normal 
university History curriculum is constructed, and to ensure that despite a relatively 
12 Statistical source: Shanghaishi jiaoyu xuehui lishi jiaoxue yanjiuhui, `Shanghaishi zhongxue lishi 
jiaoshi xianzhuang diaoyan zhi baogao zhuanji', pp2-8. In the study from which these statistics are 
taken, all Shanghai History teachers were supposedly surveyed. Whether all teachers replied to all 
questions in the survey, however, 
is not indicated. 
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high degree of autonomy in curriculum design within each college, curricula for 
prospective teachers are fairly homogeneous. 
First and foremost, the curriculum is concerned with subject coverage, and while 
this is also true of standard universities, normal universities offer fewer opportunities 
to take elective courses and specialise in particular periods or regions. The core 
History curriculum in a typical normal university provides a more in-depth version of 
what students have studied in their junior and senior secondary textbooks, with 
numerous compulsory class hours devoted to outlining Chinese and world history 
from ancient times to the present. Other courses attempt to provide prospective 
teachers with an understanding of cultural, economic or political history, and a 
grounding in historical theory and methodology. 13 Needless to say, the focus in the 
latter type of course tends to be on dialectical and historical materialism, which ties in 
to political education courses (also compulsory), but the burgeoning interest in foreign 
historiography and the increasing availability of translated works have ensured that 
normal university students are gradually being exposed to alternative theories of 
history through the introduction of courses such as Shanghai Normal University's 
`History of Western historiography' (xifang shixueshi). 14 
Given that normal university students are supposed to be teachers in training, it 
might be expected that courses in pedagogy and practical teaching experience would 
feature as major components of the degree course. Even in colleges such as Capital 
and Shanghai Normal Universities where several professors are heavily involved in 
pedagogical research, however, pedagogy courses remain a small proportion of the 
curriculum, and pre-service classroom teaching practice is minimal. 15 Teaching 
methods courses in China's normal universities are, furthermore, normally taught as 
entirely divorced from content, merely as a means by which to convey the substance 
of the History subject to school students, namely the necessary `facts'. 
'6 Only a few 
normal university History professors (if their writings are to be taken as representative 
13 Source: History timetables from Shanghai and Capital Normal Universities 2000 and 2001. 
14 Source: History timetable from Shanghai Normal University. The set text for this second-year 
course (also entitled Xifang shixueshi) covers Western historiography from Herodotus to Hegel and 
onwards into the twentieth century, including thinkers such as Toynbee and Collingwood, and even a 
handful of postmodernists such as Foucault. Since the course was only allocated one weekly session, 
however, it seems probable that only a few thinkers were covered in class with the remainder treated as 
supplemental reading. 
15 Capital Normal University's Yu Youxi (now retired), Ye Xiaobing and Zhao Yafu and Shanghai 
Normal University's Wang Duoquan and Li Zhiyong have been very active in pedagogical research. 
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of their classroom teaching) have seriously attempted to analyse the relationship 
between method and content, and to encourage a critical approach to both. 17 
Lack of emphasis on pedagogy is no doubt in large part because few faculty 
members have much - if any - experience as classroom teachers in primary or 
secondary schools, and tend, like their counterparts in standard universities, to be 
academic subject specialists. It is also, however, because `coverage', as Stearns has 
argued, is typically a pedagogical end in itself, not only as a reflection of `curricular 
routine-mindedness', but as a product of profound beliefs that certain `historical facts' 
are `an essential qualification for an educated person'. Such beliefs, he maintains, are 
not confined to cultural conservatives (in the mould of Hirsch with his `cultural 
literacy' concept' 8), but extend to many postmodemists, postcolonialists and global 
historians, all of whom have `their own list of vital facts and events', ethnic or social 
groups and regions, countries or cultures that they insist must be covered. 19 Steams' 
critique derives from his studies of US historians and history educators, but the 
obsession with coverage is just as common in other societies and especially in China 
where, as shown in Chapters 1 and 2, it has long been believed by cultural 
conservatives and reformers alike that having a grasp of the outline of all five 
thousand years of Chinese history (and to a lesser extent world history) from one 
perspective or another is necessary to maintain or improve one's `cultural quality' or 
`cultivation' (wenhua suzhilrenwen suyang). By the time History students graduate 
from normal university, therefore, they have sat through roughly four complete cycles 
of Chinese history from ancient times onwards and at least three of the same selected 
parts of world history, with the only significant difference between primary, 
secondary and tertiary levels of study being the gradually rising intensity of coverage. 
The methods by which they are commonly assessed and the learning style to which 
they have become habituated throughout their own education, furthermore, mean that 
rote-learning and regurgitating the contents and viewpoints of set texts are a virtually 
unquestioned norm. Most new teachers, however studious and enthusiastic, are 
consequently woefully ill equipped to do much more than teach the textbook when 
they begin their first job. 
16 For a general discussion of the significance of the content-methods dichotomy, see Postman and 
Weingartner, Teaching as a Subversive Activity, Chapter II. 
" See for example Zhao, Zhongxue lishi jiaoyuxue and `Gexing, chuangzaoxing: xin shiji zhongxue 
lishi jiaoxue de hexin'; Ji, Lishijiaoyuxue gailun. 
18 Hirsch, Cultural Literacy: What Every American Should Know. 
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II. Teaching History 
Teaching Resources 
As noted in Chapter 3, recognition of widespread teacher under-preparedness has 
meant that ERUs have increasingly taken on the role of providing models of best 
pedagogical practice, observing classes, offering advice and running local training 
workshops at which live or recorded teaching demonstrations may be given and 
information and ideas on best practice provided. Lack of pedagogical training in 
normal universities also means that first-year teachers are considered to be on 
probation and must take a requisite number of in-service training credits. During this 
period and sometimes for longer, they are, in theory at least, mentored both by the 
attending ERU History subject officer and senior teachers within the school. Access 
to such support in rural and less economically developed regions is considerably more 
limited than it is in affluent cities, and rural teachers must often take their required in- 
service training credits by correspondence or through short-term residential courses; 
indeed, many teachers in rural areas are not properly trained at all, and never obtain 
the level of qualifications mandated by central government. 
ERUs are not of course the only source of teacher support, and there are many 
written materials available, offering guidance on both pedagogical theory and 
classroom practice, most of which are published by normal university or provincial 
education presses, with a few offered by unaffiliated education-oriented publishers. 
Some are lesson plans matched closely to textbook content, frequently compilations 
of model lessons written by senior teachers from well-known schools; 20 others are 
more theoretical or practical works on teaching methodology that may recommend 
particular teaching approaches or classroom activities. `' I Numerous articles are also 
published in the main History education journals offering teaching suggestions and 
19 Steams, `Goals in History Teaching', p284. 
20 See for example, the collaborative series published by PEP and Yanbian Education Press, Jiunian 
yiwu jiaoyu jiaocai (renjiaoban) jiao'an xilie congshu which provides one volume to accompany each 
textbook. A similar set of handbooks was published by Beijing Normal University, Jiunian yiwu 
jiaoyu chuzhong lishi jiao'an. Less comprehensive, but more detailed compilations of selected model 
lesson plans may be found in Zhang and Cui eds., Lishi jiaoxue bilu jingxuan; Yang ed., Shanghai 
zhuming lishi jiaoshi jiaoxue sixianglu; Wang ed., Mingshi shoukelu: zhongxue lishi. 
21 Among the more academic works are Ji Bingxin, Lishijiaoyuxue gailun, Zhao Yafu, Zhongxue lishi 
jiaoyuxue, and Yu Youxi, Jichu jiaoyu xiandaihua jiaoxue jibengong: zhongxue lishi Juan. Recently, 
however, several educational publishing houses have issued more accessible guides that provide more 
concrete suggestions for classroom activities, for example, Xueyuan Press, Zhongxue lishi chuangxin 
jiaofa, a four volume series addressing different aspects of History pedagogy. Even these supposedly 
practical guides, however, devote the bulk of their text to restating the fundamentals of History 
education. 
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lesson plans, many of them written by ERU History subject officers or by practising 
teachers, and more recently, official websites run by institutions such as the NCCT 
and PEP have published online articles and established discussion forums both for 
general educational matters and for individual school subjects. 22 
Judging from limited print-runs and conversations with school teachers, the more 
theoretical works do not constitute an important everyday teaching resource, although 
several have been used as set texts on teacher training pedagogy courses, providing 
prospective teachers with some basic exposure to up-to-date research. 23 The low 
popularity of these texts is no doubt in part because they tend towards more complex 
academic analyses of cognitive and affective development and their implications for 
History teaching and learning processes, and do not offer practical suggestions for 
classroom teaching; they also tend, like many of the newer, more practical teaching 
guides, to be fairly expensive. Individuals are consequently unlikely to buy them, and 
even many school History departments and libraries may find them to be inessential 
when finances are in most cases already overstretched and History is anyway not a 
priority subject. History education journals, by contrast, are more widely accessible, 
and many schools have subscriptions to one or more of them. As noted in Chapter 3, 
these contain many practical as well as ideological and theoretical articles, and 
frequently include lesson plans, suggestions on how to use both textbook and 
supplementary visual aids in class. It is difficult, however, to ascertain the extent to 
which they are actually used by teachers, although I found ERU staff, especially at the 
more senior levels, to be quite well acquainted with History journals. It is probable, 
therefore, that the import of some research articles is indirectly reaching even those 
teachers who do not read the journals themselves. The readership of internet articles 
is similarly hard to estimate, although on occasions the number of times a site has 
been visited is available, as well as the number of postings on a given forum 
discussion thread. Active participants in online discussion forums are most likely to 24 
22 PEP's history forum can be found at http: //bbs. pep. com. cn/forumdisplav. php? fid=15&page=1. 
Articles are published in various locations on the www. pep. com. cn site. China Basic Education is an 
NCCT and Beijing Normal University backed private website providing online resources for nine-year 
compulsory education. They also host discussion forums, although these are not restricted to particular 
school subjects (see http: //bbs. cbe21. com). Their History section main page can be found at 
http: //www. cbe2I. com/subjectfhistoly/index. 12hp. 
23 The above-cited writers (Ji Bingxin, Zhao Yafu and Yu Youxi along with others) produced these 
texts in part to use them as core readings for their normal university History pedagogy courses. I do 
not know, however, how widely each text is used. 
24 Of course, many of the site hits and posts may be from repeat users. Not all the discussants, 
moreover, are History education professionals. 
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be members of a small but motivated and diligent minority of urban History teachers 
who are genuinely interested in teaching their subject, or are looking to improve their 
performance to gain promotions and pay-rises. What is written therein, therefore, 
cannot be assumed to be representative. Discussion forums are, moreover, censored 
to some degree, although even controversial posts typically remain available long 
enough for them to be copied and circulated elsewhere and some seem either to be 
tolerated or to escape the censors' notice altogether. 25 
While resources offering both historical information and practical teaching tips are 
constantly expanding, suggesting that there is rising market demand for these items, 
the majority of History teachers seem to rely heavily, nevertheless, on the textbooks 
themselves and on their accompanying teacher handbooks (jiaoxue cankaoshu/cankao 
ziliao,, jiaoshi jiaoxue yongshu). The latter are produced by textbook publishers, and 
each textbook volume has a corresponding handbook; thus, there are currently four 
Chinese history and two world history teacher handbooks for each textbook set. 26 At 
the time of fieldwork, there were two additional teacher handbook sets in circulation, 
neither of which were directly affiliated with a particular textbook set, but both of 
which explicitly followed PEP's textbooks; in fact, one of the two was produced as a 
joint project between PEP and Yanbian Education Press, while the other was 
published by Beijing Normal University. 27 As with other supplementary texts, 
however, their print runs are dramatically lower than those of the standard handbooks, 
reinforcing the hypothesis that teachers prefer to stick with what they already know 
has a long track record as a staple pedagogical resource, tailored precisely to the 
particular text they are teaching. 
Teacher handbooks are not, of course, a new phenomenon, having been first 
issued by textbook publishers in early Republican times, and accompanying almost 
every set of textbooks published thereafter. 28 The current crop, like the textbooks on 
25 See for example blogger `Qianjiao maichu' (front foot forward) in which the writer criticises 
textbook editors for omitting important topics and distorting others in the HCS-compliant textbooks, 
thereby duping the children. ('Qing bianxie chuzhong lishi de zhuanjia huidao menggu tongzhi de 
shigi') http"//club. cat898. com/newbbs/dispbbs. asp? BoardlD=1 &ID=1091399. 
26 See Appendix for list of teacher handbooks. 
27 PEP and Yanbian Education Press, Jiunian yiwu jiaoyu jiaocai (renjiaoban) jiao'an xilie congshu ( 
Beijing Normal University, Jiunian yiwu jiaoyu chuzhong lishi jiao'an. According to the preface of the 
BNU handbooks (Vol. 1, pl), this set, produced by senior Beijing teachers and ERU researchers, was 
designed to follow the arrangement of PEP's textbooks, but was also, in principle at least, aimed at 
teachers of all textbook sets. 
28 See, for example, Zhao Yusen, Benguoshi cankaoshu, and Zhong Shulong, Xintizhi benguo lishi 
cankaoshu (both first published in 1915, reprinted until mid-1920s). 
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which they are based, has not departed significantly from earlier PRC models. 
Unfortunately, the only standard History handbooks I was able to obtain were the PEP 
and Shanghai editions, as well as the Zhejiang and Shanghai Social Studies teacher 
handbooks, Beijing Normal University's (BNU) independent History handbook set 
and a couple of volumes of the PEP-Yanbian Education Press collaborative texts. 
While it would have been useful to compare Coastal and Inland edition handbooks 
with PEP and Shanghai volumes, the high degree of similarity between textbook sets 
suggests that handbook differences are likely to be equally minor. Furthermore, since 
I was only able to observe classes in Beijing and Shanghai, it is these texts which are 
most relevant to the present study. 
Each chapter of the handbooks minors a textbook chapter, and is structured in the 
same way throughout a given set. PEP handbooks, for example, divide each chapter 
into four main sections: `teaching objectives', `key points', `teaching requirements 
and suggestions', and supplementary `data and annotations'. They also include 
appendices which contain tips on suggested answers to the `xiang yi xiang' or 
`thinking questions' (sikaoti) posed in the textbooks, namely, those questions which 
cannot be answered simply with data. The Shanghai handbooks follow a similar 
pattern with sections on `teaching requirements' (which correspond to PEP's 
`objectives'), `key points and difficult points', `teaching suggestions' and 
`supplementary data'. They do not, however, provide model answers to open-ended 
`xiang yi xiang' questions, and in some chapters their `supplementary data' section 
includes not only the standard items, such as brief biographies of key actors or details 
on the historical background of political movements, but also notes on recent 
historical research on the subject. 29 PEP's handbooks also recommend bringing some 
of the fruits of academic research into the school classroom, but they are far less 
specific and informative than Shanghai's. Both share, however, an avoidance of 
controversy. In the PEP chapter on Ming foreign relations, for example, it is 
emphatically stated that while historians disagree on the objectives of Zheng He's 
expeditions, `teachers need only tell students what is written in the textbook and do 
29 For example, in vol. 3 of Shanghai's Chinese History handbook, a detailed explanation is given of 
historians' debates over the precise dates of the Hundred Days Reform and over whether Yuan Shikai's 
betrayal of the reformers was the immediate cause of Cixi's palace coup (pp98-100). 
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not need to add any supplementary opinions', while the Shanghai edition simply 
omits from this chapter the section giving conflicting academic opinions. 30 
The BNU and PEP-Yanbian sets are similarly arranged, although the PEP- 
Yanbian set adopts a hybrid style, integrating the traditional handbook structure with 
samples of possible teacher-student dialogue, commonly seen in edited volumes of 
model lesson plans, which, given that these texts are a collation of chapters written by 
ERU researchers and senior teachers is hardly surprising. 31 While PEP-Yanbian's 
model dialogues suggest a more concrete, pragmatic and less text-oriented approach 
to teaching, in almost every case, they do not move far away from the traditional 
teacher-centric methods advocated by other model lesson compilations. BNU's 
teaching methods section, meanwhile, almost invariably recommends `lecturing' or 
`narrating' (jiangshu) as the main method, only very occasionally adding an 
exhortation to use `discussion' or 'audiovisuals'. The PEP-Yanbian set likewise in its 
model dialogues allots almost all the class-time to teacher explications of textbook 
content, punctuated only occasionally by question and answer interactions with 
students. Most of these suggested questions, moreover, merely require the students to 
respond with information that has been provided moments ago in the preceding 
section of the teacher's lecture. The much vaunted question and answer approach to 
teaching promoted by pedagogical reformers as a productive, `holistic' and 
`democratic' alternative to traditional teacher-centric lecturing, 32 thus, in this model, 
simply evaluates whether students have been paying attention and have understood 
the topic, and attempts to reinforce data and viewpoints through simple repetition. 
Clearly then, teacher handbooks greatly contribute to the likelihood that the 
implemented History curriculum will closely resemble the preactive curriculum, and 
although they are only intended as a basic teaching guideline which should be 
supplemented with `lively', `creative' and `practical' learning activities, their 
dominance as a teaching resource reinforces the privileged position textbooks and 
teachers enjoy over all other sources of historical data and methods of learning about 
the past within the formal education system. Before turning to the implications this 
has for learning outcomes, it is necessary first to examine briefly the ways in which 
teachers actually conduct their lessons so as to ascertain the extent to which they 
30 PEP, Zhongguo lishi dierce: jiaoshi jiaoxue yongshu, p235; Shanghai, Jiaoxue cankao ziliao, vol. 2, 
chapter 21, lesson 2. 
31 See above-cited volumes edited by Zhang and Cui, Wang Duoquan, and Yang Xiangyang (n18). 
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follow the prescriptions and models provided by Teaching Outlines and teacher 
handbooks. Specifically, it is asked whether teachers omit some topics and 
supplement others (as Au Yeung maintains has occurred in the Chinese Language 
subject) ; 33 how they have integrated sometimes conflicting pedagogical innovations 
with political-ideological imperatives; and to what degree they adhere to or deviate 
from orthodox textbook interpretations of historical events and persons in their 
classes. The style in which they present their lessons - the teaching methods and 
language that they use - is also analysed in order to evaluate the ways and extent to 
which the textbooks and their explicit and implicit messages are reconfigured through 
teacher mediation. Evidently, the number of classes I was able to observe in Beijing 
and Shanghai furnished me with only a few snapshots of classroom teaching and thus 
provided a very tentative basis for generalisations about History teaching nationwide, 
while my Chinese language limitations, as noted in Chapter 6, have prevented me 
from fully comprehending all the linguistic nuances of teacher-student interactions. 34 
My own observations are accordingly supplemented by evidence supplied by ERU 
researchers, teachers and other History education professionals, both in personal 
communications and in print. 
Classroom Teaching 
Teachers in the post-Mao era have been assailed from a number of directions, 
receiving frequently contradictory messages about what they should be doing and 
how they should be doing it. As discussed in Chapter 2, there are, on the one hand, 
periodic MOE directives which explicitly praise past and present efforts of History 
teachers, while implicitly reprimanding them through exhorting them to take the lead 
32 See Chapter 2 for more discussion on post-1978 pedagogical thinking. 
33 Au Yeung, `Curriculum Dissemination in the People's Republic of China', p85. 
34 In most instances, I was only able to observe one teacher's class on a given textbook chapter. While 
it would have been interesting to compare several different teachers' interpretations, it would have been 
logistically impossible since all teachers are trying to cover each textbook in a single semester, and are 
thus roughly on the same schedule in terms of when they cover which chapters. Furthermore, my 
school visits were almost wholly dependent on my ERU contacts, and I was unable, therefore, to pick 
and choose which schools and lessons to observe. My Shanghai visits, however, were concentrated in 
a much shorter period than those I made in Beijing, and purely by chance I was able to observe a 
couple of repeat classes. None of the classes I attended were recorded and I merely observed and took 
notes on the proceedings. Although I believe some additional information might have been gleaned had 
I been able to review the classes multiple times, the universal teenage grunt with which many students 
proffered their classroom contributions rendered some utterances completely unintelligible to my 
foreign ears. Such a detailed analysis of classroom practices would anyway have provided far more 
data than this study could accommodate. 
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in promoting patriotism, morality and a willingness to serve as if they have not yet 
adequately done so. Writings by senior members of organisations such as the NCCT, 
the History TMIC and PEP, and education journal editorials also repeatedly highlight 
these political-ideological functions of the History subject. On the other hand, there is 
a growing movement, primarily among university academics and senior ERU 
personnel, that explicitly advocates training students to think critically and to 
formulate their own opinions, and implicitly criticises using the past to legitimise the 
polity. Needless to say, there are many advocates of the history-for-moral-and- 
patriotic-education school who have embraced various aspects of skills-oriented 
pedagogy, while the critical thinking promoters are by no means necessarily opposed 
to incorporating moral and patriotic education into History classes. Nevertheless, in 
practice, the two goals frequently conflict, leaving teachers confused and frustrated by 
apparently contradictory instructions, such as helping students to form individual 
viewpoints, while also ensuring that they reach correct conclusions. As noted at the 
beginning of this chapter, teachers have also at times been victims of political 
persecution, while at other times they have been publicly exalted as the chosen 
vectors for transmitting ideological campaign messages. The volatility of their 
position has thus made many teachers understandably fearful of following unorthodox 
or suddenly fashionable paths. Add to this mix the fact that most History teachers did 
not select and do not have strong emotional attachments to their profession, that 
teacher training is often inadequate and that many History teachers are not even 
trained in the History subject, and it comes as no surprise to find that most simply 
follow the path of least resistance, modelling their lessons principally on the content 
of textbooks in the ways advised by the handbooks. Most of the classes I observed, 
therefore, whether in Beijing or Shanghai, in key schools or `bog-standard' junior 
secondaries, were remarkably similar. 
Unlike Gardner, who observed art and music classes in the early 1980s, I was not, 
in most instances, treated to a flawless performance of a pre-rehearsed lesson. 
35 In 
some cases, I accompanied local ERU History subject officers on their regular school 
rounds, while in others I was simply assigned to audit one or more teachers' lessons 
by the head of the History department or the school principal, and a few teachers 
35 In one instance, he was told that the regular music teacher had been suddenly taken ill, and an award- 
winning teacher was brought in as a `last-minute' replacement, presenting a class which had clearly 
been painstakingly rehearsed by all involved (Gardner, To Open Minds, p260). 
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personally invited me to visit their classrooms. Many teachers had only a day's notice 
of my impending visit, and those that I observed with the ERU officers (of whose 
attendance the school had had ample warning) were correspondingly more prepared. 
Only in one school was the lesson clearly a well choreographed performance. 36 
Lessons I observed were taught by both male and female teachers from various 
age groups, although younger women formed the majority, reflecting the widespread 
transition of normal university intakes and thus the History education profession from 
male- to female-dominated (figs. 7.5,7.6). While there was obviously individual 
variation in teachers' performances, I did not witness any pronounced differences 
between genders, nor - more unexpectedly - between age groups, although it was 
certainly the case that the classes which diverged most from handbook formats were 
mainly given by younger teachers. 37 Unsurprisingly, novice teachers, especially those 
Figs. 7.5 & 7.6 Gender and age distribution of Shanghai History teachers38 
7.5 
Gender % of workforce Average age 
Male 53.3 43.6 
Female 46.7 34.5 
7.6 
Age group % of workforce 
Under 30 32.37 
30 - 40 16.03* 
40 - 50 24.09 
50 and over 27.62 
* Most teachers in this group were under 35. 
with a background in a subject other than History, adhered most rigidly to the 
handbooks, textbooks and model lesson plans, while some older teachers had clearly 
36 This visit was organised as part of the 2000 conference of the national History Education Association 
held in Shanghai. Groups of approximately 15 delegates were each assigned to visit a local school and 
observe a History lesson. My group, which included all the foreign delegates, visited a first-year senior 
secondary class at Jincai Zhongxue in Pudong. 
371 have tried in vain to rediscover and thus supply the reference for an article I once read by a Chinese 
sociology professor who claimed that the `feminisation of the teaching profession' is an impediment to 
the development of creative teaching and learning practices as women are, by nature, diligent, but less 
intellectually creative and forward-thinking than men. His views, unfortunately, are not uncommon; 
indeed, the Chinese government itself has stated relatively recently that men are more suited to 
intellectual pursuits and women to nurturing (Ross, `The Crisis in Chinese Secondary Schooling', p85). 
Many Chinese educational psychologists, meanwhile, maintain that although male and female 
intellectual capacities are roughly equal, boys have a broader intellectual range and are able to 
conceptualise more complex abstractions (Huang, `Xue lishi yu di zhishang', p46). 
38 Source: Shanghaishi jiaoyu xuehui lishi jiaoxue yanjiuhui, `Shanghaishi zhongxue lishi jiaoshi 
xianzhuang diaoyan zhi baogao zhuanji'. 
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repeated the national and global narrative (albeit with various ideological 
permutations) so many times that they had virtually memorised the textbooks, and 
were able to digress more confidently and include supplementary data. 
As numerous education articles as well as teacher handbooks and even the more 
recent curriculum guidelines repeatedly stress, it is deemed more important to cover 
some topics than others, and, since time is invariably constrained, teachers are advised 
to focus chiefly on the information contained in the `large character' sections of the 
textbooks, reserving the `small character' sections mainly for supplementary 
reading. 39 Following these instructions, the handbooks and common model lesson 
plans, most teachers accordingly spend the majority of the time talking, standing at 
the front of the class and relaying the salient points of the textbook narrative to largely 
passive (and, in several classes I attended, actually sleeping! ) students . 
40 Mirroring 
the model lessons, most classes I observed opened with a brief recap of topics and 
key points covered in the previous class, before introducing the current lesson. In line 
with recent efforts to develop a more participatory learning style and thus accomplish 
the stated central goal of `teaching students to learn', teachers, in most instances, also 
asked the students questions about the content of both the previous and forthcoming 
lessons. In some cases, the students simply called out the answers individually or in 
unison, in others they raised their hands, and only in very few classes were 
respondents pre-selected by the teacher or required to stand up to answer the question. 
The following near- verbatim exchange from a class on the Boxers (which follows the 
textbook chapter on the 1898 reforms) is an illustrative example of such a question- 
and-answer revision and preview session. (Similar exchanges were witnessed in most 
of the classes I attended, regardless of the subject matter or which textbook - PEP or 
Shanghai - they were using. ) 
39 See, for example, Wang, `Jiunian yiwu jiaoyu chuzhong lishi jiaokeshu (Renjiaoban), di san, si ce 
neirong de zhongyaoxing he jiangshou jianyi', p27. The local curriculum guidelines produced in 
Shanghai and Beijing have explicitly identified which areas are more important, and what level of 
understanding is required for various topics (see Chapter 5). In this vein, one Beijing ERU History 
officer I accompanied on school visits also distributed to the teachers in her district a detailed chart she 
had compiled herself showing which topics could be omitted and what level of understanding was 
required for each. 
ao It should be noted that the only sleeping students were at the back of the class where there they could 
not be easily seen, although in one class I attended, a boy was quietly snoring! 
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T= Teacher S= Student n= specific student 
T. Why did the Wuxu reforms fail? 
S I. Because of Cixi and the conservative faction's coup 
S2. Because Yuan Shikai betrayed the reformers 
T. Yes, Yuan was not yet able to realise his own imperial ambitions, and was still 
under Cixi's wing. Who were the Six Martyrs (liujunzi)? 
S3. Tan Sitong, Liu Guangdi, Kang Guangren, Yang Shenxiu [pause] 
T. Does anyone know? 
S4. Lin Xu and Yang Rui. 
T. Excellent. Now, open your books to page 54 and read out the last paragraph. 
[Students read aloud in unison a paragraph on the impact of the 1898 reforms]. What 
was the nature of the 1898 reforms? [No reply volunteered]. Bourgeois reformism 
(zichan jieji gailiangzhuyi). This kind of reform could not succeed in China because 
the imperialist influence was very strong.... Unequal treaties had given foreigners 
many powers in China..... From the unequal treaties, we can see that some of the 
provisions therein permitted foreign religious influences to infiltrate our country. 
Which treaties allowed foreigners to disseminate their religion in China? 
S5. Treaty of Tianjin 
S6. Treaty of Nanjing 
S2. Treaty of Wangxia 
T. Correct. After these unequal treaties were signed, the Chinese people 
unceasingly resisted foreign religious invasion. The Boxers were part of this 
patriotic struggle. 
41 
Questioning students is not, in theory, intended to be solely a revision technique, 
and as advocated by both the handbooks and contemporary writings on teaching 
methods, questions should be used throughout the lesson to involve students actively 
in the learning process. 42 In practice, however, they tend to focus almost exclusively 
on eliciting information that demonstrates mastery of the basic knowledge and 
viewpoints already covered in the set texts. In this particular class, the teacher posed 
several questions on previous topics during the course of the lesson, asking, for 
example, `Which was the largest peasant uprising in modern history? ' (Taiping), as 
well as asking for feedback demonstrating students had listened and understood the 
content of the present lesson; for example, basic questions about relevant dates, names 
and places, and more potentially complex ones, such as `Why did the Eight Nation 
Alliance mount yet another foreign invasion of China? ' Other teachers I observed also 
made pronounced efforts to use a question and answer format, opening a class on the 
consolidation of Han dynasty rule, for example, with factual revision questions on the 
aspects in which Qin unification had laid the groundwork for Han rule, and continuing 
41 Second-year class, Weiyu zhongxue, Shanghai. 
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throughout the class to pose basic questions on the newly covered material. 43 In a 
class on the Three Kingdoms, meanwhile, opening questions were asked about what 
had caused disunity (a recap of the demise of Eastern Han), and subsequent ones on 
the content of the current lesson, such as why Cao Cao was able to unify the north, 
which of the three kingdoms was strongest and so forth. 4 
Generally, I found rather more questions were asked in those classes I attended 
alongside the local ERU History officer than in those I observed alone. Whether this 
was because teachers were seeking to impress the ERU officer (whose assessment 
counts towards promotion) or was simply coincidental, I cannot be certain. It is clear, 
however, that even if teachers are exerting themselves to please ERU personnel, this 
format has anyway already been well integrated into everyday classroom practice. 
Only in a few classes did teachers talk virtually uninterruptedly or limit student 
participation mostly to reading aloud from the textbook. At the other end of the scale, 
a minority of teachers posed more challenging questions that required students to 
provide more lengthy answers and thus to occupy more of the available talk time. 
Some were common `what', `why' and `either/or' questions, that might be asked in 
any class, such as `What was the Renaissance? ', `Why did the Sino-Japanese War 
begin? ' and `Was bourgeois reformism regressive or progressive? '45 In some classes, 
relatively simple answers may suffice (whether because the teacher expects nothing 
more, or merely wishes to elicit confirmation of basic mastery of the narrative, its 
basic data and key concepts). Appropriate answers of this type to the above questions 
might be, respectively, a short description of key ideas and/or a list of artistic 
achievements of the Renaissance period, a summary of events in Korea preceding the 
Sino-Japanese conflict or a litany of foreign, especially Japanese, designs on China's 
territory, or simply one-word, `regressive/progressive' responses. In others, however, 
teachers are more demanding, requiring students to go into greater depth to justify 
their responses. Indeed, students may even be asked to explain their own value 
judgements or verdicts on historical figures and their actions. For example, one 
teacher asked her class whether they thought the adoption of Confucianism as state 
42 For example, Feng, `Bangzhu xuesheng tigao xuexi de fangfa', pp48-49. 
43 First-year class, Humin Zhongxue, Shanghai. 
44 First-year class, Xinan Mofan Zhongxue, Shanghai. This particular teacher (young male with a 
normal university Politics degree) was extremely nervous as he had not been forewarned of my visit, 
and simply read from his notes for the first few minutes of the lesson. He was also being observed by 
the head of the History department and two other teachers. 
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orthodoxy in the Han period was a good or bad policy. In an apparent effort to 
stimulate thinking about the impact of a monolithic state ideology on individuals and 
society and elicit more than straight good/bad answers, she first asked by way of an 
example, `If the only subjects examined in school were Mathematics, Chinese and 
English, would you bother to revise History? ' (Given that History is currently not 
tested in the SSEEs this might be seen as adding yet another layer of meaning to what 
was already a question which could be interpreted in multiple and potentially 
subversive ways. ) Some students simply responded with a monosyllabic `good' or 
`bad', while others offered reasons for their verdict. For example, `It was good 
because it concentrated political power and brought peace to the nation'; `It was bad 
because it spread the poisonous influence of Confucianism, putting too much pressure 
on people to pass the civil service examinations, causing lots of people to commit 
suicide'; or, `Bad, because people didn't study other subjects because they wanted to 
become officials, so science and technology couldn't develop'. 46 Clearly these 
responses suggest that students' grasp of textbook content and classroom lectures may 
not correspond exactly to anticipated learning outcomes, a matter which is discussed 
in more depth in the final parts of this chapter. Suffice it for the moment to say that 
some answers are usually deemed more `correct' than others, although in this 
particular case, the teacher did not pass judgement on any student's opinion, and after 
about a quarter of the class had replied, moved on to introduce the next topic. 
The lecturing and question and answer styles discussed above constitute the core 
of History teaching while textbooks provide the basic learning materials, but they are 
intermittently supplemented to varying degrees by other methods and materials, either 
for whole lessons or parts thereof. In better equipped schools, these might include 
showing television documentaries and dramas, audio-recordings, or slides and 
photographs which may be projected or handed around. In one class I observed, for 
example, half a lesson was spent watching a documentary on the German invasion of 
the USSR, in particular the Battle of Stalingrad, while in another excerpts from a 
documentary on the Boxers was shown. 47 Fairly widespread use was also made of 
overhead projectors to display images, such as detailed maps, famous paintings and 
historic buildings which are of poor quality in all textbooks except Zhejiang's Social 
as These examples are taken from classes at, respectively, Xinan Mofan Zhongxue, Beijing No. 80 
Zhongxue and Weiyu Zhongxue. 
46 First-year students, Weiyu Zhongxue, Shanghai. 
239 
Studies volumes; indeed, the images in the PEP textbooks are not even reproductions, 
but are illustrations provided by the in-house art department. In addition to these 
teaching aids, some schools have recently begun to use computers, although at the 
time of fieldwork this was in its infancy, available in only a handful of well funded 
schools. One class on the Renaissance, for example, projected images from a 
computer onto a large pull-down screen, although the effect was little different from 
an overhead or slide projector. I also had the opportunity on one occasion to attend a 
genuinely computer-based class, but this too was much like any other lesson. The 
only significant difference was that the students sat in front of individual computer 
screens instead of textbooks, while the teacher adopted the standard question and 
answer format and instructed students to go to a particular page/section of the 
programme instead of turn to a given page in the textbook. 48 
Where question and answer sessions aim to encourage participatory learning and 
to reinforce knowledge and viewpoint acquisition through repetition, these audio- 
visual aids (as well as the images included in textbooks) are thought to help bring the 
subject to life, and provide students with a more tangible link to the past than they 
typically derive from text-based narratives. They also aim to `stimulate the senses 
and emotions' and thereby assist the development of students' affective skills and 
attachments. 49 Students, for example, should be inspired by the majesty of a building, 
angered by a photograph of Japanese soldiers raping and pillaging, and moved by a 
piece of music or a powerful public speech; they should also feel pride or shame when 
they see images of their own or others' achievements, such as an atomic bomb 
detonating or mankind in space, emotions which may be enhanced by an 
accompanying explanatory oral or textual narrative. In one class which made 
considerable use of the overhead projector, for example, a map of Asia, the Indian 
Ocean and East Africa was displayed on a large screen. Numerous arrows criss- 
crossed the map showing the voyages made by Zheng He. Although only the lands 
then directly controlled by the Ming and/or currently held by the PRC were marked as 
`China', both China thus conceived and its tributary states were all shaded in the same 
colour. The teacher pointed at the map as she talked, exclaiming `See how big China 
47 Second-year class, Weiyu Zhongxue; third-year class, Shoudu shifan daxue fushu zhongxue, Beijing. 
48 This was extremely new at the time, and was a major event, with the school (Beijing No. 80 
Zhongxue) principal and many ERU personnel in attendance. A local Beijing newspaper had even sent 
a reporter and photographer to cover this breakthrough. 
(Whether the paper deemed this newsworthy 
or whether the school enticed them to attend, 
however, is unclear). 
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was/is', `Look how far Zheng He travelled'. She also asked various questions such 
as, `How many countries did Zheng He visit? ', `How many times/kilometres/for how 
long did he travel? ' This was followed by a comparative table (borrowed from the 
PEP handbook) matching up the voyages of Zheng He against those of da Gama and 
Columbus. 5° It showed where the three had travelled, when, how many voyages, how 
many people and ships had been involved and compared the size of the ships. A final 
section of the table (not included in the handbook) outlined the motives for their 
explorations. The teacher then asked students to say something about Zheng He in 
each comparative regard, eliciting the predictable replies, `he was earliest, ' `his 
expeditions/ships were biggest' and `his motives [friendly trading] were good'. A 
little mental arithmetic practice was also incorporated as students were asked how 
much earlier and how many times larger his expeditions were, the magnitude of his 
superiority only compounded by his virtue in comparison to his colonialist European 
counterparts. 51 While a few students appeared to be genuinely fired up by the lesson, 
the majority remained passive, offering up predictable responses when pressed, and 
the whole episode rather brought to mind a scene from the film `Hope and Glory', 
where the teacher taps her cane across a world map, rapping out `Pink, pink, pink, 
pink. And what are all the pink bits children? ' The children fidget in their seats, 
trying not to catch her eye, but one small child is picked out, finally answering `the 
British Empire. ' `Yes, ' glows the teacher, `three-quarters of the world is pink. ' 52 
The above examples represent the mainstream of History teaching, and although 
some teachers digress somewhat from the textbook, or encourage student participation 
more than others, most of the classes I observed followed much the same format. 
Even those classes which seemed more lively with higher levels of student 
engagement ultimately made few significant breaks from the texts. A class on the 
Munich Conference, for example, was wonderfully entertaining as the teacher acted 
out an imaginary dialogue between Hitler, Mussolini, Chamberlain and Daladier. 
Leaping back and forth, putting on funny voices (Chamberlain and Daladier dithering 
and pleading with confident and bullish Hitler and Mussolini, but scheming and 
sneaky between themselves), the teacher had the students in fits of laughter. His 
performance was not just a piece of empty entertainment, and through this dialogue he 
49 Zhou, `Chongfen fahui lishi ketang jiaoxue de feizhili yinsu'. 
j° PEP, Zhongguo lishi jiaoshi jiaoxue yongshu, vol. 2, p239. 
51 Second-year class, Nanzhong zhongxue, Beijing. 
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effectively conveyed the substance of the issues then at stake in Munich. He also 
conveyed value judgments both with his tone of voice and movements and with his 
dialogue, through showing Chamberlain and Daladier passively if slightly reluctantly 
and obsequiously agreeing to German demands. The conclusions to be drawn, as the 
subsequent question and answer section of the class revealed, were that Britain and 
France had become lazy capitalists (indeed, at one point in the `play', Daladier had 
been portrayed, literally, as a fat squealing pig) and simply preferred to capitulate than 
to unite with their neighbours to defeat the evil forces of fascism while also 
harbouring secret hopes that Germany would take out the USSR and save them the 
trouble. 53 Thus, although this teacher's presentation style was dramatically different 
from (and more appealing than) that of most of his peers, the substance of the lesson, 
in fact, was nothing more than a repackaging of textbook content and teacher lecture 
in more attractive wrapping. 
This is not say that no student-centred classes are held at all, and attempts have 
increasingly been made to introduce more evidence- and discussion-based learning. I 
found that evidenced-based learning is rather undeveloped, with writers of journal 
articles and books on History pedagogy providing a theoretical foundation and some 
model practice examples, but I saw no deployment of these techniques in school 
classrooms. Many teachers and especially ERU History officers, nevertheless, were 
very familiar with the general principles involved and were especially interested in the 
kind of data-based questions used in UK examinations that require students to 
synthesise, compare and generalise about what they have learnt in order to analyse 
and draw conclusions from the evidence (such as pictures or historical documents) 
before them. 54 Certainly, ERU officers have been keen to include these in 
examinations, but at the junior secondary level History is only examined in end-of- 
year tests and graduation examinations, not in the all important SSEEs. Whether this 
interest will eventually translate into significantly altered classroom practices, 
52 `Hope and Glory' directed by John Boorman (Columbia pictures, 1987). 
53 Beijing No. 35 shiyan zhongxue. 
sa Many teachers assumed that since I was British and researching Chinese History education that I was 
well-acquainted with British schooling, and in every school I visited, a significant part of my after-class 
discussions with teachers involved talking about History education in the UK. Despite my explaining 
that my academic background was in Chinese Studies, and that my information on History in Britain 
was based mainly on my own secondary school experiences and thus not only unrepresentative but also 
extremely out of date, my opinions were nevertheless apparently highly valued as if merely being 
British was sufficient to provide me with an authoritative overview. By contrast, my foreignness 
rendered my opinions on Chinese history and History education virtually worthless. 
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therefore, remains to seen. By contrast, class discussion has quickly become 
relatively popular, and suggested activities in textbooks and teacher handbooks 
include some recommendations to hold a group discussion at the end of certain 
macro-periods. Whole lessons given over to discussion still remain few and far 
between, since there is barely time to get through the textbook let alone add what is 
widely perceived as supplementary and therefore inessential material, but in several 
classes I attended, students were asked to discuss a topic briefly among themselves 
and report their conclusions to the class. In other classes, the teacher solicited 
opinions from a number of individual students, sometimes commenting and 
redirecting before allowing other students to contribute; at other times, leaving the 
`discussion' (or at least statements of opinion) to flow freely between students with 
little or no interruption or guidance. 
The introduction of a more discursive element is part of the same movement 
which has led to historical events and persons now being evaluated in more subtle 
shades of grey than in the past when analysis was supposed to result in black and 
white conclusions. One of the main outcomes of this trend has been that students are 
frequently asked to explain the `subjective' (zhuguan) or `objective' (keguan) view of 
an event or historical person that should be formed in light of all the evidence, or at 
least all the evidence the students have encountered in the textbooks and possibly in 
their extra-curricular learning activities. For example, colonisation of the Americas, 
Asia and Africa was `subjectively bad because the people were exploited and 
oppressed by the imperialists', but `objectively it accelerated progress and 
modernisation'. 55 Individuals are likewise examined in a more nuanced manner, and, 
in this same topic area, Christopher Columbus is evaluated as someone who both 
`opened' (kaifa) and `destroyed' (pohuai) new lands; thus, from an `objective 
perspective' he should be praised for his spirit of adventure and his contributions to 
modernisation and global interaction, while from a subjective point of view he should 
be blamed for bringing disaster and destruction to native American peoples. 
While this represents a significant development in History education, I am 
unconvinced that `subjective' and `objective' are appropriate terms to denote what is 
actually being done in these attempts at multifaceted analyses. Aside from the 
obvious questions surrounding the attainability of objectivity in historical analysis, in 
55 Third-year students, Xinan mofan zhongxue. 
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almost every instance I have observed in classrooms and in texts, `objective' 
perspectives are concerned with outcomes such as scientific development, economic 
and social modernisation, and international exchange, all commonly brought together 
under the rubric of `progress' (fazhan). In other words, `objective' corresponds to 
long-term developmental outcomes, which are deemed good or bad in terms of 
whether they helped or hindered historical materialist evolution. `Subjective' 
evaluations, meanwhile, are not asking for the personal views of students or for those 
of the participants in the events under consideration, but are either moral verdicts 
based on contemporary values (such as oppressors bad, victims = good) or 
assessments of short-term outcomes that were incidental to or had no calculable 
impact on the grand narrative of historical materialist progress. In short, the 
subjective-objective assessment of the past is merely a by-product of what, in Chapter 
6,1 referred to as `progressivism' and `the rise-and-fall conception of history'. 
As the above discussion has shown, vigorous efforts to reform History education 
have in practice achieved relatively little. Teaching methods, the main ideological 
thrust and structure of historical narratives whether spoken or in print, and even the 
language used by most teachers are in general hard to differentiate clearly, and in 
many respects remain virtually unchanged from the days when History was 
universally examined for SSEEs and classes necessarily revolved around equipping 
students to succeed in the tests. For many pedagogical researchers, this is an endless 
source of dismay. As far as they are concerned, since junior secondary History is no 
longer normally examined for SSEEs, there is no logical reason for History classes to 
continue the old `examination-oriented' style. They are constantly reading the latest 
theories on History pedagogy, especially those by foreign academics, and frequently 
recommend and sometimes translate whole volumes and articles or selected parts 
thereof for wider consumption; 56 they believe they have clearly and accurately 
communicated their ideas to their students; and they know they have published 
numerous articles not just on theory, but on how to harness theory to practice in 
journals widely read by ERU History officers and possibly also by teachers. Yet, as 
56 Well known American theorists of History pedagogy, Keith Barton and Linda Levstik and British 
researchers Peter Lee and Alaric Dickinson, for example, appear to be widely read among normal 
university and senior ERU researchers. Texts mentioned to me included Barton and Levstik, Teaching 
Historyfor the Common Good; Levstik, Doing History; Dickinson, Lee and Rogers, Learning History. 
While more recent research has generally not been translated into Chinese, classic works on education, 
such as Benjamin Bloom's Taxonomy of Education Objectives and Jerome Bruner's The Process of 
Education have long been in circulation in Chinese. 
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the conversation reproduced below, between Capital Normal University's Zhao Yafu 
and two of his former students, illustrates, breaking old patterns is no easy task. 
T= Teacher Z Zhao (author) n= specific teacher 
Ti Our efforts were in vain! Now all we can do is teach the textbook, and declaim 
the narrative. I teach the textbook and students memorise it; this is the reality of 
History classes, and you're doing well if you can just tell a story 
Z. Aren't there X and X methods you can use? 
Ti That's what you specialists think, but its not what the students want. Who 
actually practises the teaching methods expounded in pedagogical science? 
T2 Yes, those are just teaching models you learn in class.... 
Z. Haven't student-centred, participatory learning and class discussion etc been 
advocated? 
Ti. The more you reform a lesson, the more tasks there are, there are changes in 
form, but not in substance. Whatever method you use is only carried out under the 
teacher's strict control. A good class in terms of `doing' is still the teacher leading, 
while the students remain passive recipients. 
Z. But after many years of emphasising skill training, haven't there been any 
improvements? 
Ti Yes, but they are all superficial. 57 
Thus, despite much proselytising on the importance of teaching students how to learn 
and of placing learners rather than texts and teachers at the heart of the educative 
process, whether by omission or commission, students, in effect, continue to be 
sidelined by current majority teaching practices. What implications this has for 
student learning, their mastery and appropriation of historical concepts and narratives, 
is discussed below. 
III. Learning Outcomes 
If the first thing that should be said about History teachers is that most of them did not 
choose their profession, and many would pursue a different career path if they could 
have their time again, perhaps the first thing that should be said about learning 
outcomes is that most students dislike the History subject. Contrary to Chan and 
Scott's claims that History is among the most well liked of school subjects, 
58 Chinese 
education journals have long been reporting History teachers' and ERU staff laments 
57 Zhao, `Gexing, chuangzaoxing: xin shiji lishi jiaoxue de hexin', p12. 
58 Chan and Scott ('Teaching Chinese History', p118) state that History is among the more popular 
school subjects, but cite neither published sources nor even personal communications to support this 
claim of History's popularity. It can only be surmised that the assertion was made based on their own 
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over the unpopularity of History, 59 although Yu has argued that this dislike is a 
relatively recent phenomenon; indeed, he asserts that prior to 1991, more than 60% of 
students liked History, and while its popularity subsequently declined, it is still among 
the more popular subjects . 
60 He cites no references, however, and other recorded 
student surveys, as well as teachers and ERU personnel, confirm the original claim 
that History is unpopular. In 1997, for example, an MOE survey of 2,107 Beijing 
students revealed that of fifteen subjects, History ranked third in subjects students 
least wanted to study, second of those they least enjoyed, and the fifth most `dry and 
boring' 
. 
6' Although the results of this and other surveys merely confirmed the 
existence of a longstanding problem, many people were apparently `shocked by these 
statistics' showing just how much students dislike History. 62 Such findings have 
resulted in much soul-searching within the History education profession, with the 
general consensus being that the problem is not that students find learning about the 
past boring, nor even that History as a school subject is a subsidiary part of the school 
curriculum and is invariably superseded by more important core courses, but that 
`classroom teaching methods are unsatisfactory and lack appeal'. 63 The desire to 
make History more popular, therefore - whether to enhance the status of the subject 
and those who work in the field, whether because it is believed that students need to 
understand the past and that disliking the subject will prevent them from doing so, or 
whether simply to provide learners with a holistic education - has been one of the 
primary factors driving History education researchers to investigate new teaching 
methods and persuading school History departments to carry out experimental 
projects. Only when teachers truly follow the tenets of quality education, it is 
believed, `will students respect History teachers, respect the History subject, and will 
History's rightful place in secondary education be guaranteed. 64 
As shown above, however, the enormous volume of writing on History pedagogy 
that has been produced in recent years has not yet, in most instances, been reflected in 
presumptions or that they were told this in private conversation with teachers who may have desired to 
project an image of their own importance and that of their subject. 
s9 See for example Qi, `Lishi ketang jiaoxue de meili tanwei', p31. 
60 Yu, Jichujiaoyu xiandaihua jiaoxue f ibengong: zhongxue lishi Juan, p?? 
61 Zhang, `Xuesheng lishi xuexi xinli yu jiaoxue celue de tantao', p4. (A full report of the implications 
of these survey findings may be found in another article by the same author, `Kecheng gaige xuesheng 
wenjuan de diaocha yu fenxi'). 
62 ibid., p4- 
63 Qi, 'Lishi ketang jiaoxue de meili tanwei', p31. 
64 Huang, Aue lishi yu di zhishang', p46. 
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a universally decisive reorientation of classroom practice away from teachers and 
textbooks towards a more learner-centred curriculum. Unsurprisingly, student 
attitudes to History have not really changed either; surveys have continued to find that 
History remains deeply unpopular, and is widely disdained as a subject requiring `low 
intellect', an option (at university entrance examination level) for those who are 
unable to specialise in more complex and useful subjects such as Physics and 
Chemistry. 65 More in-depth surveys conducted by ERU personnel have attempted to 
discover what exactly it is that students dislike about History other than its low status 
vis-ä-vis other subjects, and how it might be adjusted so as better to accommodate and 
develop student interest and skills. Although most of these surveys have been 
relatively small-scale and respondents are rarely anonymous, the range of responses 
as well as the frank criticisms made by some respondents indicate that the findings are 
meaningful even if they cannot be regarded as wholly free from self-censorship or be 
considered representative of student attitudes nation-wide. 
One Beijing survey conducted in January 2001, for example, asked first-year 
senior secondary students to list the topics they had most liked and disliked in junior 
secondary History and to explain why. It also asked them to identify any areas or 
topics they had found difficult to comprehend, to state the topic they most wished to 
see eradicated from the course and to select which of the three sections of the History 
course - ancient Chinese history, modern-contemporary Chinese history and world 
history - they preferred, giving reasons for their answers in each case. Finally, they 
were asked how they thought the junior secondary textbook could be improved, and to 
give their opinions on testing and assessment methods. (See the appendix at the end 
of this chapter for a translation of the survey questions). The survey findings I was 
able to analyse66 indicated clearly that students generally had little trouble 
understanding what they were learning, but found that some topics were rather 
convoluted and difficult to remember, especially those relating to periods of disunity 
65 Ibid., p46. 
66 This survey was carried out at several schools, but I only obtained copies of thirty-seven completed 
survey forms from Capital Normal University's attached secondary school. The survey sample 
consisted of twenty-four females and eleven males, with two respondents not identifying their gender. 
I have numbered the survey response forms in no particular order, merely separating male from female. 
Hence, form nos. Sl-S24 refer to female students, S25-S35 male, S36 and S37 to the unidentified 
respondents. It is worth noting that although the respondents' prior education was not identified, it is 
likely that many of them had studied at the same school in their junior secondary years; others would 
have tested into the senior secondary section from other junior secondary schools through the SSEE. 
Their junior secondary History classes, therefore, should be assumed to have taken place with a variety 
of teachers, which may have influenced their responses to the textbooks. 
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when there were numerous dynasties controlling different parts of China, and to 
topics that focused particularly heavily on the laws of historical materialism and the 
changing means and relations of production. These relatively `difficult' topics were, 
unsurprisingly, also among those listed as the most disliked, the reason being the 
aforementioned problems with remembering all the relevant data and chronologies 
which were widely criticised as `too chaotic' (tai luan), as well as dull (meiyisi) and 
dry (kuzao). Other unpopular topics included wars, which particularly in the modern- 
contemporary period were said (in each case by female students) to go into too much 
detail about individual battles, and peasant rebellions, with the Taiping and Boxer 
rebellions specifically identified by several respondents (male and female) as `dry and 
repetitive', while in world history, the 1848 European revolutions and `the 
development of scientific socialism' chapters were written off as boring and difficult 
to follow. 67 Popular topics tended to include those from ancient history (both Chinese 
and world), especially cultural themes, although several students did state that they 
hated `all periods of cultural history' for no apparent reason other than that cultural 
history is `boring', even if, as one girl wrote, `we know it is very important. '68 
Although reasons for liking a given topic were, as those for disliking one, fairly 
mundane and generic, limited in the main to adjectives such as `interesting', 
numerous students did specifically state that they enjoyed topics where stories were 
told or that gave them as `sense of mystery' or `wonder', as well as those that `opened 
one's eyes', `stimulated one's imagination' or `expanded one's horizons'. For these 
same reasons, ancient Chinese history and world history scored highly on the question 
asking which section of the course students had most enjoyed, with only a handful 
stating a preference for modem-contemporary Chinese history. 69 Perhaps somewhat 
surprisingly given that this survey was not anonymous, only a few students wrote 
`politically correct' answers that sounded as if they had been taken directly from the 
textbook sections on `Why study Chinese/world history? '. One girl wrote that her 
preference for ancient Chinese history was because as `a descendant of the Yellow 
emperor, one should have a knowledge of one's own history and culture', 
7° while 
another stated a preference for world history for its use as an instructional resource. 
67 S2, S 14, S29, S31. 
68 S7. 
69 Five students selected modern history. 
70 S 10 
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Since China is undergoing socialist modernisation, we must learn from other 
countries material and spiritual civilisations, we must take the good things to 
supplement our deficiencies and accelerate socialist construction, and deepen our 
education in historical materialism and patriotism. 7 
Other students maintained the patriotic theme, but did not follow the patriotic 
education script as closely, with the few students who expressed a preference for 
modern-contemporary Chinese history stating that learning about China's recent 
humiliations could help revive (xing) the country. 72 Similar reasons, however, were 
given by other students for disliking modem-contemporary Chinese history as `the 
Chinese people suffered too much' and `it is too humiliating and depressing to learn 
about it'. 73 
Given the clear preference for story-telling and the rejection of all things dry and 
dull expressed by many students, recommended improvements to the textbook 
unsurprisingly included adding more images and stories and making the exercise and 
activity sections more `lively'. Reducing the amount of data, while only specifically 
indicated as a suggested textbook improvement by a few students, was nevertheless 
apparently desirable since almost all of those who filled in the final section on 
assessment methods stated a preference for `open book' tests to avoid having to 
memorise a great deal of information; as one student lamented, `such and such a 
treaty, such and such a revolution, such and such a reform, such and such a movement 
There are so many of them and it is so boring to learn the names, dates, places and 
the historical significance of each one, and the teacher makes us memorise them all'. 74 
While neither the students nor the above average Beijing school from which these 
survey results were obtained can be considered representative of secondary schools or 
students across the country, History teachers, academics, ERU personnel and students 
I interviewed in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, and History education 
professionals from other parts of the country that I met at the 2000 Shanghai 
conference as well as journal articles and my own classroom observations confirmed 
the general thesis that, like their counterparts the world over, students throughout 
China are easily bored by the `acts and facts' style of textbooks and many teachers, 
and confused by `structural' explanations of the past, leading them to dislike what 
they are supposed to be learning. By contrast, they respond enthusiastically to story- 
71 S12 
72 For example, S9, S25. 
73 S27. 
74 S8 
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telling that focuses on `intentional' explanations, and the personalities, thoughts and 
emotions of individual or group participants in events. Thus, teachers who tell lively 
stories about great men are almost invariably more popular than those who simply 
parrot the textbook or talk in terms of historical materialist laws, and their students 
more likely to enjoy History, which according to Chan and Scott may make them less 
resistant to believing what they read in textbooks and hear in classrooms, and to 
accepting the ideologies transmitted through these media. 75 
Chan and Scott, as the evidence shows, were mistaken in their assumption that 
History is popular, but does disliking the History subject mean that students' 
`mastery' and `appropriation' of historical narratives and the moral-ideological 
messages embedded therein are thereby impaired? Clearly, liking History might 
increase the probability that mastery and appropriation will be accomplished more 
easily or quickly, since preference for a particular subject may translate into better 
concentration within the classroom and greater diligence without, but there are many 
factors other than students' interest in or enjoyment of the subject involved in 
determining the effect of texts on their users. In fact, if McLuhan is right and the 
medium is indeed the message, then it might be if not quite irrelevant at least 
inessential for students to like History at all in order for them to master and even 
appropriate what is learnt in the school. 
There are, of course, as Bloom's taxonomy (which is very popular among 
educationalists in China) different levels of mastery. 76 Being able to recite all the 
dynasties and their reign dates, for example, is undoubtedly one form, but it does not 
mean that one knows anything about them. Understanding something one has learnt, 
and being able to deploy the data to make sense of something else, or to support an 
argument is another level of mastery. Which levels students are expected to attain is, 
as noted in Chapters 4 and 5, specified in curriculum requirements in accordance with 
their stage of schooling, but the extent to which they succeed is debatable. It seems, 
nevertheless that whether or not they learn to manipulate and apply their knowledge, 
most students do have a relatively strong grasp of `the facts' in the textbook, even if 
75 Chan and Scott, `Teaching Chinese History', p 118. 
76 Bloom, Taxonomy of Educational Objectives. 
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they are sometimes a little unclear about the relationship between them, or about 
concepts such as cause and effect. " 
Widespread attainment of this level of mastery, I would argue, has little relevance 
to whether students like the subject, but more to do with the teacher- and text-centric 
style of classroom learning (McLuhan's `medium') which still predominates despite 
many efforts to the contrary. Furthermore, although History is no longer included in 
SSEEs, tests remain an important and regular fixture in the school calendar and 
student-learning is generally, as Chinese educationalists have long been complaining, 
`examination-oriented'. There are, of course, fewer immediate negative consequences 
for poor grades when a subject is not SSEE-tested, but low grades mean lower 
expectations from teachers, and lower expectations are typically reflected in poorer 
overall performance. Given the pressure from parents and society to perform well 
academically - pressure which has intensified as the one-child policy gives parents 
only a single focus for their hopes - it is hardly surprising that many students continue 
to be fairly diligent about studying and homework, even if they do not always pay 
attention in class. Perhaps most importantly for cognitive mastery, is that students are 
exposed to this same account of history beginning in primary school and continuing 
most of the way through senior secondary. Furthermore, as in the former USSR, N 
Korea, Iran and other authoritarian and revolutionary states, the state has until 
recently at least also exercised a high degree of control over cultural (re)production, 
the media and other sources of public history. Given this context of intensive 
repetition and the dominance of government-authorised, if not government produced, 
historical narratives, and it seems almost impossible not to master the basic 
knowledge transmitted through the school History curriculum. 
Knowing, as Wertsch and others have argued is not, however, the same as 
believing. As discussed at some length in the introductory chapter, in order for 
students to appropriate the values and ideologies inherent in a historical narrative, 
they cannot simply know an account of the past, but must believe it to be true. 
78 
Thus, just as with mastery being perhaps a smoother process if one enjoys the subject, 
liking History or a History teacher may predispose one towards believing what is 
heard, and thus more quickly to appropriate implicit or explicit ideological messages 
77 See the example in the previous section of student opinions on Han Wudi's expulsion of the `100 
Scholars' and the instatement of Confucianism as the official state ideology. 
78 Wertsch, `Is it possible to teach beliefs as well as knowledge about history? ' 
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and concepts. There is, however, no direct correlation between liking History and 
either knowing or believing it. 
The question that remains, therefore, is what do students actually believe and 
under what conditions are they likely to appropriate or reject what they are taught? 
Only when this is known can an attempt to answer the question of who controls the 
past be made. As to the latter part of the question, those who feel excluded from the 
national narrative and are not perceived to embody the national qualities of the 
Zhonghua minzu are undoubtedly the least likely to believe what they are taught. 
Ethnic minorities, for example, who are on the one hand included in contemporary 
national narratives as brother minzu, but on the other, consistently derogated by being 
shown to be at a lower stage of socio-economic development, only good at singing, 
hunting, horse-riding or archery and so forth, are far more likely to reject a narrative 
in which an important community to which they belong is treated as peripheral and 
incidental to the narrative, or plays a `negative' role as splittist, barbaric or 
backwards. Indeed, one text of a model teacher-student dialogue has the teacher 
asking the student to say which minority figures (from the Sixteen Kingdoms and N 
and S Dynasties) are positive, which negative. The student replies that Shi Le is 
positive `because he studied hard, respected the Han and Confucianism, and absorbed 
[their] advanced culture'. 79 
Similarly women have few female role-models in the textbooks, and thus may 
also feel excluded from a gendered national narrative. This may perhaps be one 
reason why in the surveys cited above, female students displayed greater interest in 
foreign history, which tends to be more about events and cultures than individual 
(male) people, although in world history, the worthies students are encouraged to 
emulate are also almost invariably male. More recently, peasants and industrial 
workers, who were once at the narrative centre as the principal agents of historical 
change, have also been increasingly excluded as History has moved away from 
praising peasants and workers for their redness (once the highest national quality) to 
portraying them as backwards and ignorant. National qualities, as discussed in 
Chapter 6, are increasingly the preserve of the educated, male, Han elite. 
If it relatively easy to discern some of the factors that militate for or against the 
affective appropriation of values transmitted by historical narratives, it is 
79 Zhu, `Tigao suzhi zuanyan jiaofa', pl l1. 
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extraordinarily difficult to ascertain what exactly people do believe, the precise reason 
for which this study has focused principally on the areas of history production and 
transmission rather than that of consumption. It is necessary, however, to attempt a 
preliminary and tentative explanation, or at least a hypothesis, in order to gain a 
complete picture of History education in the contemporary PRC. After all, if history 
had no bearing (real or imagined) on our values, beliefs and identities, it would not be 
as controversial as it is, nor would it be the object of intense public scrutiny, both 
domestic and international, that it so often is. 
My impression has been that many Chinese students both master and appropriate 
what they learn in school and, in fact, may appropriate the values therein without ever 
attaining a high level of mastery in the subject. This is not, I would argue, because 
history education is simply an instrument of the Party-state, a vehicle for the top- 
down brainwashing of innocent minds. It is instead because History education in 
practice is remarkably homogeneous, with virtually the same language and concepts 
used by all textbooks and all teachers; indeed, in many other revolutionary and 
totalitarian states, school textbooks use astonishingly similar language to those used in 
the PRC. 8° While this homogeneity may originally have been designed, now, I 
would maintain, it is in large part simply because of inertia. Despite all the efforts to 
reform curricula, textbooks and teaching, thus far the changes have been extremely 
superficial. I do not believe this is because of a grand conspiracy to preserve the 
status quo on the part of the elite, for although homogeneity may perhaps be 
necessary, it is not a sufficient condition for hegemony, even if in practice it 
accomplishes the same thing. Hegemony implies, as Searle has put it, `collective 
intentionality', that is, a collective will to power, to create or sustain domination, and 
while the CPC clearly wants to retain political power and there is evidently some 
concern among the leadership over what versions of history are taught to 
impressionable young children, the level of government control has, as discussed in 
Chapter 3, been dramatically reduced in recent years, and schools in practice have 
more autonomy than they do in theory. Homogeneity is, rather, a product of the 
current education system, the type of texts studied, teaching methods and, underlying 
it all, decades and even centuries and millennia of teacher- and text-centred education 
80 See, for example, North Korean texts cited in Wilson, Ford and Jones, `The History Text'; Iranian in 
Aloni, Revolutionary Messages in Elementary School Textbooks in Iran. This may be in large part 
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which have created an inert force of their own, independent of politics; as one teacher 
told Gardner, `We have been doing this for so long that we just know it is right'. 81 
While homogeneity of texts and teaching may ensure that the same messages are 
being transmitted, it does not mean that they are necessarily appropriated in the ways 
curriculum developers and textbook writers might originally have had in mind. As Ye 
has put it, `speaking clearly is not the same as hearing clearly' (fang mingbai bu 
dengyu ting mingbai), `teaching is not the same as learning' (jiaoxue bu dengyu 
xuexi). 82 What goes in, in other words, may not be what comes out, and even if 
students appropriate the values and ideologies embedded in historical narratives, the 
values they are absorbing may not be in the form in which they were originally 
conceived, and even if they are, how they are subsequently deployed in social and 
political life may not be what was originally projected or intended. Under government 
direction, schools in post-World War II Ethiopia, for example, in an effort to construct 
a basis for `modernisation', 
cultivated scientific attitudes, taught about democratic institutions and transmitted 
egalitarian values for a society which remained pre-scientific, authoritarian and 
hierarchical. The school taught the opposite of what the society was and what the 
rulers wanted it to be. As a result the schools produced not merely cultural misfits, 
but also enemies of the social, economic and political order. 83 
Perhaps to a lesser degree, History education in contemporary China is doing the 
same thing. As the language of historical grievance deployed by militant nationalists 
in today's China suggests, they have indeed mastered and appropriated much of what 
they learnt in their school History textbooks. Significantly, the most militant 
nationalists tend to be university students, that is, those who have had the greatest 
non-professional exposure to the authorised narratives of Chinese and world history. 
These educated nationalists are, of course, a small percentage of the population, albeit 
an influential one and the emotional component of their nationalism derives in no 
small part from their appropriation of historical narratives which teach them that 
China has always been generous and peace-loving and has been cruelly victimised by 
foreign capitalism-imperialism. While the curricula and textbooks attempt to use 
relatively moderate language, teachers frequently do not; indeed, in one volume 
aimed at school teachers, a TMIC member explicitly stated that the students should be 
because many revolutionary Communist states have borrowed their textbook formats, or even simply 
translated, directly from USSR texts. 
81 Gardner, To Open Minds, p271. 
82 Ye, talk given at History education conference, Shanghai, Nov. 2000. 
83 Amare, `Education in Ethiopia', pp94-95. 
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encouraged to hate China's enemies, because `the more they hate our enemies, the 
more they will love China'. 84 Others, however, have denounced this as narrow and 
potentially harmful nationalism and believe History should seek to cultivate more 
globally minded citizens; as Yang has written 
Dwelling only on `glorious victories' and ignoring `humiliating defeats' easily 
encourages arrogance and an unwillingness to learn from the strong points of other 
peoples.... While maintaining complete silence on China's own problems, the 
teaching of modern history on the other hand stresses the calamity brought about by 
the incursion of capitalism into China. This could easily create the impression that 
the main cause for the degradation of an advanced China into a backward position 
was the pillage and aggression perpetrated by capitalism and imperialism. 
Consequently, students are steered towards racial hatred and the rejection of other 
nations' advanced science and technology, thoughts and cultures. 
85 
While the state has certainly sought to harness this popular nationalism in real or 
imaginary battles against contemporary `foreign imperialism', it has no doubt been in 
part to deflect attention from its domestic failures. These militant nationalists, 
however, potentially pose a threat to the regime, in part, because of their generally 
more privileged social background and their ability to vocalise and disseminate 
opinion, but primarily because the loyalty History teaches students to feel has been 
increasingly towards the Chinese minzu and to the lands that constitute a de facto or 
wished-for `China' rather than to the CPC-led state. Thus to maintain its legitimacy, 
the government must be seen to be representing the honour and face of the Zhonghua 
minzu at all times, especially in the international arena, leading China into potentially 
dangerous confrontations. But this encouragement of nationalism is, for the regime, a 
potentially dangerous game, for the nation-centred narrative of history posits a 
primordial people and eternal motherland that transcend the transient historical 
category of the Communist state. It is this nation, descended from the yellow 
emperor, its cultural and ancestral lands - not the historically contingent regime and 
its political manoeuvring - with which History texts exhort the Chinese people to 
identify, and for the betterment of which they should strive. The state as Tang wryly 
observes `will sooner or later become obsolete and end up in the museum, whereas 
86 the motherland will have as long a life as humankind itself . 
84 Bao, `Lishi jiaoxue de renwu', p14. 
85 Yang, `Zhongxue lishi jiaoxue jidai gaijin de neirong', p72. 
86 Tang, `Rethinking the problem of patriotic education', p81. 
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Conclusion 
Current Projects, Future Prospects 
As we have seen, strenuous efforts have been made over the past few years to change 
the ways in which the curriculum is produced and transmitted, and to make History as 
a school subject both more appealing to students and more relevant to their everyday 
lives as members of a rapidly transforming society. While increased participation of 
experts in curriculum development and the introduction of limited textbook pluralism 
have clearly been major steps in the arduous process of reforming what has 
traditionally, because of its immense political sensitivity, been an extremely 
conservative school subject, in terms of format and content, neither the curricula nor 
the textbooks have been fundamentally altered. Classroom teaching, which reformers 
have long been trying to make more learner-centred, similarly lags in practice far 
behind the pace of theoretical developments. In classroom practice it is, of course, far 
harder to ensure that old habits and styles are being reformed than it is in the case of 
syllabi and textbooks, since as shown in Chapter 3, mandating changes has little 
correlation to their enactment, especially when there is apparently so little at stake for 
teachers. Accordingly, it was decided that a more radical overhaul of the curriculum 
and textbooks was necessary. If the teaching guidelines and materials were 
dramatically revised, it was reasoned, then teaching - even if it continued to adhere 
rigidly to the textbook - would automatically follow in the `correct' direction. The 
fruits of these labours are yet to be determined, since the new national curriculum 
standards, Beijing's new and Shanghai's revised curricula and the array of textbooks 
that have been drafted in accordance with these several documents have only been on 
trial since 2001. It is worth offering, however, a preliminary analysis of these new 
materials in order to ascertain in a broad sense the extent to which the Party-state's 
hold on the past has been maintained and to evaluate the implications for the future. 
More specifically, it evaluates whether reformist goals have actually been achieved in 
the new materials. The Beijing curriculum has already been discussed in Chapter 5; 
here we will survey only the content of the 2001 national History Curriculum 
Standards (HCS) and several textbooks that were drafted in accordance with it in 
addition to one of the textbooks drafted on the basis of Shanghai's revised curriculum. 
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As discussed in Chapter 3, the 2001 HCS has been extremely controversial, 
beginning with the transfer of power over curriculum development from PEP to 
Beijing Normal University (BNU). Whether the BNU team has in part designed the 
curriculum with a key motive of displaying their difference from PEP, or whether 
they have simply followed sound pedagogical principles is difficult to ascertain, but 
the structural organisation of HCS is a major redirection from the old PEP format. 
The first section is a lengthy explanation of the nature of the curriculum, the basic 
conceptual aims to which it aspires and the thinking that informed the drafting of the 
document, although this last item is somewhat misleading as in fact, it merely 
summarises how it is organised, rather than explains why particular choices have been 
made. It implicitly and explicitly criticises the ways in which things have hitherto 
been done, while also reiterating its adherence to fundamental tenets of history, 
namely historical materialism, and to future pedagogical goals. More radically, it 
does not mention the Communist Party, socialism or even the reform and opening 
policy, let alone revolution and the proletariat, and generally tries to stay away 
traditional platitudes about using the past as a mirror for the present and guide for the 
future, focusing instead on its role in moulding the values and outlooks of the next 
generation. It is worth quoting the opening statement at some length. 
As mankind enters the twenty-first century, economic globalisation accelerates daily, 
all kinds of ideas and cultures influence one another, while the trend towards political 
multi-polarity continues to evolve. How to maintain and disseminate the traditions of 
the Chinese national people (minzu) and their culture and stimulate students' patriotic 
sentiment in this environment has become a problem from which History education 
cannot turn away. At the same time, the unceasing development of social science 
research has also highlighted new tasks in the basic education History curriculum. 
Since the establishment of New China more than fifty years ago, History education 
has had some astounding achievements, but there are still many areas in which it has 
not been able to adapt to the needs of the times and the quality education of the 
people (guomin). These curricular reforms use historical materialist viewpoints and 
scientific education theory as a guide, and through a selective syllabus, they create 
lively and varied teaching methods, encourage student interest in learning history, 
transform student learning from a state in which they have been passive, rote- 
learning recipients of teaching to one in which they have space to learn about and 
explore historical issues; they nurture a correct conception of history (lishiguan) , 
teach students to observe and analyse both historical and current problems 
dialectically, deepen their love of the motherland and their understanding of the 
world, and teach students to derive wisdom from history, making them into modern 
civilised citizens equipped to face the challenges of the new century. ' 
Subsequent sections reiterate many of the above points, and reinforce the principle 
of reforming both methods and content of teaching. It is asserted that the curriculum 
has hitherto been too specialised and adult, too focused on knowledge transmission 
1 HCS, pl. 
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and neglectful of skill-training, and overly preoccupied with presenting a systematic, 
comprehensive account of the past; all in all, a curriculum that is both unsuitable for 
young minds and unsuited to the times. The curriculum's ambition to provide a basis 
for teaching improvements is also noted here with a clear statement that `history 
curriculum reform should help teachers to change their teaching methods, and instil 
the notion of students as the subjects of education'. This, in turn, will `benefit the 
transformation of learning, promote students' positive and active participation in the 
educational process' and teach them analytical skills. 2 To this end, the second section 
on curricular objectives adds some general principles on striking the balance between 
knowledge and skills, on the process and methods of teaching and learning, and on 
affective development and values. 
The remainder of the document consists of the syllabus and a section on 
implementation which covers teaching and assessment recommendations. 3 Unlike the 
History Teaching Outlines, the new HCS does not provide lengthy introductions to 
historical periods and topics, nor does it offer guidance on the key themes, although it 
does contain short summaries of each historical period (ancient, modem 
contemporary) before listing the syllabus items. Here, the historical materialist stages 
of development are mentioned, but the narrative content focuses primarily on the key 
themes of unity and economic and scientific progress. None of this, of course, is 
particularly radical; the content of the 2000 revised Outline made many of the same 
departures from the language of revolution, emphasising reform and modernisation 
instead. What is a major change, however, is that the syllabus has been drastically 
curtailed. No longer is it ordered in such a way that textbook writers can merely take 
each topic heading and make it into a chapter, nor is it explicitly organised along 
historical materialist or dynastic lines. Instead, it attempts to pick out a key organising 
principle for each period and select relevant topics. Thus, for example, the Qin-Han 
period is labelled as `the establishment of a unified state', the period between the fall 
of Eastern Han and the rise of Sui as `the division of political power and the 
integration of the national people', and the pre-Opium War Qing period as `the 
4 
consolidation of the multi-ethnic state and social crisis'. Only very general topics are 
2 HCS, p2. 
The syllabus comprises approximately 60% of the document (pp6-32), the final section on teaching 
and assessment almost 30%. 
4 HCS, pp8-9. 
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listed, with an extremely brief explanation of the relevant key points and a classroom 
activity recommended at the end of each section. 
While the ethos of simplicity is evident and clearly has a logical basis, there are 
nevertheless some rather odd omissions. In the modem history section, for example, 
the Taiping Rebellion has been omitted as a major rebellion targeting the ruling 
dynasty, but has instead been categorised rather awkwardly as part of the section on 
`Foreign invasion and the Chinese people's struggle of resistance'. Since this section 
is all about foreign encroachment and resisting, the Taiping armies have accordingly 
been given some foreign enemies in the shape of the Ever Victorious Army. It is 
nowhere mentioned that the role of this foreign mercenary force was extremely minor 
and wholly ignores the main target of the uprising. This section has accordingly been 
much criticised. One PEP editor who was working on the HCS textbooks simply 
could not believe it, and struggled tremendously trying to fit the narrative to its 
revised function. `This is complete chaos', he said, `I understand that History needs 
to be reformed, but this does not make any sense at all. How can I write a book about 
modem history without discussing the Taiping Rebellion? '5 Where rebellions (except 
for the patriotic Boxers) have largely disappeared from modern history, reform has 
taken their place and there is a section here (covering roughly the same time frame as 
the anti-imperialist section) on the origins of China's modernisation. 6 
In the contemporary history section, meanwhile, the topics have also been cut, 
with key ones such as the establishment of the PRC, the peaceful liberation of Tibet, 
and the eradication of feudalism. The Great Leap and the communes are 
unambiguously denounced as an `serious error' and the Cultural Revolution said to 
have `brought disaster to the country and the people', but the Anti-rightist movement 
is omitted.? Unsurprisingly, given the focus on reform and development for the 
twenty-first century, the post-Mao period is allotted a considerable portion of the 
syllabus, with an emphasis on economic growth, ethnic unity (reunification), national 
defence and achievements on the international stage. 
World history, by contrast, has again undergone relatively few changes, although 
as in Chinese history a number of topics have been deleted. Focus remains on 
providing illustrative examples of different stages of historical materialist 
5 PEP editor, personal communication. 
6 HCS, p13. 
7HCS, p17. 
259 
development although the language has been somewhat revised to include currently 
fashionable terms such as `clash of civilisations' (used to describe the conquests of 
Alexander the Great) as well as the more gentle `contact' demonstrated by the travels 
of Marco Polo (or in Chinese history, Zheng He). 8 
While the narrative outlined in HCS does not suggest that significant revision of 
older textbook narratives is warranted, the `educational activity' sections at the end of 
each topic and the lengthy final chapter on teaching and assessment do indicate a 
commitment to reform that is not evident from the syllabus. Suggested activities 
include reading various works of historical fiction, or classic works from the past, 
watching films that fictionalise the lives and times of various historical figures, 
organising class debates, `collecting and sharing stories of friendly inter-ethnic 
exchange' and other story-telling activities, reciting classical poetry, visiting 
museums and historical buildings and other similar `cultural' exercises. In the 
contemporary period there are also some suggestions that involve finding out from 
one's family about the past, collecting the old coupons for grain, oil and other 
products, while in an effort to reinforce the ethnic unity message, it is also 
recommended that students each tell the class about a particular ethnic group, 
explaining their holidays, attire, customs and so on. 9 Activities for world history, 
meanwhile, focus mainly on looking at historical maps and photographs, although 
there are a few recommendations to see films (such as `The Battle of Austerlitz') and 
write essays or hold debates, such as one on friendly contacts and violent clashes 
between ancient (i. e. pre-seventeenth century) civilisations and another on whether 
World War II could have been avoided. 10 There is also a potentially interesting 
activity suggesting a comparison between Chinese socialism and that of the USSR, 
although unfortunately the purpose of demonstrating China's superiority and the 
correctness of its current path are explicitly noted in the question, thereby telling the 
students the conclusion they should reach. 
The final sections on implementation do seem to be a useful addition to the 
curriculum. The first section is directed at textbook writers, and includes numerous 
examples of potential activities to incorporate at the end of each chapter or textbook 
section, while the latter seems to be more suited to ERUs since it is concerned 
8 HCS, p22. 
9 HCS, pp7-20. 
10 HCS, pp22-27. 
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principally with assessment, and although teachers often set their own tests, they 
frequently do so with ERU input, and more important examinations, such as end of 
year and graduation examinations are always set by ERU officials. 
As noted above, HCS has been viewed by PEP as something of an aberration, but 
having drafted curricula and written textbooks for many years, most of the editors 
were all too aware that they would need to comply with the guideline fairly closely in 
order to pass the TMIC inspection. What the TMIC inspectors actually thought of 
HCS I do not know as I interviewed them before HCS had been submitted for 
inspection. My suspicion, given that most of the TMIC members are rather elderly, 
and - if their writings are any basis on which to judge - are relatively conservative, is 
that they, like PEP, have found HCS to be somewhat piecemeal and insubstantial in 
comparison to the comprehensive narrative which has hitherto been in force. Since 
the BNU curriculum developers had been commissioned by the MOE to produce HCS 
however, and in the context of increasing pressure from central government to deliver 
on-time results in education, the TMIC inspectors would have had little choice but to 
recommend minor alterations or risk there being no curriculum to promulgate. Once 
HCS had been approved, therefore, the textbook writers would in turn have had no 
choice but to comply. 
The new textbooks accordingly make an effort to follow the structure set by HCS. 
BNU's own press has published one set, ' 1 which since it was written and edited by 
many of the same scholars who drafted HCS, closely resembles what, presumably, the 
authors originally imagined would ensue from the guidelines. 12 The PEP editions, by 
contrast, organise their material under the broad headings suggested in HCS, but in 
their chapter titles indicate a reluctance to move away from the more traditional 
chronological approach that covers each of the `major' topics. Nevertheless, in 
keeping with the spirit of HCS, PEP's volumes have drastically reduced their 
coverage in terms of plain text and greatly increased the number of images, while also 
adding more detail to their cultural sections. 
' 3 Huadong Normal University (HNU) 
Press, meanwhile, has published two sets of History textbooks, one compliant with 
HCS, the other with the revised Shanghai curriculum, which has compressed the 
1° BNU, Lishi, (6 vols. ) 
Zhu Hanguo is the chief editor of the textbook set and was also the convener of the curriculum 
development committee. 
13 PEP, Zhongguo lishi (4 vols. ), Shi ie lishi (2 vols. ) 
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junior secondary History course into two years instead of three. 14 Junior secondary 
students following the Shanghai curriculum, therefore, study Chinese History in their 
first year, and world history in the second, with the first volume of Chinese history 
covering from the dawn of Chinese civilisation up to the early Qing period, and the 
second from the Opium Wars to the present. The world history textbooks are 
unchanged in their coverage since there were only two volumes originally anyway. 
The large time-span covered by the Shanghai Chinese history texts compared to 
the HCS-compliant ones means, needless to say, that they have had to excise 
considerably more material from the previous textbook set than has been the case for 
the other sets, even given the reduced coverage recommended in HCS. In this 
Shanghai set, the 1898 Reforms and the Boxers, for example, are merged into one 
chapter, as are the May 4th movement and the establishment of the CPC. 15 On the 
other hand, the New Culture Movement, which in previous texts had been subsection 
of the May 4th chapter, is here given a chapter of its own, albeit a short one. 16 Savings 
to offset this have been made in the kangri section of the text which was previously a 
substantial component of the modern history syllabus (and remains so in the HCS 
textbooks, albeit slightly reduced from those compliant with the Outlines). Now it has 
been reduced to only two (of twenty-eight) chapters. Like the HCS textbooks, the 
Shanghai texts here appear to be making an effort to focus on cultural history and 
reduce coverage of political and military history, which, as seen in the surveys cited in 
Chapter 7, are areas in which students appear to have little interest. As in HCS texts, 
there is also a downplaying of peasant uprisings and the theme of revolution, with the 
Taiping Rebellion reduced to a few paragraphs (although unlike the HCS textbooks 
this brief summary does pit them against the Qing, not the foreign imperialists). The 
Boxers, here, are represented as loyal patriots, but more is made of their anti- 
foreignism than in the equivalent sections in the HC'S-compliant volumes. 
From a presentation standpoint all the texts have changed quite significantly, but 
based on the one HCS-compliant Huadong Normal University (HNU) textbook I have 
seen, this is a dramatically more impressive volume than any of the others. Although 
both the BNU and PEP sets are in colour and have far better quality images than they 
did in the past, this HNU volume is superior in this regard. It appears to be following 
14 Huadong shifan daxue, (HCS-compliant) Zhongguo lishi (4 vols. ), Shyie lishi (2 vols. ); (Shanghai 
HCS-compliant) Zhongguo lishi (2 vols. ), ShUie lishi (2 vols. ). 
15 HNU (Shanghai) Zhongguo lishi, vol. 2, pp33-37, pp65-69. 
16 HNU (Shanghai), Zhongguo lishi, pp6l-64. 
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the lead set by Zhejiang several years ago and also to be influenced considerably by 
foreign textbooks (especially Japanese textbooks which are well known among 
educationalists in China, not only, as noted in Chapter 2, for their sometimes 
controversial views on the war). It contains numerous high quality prints of 
photographs and paintings, as well as the usual items, such as maps and charts. In its 
layout, however, it appears rather more staid and traditional than the other two. Where 
BNU makes use of fluorescent colours and alternative fonts (somewhat reminiscent in 
fact of the kinds of fonts used in manga dialogues), and PEP includes numerous text 
boxes and even two little cartoon figures who have short dialogues in speech bubbles, 
the HNU edition simply lays out the text in muted colours, with no embellishments 
other than the aforementioned photographs and other images. It is uncertain why this 
volume is thus presented since the Shanghai curriculum-compliant textbook (also 
published by Huadong Normal University Press) is much more like BNU's and, like 
PEP, also has a cartoon character who appears regularly throughout the text. I can 
only surmise that the major differences are attributable, in part, to the fact that the 
HNU HCS edition I saw was the final volume of the world history textbooks, and thus 
aimed at slightly older readers, but perhaps also because the writer, Wang Side, is a 
respected scholar of foreign (mainly French) history, and accordingly produced a less 
superficially child-friendly work. 
The presumption that underlies all these textbooks (except Wang's), of course, is 
that students will be more receptive to textbooks that contain groovy colours, crazy 
fonts and cartoon characters, thus making them more interested in the substance of 
what they are learning, more likely to acquire the desired skill-set History is thought 
to offer, and more open to the moral-ideological messages the texts convey. Perhaps 
because I am many years past my own secondary schooling and, anyway, never even 
had a textbook for the History subject, I find it hard to imagine that these more 
colourful volumes have any significant impact on student learning. While the 
coloured pages and cartoon figures may initially grab students' attention, I remain 
unconvinced that they will retain it. Furthermore, since teachers are often the key 
vehicle for transmitting the content of textbooks, giving classes which are frequently 
just an oral representation of the relevant chapter of the textbook, students frequently 
do not even need to read the textbook themselves except when required to do so for 
homework exercises, class preparation or revision for a test. Thus, if teachers 
continue their current practices and do not genuinely engage students in the learning 
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process, it is unlikely that the textbook will be powerful enough to do so alone. In 
short, nothing essentially will be changed in terms of student motivation, unless, as a 
phrase commonly used by educationalists goes, mindsets can be changed from `Make 
me learn' (yao wo xue) to `I want to learn' (wo yao xue). 17 
Yet, as we have seen in Chapter 7, being interested in, wanting to learn History, 
does not necessarily have much bearing on whether the learning outcomes desired by 
policy-makers, curriculum developers and educationalists will be attained by students. 
Furthermore, it was argued that while students may master and appropriate the history 
that they consume, the ways in which they recycle what they have learnt may actually 
be counter to what was originally intended. In this way, even if the state retains 
coercive, administrative or economic control over the production of history, and 
exerts considerable influence through vetting mechanisms over its transmission, it is 
still failing ultimately to control the past. If history education in recent years has in 
this way contributed to the rise of a militant popular nationalism that owes its loyalty 
to the Chinese minzu rather than to the rulers of the PRC state, what then are the 
likely outcomes for these latest reforms? 
Since the last round of major reforms in the mid-1980s there have been few 
substantial changes in any areas of history education other than in pedagogical 
research; what changes have been made to textbooks and curricula have been 
superficial tweaking at best. With the pace and scope of change accelerating, the 
Chinese government has had to increase regional autonomy and open many areas of 
social, intellectual, cultural and economic life to market forces, and this has 
increasingly led History education personnel to demand and to implement more 
reforms. This latest round of reforms on the surface looks significant as many of the 
basic goals have been reoriented to focus increasingly on learning to learn, and on 
learning to acquire skills rather than on absorbing political-ideological theories. Great 
emphasis has also been placed on stimulating student interest in history, and as noted 
above, this has meant a considerable reorganisation of textbook materials. 
Additionally, the perception that Western success has been built on creativity has 
impelled reformers to focus on critical thinking and analytical skills. Although the 
texts remain largely unreformed in their general tone and the language and structures 
of the narratives remain more or less intact, the emphasis on activities such as 
17 Ye Lan, paper given at history education conference, Shanghai 2000. 
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discussion and essay-writing and the conscious encouragement of debate, indicates 
that the potential to develop a more critically minded cohort of students is there. 
Critical thinking and debate, however, are likely to remain, for the moment at least 
limited within certain confines; as the article by Professor Yuan Weishi which 
recently got the magazine Freezing Point (bingdian) temporarily closed down has 
demonstrated, critical thinking can be a dangerous activity. Nevertheless, with the 
gradual relaxation of cultural and intellectual life and a rapid growth in mass media 
history which often reappraises hitherto orthodox verdicts on historical events and 
persons, it seems probable that although the state will retain considerable coercive 
powers to regulate academia, education and cultural production, and self-censorship 
will remain correspondingly widespread, reform will continue permitting a more 
polyphonic Geschichtskultur to evolve. 
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Vol. 4, Dec. 1956, final printing Nov. 1964, Yao Yonglin and Su Shoutong eds. 
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eds. 
Vol. 2, revised edition, June 1987, final printing Aug. 1991, PEP History Editorial 
Department. 
Vol. 3, revised edition, Dec. 1987, final printing Feb. 1992, PEP History Editorial 
Department. 
Yiwu jiaoyu sannian zhi, sinianzhi chuji zhongxue jiaokeshu: Zhongguo lishi (shiyan ben). 
(Textbook for the compulsory education three-year and four-year junior secondary school 
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History Editorial Department. This same textbook was published separately for the four-year 
system, although there are no differences in content, and both colour and black and white 
editions were printed. These textbooks are still in use, and were revised most recently in 2000 
- 2001. 
Vol. 1, Oct. 1992 
Vol. 2, Apr. 1993 
Vol. 3, Oct. 1993 
Vol. 4, Apr. 1994 
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Yanhai ban (Coastal Edition) 
Published by Guangdong jiaoyu chubanshe (Guangdong Education Press) 
Zhongguo lishi (Chinese History), Nine-year compulsory education teaching materials 
(coastal region) editorial committee. [Still in use] 
Vol. 1,1s` edition July 1992; 2nd edition July 1993; 3Td edition July 1997 
Vol. 2,1 S` edition 1991; 4tb edition Dec. 1997 
Vol. 3, ls` edition July 1994; 2°d edition July 1998 
Vol. 4, ls` edition Dec. 1992; 4th edition Dec. 1999 
Shanghai ban (Shanghai edition) 
Published by Shanghai jiaoyu chubanshe (Shanghai Education Press) 
Jiunianzhi yiwu jiaoyu leben: lishi (Nine-year compulsory education system textbook: 
History), Shanghai Commission for the Reform of Primary and Secondary School Curriculum 
and Teaching Materials. [Still in use] 
Vol. 7/1,1st edition June 1991; 2'd edition June 1994 
Vol. 7/2,2°d edition Nov. 1992 
Vol. 8/1,15t edition June 1992; 2nd edition June 1994 
Vol. 8/2,1st edition Nov. 1992; 2nd edition, Nov. 1994 
Neidi ban (Inland Edition) 
Published by Sichuan jiaoyu chubanshe (Sichuan Education Press) 
Zhongguo lishi (Chinese History), Neidiban History Teaching Materials Committee, Yang 
Guangyan, Gong Qizhu chief eds. [Still in use] 
Vol. 1,1st edition 1992; 2nd edition, June 1994 
Vol. 2,1St edition November 1993 
Vol. 3, ls` edition June 1994 
Vol. 4,1 S` edition Nov. 1994 
World History 
Xinhua shudian 
Chuji zhongxue waiguo lishi keben (Junior secondary textbook: foreign history), Shen 
Changhong., revised by Xinhua Education Department History Editorial Committee. 
I Vol., Sept. 1949; further revised by Wang Zhijiu and subsequently divided into two 
volumes. 
Vol. 1 (revised edition), July 1951; final printing May 1953 
Vol. 2 (revised edition), Oct. 1951; final printing Sept. 1955 
People's Education Press 
Chuji zhongxue keben shijie gudai shi (Junior secondary textbook: ancient world history), 
Wang Zhijiu. 
Vol. 1, Sept. 1953 
Vol. 2, Feb. 1954 
Vol. 3, Aug. 1954 
Chuji zhongxue keben shi/ie lishi (Junior secondary textbook: world history). 
Vol. 1, Dec. 1955; final printing July 1965, Li Gengxu. 
Vol. 2, Aug. 1956; final printing Sept. 1963, Wang Zhijiu 
Chuji zhongxue keben shijie lishi (Junior secondary textbook: world history), PEP History 
Editorial Department. 
1 vol., June 1988; final printing Oct. 1991. 
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Yiwu jiaoyu san, sinianzhi chuji zhongxue jiaokeshu: shUie lishi (shiyan ben) (Junior 
secondary textbook for the three and four-year compulsory education system (trial edition)), 
PEP History Editorial Department. 
Vol. 1, Oct. 1991; final printing Jan. 1993 
Vol. 2, Apr. 1992; final printing Sept. 1993 
Jiunian yiwujiaoyu sannianzhi chuji zhongxue jiaokeshu: shýie lishi and Jiunian yiwu jiaoyu 
sinianzhi chuji zhongxue jiaokeshu: shijie lishi (nine-year compulsory education textbook for 
three(four)-year junior secondary schools: world history). PEP history editorial department 
eds. 
Vol. 1, ls` edition Oct. 1994 
Vol. 2, ls` edition April 1995 
Yanhai ban 
Published by Zhongguo ditu chubanshe (Chinese Cartographic Press) 
ShUie lishi (World history). Nine-year compulsory education teaching materials (coastal 
region) editorial committee. [Still in use] 
Vol. 1,4t' edition June 1999 
Vol. 2,3rd edition Dec. 1999 
Shanghai ban 
Published by Shanghai jiaoyu chubanshe. 
Jiunianzhi yiwu jiaoyu keben: lishi (Nine-year compulsory education system textbook: 
History), Shanghai Commission for the Reform of Primary and Secondary School Curriculum 
and Teaching Materials. [Still in use] 
Vol. 9/1,3rd edition June 1996 
Vol. 9/2,3rd edition Nov. 1996 
Neidi ban 
Published by Sichuan jiaoyu chubanshe 
Shijie lishi. Neidiban History Teaching Materials Committee, Yang Guangyan, Gong Qizhu 
chief eds. [Still in use] 
Vol. 1, ls` edition June 1994 
Vol. 2,1" edition Dec. 1994 
Junior Secondary Social Studies 
Zhejiang ban (Zhejiang edition) 
Published by Zhejiang jiaoyu chubanshe (Zhejiang Education Press) 
Yiwujiaoyu chuji zhongxue keben: shehui (Compulsory education junior secondary textbook: 
Social Studies). 
Vol. 1,1" edition July 1991; 2nd edition May 1997 
Vol. 2,1 St edition Nov. 1991; 2nd edition Nov. 1997 
Vol. 3,15` edition July 1993 
Vol. 4,1" edition Nov. 1993; 4th edition Nov. 1999 
Vol. 5,5Th edition June 1999 
Vol. 6,4th edition Dec. 1999 
Shanghai ban (Shanghai edition) 
Published by Shanghai jiaoyu chubanshe 
Jiunianzhi yiwu jiaoyu keben: shehui (Nine-year compulsory education system textbook: 
Social Studies), Shanghai Commission for the Reform of Primary and Secondary School 
Curriculum and Teaching Materials. [Still in use in trial district] 
Vol. 7/1,1" edition June 1991; 2'd edition June 1994 
Vol. 7/2,2nd edition Nov. 1994 
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Vol. 8/1,2°d edition June 1995 
Vol. 8/2,2nd edition Nov. 1995 
Vol. 9/1,2nd edition June 1996 
Vol. 9/2,2nd edition Nov. 1996 
Trial textbooks' 
Beijing Normal University Press. Lishi: qinianji shangce (History, 7`b Grade, vol. 1). 2001. 
Beijing Normal University Press. Lishi: banianji shangce (History: 8t' Grade, vol. 1). 2001. 
Huadong Normal University Press. Zhongguo lishi qinianji, di er xueqi (shiyanben) 
(Chinese History, 7th Grade, 2nd Semester (trial edition). Shanghai, 2003. 
Huadong Normal University Press. Shijie lishi chuzhong san nianji (xia) (World History, 
Third-year Junior Secondary, vol. 2). 2004. 
People's Education Press. Zhongguo lishi, di yiler/san/si ce (Chinese History, vols. 1-4). 
2001-2003. 
Teacher handbooks: Junior Secondary History2 
People's Education Press 
Zhongguo lishi: jiaoshi jiaoxue yongshu (Chinese History: Teacher Handbook) 
Vol. 1,1" edition, 1991 
Vol. 2,1st edition, 1992 
Vol. 3,1st edition, 1992 
Vol. 4, ls` edition, 1993 
Shijie lishi: jiaoshi jiaoxue yongshu (World History: Teacher Handbook) 
Vol. 1,1 S` edition, 1993 
Vol. 2,1St edition, 1994 
Shanghai edition 
Jiunianzhi yiwu jiaoyu keben., Lishi: jiaoxue cankao ziliao (Textbooks for Nine-year 
Compulsory Education. History: Teaching Reference Materials) 
Vol. 7/1,1s` edition, 1993 
Vol. 7/2,1st edition, 1994 
Vol. 8/1,2nd edition, 1997 
Vol. 8/2,2nd edition, 1996 
Vol. 9/1, ls` edition, 1995 
Vol. 9/2,1 st edition, 1996 
Beijing Normal University Press 
Jiunian yiwu jiaoyu chuzhong lishi jiao'an: Zhongguo lishi (Teaching Plans for Nine-year 
Compulsory Education, Junior Secondary History: Chinese History) 
Vol. 1,1" edition, 1993 
Vol. 2, l si edition, 1994 
Vol. 3,1 S` edition, 1994 
' This is not a complete list of all the textbooks currently on trial; it is merely a list of those texts I have 
seen and consulted. 
2I was unable to obtain copies of the relevant teacher handbooks for the Inland and Coastal Edition 
textbooks. 
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Vol. 4,1 s` edition, 1995 
Jiunian yiwu jiaoyu chuzhong lishi jiao'an: shijie lishi (Teaching Plans for Nine-year 
Compulsory Education, Junior Secondary History: World History) 
Vol. 1,1st edition, 1996 
Vol. 2,1 St edition, 1997 
